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2025 DIGILAW 1050 (ALL)

Urmila Devi v. State of U. P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue Deptt. , Lko.

2025-08-13

ALOK MATHUR

body2025
JUDGMENT : Alok Mathur, J. 1. Heard Shri Ashok Kumar Singh 'Pankaj', learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondents no. 1 to 4, Shri Satendra Nath Rai, learned counsel for respondents no. 5 to 7 and Shri Mukesh Sharma, learned counsel for respondent no.8. 2. In view of the order proposed to be passed, notice to respondent no. 9 is dispensed with. 3. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.3.2020 passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Utraula, District Balrampur as well as the appellate order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Administration- II, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda dated 20.11.2024 and order dated 04.07.2025, passed by the Board of Revenue, wherein all the three orders the matter has been decided against the petitioner. 4. The facts in brief, as stated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner had purchased the half of the land of Gata No. 280 Min. through a registered sale deed on 18.05.1991 from the recorded tenure holder, Prameshwari and his name was duly mutated in the revenue records. The opposite parties no. 5 to 7 are the successor in interest of the recorded tenure holder and undoubtedly are owners of the remaining portion of Gata No. 280 and in the aforesaid circumstances, the suit for partition for half of the land was filed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, under Section 176 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. At the stage of preparation of Kura (share) objections were filed by the petitioner and a prayer was made to divide the land in such a manner that both the co-sharers have equal land of P.W.D. Road side, which is of higher value land. The Sub Divisional Magistrate decided the matter in favour of respondents no. 5 to 7 rejecting the prayer made by the petitioner. By means of order dated 17.3.2020 the petitioner thereafter, filed an application for recall of the order dated 17.3.2020, which was also rejected and thereafter filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda, which was also rejected on 20.11.2024. A Second Appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue, which has also been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 4.7.2025. All the aforesaid orders have been assailed in the present writ petition. 5. A Second Appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue, which has also been rejected by means of the impugned order dated 4.7.2025. All the aforesaid orders have been assailed in the present writ petition. 5. At the very outset learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner does not have any right or interest in the disputed property, in as much as, he has gifted 0.2160 hectare of land by means of a registered sale deed on 2.6.2021 and the remaining portion of the land i.e. 0.107 hectare by means of a sale deed on 19.7.2021. He submits that after divesting with the aforesaid portion of the land no further portion remains with the petitioner and accordingly he has no right to further litigate in the said matter after that he has divested himself in the said property. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has opposed the objection made by the respondents, he does not firstly dispute the said fact that the entire portion of land stands divested by sale deed dated 19.7.2021 and gift deed dated 2.6.2021 but submits that despite the aforesaid fact, the petitioner still has right to pursue his legal remedies. In support of his submission he has relied upon the judgment in the case of Ram Chander Vs. Deputy Director of Cosmopolitan , passed in Case Consolidation No. 47 of 2013. In the said judgment he has relied upon the judgment which was quoted therein in the case of Ram Pyare Verma Versus Third Additional District Judge, Faizabad , 2015 (128) RD 273 ; wherein he has held that impleadment of the purchaser who had bought the property during the pendency of the suit is not necessary. The purchaser during the pendency of the lis steps into the shoes of the original defendant/ judgement debtor. It is only the aforesaid judgment was quoted but the petitioner could not reduced the entire judgment even perusal of the aforesaid clearly indicates that the same does not apply in the case of the petitioner, in as much as, it is clearly held that the purchaser steps into the shoes of the original defendant and accordingly the proceedings if any, can be continued after impleading the subsequent purchaser. He further relied upon another judgment in the case of Usha Sinha Vs. He further relied upon another judgment in the case of Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and others ; (2008)7 Supreme Court Cases 144, which was the matter when the question before the Court was pertaining to an execution of a decree and which case also does not apply to the facts of the present case and it is clearly distinguishable. 7. Considering the objections raised by the respondents, it is noticed that once the petitioner has been divested all the rights vested in the property he would be stranger to the said dispute and accordingly will not have any right to litigate with regard to the said property. One of the basic consideration for any person in any litigation in his right or interest in the disputed property. Even if the right is removed still a person has a right to litigate even if he has contingent right he can contest and participate in the litigation which is distinguishable from a person who has absolutely no right in the property and initially had a right but had subsequently divested such a right. In the present case there is no dispute that the petitioner has sold of entire portion of the disputed property and does not have any right or interest in the said land. Even if a small portion had been retained by the petitioner then he would have sufficient interest to continue with the litigation but we are not persuaded by the argument of the petitioner that despite selling of and divesting the entire land, he would continue with the litigation. 8. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner has transferred the whole of his share in the disputed land and no portion thereof remains vested in him. Had the petitioner retained even a fractional interest in the said property, such retention would have been adequate to sustain his participation in the proceedings. But, having divested himself of the entire property, the petitioner neither stands to gain nor to suffer any loss by the outcome of the litigation. In such a situation, the only person competent to prosecute or defend the proceedings would be the transferee, or any person lawfully stepping into the shoes of the petitioner, unless it is shown that some residual right or interest continues to subsist in favour of the petitioner. 9. In such a situation, the only person competent to prosecute or defend the proceedings would be the transferee, or any person lawfully stepping into the shoes of the petitioner, unless it is shown that some residual right or interest continues to subsist in favour of the petitioner. 9. The principle that a litigant must demonstrate a subsisting right in the subject matter o dispute to maintain a proceeding has been consistently affirmed by the Courts. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [(19920)2 SCC 524], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the primary test for determining locus standi is whether the person approaching the Court has a direct or substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Similarly, in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan [ (1999)4 SCC 526 ], it was emphasized that a person who becomes a stranger to the subject matter, having divested all interest therein, cannot be permitted to prosecute the proceedings. The Allahabad High Court in Ram Swarup v. Board of Revenue [ AIR 1966 All 623 ] reiterated that once a party has completely alienated his interest in the disputed land, the proper course is for the transferee or assignee to be substituted in his place, as the transferor ceases to have any enforceable right. 10. Applying the above principles, it is clear that since the petitioner has sold away the entire disputed property, he lacks the necessary locus standi to continue with the present proceedings. 11. In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that once the petitioner has sold of and divested upon the disputed property, he cannot persuade the court to decide any lis in the dispute and for this reason, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner does not have any right to continue the litigation subsequent to divesting of the said land. 12. In the light of the above, I find that this petition is not maintainable at the behest of the petitioner and consequently dismissed.