Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari,J. 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner. 2. Present petition has been filed seeking following reliefs:- “i. Set aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2024 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghazipur in Hindu Marriage Petition No. 551 of 2024, (Ajit Singh Yadav vs. Smt. Neelam Yadav) under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, by which the court below has rejected the application dated 10.09.2024.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that marriage of petitioner and respondent was solemnized on 11.12.2020. After some time, some differences took place between the parties and they have decided to live separately from 20.12.2021. All attempts made for reconciliation have been failed between the parties. As there was no scope for reconciliation between the parties, therefore, they have filed divorce petition with specific averment that they are living separately since 20.12.2021. The said petitioner was registered as Hindu Marriage Petition No. 551 of 2024, under section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1955’) before Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghazipur. Thereafter, order dated 30.07.2024 has been passed directing the parties to appear before the mediation centre on 10.09.2024 and further 01.02.2025 was fixed for hearing/evidence. Both the parties have appeared before mediation centre on 10.09.2024 and thereafter, mediation proceedings were dropped. As long date of 01.02.2025 was fixed, therefore, parties have moved application no. 11(c) dated 20.09.2024 for waiver off statutory period of six months as provided under Section 13-B(2) Act, 1955, which was rejected vide impugned order dated 11.09.2024. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that once there is no scope of mediation between the parties, in the light of judgment of Apex Court in the matter of Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur; (2017) 8 Supreme Court cases 746, it is required on the part of Court to waive off the cooling period of six months. 5. He next submitted that in another Criminal Case No. 652 of 2021, matter was again referred to mediation centre and this time both the parties have appeared before the mediation centre and an agreement dated 01.08.2024 took place between them to dissolve their marriage. In the said agreement, it was also admitted that out of total settlement amount of Rs. 13 lakh, respondent had already received Rs. 8 lakh and remaining Rs. 5 lakh shall be given to her after decree of divorce. In the said agreement, it was also admitted that out of total settlement amount of Rs. 13 lakh, respondent had already received Rs. 8 lakh and remaining Rs. 5 lakh shall be given to her after decree of divorce. He firmly pointed out that under such facts, impugned order is bad and liable to be set aside. 6. I have considered submissions made by counsel for petitioner and perused the records as well as copy of agreement dated 01.08.2024 before Mediation and Reconciliation Centre, Ghazipur. 7. From the perusal of records, it is apparently clear that as on date, parties are living separately and there is no scope of reconciliation between the parties. Agreement dated 01.08.2024 also provides very same facts that now parties are agreed to withdraw all criminal cases between them and further proceeded with divorce petition to obtain decree of divorce. 8. In the case of Amardeep Singh (Supra) , Apex Court has taken same view. Relevant paragraph nos. 14 to 20 are being quoted below:- “14. Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that waiting period enshrined under Section 13-B(2) of the Act is directory and can be waived by the court where proceedings are pending, in exceptional situations. This view is supported by judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini, Karnataka High Court in Roopa Reddy vs. Prabhakar Reddy, Delhi High Court in Dhanjit Vadra vs. Smt. Beena Vadra and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Kumar Shukla vs. Smt. Neeta. Contrary view has been taken by Kerala High Court in M. Krishna Preetha vs. Jayan Moorkkanatt. It was submitted that Section 13B(1) relates to jurisdiction of the Court and the petition is maintainable only if the parties are living separately for a period of one year or more and if they have not been able to live together and have agreed that the marriage be dissolved. Section 13B(2) is procedural. He submitted that the discretion to waive the period is a guided discretion by consideration of interest of justice where there is no chance of reconciliation and parties were already separated for a longer period or contesting proceedings for a period longer than the period mentioned in Section 13B(2). Thus, the Court should consider the questions: i) How long parties have been married? ii) How long litigation is pending? iii) How long they have been staying apart? Thus, the Court should consider the questions: i) How long parties have been married? ii) How long litigation is pending? iii) How long they have been staying apart? iv) Are there any other proceedings between the parties? v) Have the parties attended mediation/conciliation? vi) Have the parties arrived at genuine settlement which takes care of alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties? 15. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were living separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts at mediation and reconciliation have been tried and have failed and there is no chance of reconciliation and further waiting period will only prolong their agony. 16. We have given due consideration to the issue involved. Under the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the statutory law on the point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be dissolved by consent. The Act enabled the court to dissolve marriage on statutory grounds. By way of amendment in the year 1976, the concept of divorce by mutual consent was introduced. However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to divorce being granted before six months of time elapsing after filing of the divorce petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down to enable the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants divorce by mutual consent only if there is no chance for reconciliation. 17. The object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve a marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down and to enable them to rehabilitate them as per available options. The amendment was inspired by the thought that forcible perpetuation of status of matrimony between unwilling partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling off the period was to safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of differences being reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better option. 18. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better option. 18. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. This principle, as formulated in Justice G.P. Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (9th Edn., 2004), has been cited with approval in Kailash versus Nanhku and ors. as follows:(SCC pp. 496-97, para 34). “34……..The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord Campbell said: “No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.” (p. 338) “For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature’, points out Subbarao, J. ‘the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non- compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non- compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered’. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory.” (pp. 339-40) 19. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory.” (pp. 339-40) 19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following : i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court. 20. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation. ” 9. Facts of this case are fully covered with the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in Amardeep Singh (Supra). In the present case, both the parties are living separately since 20.12.2021 and also filed divorce petition jointly. Apart that, earlier attempts of mediation was failed, but later on, in another proceeding, mediation took place between the parties with agreement to dissolve the marriage and withdraw the criminal cases pending between them. In the present case, both the parties are living separately since 20.12.2021 and also filed divorce petition jointly. Apart that, earlier attempts of mediation was failed, but later on, in another proceeding, mediation took place between the parties with agreement to dissolve the marriage and withdraw the criminal cases pending between them. Therefore, under such facts, there is no occasion to direct the petitioner to wait for cooling off period as provided in Section 13-B(2) of Act, 1955. 10. Therefore, under such facts of the case as well as law laid down by the Apex Court in Amardeep Singh (Supra), impugned order dated 11.09.2024 is bad and hereby set aside. 11. Writ petition is accordingly, allowed. 12. No order as to costs. 13. Principal Judge, Family Court, Ghazipur is directed to proceed with the divorce petition waiving off the cooling period of six months as provided in Section 13-B(2) of Act, 1955.