ORDER : Nagesh Bheemapaka, J. Challenging the Award dated 31.03.2021 in I.D.No.4 of 2016 on the file of Labour Court-II, Hyderabad, this Writ Petition is filed. 2. The case of petitioner is that while he was working as Operator in Production Department of respondent - Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages Private Limited (for short, ‘the Company), he was removed from service on the allegation that he misbehaved with one Ms. A. Bodi and outraged her modesty. His grievance is that in order to remove him from service, the said Bodi and other colluded and gave a false complaint; when the complaint was referred to Internal Complaint Committee, an enquiry was conducted without giving opportunity to petitioner and the Committee gave findings which were biased and basing on the false report, he was terminated from service with effect from 20.11.2015, without considering his objections opposing the finding of the Committee. 2.1 Petitioner therefore, raised the mentioned I.D. before the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad on the ground that the Internal Complaint Committee report is not based on any tangible evidence and Committee also did not give a reasonable opportunity and that it is one sided, hence, is liable to be dismissed. However, the Labour Court considering the judgment in 2013 (1) SCC 297 which was rendered prior to POSH Act , 2013 which is not a binding precedent, passed the impugned Award. According to petitioner, the Court below failed to appreciate that a duty is cast on the management to follow the rule and regulations framed by it which dealt with the disciplinary actions. This principle was reiterated by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2020 LLR SC 401 as well as in Visakha Case rendered in 1997. Therefore, the Award impugned is liable to be set aside. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner Sri V. Narasimha Goud submits that the Court below ought to have held that Internal Complaint Committee cannot be equated with that of domestic enquiry. According to learned counsel, the Court below having come to the conclusion that petitioner had put in 23 years of unblemished service and that the alleged incident did not shatter the confidence of other women workers, ought to have imposed some lesser punishment and ought to have granted reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 4. According to learned counsel, the Court below having come to the conclusion that petitioner had put in 23 years of unblemished service and that the alleged incident did not shatter the confidence of other women workers, ought to have imposed some lesser punishment and ought to have granted reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 4. The respondent filed counter stating that for the purposes of inquiry under Section 11 of POSH Act , the question of giving any opportunity of issuing the charge sheet and conducting departmental enquiry does not arise. The three- judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India , [ (2013) 1 SCC 297 ] held that the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report in a disciplinary action under the Civil Services Conduct Rules and the disciplinary authority shall act on such report accordingly. It has also been held that the findings of the report of the Committee shall not be treated as mere preliminary investigation of enquiry leading to disciplinary action but shall be treated as finding / report in an enquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent. It is stated, the defence set up by petitioner is a mere alibi to escape the consequences of his acts of sexual harassment of a woman employee at work place. This respondent denied that the findings of the ICC are self-contradictory and that ICC members have committee error. The contention of petitioner that there shall be tangible evidence beyond reasonable doubt in proof of the allegations of sexual harassment is contrary to law and shall not be countenanced, because it is very well-settled that allegations of this nature are proved based on preponderance of probability but does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt like a criminal trial. 4.1 It is stated, the impugned Award was fully fortified by the latest Division Bench judgment of this Court in GAIL (India) Ltd., New Delhi v. Dr. Duraisamy Baskaran , [2023(5) ALD (TS)(DB) 204,] whereas petitioner relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Dr. Duraisamy Baskaran v. GAIL (India) Ltd. , [ 2021(3) ALD 461 ] which was reversed by the Division Bench. The Labour Court erred in granting compensation, hence, the respondent assailed the Award in Writ Petition No. 19755 of 2021. 5. Duraisamy Baskaran , [2023(5) ALD (TS)(DB) 204,] whereas petitioner relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Dr. Duraisamy Baskaran v. GAIL (India) Ltd. , [ 2021(3) ALD 461 ] which was reversed by the Division Bench. The Labour Court erred in granting compensation, hence, the respondent assailed the Award in Writ Petition No. 19755 of 2021. 5. Heard Sri G.V.S.Ganesh, learned counsel for respondent Company and perused the record. 6. At the outset, it may be noted that the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Duraisamy Baskaran (supra) , at paragraph 26(C), held that it is only when the Disciplinary authority disagrees with the report of the enquiry officer, for reasons to be recorded in writing, it shall remit the case to the enquiry officer for fresh enquiry. 7. Further, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has referred to the decision of the Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele’s case (supra) wherein it was clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the disciplinary authority shall treat the report/findings etc., of the ICC as the findings in a disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent employee and shall act on such report; and therefore there cannot be any artificial distinction drawn to contend that the enquiry/findings of the ICC do not constitute a regular disciplinary/departmental enquiry. 8. In the instant case, the Internal Complaints Committee, which is a duly constituted committee under the POSH Act , conducted the enquiry into the sexual harassment charges against the workman and submitted a report holding that the charges are “proved”; and the enquiry report was accepted by the disciplinary authority; and a copy of the enquiry report was provided to the workman for his comments/explanation, and the workman submittedhis explanation and having found the explanation not satisfactory, the workman was terminated from service. The enquiry conducted by the ICC cannot therefore be said to be invalid, and the disciplinary authority need not order another round of enquiry. 9. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Labour Court, under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act , has the power to re-appreciate the evidence as an appellate authority and can arrive at its own findings and may even reverse the findings arrived at by disciplinary authority. 10. 9. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the Labour Court, under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act , has the power to re-appreciate the evidence as an appellate authority and can arrive at its own findings and may even reverse the findings arrived at by disciplinary authority. 10. In the instant case, the Labour Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the ID Act, reappreciated the evidence on record, and held that the punishment of termination from service was too harsh. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the findings of the Labour Court, at paragraph 29 of the impugned Order, which reads as follows: “33. … Under Rule 21.5 it is said that while imposing the punishment the previous record of the employee has to be considered and background of the workers must also be looked into. 34. *** 35. In view of the discussion made above, the removal of the petitioner from the service with stigma is harsh. Instead of removing him from service the respondent company should have taken steps that: to transfer from that particular section to another section where he may not have contact with woman employees or he should have been given some punishment to sit in the office room tolook into the accounts whereby he cannot have any access to the employees. If more punishment is to be given, the respondent should have reduced the pay of the petitioner and his increments should have been stopped with cumulative effect. When some alternative punishments are available; more particularly when the petitioner has rendered unblemished service of 23 years in the company removing him with the stigma that he has harassed a woman employee certainly is harsh and disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. Having appreciated the overall circumstance of the case, this Court is of the opinion that instead of removing the petitioner from service some lesser punishment should have been given to him. 36. This Court has carefully considered the citations submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent. The petitioner was removed from service in the year 2015. For the last 6 years he is out of employment. At the time of alleged incident, the petitioner was aged 48 years and by now he has attained the age of 54 years. This Court verified the physical condition of the petitioner. The petitioner was removed from service in the year 2015. For the last 6 years he is out of employment. At the time of alleged incident, the petitioner was aged 48 years and by now he has attained the age of 54 years. This Court verified the physical condition of the petitioner. In the opinion of the Court physically he is not prepared to work nor mentally. Because of this incident he underwent mental shock. Due to unemployment for the last 5 or 6 years he suffered financially. His family is completely scattered. It is observed by the Court that for a few dates of hearing his wife was assisting him to come to the Court. He has become very feeble physically. Even though the respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner he will not be useful. He cannot discharge his functions as expected of. More so, when he has been removed with such stigma it will be difficult for him to work in the same factory among the same workers. Having appreciated the case, in all angles, this Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case where he can be awarded some compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 37. To work out the compensation payable to the petitioner this Court has considered the last pay drawn by the petitioner which is Rs.26,339/- p.m. So, the annual income would be around Rs.3,12,000/-. The petitioner would have continued his service for another four years hence he is entitled for Rs.12,48,000/- approx. 11. At this juncture, it is equally relevant to note that though the Labour Court can re-appreciate the evidence under Section 11 , and arrive at a finding which could even be reversing of the judgment of the departmental authority, however, such evidence should be borne out by the record. 12. In the instant case, the Labour Court held that the impugned termination is too harsh and suggested some lesser punishments like reduction of pay, transfer to another section etc., (as extracted in paragraph No.35), which the Labour Court is, of course, empowered to do under Section 11 of the Act. 13. 12. In the instant case, the Labour Court held that the impugned termination is too harsh and suggested some lesser punishments like reduction of pay, transfer to another section etc., (as extracted in paragraph No.35), which the Labour Court is, of course, empowered to do under Section 11 of the Act. 13. However, the Labour Court has gone beyond its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act, while recording that “the workman is under mental shock, that the workman is physically and mentally not prepared to work, and the workman will not be useful even if reinstated, and that the workman cannot discharge his functions as expected, and that when he has been removed with such stigma, it will be difficult for him to work in the same factory among the same workers”. The recording of these findings / opinions has no evidentiary basis. Further, the Labour Court heavily relied on these opinions, and embarked upon the task of computing monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement with the assumption “that the workman would have continued in service for another four years and therefore entitled to four years of salary as compensation”. In fact, awarding of such monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement, would amount to advance salary for future service on the sheer assumption that the workman would have continued in service, discarding all the uncertainties of life, and therefore the same is unsustainable in law. 14. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, this Court is of the considered view that while the Labour Court had appreciated the facts of the case and set-aside the punishment of termination, ought to have either relegated the matter to the disciplinary authority for imposing a lesser punishment, rather than stepping into the shoes of the disciplinary authority. The dismissal of workman was in 2015, and the impugned order of Labour Court was passed in 2021. We are now in 2025. Almost a decade has passed from the date of dismissal of the workman. This Court is therefore, inclined to modify the punishment appropriately in the interest of justice. 15. Accordingly, the alternative punishment of monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement of workman is set aside. We are now in 2025. Almost a decade has passed from the date of dismissal of the workman. This Court is therefore, inclined to modify the punishment appropriately in the interest of justice. 15. Accordingly, the alternative punishment of monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement of workman is set aside. The respondent-Management is directed to reinstate the workman forthwith with continuity of service and with back-wages from the date of impugned order of Labour Court i.e. 05.05.2021 to the date of reinstatement, payable at the rate of 50% of the Last Pay drawn as of November 2015. The back- wages shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 16. The Writ Petition is accordingly, allowed. No costs. 17. Miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.