ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents No.1 to 4 as well as learned counsel for respondent No.5. 2. This petition is filed challenging the order dated 07.12.2023 passed by 2 nd respondent-Deputy Commissioner. In terms of the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner has held the sale transaction in respect to the petition property is hit by the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short ‘Act of 1978’). 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner claims that the property in question was originally granted to Bheemanna Kempanna Vaddar in the year 1948-the grandfather of respondent No.5. This fact is not in dispute. On 10.09.1964, grandfather of respondent No.5, the original grantee expired leaving behind his adopted son Nagappa. On 19.05.1966, Nagappa, the father of respondent No.5 sold the property to one Abdul Sattar Sheikh Hussain Tilavalli under the registered sale deed and on 26.05.1970. Said Abdul Shattar sold the property to Ramakant Vitobarao Balse under the registered sale deed. Ramakant Vitobarao Balse sold the property in favour of Bhaskar Narayan Hegde. Then on 01.09.1983, Bhaskar Narayan Hegde sold the property to Vishweshwar Narayan Bhat. The son of Vishweshwar Narayan Bhat sold the property on 27.04.2023 to present petitioner. 4. When the property was sold pursuant to the sale deed dated 27.04.2023, the name of the petitioner was entered in the property records. Thereafter, respondent No.5 challenged the mutation on the premise that the sale transaction in favour of the petitioner is hit by the provisions of the Act of 1978. 5. The Assistant Commissioner after considering the materials on record has concluded that the transaction is valid and dismissed the appeal. On appeal, the Deputy Commissioner has held that transaction is hit under the provisions of Act of 1978 and has passed the impugned order. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in Manchegowda and others v. State of Karnataka and others , (1984) 3 SCC 301 to contend that the transaction is before the commencement of Act of 1978 and after the expiry of the alienation period, thus, the transaction is valid and cannot be said to be in violation of Act of 1978. 7. 7. In support of his contention that the 15 years alienation period has expired, he would urge that the Government of Karnataka had issued a Notification which is extracted in the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, and in terms of the said Notification, the restriction on alienation is only 15 years from the date of grant. Thus, it is his contention that the first transaction has taken place 15 years after the grant, and after expiry of the restriction on non-alienation as such, all other transactions are valid. 8. In the alternative, learned counsel for the petitioner would also refer to the judgments of Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and another , (2020) 14 SCC 232, Shardhamma and another v. Deputy Commissioner and others , 2025 SCC Online SC 977 and also would rely on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Narayan Swami v. District Commissioner Bengaluru , ILR 2020 KAR 303. 9. In addition to that, learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that even after the amendment to the Act of 1978, providing that there is no limitation to challenge the violation of the Act of 1978, the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma v. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri , Writ Appeal No. 100101 of 2024 has held that belated claim cannot be entertained. 10. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 would urge that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the petition. It is his contention that the first transaction is in violation of the terms of the grant which mandated permission of the Government before sale of the property. Since the first transaction itself is void, all other transactions subsequent to the first transaction are void and the petitioner does not acquire any right over the property. 11. In addition learned counsel for the respondent would also place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Amarendra Pratap Singh vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati, others , (2004) 10 SCC 65 and Sarvinder Singh vs. Dalip Singh , (1996) 5 SCC 539 and Satyan vs. Deputy Commissioner and others , 2019 (3) Kar. L.J. 241 (SC) to contend that the transaction is hit by the provisions of Act of 1978. 12. L.J. 241 (SC) to contend that the transaction is hit by the provisions of Act of 1978. 12. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 has also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in B. Mohammad vs. Deputy Commissioner, Mangalore & Others , ILR 1999 KAR 634. 13. This Court has considered the contentions raised at the Bar and perused the records. 14. The land was originally granted to Bheemanna Kempanna Vaddar in the year 1948. On 10.09.1964, the grandfather of respondent No. 5, the original grantee, died. On 19.05.1966, the father of respondent No. 5 i.e., Nagappa, sold the property. This is the first sale transaction. The grant order would reveal that the property shall not be alienated without permission of the Government. The grant order would indicate that this clause restraining alienation without the permission of the Government was not restricted to any particular period, but it was a condition, which was made applicable for sale transactions by the grantee or his successors, irrespective of the duration from the date of grant. 15. Referring to this Clause in the grant order the claim is made for resumption by the descendants of the grantee. 16. To counter this submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited the attention of this Court to the Notification dated 21.05.1964, issued by the Government of Mysuru. This Notification has been issued in light of representations made by the grantees of certain lands under the provisions of the Bombay Land Grant Rules. The persons who made the representation brought to the notice of the Government that under certain provisions of the Mysuru Land Grant Rules, the restriction on alienation is imposed only for 15 years, whereas, under the Land Grant Rules applicable to the erstwhile Bombay State, the restriction is a permanent restriction. Noticing this anomaly and discrimination, the Government passed the following order, which reads as under: "Government consider this representation to be reasonable and accordingly direct that lands granted in the Bombay area prior to the issue of the Bombay Land Revenue (Mysore Amendment) Rules, 1960 may be alienated without restrictions after a period of 15 years from the date of grant." 17. This Notification does apply to the property in question. As already noticed, the property was granted to Bheemanna Kempanna Vaddar on 09.02.1948. Therefore, the 15 year restriction would expire on 08.02.1963. This Notification does apply to the property in question. As already noticed, the property was granted to Bheemanna Kempanna Vaddar on 09.02.1948. Therefore, the 15 year restriction would expire on 08.02.1963. Thus, after 08.02.1963, there was no restriction on the grantee to alienate the property. The first sale transaction has taken place on 10.09.1964, and the property was sold by the father of respondent No. 5. Thereafter, several sale transactions have taken place, which are already noted above. 18. In light of the aforementioned relaxation of the condition relating to alienation, the transaction is not in violation of any of the terms of the grant order. 19. Now Section 4 of the Act of 1978 is required to be considered, as the entire case of respondent No. 5 is under Section 4 of the Act of 1978. Section 4 of the Act of 1978, reads as follows: “4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or of any award or order of any other authority.” 20. From the reading of Section 4 of the Act of 1978, it is evident that Section 4 of the Act of 1978 prohibits transfer of lands without the previous permission of the Government, irrespective of the fact that the land was granted prior to the Act of 1978 or after the Act of 1978. 21. Section 4 of Act of 1978 applies to all transactions, which are carried out in contravention of the terms of the grant and declares that such transaction as null and void; and no right would be acquired in favour of the transferee. 22. 21. Section 4 of Act of 1978 applies to all transactions, which are carried out in contravention of the terms of the grant and declares that such transaction as null and void; and no right would be acquired in favour of the transferee. 22. As already noticed, the first transaction dated 10.09.1964, is not in contravention of the terms of the grant. No provision of law is pointed out to show that on 10.09.1964, there was any other law, which prohibited alienation of such property. This being the position, the contention that Section 4 of the Act of 1978, would apply to the facts of the case has no merit. 23. In addition to that, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the situation where the land is transferred after the expiry of the non-alienation clause; and the Apex Court in Manchegowda ’s case (supra), held that, in case the land is transferred after the expiry of the non-alienation clause, before the commencement of Act of 1978, then such transactions are not hit under Section 4 of the Act of 1978. Thus, the contention that the transaction is hit by the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1978 has to be rejected. 24. In addition to that, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shripad Narayan Hegde and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others , (1996) 5 KLJ 641 . The Court has also referred to the effect of Notification dated 14.04.1964 and has held that the said Notification would apply to lands granted under the Bombay area. The Division Bench of this Court has also considered the contention relating to Section 11 of the Act of 1978. The relevant portion reads as under: “It is, therefore necessary to examine whether the Government order dated 14-4-1964 is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. As stated in paras 11 and 12 of this order Section 4 of the Act provides that transfer of any granted land in contravention of the terms of the grant or the law under which such grant was made, is null and void. As stated in paras 11 and 12 of this order Section 4 of the Act provides that transfer of any granted land in contravention of the terms of the grant or the law under which such grant was made, is null and void. Section 11 of the Act is only clarificatory in nature inasmuch as it states that any law or custom or contract or order of any authority is ineffective if such law, custom, contract or order is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Such law, custom, contract or order to be ineffective must be repugnant to the provisions of the Act in general and Section 4 in particular. Section 11 will become inoperative only if the law, custom, contract or order is inconsistent with the terms of the order of grant or law under which grant was made.” 25. Thus, it is to be noticed that Section 11 of the Act of 1978, will be having an overriding effect only to the extent of inconsistency. Section 4 provides for alienation before the commencement of Act of 1978 as long as alienation does not contravene the terms of the grant. 26. As already noticed, the condition relating to alienation was relaxed to 15 years from the date of the grant. There was no contravention of any agreement when the property was sold in the year 1964. In the year 1964 there was no law applicable to the petition property prohibiting alienation of the property without prior permission of the Government. 27. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the full bench judgment in B. Mohammad supra. This Court is not persuaded to apply the aforementioned judgment. The said judgment has been rendered in an entirely different context. The Court was considering the claim with reference to Rule 29A of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 and Section 4 read with Section 11 of the Act of 1978. It is to be noticed that in the present case the transactions has taken place before the introduction of Rule 29A, which was introduced in the year 1974. Hence, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the case. 28. The submission by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that the petitioner has no locus standi to question the impugned order, has to be rejected. Hence, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the case. 28. The submission by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that the petitioner has no locus standi to question the impugned order, has to be rejected. The petitioner is affected by the impugned order, which declares that the petitioner has no title over the property purchased under the registered sale deed on the ground that the transaction is hit by Section 4 of the Act of 1979. Thus, the petitioner has the locus to question the impugned order to which he is a party. 29. Respondent No. 5 infact has no locus to question the mutation certified based on the registered sale deed in the name of the petitioner. The reason is father of respondent No.5 sold the property in the year 1964, after expiry of non-alienation period. Thus, father of respondent No. 5, lost title over the property and respondent No.5 did not inherit any right over the property after the demise of his father. 30. Even otherwise, assuming that the transaction of 1964 is invalid under law, still the claim raised by respondent No. 5 is belated and stale and is hit by delay and laches as laid down in Nekkanti (supra). 31. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 would submit that the petitioner is a pendente lite purchaser, as such, he has no locus standi. The contention cannot be accepted. Merely because a person has purchased property during the pendency of proceedings, it cannot be said that he has no locus to defend the transaction. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not prohibit the transaction during the pendency of proceedings; it only states that the transaction will be subject to the result of the proceeding. As such, the petitioner has locus standi. 32. The Apex Court in Nekkanti ’s case supra has held that the claim relating to violations of provisions of the Act of 1978, and consequent application of land pursuant to such violation have to be made within a reasonable time. In that case, the claim was made 17 years after the property was sold in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1978. In the instant case, the dispute is raised after 52 years. Accordingly, the petition has to be allowed. 33. Hence, the following: ORDER i. Writ Petition is allowed. ii. In that case, the claim was made 17 years after the property was sold in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1978. In the instant case, the dispute is raised after 52 years. Accordingly, the petition has to be allowed. 33. Hence, the following: ORDER i. Writ Petition is allowed. ii. The impugned order dated 07.12.2023 passed by respondent No.2-the Deputy Commissioner at Annexure-E is quashed.