ORDER : J. Sreenivas Rao, J. This criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr.P.C.’) by the appellant/Accused Officer aggrieved by the judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed in C.C.No.7 of 2002 on the file of the Principal Special Judge for ACB Cases at Hyderabad, whereby he was convicted for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 13 (2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act. 2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell : 2.1. The de facto complainant is native of Thattupally Village, Korvi Mandal, Warangal District, was worked as the Chairperson of the School Education Committee of the said village. During the year 1998–99, under the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), he was entrusted with the work of construction of a school building for a sanctioned amount of Rs.1,70,000/-. PW.1 undertook the construction and during its progress, he received part payments i.e., Rs.85,000/- on 23.01.1999 and Rs.59,500/- on 20.03.1999, aggregating to Rs.1,44,500/-. Though the construction of the school building was completed by the end of November 1999, the final bill for the balance amount of Rs.25,500/- was not released. PW.4-Site Engineer of Korvi Mandal inspected the work executed by PW.1 and certified about completion of school building. When PW.1 approached PW.4 for the release of the pending amount, PW.4 stated to have informed him that the appellant- Accused Officer, who was a Government servant at the relevant point of time, had demanded a sum of Rs.4,000/- as illegal gratification for recommending and facilitating the issue of the final cheque towards the balance payment. It was also conveyed that unless the bribe was paid, the measurement book would not be forwarded and the final bill would not be processed. Basing upon the complaint of PW.1, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) registered the case and laid a trap. It was also conveyed that unless the bribe was paid, the measurement book would not be forwarded and the final bill would not be processed. Basing upon the complaint of PW.1, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) registered the case and laid a trap. The trap was initially proposed to be conducted at the residence of the appellant, but it was later carried out at Mahabubabad at the insistence of PW.1 and to prevent leakage of the operation. During the trap proceedings, the appellant was allegedly found in possession of Rs.4,000/- of tainted currency notes and upon chemical test, gave positive result for phenolphthalein. Post-trap proceedings were duly recorded. The prosecution thereafter filed a charge-sheet before the Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act and the same was taken cognizance and numbered as C.C.No.7 of 2002. 2.2. During the course of trial, the complainant-PW.1, mediator PW.2, Trap Laying Officer PW.8, and other official witnesses were examined. The defence sought to rely on certain documents, including Ex.P-25 representation of the appellant and also examined DW.3 and DW.4 in support of its version that the trap was falsely engineered. The trial court, however, disbelieved the defence evidence, held that the prosecution had proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt and invoked the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act and consequently, by judgment dated 09.04.2007, in C.C. No.7 of 2002, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 7 of the Act and also pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, undergo simple imprisonment for one month and also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, undergo simple imprisonment for one month under Section 13 (1)(d) of the Act and ordered that both substantive sentences shall run concurrently, by its judgment dated 09.04.2017. Hence, this present appeal. 3. Heard Mr. P. Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Ms. P. Naga Deepika, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB appearing for the respondent State. 4. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant: 4.1. Hence, this present appeal. 3. Heard Mr. P. Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Ms. P. Naga Deepika, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB appearing for the respondent State. 4. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant: 4.1. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant has not committed any offence, much less the offences alleged against him. He further submitted that PW.1 lodged the complaint against the appellant that he demanded an amount of Rs.4,000/- towards bribe for release of final bill amount of Rs.25,500/- pertaining to construction of school building at Thattupally Village. Even according to PW.1, the appellant allegedly demanded the amount on 20.12.1999 and he met the appellant on 01.01.2000. Subsequently, on 03.01.2000 trap was laid. However, it was submitted that PW.1 in his evidence specifically stated that he never met the appellant at any point of time and he never demanded any amount, much less the alleged amount of Rs.4,000/- from PW.1 and there is no demand and acceptance. Hence, the essential ingredients under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act does not attract against the appellant. 4.2. He further submitted that on the alleged date of demand, the appellant is not in the office and also he is not having authority to issue or handover the cheque, especially PW.1 was not eligible to receive the final bill amount of Rs.25,500/- as per rules on the ground that he has not completed the construction of school building as on that date. Unless and until, PW.1 completes the construction work and after issuance of requisite certificate by the concerned officer, then only PW.1 is entitled to claim the final bill amount. Even according to the prosecution, PW.1 has not completed the work. The appellant filed photographs dated 04.01.2000 by examining DW.1 photographer, proving the fact that the school building work was not completed. The learned Special Judge failed to consider the said evidence. Even according to the evidence of PW.1, the appellant did not demand and accept the bribe. The prosecution has not produced any other evidence to prove that the appellant demanded and accepted the bribe. 4.3. PW.2 in his cross-examination deposed that he acted as a mediator in another case registered by ACB, Warangal. Even according to the evidence of PW.1, the appellant did not demand and accept the bribe. The prosecution has not produced any other evidence to prove that the appellant demanded and accepted the bribe. 4.3. PW.2 in his cross-examination deposed that he acted as a mediator in another case registered by ACB, Warangal. It is also stated that unless the work is completed in all aspects, there was no possibility to make final payment. Despite this, learned Special Judge strongly relied upon the evidence of PW.2, who has a stock witness. 4.4. He further submitted that PW.3 has not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Even according to the evidence of PW.4, an amount of Rs.4,000/- had been paid by PW.1 towards supervisory charges. Hence, the question of demand of bribe by the appellant and acceptance of the same does not arise. PW.4, in his cross- examination, stated that as on 29.12.1999, the doors, shutters and window shutters were not fixed to the building by PW.1, and plastering of the ceiling, fixing of shelves and tower bolts to the shutters were not done. Since the work was not completed, the final measurements were not recorded by him by 03.01.2000 in Ex.P.12 measurement book. He also stated that as per the norms, PW.1, School Committee Chairman, was expected to pay Rs.4,900/- to him towards supervisory charges in respect of the said construction. PW.1 did not pay the said amount to him by 03.01.2000. 4.5. He further submitted that PW.5 has not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. PW.6, in his cross-examination, stated that as on 22.01.2000, plastering of the ceiling, fixing of racks in the shelves and re-white washing were incomplete. Hence, the question of the appellant demanding a bribe from PW.1 on 20.12.1999 and 01.01.2000 does not arise, especially since the school building works were not completed as on 22.01.2000. 4.6. PW.7 has also not supported the case of prosecution and turned hostile. 4.7. PW.8, in his cross-examination, specifically stated that the appellant had no authority to issue or sign any cheques and measurements of books executed by PW.1 was to be recorded by PW.4. 4.6. PW.7 has also not supported the case of prosecution and turned hostile. 4.7. PW.8, in his cross-examination, specifically stated that the appellant had no authority to issue or sign any cheques and measurements of books executed by PW.1 was to be recorded by PW.4. PW.8 simply denied the suggestion that the appellant had brought to his notice that PW.1 had not executed and completed the work, but on the other hand was pressurizing him to get the final bill paid to him and that since he did not listen to PW.1 in the said context, PW.1 falsely implicated the appellant in this case. Even according to the evidence of PW.8, the appellant is not having any role to sign or issue the cheques. Hence, the offences alleged against the appellant that he demanded and accepted the bribe for release of final bill amount is not true and correct and the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed by the learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside. 4.8. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments: 1. Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. , AIR 1954 SC 15 2. Mini v. CBI/SPE Cochin , SLP (Crl.) No.11212 of 2022 ; and 3. Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab , 2023 LawSuit (SC) 287 5. Submissions of learned Special Public Prosecutor 5.1. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the appellant demanded and accepted the bribe from PW.1 for illegal gratification. The prosecution proved the case against the appellant by adducing oral and documentary evidence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the learned Special Judge after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record has given specific finding that the appellant has committed the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act and rightly convicted the appellant. 5.2. He further submitted that PW.1 in his complaint specifically mentioned the role of the appellant that he demanded and accepted the bribe. Merely because PW.1 declared as a hostile witness in subsequent stage, the same is not a fatal to the case of the prosecution. He also submitted that PW.2 supported the version of prosecution case. PWs.4 and 6 in their evidence specifically stated that the role of the appellant. 5.3. Merely because PW.1 declared as a hostile witness in subsequent stage, the same is not a fatal to the case of the prosecution. He also submitted that PW.2 supported the version of prosecution case. PWs.4 and 6 in their evidence specifically stated that the role of the appellant. 5.3. He further submitted that PW.1 in his complaint and in his chief-examination specifically stated that the appellant has demanded and accepted the bribe and in subsequent stages, he changed his version that he never demanded bribe for processing final bill. The amount which was given by PW.1 to the appellant towards supervisory charges is an afterthought and PW.1 had turned hostile. He further submitted that Ex.P.14 and P.16-receipts issued by PW.4 support the version of the prosecution. He also submitted that PW.6 in his cross- examination specifically stated that the amount which was received by the appellant is in respect of the bribe. 5.4. He further submitted that the prosecution discharged the burden by proving entire case, however, the appellant has not produced any evidence to substantiate his case. The learned Special Judge after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence rightly convicted the appellant and there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5.5. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments: 1. Neeraj Dutta v. State , (2023) 4 SCC 731 2. Vinod Kumar Garg v. State , (2020) 2 SCC 8 ; and 3. Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab , (2015) 3 SCC 220 6. Reply submission of learned counsel for the appellant: 6.1. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that to draw the presumption under Section 20 of the Act, demand and acceptance are mandatory. The prosecution case should be based on the complaint and the F.I.R. But, in the case on hand, the complainant himself turned hostile. He further submitted that PW.1, in his chief-examination, did not state anything against the appellant, but in his cross- examination specifically stated that money given by him to the appellant was towards supervisory charges. He also submitted that Exs.P.14 and P.16-receipts are subsequent to the trap and there is no relevancy to the above said documents. 6.2. He further submitted that PW.1, in his chief-examination, did not state anything against the appellant, but in his cross- examination specifically stated that money given by him to the appellant was towards supervisory charges. He also submitted that Exs.P.14 and P.16-receipts are subsequent to the trap and there is no relevancy to the above said documents. 6.2. He further submitted that PW.2 is not an eye witness and he is not even a shadow witness, but acted as a mediator and he was used as stock witness by the prosecution and, hence, his evidence cannot be taken into consideration. He further submitted that unless the prosecution discharges the initial burden by proving the case in all probabilities, the burden does not shift upon the appellant. In the case on hand, the prosecution has not discharged its initial burden. The judgments which were relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and on perusal of the record, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge convicting the appellant for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act is sustainable under law? (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled any relief in the appeal? (iii) To what relief? Analysis : Points (i) to (iii) : 8. It is not in dispute that basing upon the complaint lodged by PW.1 dated 01.01.2000, Crime No.1 of 2000 was registered. PW.8-Investigating Officer after conducting investigation filed the charge sheet before the Principal Special Judge for ACB Cases at Hyderabad, and the same was taken cognizance and it was numbered as C.C.No.7 of 2002. 9. The record discloses that PW.1 was awarded the work of construction of a school building worth of Rs.1,70,000/- and he had received payment for two bills, but the final bill was pending. After completion of work, when he requested the appellant for release of the final bill amount of Rs.25,500/-, the appellant demanded a sum of Rs.4,000/- towards illegal gratification for processing the final bill and issuing the cheque. At that state, PW.1 lodged complaint- Ex.P.1. After completion of work, when he requested the appellant for release of the final bill amount of Rs.25,500/-, the appellant demanded a sum of Rs.4,000/- towards illegal gratification for processing the final bill and issuing the cheque. At that state, PW.1 lodged complaint- Ex.P.1. Pursuant to the same, crime was registered and LWs.8 to 12 laid a trap against the appellant in the presence of PW.2 and they recovered tainted currency notes of Rs.4,000/- from the appellant after conducting a chemical test. 10. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1, in his chief examination, did not state that the appellant demanded an amount of Rs.4,000/- towards illegal gratification for issuing the final bill amount of Rs.25,500/-. On the other hand, in his cross-examination, he stated that he kept some amount in the right hand of the appellant stating to him that the said amount pertains to supervisory charges payable to site engineer and he specifically stated that the appellant did not demand and accept any amount from PW.1 as bribe for processing the final bill, either on 03.01.2000 or subsequent to the said date. 11. PW.2 in his evidence stated that he acted as a mediator in another case registered by ACB, Warangal. He also stated in his cross-examination that unless the work is completed in all aspects, there was no possibility to make final payment to PW.1. He also stated that he along with the Investigating Officer and other staff went to the house of the appellant in a jeep. However, they were informed that the appellant went to Mahabubabad, where construction work was going on. Thereafter, they reached Mahabubabad, where D.R.C. building works are going on and where the appellant was available. 12. PW.3, who is a private driver, did not state anything against the appellant and he was declared as hostile. 13. PW.4, site engineer, in his cross-examination, stated that PW.1 did not pay the amount towards supervisory charges by 03.01.2000 and initially the contractor will pay the supervisory charges and at the time of payment of final bill, the Department will reimburse such supervisory charges to the contractor (PW.1). He also stated that Ex.P.16-receipt issued by him to the Additional Project Coordinator to the effect that he had received Rs.4,000/- from the appellant towards supervisory charges. This admission directly contradicts the prosecution case that the said sum represented illegal gratification demanded by the appellant. 14. He also stated that Ex.P.16-receipt issued by him to the Additional Project Coordinator to the effect that he had received Rs.4,000/- from the appellant towards supervisory charges. This admission directly contradicts the prosecution case that the said sum represented illegal gratification demanded by the appellant. 14. PW.5, who is executive engineer, did not state anything against the appellant and he also turned hostile. 15. PW.6, in his chief-examination, stated that he received a written requisition in Ex.P.19 from D.S.P., ACB, Warangal, on 04.01.2000. Pursuant to the same, he forwarded Exs.P.20-file and Ex.P.12-Measurement Book along with cover letter under Ex.P.21 to the D.S.P. He further stated that the final payment was made to PW.1 on 29.01.2000 on the basis of Ex.P.17-check report and Ex.P.24-proceedings issued by him. In his cross- examination, he specifically stated that as on 22.01.2000, plastering of ceiling, fixing of racks in the shelves and re- white washing works were incomplete. After receipt of Ex.P.27-letter from MEO and recommendation of Executive Engineer regarding check report, final payment was made to PW.1. 16. PW.7 did not state anything against the appellant. 17. PW.8, who is a Trap Laying Officer, stated in his evidence that he received a complaint from PW.1. He enquired about the professional conduct of the appellant, conducted the trap, seized the amount from the appellant and filed the charge sheet through LW.13. 18. DW.1, in his evidence, stated that he had taken photographs. Ex.D.3-(18) are the positive photographs and corresponding negatives pertaining to the school building were taken by him. According to the said photographs, the school building works were incomplete. DW.1, in his cross- examination, stated that no proceedings had been issued to him by D.P.E.P. for taking the said photographs and he subsequently denied the suggestion that entire work was completed by the said date. 19. DW.3, in his evidence, stated that he, along with his friend Srinivas Reddy and worker Chand, was present at the site on 03.01.2000, where R.C.C. slab was being laid for D.R.C. building at Mahabubabad and the appellant came to the site at 09.00 a.m. in official jeep. At about 11.45 a.m., PW.1 came to the spot. At that time, he and Srinivas Reddy saw the appellant and Chand coming down from the slab and going towards the place where the mixers were working through the said passage. Ten minutes thereafter, they came towards front side of the building. At about 11.45 a.m., PW.1 came to the spot. At that time, he and Srinivas Reddy saw the appellant and Chand coming down from the slab and going towards the place where the mixers were working through the said passage. Ten minutes thereafter, they came towards front side of the building. At that time, PW.1 went towards the appellant and Chand and gave some amount to the appellant, who took it and kept it in his pant pocket. Then the appellant again went to the slab of D.R.C. building. PW.1 went behind him and Srinivas Reddy. After some time, some persons came to the D.R.C. building, went to the slab, and took the appellant to the MPDO Office. DW.3 in his cross-examination denied the suggestion made by the prosecution that DW.3 and Chand were not present in the premises of D.R.C. building on the date and at the hour of the trap. 20. DW.4 in his evidence stated that on 03.01.2000 at D.R.C. building, the ACB officials went to the appellant and took him to the M.P.D.O. office. 21. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant does not have any role or authority to forward the final bill or to issue the cheque to PW.1. The appellant did not demand any amount from PW.1 on 20.12.1999 or 01.01.2000. The appellant was not present when PW.1 visited the office on 20.12.1999 or his residence on 01.01.2000. Even according to the prosecution, the appellant was present at the construction site during the trap operation on 03.01.2000. Hence, the question of demanding any amount from PW.1 does not arise. 22. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1, in his chief- examination and cross-examination, did not state anything against the appellant that he demanded Rs.4,000/- as illegal gratification in order to process his final bill amount of Rs.25,500/- and issue the cheque. But, he specifically stated that the amount paid by PW.1 to the appeal is towards supervisory charges that is payable to the site engineer/PW.4 and the appellant did not demand and accept any amount from him as bribe for processing his final bill, either on 03.01.2000 or subsequent to the said date. 23. But, he specifically stated that the amount paid by PW.1 to the appeal is towards supervisory charges that is payable to the site engineer/PW.4 and the appellant did not demand and accept any amount from him as bribe for processing his final bill, either on 03.01.2000 or subsequent to the said date. 23. It is also the case of the appellant is that PW.1 had not completed the construction of school building as per the terms and conditions of the contract, and therefore, the question of payment of final bill amount to PW.1 does not arise. Even according to the prosecution witness PW.6, the appellant did not have authority to issue cheque and the issuance of the final bill arises only after completion of entire work and as on 22.01.2000, the school building works, namely plastering of ceiling, fixing of racks in the shelves and re-white washing were pending and the said works were completed subsequently. The Mandal Education Officer issued a letter through Ex.P.27, relying on the completion of the works. Pursuant to the said letter- Ex.P.27 only, the final payment was made to the contractor. The above said document is subsequent to the trap. 24. It is pertinent to mention that PW.4 also, in his evidence, stated that PW.1 has not paid any amount towards supervisory charges by 03.01.2000. Initially the contractor will pay his supervisory charges and after final amount, the Department reimburse such supervisory charges to PW.1. He received Rs.4,000/- from the appellant towards supervisory charges, which was given by PW.1. Pursuant to the same, he had issued Ex.P.16-receipt. The evidence of PWs.1 and 4 were taken into consideration together, PW.1 paid an amount of Rs.4,000/- to the appellant pertaining to the supervisory charges. Even according to the prosecution, as on the date of trap, PW.1 has not paid the supervisory charges to PW.4. 25. In Zwinglee Ariel supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the fundamental presumption of innocence and the necessity of stringent evidentiary standards in criminal trials. The Court, while scrutinising the prosecution case, emphasised that lapses in procedure and lack of corroboration fatally weaken the prosecution’s version. It was held that conviction cannot rest on doubtful, circumstantial, or uncorroborated testimony; rather, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established through reliable and consistent evidence. The Court, while scrutinising the prosecution case, emphasised that lapses in procedure and lack of corroboration fatally weaken the prosecution’s version. It was held that conviction cannot rest on doubtful, circumstantial, or uncorroborated testimony; rather, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established through reliable and consistent evidence. This decision thus not only protects the rights of the accused but also fortifies the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that findings of guilt are anchored in unimpeachable proof. 26. In Mini supra, the appellant urged that the Courts below erred in disregarding the defence explanation under Section 313 CrPC. The accused had clarified that the complainant, through an advocate, had sought his assistance for obtaining a passport and, in that context, tendered Rs.1,000/- as prescribed fee along with requisite documents. The accused maintained that he accepted the money believing it to be only the lawful fee, being unaware that two Rs.100/- notes were concealed between two Rs.500/- notes. Thus, his defence consistently was that there was no conscious receipt of any bribe but only acceptance of the legitimate statutory fee. 27. In Jagtar Singh supra, the Supreme Court observed that with both the complainant and the shadow witness having turned hostile, and no evidence of reiteration of demand at the time of the alleged payment, the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirement of demand. The only evidence was that of PW-8, who merely proved recovery from the appellant. The High Court, by presuming demand solely from the fact of recovery, committed a serious error. The Court held that in the absence of either direct or circumstantial evidence proving demand, conviction could not be sustained. 28. In the above said judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that convictions under anti-corruption laws must be based on clear, credible, and corroborated evidence. Mere recovery of money or procedural lapses cannot replace proof of essential elements, particularly demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification. Courts must carefully examine hostile witnesses, defence explanations, and the possibility of innocent receipt, as presuming guilt from recovery or circumstantial factors alone violates the presumption of innocence. Therefore, each element of the offences must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 29. In Vinod Kumar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified multiple important aspects of criminal trials. Courts must carefully examine hostile witnesses, defence explanations, and the possibility of innocent receipt, as presuming guilt from recovery or circumstantial factors alone violates the presumption of innocence. Therefore, each element of the offences must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 29. In Vinod Kumar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified multiple important aspects of criminal trials. Firstly, following S. Jeevanantham v. State, it was held that the fact that the same officer lodged the FIR and conducted the investigation does not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings unless bias or prejudice is shown. Secondly, the Court reiterated the well-settled principle from Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, and Khujji v. State of M.P., that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in toto, but remains admissible and can be relied upon to the extent it is found credible and corroborated. It further stressed that the Public Prosecutor, during re-examination, has wide latitude to clarify or elicit explanations from such witnesses, and both the prosecution and the defence are entitled to rely upon parts of their testimony. Lastly, approving M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., the Court recognised that when witnesses turn hostile contrary to their earlier statements recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC, and appear to have been won over, they may rightly be prosecuted for perjury. 30. In Vinod Kumar Garg supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with discrepancies relating to the hand-wash and pant-wash procedure in a trap case. It was noticed that while one witness could not recall the details and another stated that the pant-wash was not conducted, the evidence clearly established that the tainted money was kept in a polythene bag, which was duly washed and the wash preserved in bottles. The Court held that such minor inconsistencies or inability of witnesses to recollect precise details regarding the washes did not undermine the prosecution case or warrant acquittal, as the core fact of recovery stood duly proved. 31. In Neeraj Dutta supra, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively summarised the governing principles under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It held that proof of both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act. Such proof may be established through direct oral or documentary evidence, or, in its absence, by reliable circumstantial evidence. It held that proof of both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act. Such proof may be established through direct oral or documentary evidence, or, in its absence, by reliable circumstantial evidence. The Court clarified the distinction between “acceptance” under Section 7 , which arises where a public servant merely receives an unsolicited offer from a bribe-giver, and “obtainment” under Section 13 (1)(d), which requires a prior demand emanating from the public servant. Mere recovery of tainted money, without proof of demand, is insufficient to establish guilt. Presumption of fact regarding demand and acceptance may be drawn only when foundational facts are proved, whereas Section 20 mandates a presumption of law in respect of offences under Section 7 , subject to rebuttal, but does not extend to Section 13 (1)(d). Importantly, even where the complainant turns hostile, dies, or is otherwise unavailable, the demand can still be proved through other witnesses or circumstantial evidence, and the prosecution case does not necessarily fail. 32. The above said judgments relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor are distinguishable and in those cases, prosecution proved about involvement of accused and foundatinal facts of demand, whereas, in the present case, such facts are entirely absent and key witnesses have turned hostile. Reliance on those judgments cannot sustain conviction, since the burden of proof in corruption offences rests entirely on the prosecution, and the statutory presumption under Section 20 cannot apply in the absence of proof of demand. Mere recovery of money does not establish guilt without corroborative evidence of conscious acceptance, and courts must not infer criminal liability from assumptions or incomplete evidence. 33. It is very much relevant to pertinent to mention that in N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N. , (2021) 3 SCC 687 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in corruption cases, mere recovery of tainted money is not enough to prove guilt. To secure conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, the prosecution must prove demand and voluntary acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption under Section 20 can arise only after such proof. If the complainant does not support the case and there is no independent evidence of demand, conviction cannot stand. To secure conviction under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, the prosecution must prove demand and voluntary acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption under Section 20 can arise only after such proof. If the complainant does not support the case and there is no independent evidence of demand, conviction cannot stand. The Court also stressed that once a trial court acquits, the presumption of innocence becomes stronger, and unless its view is perverse, appellate courts should not interfere. Since demand and acceptance were not proved, the acquittal by the trial court was a possible view, and the High Court’s conviction was set aside. 34. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. , (2015) 10 SCC 152 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that in offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of demand of illegal gratification is essential. Mere recovery of tainted money, or even acceptance without proof of demand, is insufficient to establish guilt. The presumption under Section 20 also arises only after demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, since the complainant had died and PW1’s testimony did not clearly establish demand, the prosecution’s case lacked decisive proof. The Court held that convicting the accused would amount to an impermissible inference, and emphasized that failure to prove demand is fatal to the prosecution’s case. 35. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the sine qua non of demand, which is the foundational requirement for establishing an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. PW.1, the complainant, along with PWs.3, 4, and 5 were not supported the prosecution case. The Learned Special Judge, however, relied upon the evidence of PW.2, who is a stock witnesses, convicted the appellant. The evidence on record further demonstrates that the money allegedly received by the appellant was in fact paid towards supervisory charges to PW.4 connected with the ongoing construction of a school building. The records reveal that on the date of lodging the complaint and laying the trap, the construction work was admittedly incomplete, and PW.4, subsequently issued a receipt and processed the final bill pursuant to Ex.P.27 dated 22.01.2000, conclusively showing that the payment had a legitimate basis. In these circumstances, the essential ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification are wholly absent. 36. In these circumstances, the essential ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification are wholly absent. 36. The legal position consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zwinglee Ariel , Mini , Jagtar Singh , N. Vijayakumar , and P. Satyanarayana Murthy supra is that mere recovery of money, without proof of demand, cannot sustain conviction, as the statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only when demand and conscious acceptance are proved beyond reasonable doubt. To hold otherwise would dilute the principle of presumption of innocence and expose individuals to criminal liability based on incomplete or unreliable evidence. Since the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proof, the recovered amount cannot be held to be illegal gratification. CONCLUSION: 38. In view of foregoing reasons and precedent decisions, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution failed to bring home the guilt of the appellant for the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt and the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed by the learned Special Judge is liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves the relief. Accordingly, point Nos.(i) and (ii) are answered. RESULT : Point No.(iii) 39. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 09.04.2007 passed in C.C.No.7 of 2002 on the file of the Principal Special Judge for ACB Cases at Hyderabad, is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act and his bail bonds shall stand cancelled. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.