ORDER : Nagesh Bheemapaka, J. Writ Petition No. 19755 of 2021 was filed by the management of Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Private Limited against the Award dated 31.03.2021 in I.D. No. 4 of 2016 on the file of the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad. 2. Petitioner – Company was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of non-alcoholic beverages / soft drinks, fruit juices, packaged drinking water under various brand names. The 2 nd respondent, while working as Loader in the company, it is alleged, misbehaved with Ms. A. Bodi, employee of petitioner’s contractor - M/s Iris Services who was deputed to work as a Sweeper in the premises of petitioner’s plant. The Internal Complaints Committee constituted by the petitioner as per the provisions of Section 4 of the POSH ACT , conducted enquiry and submitted report dated 12.10.2015, holding that charges of sexual harassment were proved against Respondent No.2, by assigning cogent reasons with reference to the evidence brought on record. 2.1. It is stated, based on the recommendations of ICC, petitioner addressed letter dated 20.10.2015 to Respondent No.2 enclosing a copy of the report dated 12.10.2015 of the ICC. In response, on 04.11.2015, Respondent No.2 replied denying all the findings arrived at by the ICC and also saying that he was not given or made to know the contents of evidences, which is in total contrast to the material available. As the explanation submitted was a clear afterthought and neither satisfactory nor tenable, Petitioner evaluated the proportionality of the punishment in the light of the findings arrived at by the ICC fully supported by valid material evidence, the gravity of the acts of misconduct proved and its implications on the discipline among other employees, the recommendation of the ICC and since there were no extenuating or mitigating circumstances to take a lenient view in the matter, Petitioner was convinced that no punishment lesser than that of dismissal can be imposed more so, as it has lost confidence in him, and thus, dismissed Respondent No.2 from the services vide Order dated 20.11.2015 and his account was also finally settled. 2.2. While so, Respondent No.2 approached Respondent No.1 Labour Court under Section 2 -A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’), which was numbered as ID No. 4 of 2016. 2.2. While so, Respondent No.2 approached Respondent No.1 Labour Court under Section 2 -A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’), which was numbered as ID No. 4 of 2016. Accordingly, the Labour Court, after receiving the pleadings on either side, proceeded to decide the validity of the inquiry of the ICC and after hearing both the sides, passed detailed order dated 30.12.2020 upholding validity of the enquiry conducted by the ICC. and this order has become final as it remained unquestioned by the workman. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 proceeded to hear the final arguments under Section 11 -A of the Act and passed a totally perverse and arbitrary Award impugned, ignoring the principles of law governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 11 -A arbitrarily and illegally directing Petitioner to pay the purported compensation of Rs.12,48,000/- to the workman in lieu of reinstatement, while holding that he is entitled for continuity of service, back wages and attendant benefits. Hence, the Writ Petition. 3. This Court by order dated 29.10.2021 suspended the impugned Award subject to petitioner depositing Rs.12,48,000/- before the Labour Court-II within four weeks from that day. It was made clear that Labour Court should deposit the amount in any nationalised bank. 4. The 2nd respondent workman filed counter stating that Ms. Bodi who was working as contract employee engaged by the contractor falsely implicated him in this case when he refused to give canteen token free of cost and when he asked her to refund the money taken from him. Even before the ICC, no valid documents are placed in proof of the allegations of Ms. Bodi. In fact, the said Committee also held in its report that as complained by Bodi that in the morning respondent came to her and expressed his willingness to have sex with her is concerned, the complainant, apart from her own statement, could not produce any other witness; further, the witnesses examined before the ICC in support of complainant have not corroborated the incident; the committee consisted four members but the report was submitted by only two members; on this ground also, the report is not sustainable and has no sanctity in law. 4.1. 4.1. According to the 2 nd respondent, as per the provision of Standing Order, the past record has to be taken into account while passing final order of punishment and if past record is good, lenient view has to be taken for imposing lesser punishment than that of removal from service, but it was not considered constructively and imposed the punishment of dismissal in arbitrary manner by violating the Standing Orders of the company. The ICC did not consider constructively and imposed the punishment of dismissal in arbitrary manner by violating the Standing Orders of the company. 5. Sri C. Sridhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri G.V.S. Ganesh, learned counsel for petitioner submits that after upholding the validity of Inquiry conducted by the ICC, the Labour Court, in utter disregard of the same, interfered with the order of punishment and modified the same by granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement without finding fault with the valid conclusions of the ICC by cogent reasons, thus the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 11 -A of the Act in altogether not even addressing the findings recorded by the ICC or returning a finding that the findings of ICC were perverse. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. Unnikrishnan , [(2006) 13 SCC 619] wherein it has been held as under: “ …..In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well meant but wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability.” 5.1. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability.” 5.1. Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Vinod Kumar , [ (2008) 1 SCC 115 ] , wherein it has been held as under: “ As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the respondent had confined his case only to the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer as well as the quantum of punishment. Therefore, since the respondent had not challenged the correctness, legality or validity of the inquiry conducted, it was not open to the Labour Court to go into the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding the misconduct committed by the respondent. This Court in a number of judgments has held that the punishment of removal/dismissal is the appropriate punishment for an employee found guilty of misappropriation of funds; and the courts should be reluctant to reduce the punishment on misplaced sympathy for a workman. That, there is nothing wrong in the employer losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. That in such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering with the quantum of punishment…..” 5.2. In another judgment in Air-India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A. Rebellow , [ (1972) 1 SCC 814 ] , the Hon’ble Spreme Court at para 16 held as under: “16. Regulation 48 which has been set out earlier as its plain language shows does not lay down or contemplate any defined essential pre-requisite for invoking its operation. Action under this Regulation can be validly taken by the employer at his sweet will without assigning any reason. He is not bound to disclose why he does not want to continue in service the employee concerned. It may be conceded that an employer must always have some reason for terminating the services of his employee. Such reasons apart from misconduct may, inter alia, be want of full satisfaction with his overall suitability in the job assigned to the employee concerned. It may be conceded that an employer must always have some reason for terminating the services of his employee. Such reasons apart from misconduct may, inter alia, be want of full satisfaction with his overall suitability in the job assigned to the employee concerned. The fact that the employer is not fully satisfied with the overall result of the performance of his duties by his employee does not necessarily imply misconduct on his part. The only thing that remains to be seen is if in this case the impugned order is mala fide. The record merely discloses that the appellant had suspicion about the complainant's suitability for the job in which he was employed and this led to loss of confidence in him with the result that his services were terminated under Regulation 48. In our view, loss of confidence in such circumstances cannot be considered to be mala fide. We are unable to conceive of any rational challenge to the bona fides of the employer in making the impugned order in the above background. The complainant, it may be remembered had to deal with Air Hostesses in the performance of his duties and if the appellant was not fully satisfied beyond suspicion about his general conduct and behaviour while dealing with them it cannot be said that loss of confidence was not bona fide. Once bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed the impugned order must be considered to be immune from challenge. The opinion formed by the employer about the suitability of his employee for the job assigned to him even though erroneous, if bona fide, is in our opinion final and not subject to review by the industrial adjudication. Such opinion may legitimately induce the employer to terminate the employee's services; but such termination can on no rational grounds be considered to be for misconduct and must, therefore, be held to be permissible and immune from challenge”. 5.3. According to learned counsel, it is for the disciplinary authority and not for the Court to decide as to what punishment be imposed on a delinquent even after the proved acts of sexual harassment and the Labour Court cannot substitute the penalty imposed by the employer setting aside dismissal order. 5.3. According to learned counsel, it is for the disciplinary authority and not for the Court to decide as to what punishment be imposed on a delinquent even after the proved acts of sexual harassment and the Labour Court cannot substitute the penalty imposed by the employer setting aside dismissal order. In this connection, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co.Ltd. , (1979) 3 SCC 371 , wherein at para 32, it has been held as under: “32. If such be the duties and functions of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, any party appearing before it must make a claim or demur the claim of the other side and when there is a burden upon it to prove or establish the fact so as to invite a decision in its favour, it has to lead evidence. The quasi-judicial tribunal is not required to advise the party either about its rights or what it should do or omit to do. Obligation to lead evidence to establish an allegation made by a party is on the party making the allegation. The test would be who would fail if no evidence is led. It must seek an opportunity to lead evidence and lead evidence. A contention to substantiate which evidence is necessary has to be pleaded. If there is no pleading raising a contention there is no question of substantiating such a non-existing contention by evidence. It is well-settled that allegation which is not pleaded, even if there is evidence in support of it, cannot be examined because the other side has no notice of it and if entertained it would be tantamount to granting an unfair advantage to the first mentioned party. We are not unmindful of the fact that pleadings before such bodies have not to be read strictly, but it is equally true that the pleadings must be such as to give sufficient notice to the other party of the case it is called upon to meet. This view expressed in Tin Printers (Private) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1967) 2 LLJ 677 commends to us. The rules of fair play demand that where a party seeks to establish a contention which if proved would be sufficient to deny relief to the opposite side, such a contention has to be specifically pleaded and then proved. This view expressed in Tin Printers (Private) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1967) 2 LLJ 677 commends to us. The rules of fair play demand that where a party seeks to establish a contention which if proved would be sufficient to deny relief to the opposite side, such a contention has to be specifically pleaded and then proved. But if there is no pleading there is no question of proving something which is not pleaded. This is very elementary”. 5.4. In Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. Chandrasekhar Reddy , (2005) 2 SCC 481 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “ 26. That apart, the reasons given by the Labour Court to reduce the penalty are reasons which are not sufficient for the purpose of reducing the sentence by using its discretionary power. The fact that the misconduct now alleged is the first misconduct again is no ground to condone the misconduct. On the facts of this case as recorded by the Labour Court the loss of confidence is imminent and no finding has been given by the courts below, including the Labour Court, that either the fact of loss of confidence or the quantum of punishment is so harsh as to be vindictive or shockingly disproportionate. Without such finding based on records, interference with the award of punishment in a domestic inquiry is impermissible”. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent Sri V. Narsaimha Goud submits that the Labour Court has power under Section 11 -A to appreciate and re-appreciate the material and evidence available before the Enquiry Officer to come to the finding on the charges even after the Labour Court holding the domestic enquiry as valid and can defer from the finding of the Enquiry Officer. In support of his case, he relied on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.of India Pvt.Ltd. v. The management , [ AIR 1973 SC 1227 ] , Divisional Manager, APSRTC v. E. Raja Reddy , [ 1999 (5) ALD 735 ] , Depot Manager, APSRTC, Guntur Dist. V. Ch. Suresh Babu , 2019(2) ALD 262 (DB). 6.1. V. Ch. Suresh Babu , 2019(2) ALD 262 (DB). 6.1. On the issue of loss of confidence, as argued by learned counsel for petitioner, learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent relied on the judgments in Arrack Bottling Unit, Khammam v. Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Warangal , [ 2012(1) ALD 220 (DB)] , FGP Limited, Mumbai v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-III, Hyderabad , [ 2006(1) ALD 512 ] , Kanhiyalal Agrawal v. Factory Manager, Gwalior Sugar Company Ltd. , (2001) 9 SCC 609 and L. Michael v. M/s Johnson Pump Ltd. , [(1975) 1 SCC]. 7. Having considered the material on record and having heard learned counsel on either side, it is to be noted that the gist of the complaint given by Ms.Bodi is that on 12.07.2015, the workman came to her and abused in vulgar language and attempted to molest her. In the complaint under Ex.M1, she did not refer about the incident allegedly happened at 07.00 a.m. on the same day, this is one of the contradictions in her statement which create a doubt about the incident allegedly happened at 07.00 a.m. Further, it is stated that the said incident was witnessed by Dasrath and Santosh. But from their evidence, it is clear that they did not witness the incident. The Labour Court recorded that one fact is clear from the evidence of Dasarath who is the first eye witness to the incident that workman caught hold the hands of Ms. Bodi pulling towards him and at that time, zip of his pant is open which suggests that he misbehaved indecently towards Bodi. Though workman took a plea that when he refused to give money, Ms. Bodi foisted this case, he could not produce any of the workmen in whose presence Bodi requested for financial help from him on any previous occasion. It further observed that no doubt the charges against workman are proved during ICC enquiry, but the fact remains that it is only such incident committed by him in his entire service of 23 years; the so–called victim continued her employment and this incident did not shatter the confidence of other women employees, hence, some lesser punishment can be given in the present case. In fact, the report of the Internal Complaint Committee dated 12.10.2015 also opined that as far as the complaint of Bodi retarding unwelcomed demand of having sex with him he made in the morning is concerned, she has given her own evidence and did not produce any supporting witnesses. 8. The Labour Court considering the undisputed fact that workman worked in the same factory for the last 23 years, at his work place, there may be several women co-workers available, there is no such incident for the past 23 years where workman had allegedly misbehaved with any woman worker and this is the only stray incident he behaved indecently with a colleague, the Labour Court held that removal from service with stigma is harsh. Hence, held that instead of removing him from service, some lesser punishment should have been given to him. This Court does not see any infirmity in the said findings recorded by the Labour Court. 9. Apart from that, it is also to be noted that on the complaint, the management constituted a committee consisting of three members, namely a) N. Chaturvedi, b) G. Manjula Upadhyay Prasad, c) M. Mohan Prasad and d) V. Kalyan Kumar. As per Rule 7(7) of POSH ACT , 2013, in conducting enquiry, minimum three members of complaint Committee including the Presiding Officer or the Chairperson as the case may be shall be present, but the report dated 12.10.2015 was signed by two persons namely Nishi Kulshereshtha Chaturvedi and V. Kal Kumar which is not valid in the eye of law as it is not in accordance with the rule of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. 10. As regards the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that Labour Court passed the impugned Award without jurisdiction and it exceeded jurisdiction to invoke the powers under Section 11 -A is concerned, in this context, it is apt to see the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 10.1. In The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.of India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “32. 10.1. In The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.of India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge "(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified. (2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality. (3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. (4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. (5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry. (6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective. (7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective. (8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. (9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. (10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal." 10.2. In E. Raja Reddy’s case (supra), this Court held at para 24 as under: “(a) The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal after introduction of Section 11 -A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is clothed with necessary power, and jurisdiction to reappraise the material available on record and substitute its own findings for that of the disciplinary authority. The power exercised by the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal is akin to that of an appellate Court. (b) The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is duty bound to reappreciate the evidence even in cases where the workman files a memo conceding as to the validity of the domestic inquiry. The power exercised by the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal is akin to that of an appellate Court. (b) The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is duty bound to reappreciate the evidence even in cases where the workman files a memo conceding as to the validity of the domestic inquiry. (c) The Labour Court/Tribunal even after holding that the domestic inquiry was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice may, yet, interfere with the findings and substitute its own findings; on the basis of the very same evidence it can reach its own conclusion by recording its own findings and may reverse the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority and hold that the charges are not established. (d) The Labour Court/Tribunal can also find that the evidence and material available on record justifies the findings of misconduct arrived at by the disciplinary authority and still hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified under the circumstances of a particular case and accordingly only lesser punishment. 10.3. In Ch. Suresh Babu’s case (supra), this Court at para 26 held as under: “It is however to be noticed that a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227 , categorically held that the labour Court/Industrial Tribunal would have the power to reappraise the evidence for itself and hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved did not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. The Supreme Court further held that Section 11 -A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, gives full power to the labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. In the light of this judgment, the contention of Sri N. Praveen Reddy, learned Counsel, that the labour Court-II, Hyderabad, ought not to have reappraised the evidence cannot be countenanced. The other judgments cited by him with regard to the High Court undertaking such an exercise have no application, as the learned Judge has not done so and we do not propose to do so either. The other judgments cited by him with regard to the High Court undertaking such an exercise have no application, as the learned Judge has not done so and we do not propose to do so either. It is an admitted fact that despite the clear finding of the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad, that the finding recorded in the enquiry against K. Narsaiah, the petitioner in WP No.16833 of 2011, was perverse, the erstwhile APSRTC and its successor-in-interest, the TSRTC, did not choose to assail the said finding by laying a challenge to the said Award. This finding has therefore attained finality. In the light of this finality, there is no justification on the part of the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad, in imposing a lesser punishment by directing withholding of two annual increments of K. Narsaiah without cumulative effect. No reasons whatsoever are forthcoming from the Award as to why the labour Court deemed it appropriate to impose this punishment, having held the finding of the Enquiry Officer to be perverse. Setting aside of this lesser punishment by the learned Judge was therefore well justified”. 11. These judgments are authoritative judgments wherein it was held that the Labour Court has power under Section 11 (A) to appreciate and re-appreciate the material and evidence available before the Enquiry Officer to come to the findings on the charges even after the Labour Court holding the domestic enquiry as valid and can defer from the finding of Enquiry Officer. After considering the precedents under Section 11 -A of the Act which came into effect, the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave ruling that Section 11 -A is now clothed with power to re-appraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establish the misconduct alleged against workman. In view of the same, the judgments relied on by learned counsel for petitioner cannot be of help to them. 12. Yet another contention of learned counsel for petitioner is that the impugned award portrays absolute perversity in the matter of interfering with the punishment and granting compensation which deserves to be quashed. In view of the same, the judgments relied on by learned counsel for petitioner cannot be of help to them. 12. Yet another contention of learned counsel for petitioner is that the impugned award portrays absolute perversity in the matter of interfering with the punishment and granting compensation which deserves to be quashed. When the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that proved acts of sexual harassment cannot be interfered with, more so, when the loss of confidence also comes to the fore, there cannot be a case for reinstatement under any circumstances; when that is the position, there cannot be any question of reinstatement, the question of granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement smacks of perversity and arbitrariness, the Labour Court finding that this incident did not shatter the confidence of other women employees is absolutely perverse. The Labour Court passed the Award while applying the totally irrelevant consideration that it is only one stray incident committed by the workman in his entire service of 23 years and that it had no serious ramifications, is nothing but surmises and conjectures, being based on no valid evidence at all. 13. In this regard, learned counsel for workman contends that argument of learned counsel for petitioner is not sustainable because, admittedly, the workman put in 23 years of service with clean record of service. The Labour Court having held that the punishment of termination as harsh, instead of directing the management to take the workman into service and consider imposition of lesser punishment, stepped into the shoes of disciplinary authority and entered the domain of the authority by granting monetary compensation on sheer assumptions and presumptions about his physical and mental condition. He submits that payment of compensation on the ground of loss of confidence would not substitute the employment. Here are the judgments relied on in this context. 13.1. In Arrack Bottling Unit’s case (supra), at para 34, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court held as under: “34. An order for payment of lump sum amount as compensation in lieu of reinstatement with or without back wages can never be an effective substitute for non-employment. Employment is the livelihood for skilled and unskilled workmen, it is a security for the life of a person capable of working and some sort of insurance to himself and those who depends on him. Employment is the livelihood for skilled and unskilled workmen, it is a security for the life of a person capable of working and some sort of insurance to himself and those who depends on him. The family's welfare, children education, health care and savings for future all depend on the employment especially in the area where Nation more and more depends on the service sector for Its economic progress and development. The issue therefore cannot be lightly taken by the Courts by following any straight Jacket formula. There could be instances where for some reason or the other, the workmen delayed their approach to labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. in such, cases, certainly the Court can adjudicate the competing rights between the capital and labour and grant relief without sacrificing the one for the other. In any event, even if there are no strong valid reasons denying the best relief of reinstatement to the workmen and granting him relief of compensation in lieu of reinstatement is and must be considered as not compatible with the constitutional vision of justice. 13.2. In FGP Limited’s case (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 57 held as under: “57. When an employer loses confidence in his employee, particularly in respect of a person who is discharging an office of trust and confidence, there would be no justification in directing reinstatement and it would also be idle to ask him to employ such a person in another job. In lieu of reinstatement, the employer could be required to pay a lumpsum amount to the employee as compensation. (Francis Klien & Co. v. Workman, (1972) 4 SCC 569 : AIR 1971 SC 2414 ). To invoke the principle of "loss of confidence" the employer must plead and prove that (i) the workman is holding a position of trust and confidence; (ii) by abusing such position, he has committed acts which results in forfeiting the same; and (iii) to continue him in service would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer and would be detrimental to the discipline or security of the establishment. All these three aspects must be present to refuse reinstatement on the ground of loss of confidence. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective. Objective facts, which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved. All these three aspects must be present to refuse reinstatement on the ground of loss of confidence. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective. Objective facts, which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved. (Kanhaiyalal Agrawal v. Factory Manager, Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. (2001) 9 SCC 609 AIR 2001 SC 3645 ). In the present case, none of these three conditions have been pleaded or proved before the labour Court. This Court, in certiorari proceedings, would not, normally, examine issues which have not been urged, argued and established before Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts. The plea of loss of confidence, taken for the first time before this Court, has therefore to be rejected”. 13.3. In Kanhiyalal Agrawal’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paras 3 and 9 stated thus: "In the present case, the applicant is working on the post of Weighment Clerk and he has contravened the prescribed procedure and in collusion with other colleagues signed payment slip wrongly prepared for a wrong date while on the day of incident. Chetu or Chatura did not bring sugarcane to the mill. The responsibility of applicant is that he should sign on payment slip with correct date and the amount of sugarcane of farmer concerned, while he should do its weighing As a Weighment Clerk his work was of faith and full responsibility. On the basis of evidence produced in the case, loss of trust of non-applicant in applicant appears to be proper. Therefore, it is not proper to award relief of reinstatement to applicant. According to accepted formula in Dayaram v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. which is in respect of industry of non applicant, applicant is entitled to get half salary and full returning allowance from the date of dismissal till the date of this order. 9. Substantial contention on the merits of the case by the employer in these appeals is that the finding of loss of confidence in the employee by the Labour Court has been reversed in appeal by the industrial Court on unreasonable grounds. 9. Substantial contention on the merits of the case by the employer in these appeals is that the finding of loss of confidence in the employee by the Labour Court has been reversed in appeal by the industrial Court on unreasonable grounds. What must be pleaded and proved to invoke the aforesaid principle is that (1) the workman is holding a position of trust and confidence; (/) by abusing such position, he commits acts which results in forfeiting the same, and (i) to continue him in service would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer or would be detrimental to the discipline or secunty of the establishment. All these three aspects must be present to refuse reinstatement on the ground of loss of confidence. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective based upon the mind of the management. Objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee must be alleged and proved. Else, the right of reinstatement ordinarily available to the employee will be lost”. 13.4. In L. Michael’s case (supra), the Hon’be Apex Court observed that: “20. In the light of what we have indicated, it is clear that loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or individual reaction to an objective set of facts and motivations. The Court is concerned with the latter and not with the former, although circumstances may exist which justify a genuine exercise of the power of simple termination. In a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive of strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started and a disciplinary enquiry cannot be forced on the master. There, a termination simpliciter may be bona fide, not colourable, and loss of confidence may be evidentiary of good faith of the employer. 22. Before we conclude we would like to add that an employer who believes suspects that his employee, particular one holding a position of confidence, has betrayed that confidence, can, if the conditions and terms of the employment permit, terminate his employment and discharge him without any stigma attaching to the discharge. But such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy, it should be bona fide and reasonable. But such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy, it should be bona fide and reasonable. It must rest on some tangible basis and the power has to be exercised by the employer objectively, in good faith, which means honestly with due care and prudence. If the exercise of such power is challenged on the ground of being colourable or mala fide or an act of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the employer must disclose to the Court the grounds of his impugned action so that the same may be tested judicially, in the instant case this has not been done. There is only the ipse dixit of the employer that he was suspecting since 1968 that the appellant was divulging secrets relating to his business. The employer has not disclosed the grounds on which this suspicion arose in 1968. Further, after 1968, the appellant was given two extra Increments, in addition to his normal increments, as stated already, in appreciation of his hard work. This circumstance completely demolishes even the whimsical and tenuous stand taken by the employer. It was manifest therefore that the impugned action was not bona fide. 23. It was urged by Mr Tarkunde, learned counsel for the employer that the question whether or not the employer had lost confidence in the employee, was essentially one of fact and this Court should not disturb the finding of fact recorded by the trial court on this point. It is true that this Court, in appeal, as a rule of practice, is loath to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the trial court. But if such a finding is based on no evidence, or is the result of a misreading of the material evidence, or is so unreasonable or grossly unjust that no reasonable person would judicially arrive at that conclusion, it is the duty of this Court to interfere and set matters right. The case before us is one such instance, where we are called upon to do so. 24. The Labour Court has misled itself on the law and we set aside its order. The workman will be reinstated with back wages. However the management will be free, if it has sufficient material and if so advised, to proceed against the workman for misconduct or on other grounds valid in law”. 14. 24. The Labour Court has misled itself on the law and we set aside its order. The workman will be reinstated with back wages. However the management will be free, if it has sufficient material and if so advised, to proceed against the workman for misconduct or on other grounds valid in law”. 14. In view of the above law, this Court is not inclined to agree with submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, hence, of the opinion that Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. 16. Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.