JUDGMENT : Ravi Cheemalapati, J. Challenging the order dated 05.03.2025 passed by a learned single Judge in Writ Petition vide W.P.No.20447 of 2019, the writ petitioner preferred this intra court appeal under clause 15 of Letters Patent. 2. Through the impugned orders, the writ petition filed challenging the notice for attachment (Form No.5) dated 28.11.2019 attaching his property and also the notices dated 05.11.2019 and 06.05.2019 issued by the Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation (for short, ‘APSFC’), was dismissed. 3. The contents of the writ petition, in brief, are that the petitioner availed top-up loan from APSFC vide two loan accounts by creating equitable mortgage over his property for due discharge of the said loans by executing a registered mortgage deed in favour of the APSFC. That wife of the petitioner also had availed loan of Rs.30,00,000/- from the APSFC, for which the petitioner stood as guarantor, however he did not keep his property as collateral security for the said loan and one Gundra Srinivasulu Reddy had kept his property as collateral security by executing a registered mortgage deed in favour of the APSFC. That the petitioner had cleared both the loan accounts by July,2017 and January,2018 respectively, but the APSFC did not release his property that was kept as collateral security for his loan accounts, stating that they will sell the said property for realization of the amount due under the loan account availed by his wife, as she had committed default in clearing her loan account. That the APSFC can only proceed against the properties of the petitioner’s wife or her guarantor for realization of the amount, but not against the property of the petitioner, since the said property was never mortgaged for discharge of the defaulted loan account of his wife. However, the APSFC, more than after three (03) years from the date of default of the account, is trying to bring the property of the petitioner to auction for realization of the amount covered under the loan account of his wife by orally informing the petitioner that collateral security offered to his loan accounts was extended to the loan account of his wife. It is further stated in the writ petition that the petitioner received a notice dated 06.05.1991 under Section 32(G) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 stating that the petitioner had consented for holding the charge over the property by execution of guarantee agreement. That there had never been any agreement between the petitioner and the APSFC regarding extension of his property as a collateral security for the loan sanctioned to his wife. That on the oral advice given by the Branch Manager, APSFC, Nellore that upon payment of some amount towards the defaulted loan account, his property would be released; the petitioner paid an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- towards the said account on 26.03.2019. That after four years from the date of default committed by his wife, the APSFC had chosen to proceed against the petitioner by issuing notices dated 06.05.2019, 05.11.2019 and 28.11.2019 in Form No.5 stating that the petitioner’s property would be brought to sale. That the debt due under the loan account of petitioner’s wife was time barred and the property of the petitioner was never kept as collateral security for the loan account of his wife and hence, the APSFC cannot proceed against the petitioner’s property and therefore, issuance of notices is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Hence the writ petition. 4. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed counter-affidavit denying the material averments of the petition inter alia contending that the petitioner stood as a guarantor by executing agreement of guarantee to the loan taken by his wife to the tune of Rs.30,00,000/- granted to her on 28.11.2012, however the said fact was not mentioned in the writ affidavit. That one Gundra Srinivasa Reddy offered his property as collateral security for the loan availed by the petitioner’s wife. That the petitioner executed covenant of co-obligant on 23.01.2013 and executed a notarized Sworn Affidavit on 06.02.2013 to the effect that he will not ask for return of original title deed documents offered to his loan account until closure of loan account of his wife. That therefore, the title deed documents pertaining to the property of the petitioner were not released in view of non-closure of loan account of his wife. That therefore, the title deed documents pertaining to the property of the petitioner were not released in view of non-closure of loan account of his wife. That since loan account of petitioner’s wife was classified as Non Performing Asset, action was initiated under the provisions of SARFAESI Act against the property kept as collateral security for loan availed by petitioner’s wife by one Gundra Srinivasa Reddy, however, it came to light that part of that property was included in prohibited properties list under Section 22-A of the Registration Act and the remaining property was subject matter of the suits in O.S.Nos.240 of 2020 and 70 of 2011 on the file of District Court Nellore. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that on 25.02.2019 the corporation officials requested the petitioner to clear the outstanding and accordingly the petitioner paid an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- and as there was no response either from the borrower or guarantor and as they did not clear off the entire loan account, preliminary notice dated 06.05.2019 under Section 32(G) of the State Financial Corporations Act, read with the provisions of A.P.Revenue Recovery Act was issued to the petitioner, his wife and collateral security holder requesting them to pay the dues of the loan account on or before 21.05.2019, but there was no response. That since part payment of Rs.2,00,000/- was made, which was appropriated to the loan account on 31.03.2019, the debt cannot be treated as time barred debt. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. The learned single Judge upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and upon considering the material, dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner is not entitled for the relief. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the writ petitioner preferred this intra court appeal. 7. Heard Sri J.Ugranarasimha, learned counsel for appellant/writ petitioner and Sri G.R.Sudhakar, learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2. 8. Sri J.Ugranarasimha, learned counsel, while reiterating the contents of the writ petition and grounds of appeal would contend that the loan account of respondent no.3 having been declared as a Non Performing Asset in the year 2014, the issuance of notice of demand on 06.05.2019 is barred by time. 8. Sri J.Ugranarasimha, learned counsel, while reiterating the contents of the writ petition and grounds of appeal would contend that the loan account of respondent no.3 having been declared as a Non Performing Asset in the year 2014, the issuance of notice of demand on 06.05.2019 is barred by time. He would further contend that since APSFC had invoked the provisions of SARFAESI Act in respect of the loan account of respondent no.3, they shall have to strictly adhere to the procedure contemplated under the said Act alone even in relation to the property of the appellant but they cannot be permitted to switch on to the provisions of State Financial Corporation Act and issue the notices impugned. He would further contend that debt barred by limitation cannot be recovered by resorting to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act, since the same would only facilitate speedy recovery of dues, but the same would not enlarge the right to recover the time barred debts. He would further contend that the learned single Judge had erroneously applied the principle of promissory estoppel ignoring the fact that the writ petitioner did neither execute affidavit at the time of sanctioning loan nor at the time of classification of the account as Non Performing Asset. He would further contend that liability to pay cannot be fastened on the petitioner basing on the alleged agreement of guarantee and sworn affidavit said to have been executed by petitioner. He would further contend that even as per the alleged sworn affidavit the appellant had only undertook not to seek release of the property documents till loan account of respondent no.3 is closed, but never mortgaged the property for discharge of the loan amount due of respondent no.3 either expressly or impliedly and therefore, the property of the petitioner cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act for realisation of the due under loan account of respondent no.3. He would further contend that fraud and mischief cannot be attributed to the appellant merely because the property offered as collateral security to loan account of his wife/respondent no.3 was found to be included in the prohibited properties list under section 22-A of the Registration Act, however the learned single Judge misconstrued the facts and came to an erroneous conclusion. He would further contend that fraud and mischief cannot be attributed to the appellant merely because the property offered as collateral security to loan account of his wife/respondent no.3 was found to be included in the prohibited properties list under section 22-A of the Registration Act, however the learned single Judge misconstrued the facts and came to an erroneous conclusion. He would finally contend that since the debt was barred by limitation and the appellant had never offered his property as collateral security, the writ petition has to be allowed setting aside the notices impugned therein, however, the learned single Judge under misconception of facts and law erroneously dismissed the writ petition. Accordingly, prayed to allow the writ petition. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions in (1) State of Kerala and others vs. V.R.Kalliyankutty and another , (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 657 , (2) K.P.Khemka and another vs. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and others , (2024) 8 Supreme Court Cases 391 , (3) M.D., APSFC, Hyderabad and another v. K.Satyanarayana , 2022 SCC OnLine TS 2631 and (4) N.A.Radha and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others , 2000 SCC OnLine AP 104 9. Sri G.R.Sudhakar, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, while reiterating the contents of the counter affidavit would contend that the petitioner executed guarantee agreement, covenant of co-obligant for the loan granted to respondent no.3 besides executing sworn affidavit to the effect that he will not ask for return of original title deed documents offered as security for his loan until closure of loan account of respondent no.3 and the above said documents would authorise the APSFC to proceed against the property of the petitioner for realisation of the amount due under the loan account of respondent no.3. He would further contend that the part payment made by the petitioner on 26.03.2019 towards the loan account of respondent no.3 would start limitation afresh and therefore, the debt is not barred by time. He would further contend that as the loan account was secured by an equitable mortgage, the limitation for recovery is twelve (12) years from the date the debt became due, but not three (03) years as sought to be contended by learned counsel for appellant. He would further contend that as the loan account was secured by an equitable mortgage, the limitation for recovery is twelve (12) years from the date the debt became due, but not three (03) years as sought to be contended by learned counsel for appellant. He would further contend that the learned single Judge upon proper appreciation of the material rightly came to the conclusion that period of limitation would be twelve (12) years and that the documents executed by petitioner would entitle the APSFC to enforce the mortgage over the property of the petitioner for realisation of the debt covered under the loan account of respondent no.3. There is no merit in the writ appeal and the same deserves dismissal. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the writ appeal. 10. Perused the material available on record and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 11. The petitioner availed top-up loan facility from APSFC vide two loan accounts and he had kept his property (hereinafter, referred to as ‘the subject property) as collateral security for due discharge of the loan accounts by executing a registered mortgage. There is no dispute regarding the fact that he had discharged the amounts due under the above said two loan accounts. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner stood as guarantor for the loan availed by his wife/ respondent no.3 from APSFC to the tune of Rs.30,00,000/- and he had executed an agreement of guarantee on 23.01.2013, as per which the liability of the petitioner is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor/respondent no.3. It is also an admitted fact that one Gundra Srinivasulu Reddy had kept his property as collateral security for the loan account of wife of the petitioner/respondent no.3 by executing a registered mortgage deed in favour of the APSFC. 12.The impugned notices dated 06.05.2019, 05.11.2019 and 28.11.2019 were issued under Section 32(G) of the State Financial Corporations Act calling upon the petitioner to pay off the dues under the loan account of respondent no.3, else the corporation would recover the dues as arrears of land revenue against the subject property under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Recovery Act. 13. 13. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are to the effect that a debt, which is barred by law of limitation cannot be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act, the object of which being speedy recovery of dues only but not to enlarge the right to recover the time barred debts. 14. The respondents are taking shelter of the payment of Rs.2,00,000/- made by the petitioner towards part payment of loan account of his wife/ respondent no.3 in support of their contention that the debt is not time barred and the said part payment would start fresh period of limitation 15. Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deal with extending the period of limitation. The former applies when there is an acknowledgment of liability in writing and the latter applies when there is a payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy. However, the acknowledgment or payment must be made before the expiration of the prescribed period. As per Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a promise to pay a time- barred debt is valid and enforceable if it is made in writing and signed by the person to be charged (the debtor) or his/her authorized agent. 16. It is also fairly settled that a part payment or acknowledgment made after a debt has already become time-barred under the Limitation Act does not extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the contention raised by the APSFC that even if it is presumed that the debt is barred by limitation, the payment of Rs.2,00,000/- made by petitioner towards part payment of the due covered under the loan account of respondent no.3 would extend the period of limitation and fresh limitation starts from that day, is unsustainable. 17. With the above, now coming to the aspect as to what was the period of limitation for recovering the amount due under the loan account of respondent no.3. 18. Admittedly, the loan account of respondent no.3 is secured, since one Gundra Srinivasulu Reddy, Son of Sundara Rami Reddy had kept his property as a collateral security by execution of the registered mortgage deed in favour of the APSFC. 18. Admittedly, the loan account of respondent no.3 is secured, since one Gundra Srinivasulu Reddy, Son of Sundara Rami Reddy had kept his property as a collateral security by execution of the registered mortgage deed in favour of the APSFC. Since the debt borrowed by respondent no.3 was secured, as per Section 62 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation would be twelve (12) years from the date on which the amount became due. Merely because the mortgaged property cannot be auctioned for realisation of the debt, does not, by itself, either diminish or extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the period of limitation for realisation of the debt due would be twelve (12) years from the date when the amount became due, which according to the petitioner was on 30.09.2014. 19. The agreement of guarantee dated 23.1.2013 executed by the petitioner is to the effect that his liability is coextensive with that of the borrower of the loan account i.e. respondent no.3. Since the loan account of respondent no.3 is secured, as stated supra the APSFC can enforce the security within a period of twelve (12) years from 30.09.2014. 20. By giving sworn affidavit dated 06.02.2012, the petitioner undertook that he will not seek release of the property mortgaged by him to the corporation as collateral security for the loan accounts availed by him, till the loan availed by his wife/ respondent no.3 is repaid to the corporation. 21. The intention of the petitioner, who is guarantor to his wife/respondent no.3 loan account, as evidence by the above sworn affidavit was to create a security interest that is akin to a mortgage over his property for the specific purpose of covering the debt from the unauctionable property. This intention coupled with the fact that the title deeds of the petitioner’s property were already deposited with the APSFC though for a different purpose, would create an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds over his property as defined under section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. 22. Therefore, the act of the Corporation, in issuing notices to the petitioner under Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, for realisation of the debt due towards the loan account of respondent no.3, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be either improper or irregular. 23. 22. Therefore, the act of the Corporation, in issuing notices to the petitioner under Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, for realisation of the debt due towards the loan account of respondent no.3, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be either improper or irregular. 23. The next contention that the Corporation having initiated proceedings under SARFAESI Act in respect of the property that initially was kept a collateral security to the loan account of respondent no.3 shall not switch on to any other procedure except to the procedure under SARFAESI Act is concerned, the same is misconceived and misplaced, since the debtor would be at liberty to have his grievance redressed by adopting any procedure, however in accordance with law, that would be more convenient, feasible and yield quick results, unless barred by law. Except taking a bald plea, the learned counsel for the appellant did not specify any specific law that prevent the Corporation from switching on to the provisions of State Financial Corporations Act and Revenue Recovery Act, having initiated action under SARFAESI Act in relation to some other property for recovering the debt due under the loan account of respondent no.3. Therefore, the said contention of the learned counsel for respondent does not merit consideration. 24. The learned single Judge had rightly dismissed the writ petition. The writ appeal lacks merit and the same deserves dismissal. 25. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.