Nirmal @ Mota S/o Baldeo Singh v. State of Rajasthan
2025-04-08
FARJAND ALI
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
Order : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. This criminal appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 31.10.2023 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge No.1, Sriganganagar, in Sessions Case No.17/2017 (CIS No.52/2016), whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 7/25 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo seven years of simple imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.10,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo an additional three months of simple imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 03.03.2016, one Sub-Inspector Bhoop Singh of Police Station Kotwali, District Sri Ganganagar, is alleged to have received secret information about a boy in possession of a country-made revolver, who was standing near a pipal tree and Shiv Mandir. Acting on the information, he reached the spot where it was alleged that the appellant was standing. Upon conducting a search, a country-made revolver was found in the right pocket of the appellant’s pants. Based on the above, FIR No.99/2016 was registered under Section 5/25 of the Arms Act, and the appellant was arrested. After the usual investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant for commission of an offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. 3. After taking cognizance of the offence, the learned Magistrate heard the parties on the question of framing of charges and thereafter framed charges under Section 7 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act. It is pertinent to mention that, as per the investigation report, the police were of the opinion that the recovered arm fell under the definition of an offence under Section 3 of the Arms Act, which is why the charge sheet was submitted under Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Act. The basis for invoking Section 7 instead of Section 3 appears to be a report of the District Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar, which stated that the seized ammunition fell under the prohibited category. 4. The trial commenced, during which as many as 10 witnesses were examined and reliance was placed on 11 documents to substantiate the charge. The pistol (Article 1) was tendered in evidence. Thereafter, an explanation was sought from the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he denied the allegations and claimed innocence; however, no defence evidence was produced.
The trial commenced, during which as many as 10 witnesses were examined and reliance was placed on 11 documents to substantiate the charge. The pistol (Article 1) was tendered in evidence. Thereafter, an explanation was sought from the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he denied the allegations and claimed innocence; however, no defence evidence was produced. After hearing counsel for the parties, the learned Judge found the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as mentioned above. The judgment of conviction and the order of sentence are under challenge before this Court. 5. I have heard Shri Umesh Srimali, learned counsel for the appellant, and Shri V.S. Rajpurohit, learned counsel for the State, and have minutely examined the record of the case. My observations are as under: 5.1. PW-7 Sub-Inspector Bhoop Singh, was examined during the trial and reiterated the facts as mentioned in the report Exhibit P6. His deposition regarding the search of the appellant and the recovery of the country-made pistol from the right pocket of the appellant’s pants appears to be reliable. The fact of recovery is corroborated by prosecution witnesses Narpat Singh and Jogendra Singh. They were thoroughly cross-examined, but nothing came on record to create any doubt or suspicion to disbelieve their testimony. 5.2. The evidence to this effect further gets corroborated by the statements of PW-8 Jogendra Singh and PW-1 Satish. Exhibit P1 is the recovery memo of the country-made revolver, and Exhibit P2 pertains to the structure of the arm. Interestingly, the arm was not sent to a ballistic expert for verification or to ascertain its description and quality. Although Exhibit P5, a letter, was addressed to the armourer, PW-5 Rajendra Prasad but there is nothing on record to show his expertise in the branch or subject of armory. He is merely an F.C. (Field Constable)deployed as an armourer at the Reserved Police Line, Sri Ganganagar. He stated that a packet was sent to him by Police Station Sri Ganganagar containing a rusted 0.38 bore revolver. According to him, the seized revolver qualifies as a firearm. However, he does not assert that it falls under the definition of a prohibited firearm as it is defined under the Arms Act. He admits that he did not give any opinion that the seized article qualifies as a prohibited arm. 5.3.
According to him, the seized revolver qualifies as a firearm. However, he does not assert that it falls under the definition of a prohibited firearm as it is defined under the Arms Act. He admits that he did not give any opinion that the seized article qualifies as a prohibited arm. 5.3. The prosecution has not produced any other evidence to establish that the article falls under the definition of a prohibited arm. 5.4 Section 2(1)(i) of the Arms Act, 1959 defines prohibited arms. For reference, the provision reads: “ (i)“prohibited arms” means— (i) firearms so designed or adapted that, if pressure is applied to the trigger, missiles continue to be discharged until pressure is removed from the trigger or the magazine containing the missiles is empty, or (ii) weapons of any description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other such thing, and includes artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-tank firearms and such other arms as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify to be prohibited arms;” 5.5. A bare perusal of the definition makes it clear that only articles conforming to the criteria mentioned therein can be classified as prohibited arms. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce scientific, cogent, and reliable evidence to prove that the seized article was of the type defined under Section 2(1)(i) of the Arms Act. There is no such evidence to indicate the specific nature of the article allegedly seized from the appellant. 5.6. Section 3 of the Arms Act provides that no person shall acquire, possess, or carry any firearm or ammunition unless he holds a license under the provisions of the Act. A plain reading of Section 3 indicates that possessing an arm without a valid license constitutes an offence under the said provision, punishable under Section 25 of the Act. 5.7. Before moving forward, it is necessary to first discuss Section 7 of the Arms Act which is regarding prohibition of acquisition or possession, or manufacture or sale of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition. For ease of reference, Section 7 of the Arms Act is reproduced herein below:- “7. Prohibition of acquisition or possession, or of manufacture or sale of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition. ?No person shall?
For ease of reference, Section 7 of the Arms Act is reproduced herein below:- “7. Prohibition of acquisition or possession, or of manufacture or sale of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition. ?No person shall? (a) acquire, have in his possession or carry; or (b) 1[use, manufacture] sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove; or (c) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition unless he has been specially authorised by the Central Government in this behalf.” From bare perusal of the provision, it is evident that this section applies specifically to “prohibited arms” and “prohibited ammunition” as defined in Section 2(1)(i) and 2(1)(h) of the Arms Act, which usually includes automatic firearm, certain military- grade weapons. They cannot deal with prohibited arms or ammunition unless specifically authorised by the Central Government. 5.8 Section 2(1)(i) of the Arms Act defines “prohibited arms” as those designed in such a manner that, once the trigger is activated, the weapon continues to discharge projectiles automatically. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce credible evidence to establish that the firearm in question qualifies as a prohibited arm within the meaning of the Act. However, in the present case, the prosecution has failed to discharge this burden. No ballistic expert report has been brought on record, nor have any technical specifications or documentation regarding the nature of the recovered weapon been submitted. The challan appears to have been filed without the necessary foundational documents, and even such documents, if any, were not tendered during trial. In such circumstances, it becomes essential for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the weapon allegedly recovered from the accused falls within the ambit of “prohibited arms”. In the absence of such proof, the charge under Section 7 of the Arms Act cannot be sustained. There are provisions for other categories of arms defined under the Arms Act, for which punishment may be imposed under Section 3 of the Act, but not under Section 7 of the Act. 5.9 This Court feels that the learned Judge has not provided any reasoning as to why the case against the accused would fall under Section 7 of the Arms Act instead of Section 3 of the Arms Act.
5.9 This Court feels that the learned Judge has not provided any reasoning as to why the case against the accused would fall under Section 7 of the Arms Act instead of Section 3 of the Arms Act. I am of the firm opinion that to convict an accused under Section 7, concrete scientific evidence—such as report from a ballistic expert or a certified laboratory—must be produced to establish that the seized article meets the criteria of a prohibited arm as defined under Section 2(1)(i). In the absence of any definite findings or a special description of the ammunition, a conviction under Section 7 cannot be sustained. The learned Judge indeed has committed an error of law and fact in convicting the appellant under Section 7 without having specific nature of the weapon, and therefore the same is not legally sustainable. The appellant deserves to be acquitted from charge of Section 7 of the Arms Act. 6. The next question pertains to the applicable provision for penalizing the appellant. The recovery of ammunition has been proved through sufficient material. I am of the view that the appellant’s act of possessing a firearm without a valid license constitutes an offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act. 7. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds. The conviction of the appellant under Section 7 of the Arms Act is set aside; and he is convicted under Section 3 of the Arms Act instead. 8. Since the conviction under Section 7 has been set aside, the corresponding part of the sentence under that section automatically lapses. The appellant now stands convicted under Section 3 of the Arms Act. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the State on the question of sentence. 10. It is pleaded that the appellant has never been convicted in any previous case. This Court has verified from Paragraph 27 of the impugned judgment that he has been facing rigor trial since the year 2016. He was a young man of about 21 years at the time of the offence. Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act does not prescribe a sentence exceeding three years. Therefore, the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. and Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act are squarely applicable.
He was a young man of about 21 years at the time of the offence. Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act does not prescribe a sentence exceeding three years. Therefore, the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. and Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act are squarely applicable. Section 361 Cr.P.C. imposes a duty on the court to explain why the benefit of probation cannot be granted in cases where the punishment does not exceed seven years. With the advent of reformative sentencing principles and the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act, the trial court must consider the point of extending the benefit of probation in the absence of overriding or extraordinary reasons. Nine years have elapsed since the initiation of the trial. Requiring the appellant to now furnish a bond for maintaining peace and good behaviour for a limited period would not serve the ends of justice. He has already undergone approximately two years and four months in custody. Considering his young age at the time of the offence, absence of criminal antecedents, and the prolonged pendency of the trial, this Court feels that the sentence already undergone would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. 11. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment of conviction under Section 7 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act is set aside. The appellant is convicted under Section 3 read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and his sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. 12. The appellant is reported to be in jail, therefore, it is ordered that he shall be released forthwith in this case. A requisition to this effect shall be sent to District Jail Shri Ganganagar/Central Jail, Bikaner to ensure his immediate release. 13. Record be sent back.