K. Narasimha Murthy, S/o. K. Karianna v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Rep. by its General Manager
2025-01-10
VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, claiming the following relief: “To issue writ of mandamus to declaring the proceedings of the 3 rd respondent passed in TDO/ATP/24 dated 07.03.2008 as illegal, arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.” 2. The facts of the case are that, in response to the Notification dated 19.12.2003, issued by the 1 st respondent/IOCL, which called for applications from physically handicapped individuals for the position of retail outlet dealer at Yerraguntlapalli, Anantapur District, the petitioner, being physically handicapped and meeting the qualifications, submitted an application. Following the selection process, the petitioner was chosen by the selection committee, and a Letter of Intent was issued on 20.10.2004. Subsequently, an appointment letter dated 02.09.2005, was issued, officially appointing the petitioner as the dealer for the retail outlet at Yerraguntlapalli. After securing the necessary statutory permissions, the petitioner began operations and has been conducting the business in full compliance with the terms of the agreement and all other relevant statutory regulations. 3. While the matter stood thus, the 2nd respondent, the Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager, issued a notice dated 07.05.2007, stating that the petitioner’s application for the allotment of a retail outlet dealership was incomplete. Specifically, the petitioner had failed to provide proof of age and educational qualifications. Additionally, the medical certificate submitted in support of petitioner’s eligibility under the physically handicapped (PH) category was deemed invalid, as it was not issued by an authorized competent authority. Furthermore, the petitioner had not met the required tied- up volume, as indicated in the original application. In the light of these deficiencies, the petitioner was directed to show cause within two weeks as to why the petrol/HSD pump dealership agreement, dated 24.09.2005, should not be terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 4. In response to the notice dated 07.05.2007, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation refuting the allegations made against him. He specifically stated that all required documents were submitted at the time of application, and that these documents were cross-checked by the company during the interview process and duly satisfied before the petitioner was formally considered by the selection committee. The petitioner further clarified that he had met the sales targets set by the company, while also providing reasons for his failure to meet the earlier target.
The petitioner further clarified that he had met the sales targets set by the company, while also providing reasons for his failure to meet the earlier target. Additionally, the petitioner emphasized his status as a physically handicapped individual and expressed his willingness to undergo verification by a qualified medical professional. He also highlighted that the retail outlet dealership was his sole source of livelihood and requested to drop the alleged and invented proceedings against him. 5. Despite receipt of the petitioner’s detailed explanation, the second respondent did not issue any order, and as a result, the petitioner was not supplied with the products necessary to run subject retail outlet. Challenging the unilateral action of the 2 nd respondent, the petitioner filed W.P.No.13164 of 2007, wherein this Court directed was pleased dispose of the writ petition, directing the 2 nd respondent to consider the detailed explanation of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders. Thereupon, the 3 rd respondent passed the impugned order stating that the petitioner had produced an invalid certificate and mislead the selection committee. It was further stated that the petitioner furnished wrong information with regard to ownership of the trucks and buses. Challenging the same, the present writ petition is filed. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, denying material allegations, primarily contending the writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner seeks to challenge the termination of a private non-statutory commercial contract, involving the evaluation and adjudication of disputed questions of fact. It is submitted that the petitioner’s explanation with regard to submission of an invalid Medical Certificate was not accepted. The norms of the Corporation reflected in the Notification calling for applications and also the application form itself, require the submission of a Medical Certificate issued by an Authority not being below the rank of Civil Surgeon/Chief Medical Officer/Superintendent, Govt. Hospital, whereas, the petitioner furnished a Medical Certificate issued in the name of the Assistant Civil surgeon, Government General Hospital, Anantapur. This Medical Certificate was issued in the name of the Assistant Civil Surgeon, Government General Hospital, Anantapur along with the application in the prescribed format. Merely because the Selection Committee overlooked this aspect, the petitioner cannot state that the Selection Committee was satisfied with his Medical Certificate and the petitioner misled the Committee on the basis of an invalid certificate, thereby resulting in his selection. 7.
Merely because the Selection Committee overlooked this aspect, the petitioner cannot state that the Selection Committee was satisfied with his Medical Certificate and the petitioner misled the Committee on the basis of an invalid certificate, thereby resulting in his selection. 7. It is submitted that, according to Clause 45 of the Dealership Agreement date 24.09.2005, if any information given by the Dealer in his application for appointment as dealer is found to be untrue or incorrect, the Corporation shall be at liberty at its entire discretion to terminate the dealership agreement. It is submitted that, the petitioner secured his selection on the basis of invalid and incorrect documentation and declaration. The selection made on the basis of such misinformation/misrepresentation on facts is not sustainable in law and accordingly the action of the Corporation in terminating the Dealership Agreement was lawful, valid, justified and requested to dismiss the writ petition 8. During hearing, Sri N. Pramod, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, the selection of the petitioner was made by the Selection Committee and the 2 nd respondent has no power to issue a notice stating that the application submitted by the petitioner is incomplete and the basis on which the 2 nd respondent came to such a conclusion is not known. He further submits that, once the selection committee has interviewed and selected petitioner, it is not open to the 3 rd respondent to allege that the application was incomplete and the action of 3 rd respondent would amount to sitting over the decision taken by the Selection Committee which cannot be permitted, as such, the impugned order passed by the 3 rd respondent is illegal, arbitrary. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, Respondent No.3 is not the competent authority to pass the impugned order, since the petitioner was selected by the Selection Committee after having satisfied with the application as well as the certificates submitted at the time of selection.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, Respondent No.3 is not the competent authority to pass the impugned order, since the petitioner was selected by the Selection Committee after having satisfied with the application as well as the certificates submitted at the time of selection. If any irregularity was found, the application as well as the certificates submitted by the petitioner were not in accordance with the terms of the agreement, Respondent No.3 is under obligation to conduct a detailed enquiry by affording a fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to refute the allegations made if any, but, dehorsing the detailed enquiry, passing the impugned order by Respondent No.3 is without jurisdiction and contrary to the known settled proposition of law. 10. He further submits that, since the license is being continued, in view of the interim orders of this Court, the claim of the respondents that the period of agreement is already over and it cannot be continued is not acceptable. He contends that, once a statutory license is granted, as long as the licensee performs his duties in terms of the agreement, such statutory license should be continued. In respect of continuation of license, the terms of agreement may not come in the way and it should be renewed from time to time if the licensee complied with the terms and conditions of the agreement without any default and requested to set-aside the order impugned in this writ petition. 11. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 would submit that, the petitioner has submitted invalid documents in support of his physically handicapped status, tied up volumes, assets in the form of trucks. He also failed to submit proof of age and educational qualification along with his application. When a Notice dated 07.05.2007 was issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why the Dealership Agreement should not be terminated, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 23.05.2007, explaining the reason for not achieving the tied up volumes in respect of HSD and stated that he had achieved more than the target in respect of MS. After considering the explanation, final orders were passed by the Corporation on 07.03.2008. 12.
After considering the explanation, final orders were passed by the Corporation on 07.03.2008. 12. Learned counsel would submit that, the petitioner was required to submit Medial Certificate issued by an authority not below the rank of Civil Surgeon/Chief Medical Officer/Superintendent, Government Hospita., but the petitioner submitted Medical Certificate issued by the Assistant Civil Surgeon, Government General Hospital, Anantapur, which is impermissible as per the norms of the Corporation. Merely because the Selection Committee overlooked this aspect, it cannot be stated that the Selection Committee was satisfied with the Medical Certificate of the petitioner, as such the petitioner misled the Committee on the basis of an invalid certificate. 13. Learned counsel would further submit that, as per Clause 45 of the Dealership Agreement, the Corporation shall be at liberty at its entire discretion to terminate the Dealership Agreement, in case any document filed by the dealer is found untrue or incorrect, after such selectin or after paucity of time, thereby, the Corporation was justified in invoking Clause 45 of the Dealership Agreement. 14. Learned counsel submits that, the petitioner herein not only mislead the Selection Committee while submitting his application as well as submitted untrue and incorrect certificates, but also he clearly violated Clause 45(i) of the Dealership Agreement dated 24.09.2005. 15. He submits that, as per Clause (2) of the Dealership Agreement, the period of statutory license granted in favour of the petitioner has already expired on or before 01.09.2020, therefore, either continuation of license or granting of new license does not arise. In view of completion of license period and in the absence of any fresh renewal of the agreement or fresh appointment and granting license in favour of the petitioner, since the petitioner is not entitled to continue as a licensee of the corporation, as such the writ petition became infructuous. He further submits that the impugned order itself is passed violating the terms and conditions of the agreement, therefore, the power exercised by the Corporation does not come under the definition of power exercised by the Corporation as a State and the entire adjudication before this Court is out of the disputed facts, as such, the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked. 16. Finally, learned counsel would submit that, the petitioner statement with regard to his owning 60 buses and trucks was incorrect and untrue.
16. Finally, learned counsel would submit that, the petitioner statement with regard to his owning 60 buses and trucks was incorrect and untrue. The petitioner secured his selection on the basis of invalid and incorrect documentation and declarations. The selection made on the basis of such misinformation/misrepresentation on facts is not sustainable in law and Apart from that, pending writ petition, the license period was well as period of agreement has already expired, but due to interim direction of this Court, the petitioner has been supplied the material to run the outlet, therefore, the action of the Corporation in terminating the Dealership was valid and requested to dismiss the writ petition. 17. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material available on record. 18. This writ petition is filed challenging the proceedings in TDO/ATP/24dated 07.03.2008 passed by Respondent No.3, wherein the dealership agreement executed by the petitioner with the respondent for Retail Outlet Dealership at Yerraguntlapally stood terminated, due to the wrong information and incorrect documents furnished by the petitioner. At the outset, this writ petition is borne out of violation of terms of agreement by one party and those disputed facts cannot be adjudicated under extraordinary jurisdiction, as such, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that writ petition is not maintainable is to be considered. 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, Respondent No.3 has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned proceedings alleging that the petitioner violated Clause 45(i) of the Dealership Agreement is incorrect, for the reason that, since the petitioner got selected after having satisfied all the documents by the Selection Committee, the decision of the Selection Committee is neither altered and nor be interfered, therefore, the contention that impugned order is without jurisdiction is unsustainable and unacceptable, in view of Clause 45(i) of the Dealership Agreement. 20. For better understanding, Clause 45(i) of the Dealership Agreement is extracted hereunder: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, the Corporation shall be at liberty at its entire discretion to terminate this Agreement forthwith upon or at any time after the happening of any of the following event namely: (a) …..
20. For better understanding, Clause 45(i) of the Dealership Agreement is extracted hereunder: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, the Corporation shall be at liberty at its entire discretion to terminate this Agreement forthwith upon or at any time after the happening of any of the following event namely: (a) ….. (b) …… …… (c) If any information given by the Dealer in his application for appointment as a Dealer or in any document supplied therewith or filed in support thereof shall be found to be untrue or incorrect. 21. On plain reading of Clause 45(i) extracted above, it is clear that the Corporation is at discretion to terminate the agreement with the Dealer, if any information given by the Dealer in his application or documents filed by him are found to be untrue or incorrect. It means that any point of time even after selection, if found that incorrect documents were furnished, the respondent is empowered to take appropriate action under this clause. 22. In the present case, since the petitioner, who is a Dealer provided wrong information with regard to the incorrect Medical Certificate, wrong tied up volume etc, the Corporation has terminated the agreement in accordance with the power vested with it under with Clause 45(i) of the Agreement. Once the petitioner is a signatory to the Dealership Agreement, he is bound by the terms and conditions of such agreement. Hence, the respondent Corporation is at liberty to terminate the agreement of the petitioner. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 23. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a validity of statutory license or period of license of the petitioner would not come in the way of terms of the agreement. But, the said contention is also liable to be rejected and unsustainable, for the reason that, grant of statutory license for further period or afresh is certainly subject to the terms of agreement. Once an agreement comes to an end by virtue of the agreement, the petitioner is not entitled to seek continuation of the license as a matter of right, contrary to the terms of the agreement. For better appreciation, Clause (2) of the Dealership Agreement reads as follows: “2.
Once an agreement comes to an end by virtue of the agreement, the petitioner is not entitled to seek continuation of the license as a matter of right, contrary to the terms of the agreement. For better appreciation, Clause (2) of the Dealership Agreement reads as follows: “2. The Agreement shall remain in force for a period of fifteen years till the expiry of lease of land taken by the Corporation from 2 nd day of September, 2005 and continue thereafter for successive periods of one year each until determined by either party by giving three months notice in writing to the other of its intention to terminate this agreement and upon the expiration of any such notice, this agreement shall stand cancelled and revoked, provide that nothing contained in this clause shall prejudice the rights of either of the parties hereto to terminate this agreement earlier in exercise of their rights under any of the provisions contained in this agreement and/or the Corporation to stop and/or suspend and/or restrict the supplies to the Dealer and/or the sales from the premises by the Dealer pursuant to the provisions contained in that behalf in this agreement.” 24. From the above, it is evident that the agreement was valid for a period of fifteen years from 02.09.2005 which expired on 01.09.2020. But, the petitioner was able to carry out operations only in view of the interim orders granted by this Court in WPMP No.8577 of 2008 dated 27.03.2008. In view of the specific clause regarding period of license, in the absence of renewal of grant of initial license or a license afresh, the continuation of petitioner as dealer does not arise. Therefore, the writ petition itself became infructuous. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for continuation of license/dealership in the absence of any renewal or a fresh license. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed for in the writ petition. 25. In the result, writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 26. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.