Order : (Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.) 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner has questioned legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 28.12.2011 (Annexure P1), whereby even after holding the Petitioner to be eligible for grant of lease the lease was not granted to him on the ground that the lease is for 30 years and the amount proposed by the Petitioner for grant of lease is very meager as such the lease cannot be granted. 2. In the writ petition, the Petitioner has sought following reliefs: “10.1 That this Hon’ble court be pleased to call for the entire records of the case from the respondent authorities and consider the same for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality of the impugned order/letter. 10.2 This Hon’ble Court be pleased to be pleased to issue a writ I the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order/letter dated 28/12/2011 (Annexure P-1). 10.3 That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to allot the open roof of Arpa Complex, measuring 5,690 square feet to the petitioner. 10.4 That in the alternative, the petitioner prays for a direction to the respondents to return the amount deposited by the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 20% per annum. 10.5 This Hon’ble Court be further pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fit under the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner, against the respondents.” 3. According to the averments made in the writ petition, Respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur invited an auction notice for grant of lease of the open roof of Arpa Complex situated opposite to Nav-Bharat Press near old Bus Stand, Bilaspur. The aforesaid auction notice was published in the display boards of the Municipal Corporation Bilaspur as well as in the office of the Collector, Bilaspur on 9.5.2006 and the same was also published in the local daily newspaper Haribhoomi, Navbharat and Dainik Bhaskar on 10.5.2006. Since the Petitioner was interested to participate in the process, he has deposited a sum of Rs.3,45,000 and has quoted rate of Rs.260 per square feet for grant of premium for the lease of the roof. Since the Petitioner was interested to participate in the process, he has deposited a sum of Rs.3,45,000 and has quoted rate of Rs.260 per square feet for grant of premium for the lease of the roof. After deposit of the amount, on 25.5.2006 the Petitioner was declared successful bidder and was directed further to deposit an amount of Rs.7,40,000 on 26.5.2006, which he has deposited vide cheque No.087571, as such in total a sum of Rs.10,85,000 has been deposited by the Petitioner. The matter was placed before the Mayor-in-Council on 25.5.2006 itself and the lease was approved by the Mayor-in- Council and it was placed before the General Body of the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, which has also confirmed the said proposal of lease on 16.9.2006 to be granted in favour of the Petitioner. Deceased Respondent No.4 Basant Sharma as well As Respondent No.5 Nandram Madawa have challenged the proposal to grant lease in favour of the Petitioner by the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur in WP(PIL) No.6162 of 2006. The aforesaid writ petition of Respondents No.4 and 5 was disposed of with a direction by this Court vide its order dated 24.10.2007 to decide the representation of Respondents No.4 and 5 in light of Section 421 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (henceforth ‘the Act of 1956’). In light of the order dated 24.10.2007, Respondents No.4 and 5 have moved a representation before the State. However, the State has forwarded the same to the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur seeking a report in the said matter. The Petitioner has also made several representations for decision of the matter, however, the Municipal Corporation has not given any hint and the same has never been decided. Lastly, when the Petitioner gave a notice to the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, in a very hurry and haste manner, without considering the real aspect of the matter vide the impugned order they have denied to give lease to the Petitioner without assigning any lawful reason. It seems that under the pressure of Respondents No.4 and 5 as he then was the entire exercise has been done in an arbitrary and illegal manner. Hence, the Petitioner has no way left except to file the instant petition. Accordingly, the petition was filed with the aforesaid reliefs as prayed for. 4. It seems that under the pressure of Respondents No.4 and 5 as he then was the entire exercise has been done in an arbitrary and illegal manner. Hence, the Petitioner has no way left except to file the instant petition. Accordingly, the petition was filed with the aforesaid reliefs as prayed for. 4. Respondents No.1 and 2, i.e., the State of Chhattisgarh and the Under Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department have filed their return jointly while stating that the dispute is between the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur and the Petitioner. However, under Section 80 (5) of the Act of 1956, the Municipal Corporation has to seek approval from the State Government in order to auction the roof of Arpa Complex. From perusal of the rate as well as the location of the property, which is in a very important place, it seems that the Petitioner has quoted a very meager rate in respect of grant of lease of the property, i.e., Rs.260/- per square feet, as such the Municipal Corporation has rightly passed the impugned order and there is no ambiguity, as such in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur has also filed its return stating that though the Petitioner has participated in the auction proceeding and it was declared successful in the said proceeding and the auction proceeding was further confirmed by the Mayor- in-Council as well as by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, however, since a very meager rate was quoted as such filing of the writ petition by Respondents N.4 and 5 this Court has directed the respondents authorities including the State Government to consider the representation filed by Respondents No.4 and 5 and to decide the same in accordance with law. The State Government has sent the representation filed by Respondents No.4 and 5 to the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur while seeking a report. In the aforesaid factual background, the Municipal Corporation has rejected the claim of the Petitioner for grant of lease holding that the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very meager and as such lease cannot be granted to him for the roof of Arpa Complex. As such it has dismissed the claim of the Petitioner. 5. In the aforesaid factual background, the Municipal Corporation has rejected the claim of the Petitioner for grant of lease holding that the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very meager and as such lease cannot be granted to him for the roof of Arpa Complex. As such it has dismissed the claim of the Petitioner. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that while dismissing the claim of the Petitioner the Municipal Corporation has not considered the case of the Petitioner in pragmatic manner and without considering the aspect that the rate as quoted by the Petitioner was approved by the Mayor-in-Council has dismissed the claim of the Petitioner in an illegal, arbitrary and mala fide manner. When the auction proceeding was initiated and the Petitioner was declared successful bidder on the basis of rate quoted by him subsequently only on the basis of complaint made by Respondents No.4 and 5 the auction cannot be deviated and the impugned order cannot be passed only on the ground that the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very meager. Once the rate was approved by the Mayor-in-Council and further it has been approved by the State Government after following due process of law, one cannot raise a dispute of rate in a latter stage when everything has been finalised. The manner in which the impugned order has been passed is none else, but, colourable exercise of power which cannot be approved as such the impugned order is liable to be quashed. It is vehemently argued that the provisions contained in Section 80 (5) of the Act of 1956, Section 433 of the Act of 1956 as also in Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994 are not applicable to the present case as the matter relates to auction of the property and not the disposal of the property by way of any conveyance. In the present matter, neither the property is being sold nor ownership is being transferred in this case, but, it is an auction for a period of 30 years in which the ownership of the property would not be changed and the Municipal Corporation would be the owner of the property in question. Hence, the contentions raised by the Municipal Corporation is illegal and arbitrary and is not in accordance with law. 6. Hence, the contentions raised by the Municipal Corporation is illegal and arbitrary and is not in accordance with law. 6. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the State/Respondents No.1 and 2 and Learned Counsel for the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur/Respondent No.3 argued that it is upon the Municipal Corporation to decide whether on the basis of rate quoted by the Petitioner he can be granted lease or not. Though the Municipal Corporation has approved the proceeding of lease on the basis of rate quoted by the Petitioner, however, upon the complaint made by Respondents No.4 and 5 when they found the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very low, they have rightly passed the impugned order. Learned Counsel further submitted that according to Section 80 (5) of the Act of 1956, which relates to the provisions governing the disposal of municipal property or property vesting in or under the management of Corporation, (i) no property vesting in the Corporation in trust shall be leased, sold or otherwise conveyed in a manner that is likely to prejudicially affect the purpose of the trust subject to which such property is held; (ii) no land value of which may be prescribed shall be sold or otherwise conveyed without the previous sanction of the Government and every sale, or other conveyance of property vesting in the Corporation shall be deemed to be subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force. It was further argued that the State Government has exercised the power under Section 433 of the Act of 1956 As well as under Section 80 of the Act of 1956 and further as per Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994, which relates to property more than Rs.1,00,000 the sanctioning authority would be the State Government. As such at the instance of the State Government the auction passed in favour of the Petitioner has rightly been cancelled on the ground that the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very meager rate. 7. I have heard the arguments raised by Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available. 8. As such at the instance of the State Government the auction passed in favour of the Petitioner has rightly been cancelled on the ground that the rate quoted by the Petitioner is very meager rate. 7. I have heard the arguments raised by Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available. 8. The Petitioner has challenged the letter dated 28.12.2011 by which the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur has declared the lease deed executed in respect of open roof of Arpa Complex to the Petitioner invalid (inoperative) stating that the rate quoted by the Petitioner was very low. It is pertinent to mention this fact here that upon issuance of bid the Petitioner as well as the other participants of bid applied and quoted their rates. Thereafter, while examining the proposals the bid of the Petitioner was found to be highest one and, therefore, the Petitioner was declared successful bidder and is proposal was accepted by the Respondents authorities. It is further pertinent to mention this fact here that the rate quoted by the Petitioner was Rs.260 per square feet and he has deposited a sum of Rs.3,45,000 as premium with the bid. The rate quoted by the Petitioner was further considered by eh Manor-in-Council and after due consideration the Mayor-in-Council has approved the proposal fo the Petitioner and was directed to pay a sum of Rs.7,40,000 to the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, as such in total the Petitioner has deposited a sum of Rs.10,95,000, which is still lying deposited with the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur/Respondent No.3. One Basant Sharma (the deceased Respondent No.4) filed a public interest litigation before this Court, being WP(PIL) No.6162 of 2006 in respect of the subject property in which deceased Basant Sharma and Respondent No.5, Nandram Madawa were directed to file their representation before the State Government. When the representation was filed, being influenced with the representation and to justify the representation filed by late Basant Sharma and Respondent No.5, Nandram Madawa, the impugned order has been passed without taking into consideration any legal ground under Section 80(5) of the Act of 1956, which applies only in the case of sale by the Municipal Corporation and not for the lease granted by the Municipal Corporation. In respect of grant of lease, no sanction of the State Government is required and the property is to be given only for lease and not for any other purpose. In respect of grant of lease, no sanction of the State Government is required and the property is to be given only for lease and not for any other purpose. The title-holder of the property would be wit the Municipal Corporation and after expiry of lease the lessee would vacate the premises. The lessee would not have any independent title. In this respect, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Satna v. Badri Prasad, reported in 2000 LawSuit MP 10 (Para 11) is relevant which reads as under: “The plain meaning of main part of Sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act is that every properly belonging to the Municipal Corporation shall be sold, leased or otherwise alienated subject to Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Section 80 of the Act and also in accordance with bye-laws framed by the Municipal Corporation. In this case, it is not in dispute nor any substantial question of law has been framed to the effect that while leasing out the property, if there was any violation of any of the provisions of Sub-section (1), (2), (3) or (4) of Section 80of the Act, or of any bye-law framed by the Municipal Corporation. It is not disputed that the auction in favour of the respondent No.1 was validly done but it had to be cancelled subsequently on account of the fact that the State Government did not grant the sanction. It appears to this Court that the proviso (ii) restricts the powers of the Municipal Corporation to sell or otherwise convey the property if it exceeds Rs. 25,000/-, unless the State Government accords its sanction. Such a restrictive provision has to be strictly construed. In the proviso (ii) the word "leased" has Seen omitted whereas in proviso (i) the word "leased" has been specifically used. Similarly, in Sub-section (1) of Section 80 of the Act the word "leased" has been used along with the word "alienated" to make it more comprehensive, saying that the property could be leased, sold or otherwise alienated subject to Sub-sections (2) and (3) and also subject to bye-laws framed by the Municipal Corporation. Then the question arises why the Legislature did not use the same words in proviso (ii) to Sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act. Then the question arises why the Legislature did not use the same words in proviso (ii) to Sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act. It appears to this Court that this must have been done on purpose because the proviso (ii) to Sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act only applied to sale or otherwise conveyance whereby the property is absolutely transferred, and not to lease which is only a partial transfer of an interest in the property for a period given in the lease-deed, or in the agreement to lease. Such a lease is liable to be terminated on conditions mentioned in the lease-deed or by efflux of time. The legislature among other things, expressly restricted the grant of a lease stating in so many words that the properly vesting in trust in Municipal Corporation cannot be leased in a manner which would adversely affect the purpose of trust. Obviously, this proviso is applicable to that property which are vested in the Corporation and its capacity is that of a statutory trustee. The proviso (ii) to Sub-section 5 of Section 80 of the Act, however, deals with these cases where the Municipal Corporation seeks to sell or otherwise convey the property worth more than Rs. 25,000/-, Sale is absolute transfer. The words "otherwise convey" are used in the same sense implying the transfer absolutely by modes other than sale. The words "sale or conveyance" used in the aforesaid proviso can be said to he "a term of art". They have specific and established meaning. It is clear that the Legislature deliberately omitted the word "lease" implying thereby that proviso (ii) to Sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act would not apply to a lease. Consequently, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 is accepted and it is held that it is not necessary to obtain sanction of State Government in respect of property for which lease is created. The restriction is limited to sale or absolute transfer of the property by any other mode known to law where value of the concerned property exceeds Rs. 25,000/-." 9. The restriction is limited to sale or absolute transfer of the property by any other mode known to law where value of the concerned property exceeds Rs. 25,000/-." 9. When the lease was considered and recommended by the Mayor-in-Council and the amount as directed has already been deposited, in that view of the matter, the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur cannot take a summersault and revert back from its decision only on the whims and wishes of officers of the Corporation, who seems to be influenced with the representations filed by late Basant Sharma and Respondent No.5 Nandram Madawa. In the present matter, there was hardly any evidence much more allegation regarding fraud or collusion etc. and as such the rate quoted by the Petitioner which is quoted in a public auction cannot be denied only to please others. The entire action of grant of lease has been taken in accordance with law and after proper approval fo the Manor-in-Council which cannot be denied by way of the impugned order. The rate which has been quoted by the Petitioner was worthy in the year 2006 when the auction notice was issued and hence subsequently in the year 2011 while issuing the impugned order by holding the bid amount to be very low is not in accordance with law. There was no substantial reason to hold that at the time of quoting of rate in the year 2006 it was low and meager below the prevalent rate and if it would be examined in another way in the said Arpa Complex itself a block was leased out in the year 1999 at the rate of Rs.110 per square feet to one Rekha Gupta and as such the rate quoted at Rs.260 per square feet in the year 2005 cannot be termed to be a meager rate. When this issue has been examined in light of judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the light of Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 189 (Para 77), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “77. K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple, (2022) 5 SCC 710 is a case relating to auctioning of land belonging to the Devasthanam. K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple, (2022) 5 SCC 710 is a case relating to auctioning of land belonging to the Devasthanam. This Court opined that unless and until it was found that there was any material irregularity and/or illegality in holding the public auction and/or the auction-sale was vitiated by any fraud or collusion it is not open to set aside the auction or sale in favour of the highest bidder on the basis of some representations made by a third party who did not even participate in the auction proceedings and did not make any offer. If there is repeated interference in the auction process, the object and purpose of holding public auction and the sanctity of public auction would be frustrated. This Court in para 23 of the judgment held that unless there are allegations of fraud, collusion, etc. the highest offer received in the public auction should be accepted as a fair value. Otherwise, there shall not be any sanctity of a public auction.” 10. Thereafter, in the case of Chem Solar Energy System Private Limited v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation, reported in (2020) 20 SCC 435 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus: “8. The legality and correctness of the sale made in favour of the third respondent and the actions of the Corporation in this regard including the price offered and received has to be judged in the context of the facts that had occurred in the year 2005 and not by subsequent events or the price of the property or its potential as on date. We have indicated in a previous part of the order that three earlier attempts to sell the property by auction had failed and, in fact, the fourth attempt of auction had also failed. In the fourth attempt it is not in the bidding process but in the negotiations held subsequently with all the parties that one of the bidders i.e. Sanjay Goel had offered the sum of Rs 50,00,000 (Rupees fifty lakhs). He, however, did not follow up the said offer by making actual payment. It is in such a situation that the third respondent appeared in the field and as the letter dated 31-3-2005 would indicate it was brought to the field at the instance of the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010). 9. He, however, did not follow up the said offer by making actual payment. It is in such a situation that the third respondent appeared in the field and as the letter dated 31-3-2005 would indicate it was brought to the field at the instance of the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010). 9. The third respondent offered and the Corporation accepted the sum of Rs 50,00,000 (Rupees fifty lakhs) in two instalments. There is a finding of the High Court in this regard that out of the first instalment of Rs 27.60 lakhs the loan account was adjusted and the balance amount was credited to a separate account (ARPA). It is also clear from the impugned order of the High Court that the subsequent amount of Rs 22.40 lakhs was also kept in the aforesaid separate account (ARPA-8008). The Managing Director of the Corporation though had earlier suggested a fresh auction (which was held but the offers/bids were not opened) had subsequently thought that the offer of the third respondent could be accepted subject to obtaining the necessary legal opinion. The legal opinion favoured acceptance. It is in these circumstances that the letter dated 28-5-2005 (signed by the Dy. General Manager of the Corporation) was issued to the third respondent intimating the decision of the Corporation to accept the offer of the said respondent and requiring it to pay the sum of Rs 50,00,000 (Rupees fifty lakhs) in two instalments within a particular time-frame. All such stipulations were complied with by the third respondent. 10. The cancellation of the sale made in favour of the third respondent and the notice of fresh auction was at a point of time subsequent to the institution of the writ proceedings by the third respondent for a direction from the High Court to the Corporation for execution of the sale deed in its favour. Such cancellation was also not preceded by any notice or opportunity to the third respondent despite the fact that it had paid a sum of Rs 50,00,000 (Rupees fifty lakhs) to the Corporation. 11. In the auction held after the purported cancellation was made by the Managing Director, though an offer of Rs 1.06 crores was received from one M/s H.M. Estate & Properties no payment by the said offerer or even part payment had been made. 11. In the auction held after the purported cancellation was made by the Managing Director, though an offer of Rs 1.06 crores was received from one M/s H.M. Estate & Properties no payment by the said offerer or even part payment had been made. The aforesaid offer of Rs 1.06 crores was made in the year 2005 and whether such an offer is still open is not known to the Court. Though suo motu notice was issued by the Court to M/s H.M. Estate & Properties in the present proceedings, the said party has chosen not to come to Court in spite of due service of notice. In contrast, one M/s Pinacle Enterprises who had participated in one of the earlier auctions has been impleaded as a respondent on the basis of an application filed before the Court. 12. It also would require to be noticed that the price offered by the third respondent (Rs 50 lakhs) was commensurate with the valuation of the property done in the year 2004 at Rs 53.60 lakhs (approximately). It is taking into account all the aforesaid facts that the High Court had thought it proper to reverse the order of the learned Single Judge and issue the impugned directions for handing over the possession of the property to the third respondent and for execution of the sale deed. 13. Having considered the matter and having taken into account all the aforesaid facts we are of the view that the action of the Corporation in accepting the offer of the third respondent was just, fair and reasonable. Even in the fact situation as on date we do not find any room to take a contrary view. The third respondent has paid the agreed amount as far back as in the year 2005. It is yet to get possession of the property which has remained with the Corporation. There is no viable alternative offer on record to persuade us to re-examine the matter. Even though the borrower himself had, at one stage, offered an amount 9 of Rs 6,11,00,000 (Rupees six crore and eleven lakhs) no deposit of any amount, as ordered by the Court, had been made by the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010). 14. Even though the borrower himself had, at one stage, offered an amount 9 of Rs 6,11,00,000 (Rupees six crore and eleven lakhs) no deposit of any amount, as ordered by the Court, had been made by the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010). 14. Taking into account all the above we are of the view that both the appeals challenging the order of the Division Bench of the High Court deserve to be dismissed which we accordingly do. The order dated 9-1-2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Sri Lakshminrayana Industries v. Karnataka State Financial Corpn. is affirmed. The Corporation will now carry out the directions of the High Court forthwith and in any case within a period of six weeks from today. 15. Before parting we would like to observe that Shri R.S. Hegde, learned counsel for the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010) has placed before the Court a decision of this Court in Divya Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India to contend that a higher offer that is available ought to be accepted even after the sale is confirmed and the sale certificate is issued. 16. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the third respondent has sought to controvert the above by relying on the decision a of this Court in Vedica Procon (P) Ltd. v. Balleshwar Greens (P) Ltd.5 (Paras 38 and 47) wherein the decision in Divya Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. has been considered. 17. It will not be necessary for the Court to enter into the aforesaid area of contentions and arguments as what cannot be overlooked is the fact that a period of over 10 years have elapsed in the meantime and none of the higher offers d including the one made by the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010 before this Court) have been followed up by actual payment so as to inspire the confidence of the Court. In fact, as we have already indicated that on date we do not have before us any other viable counter or higher offer. 18. Shri Hegde also urged before the Court that there has been some excess payment on behalf of the borrower to the Corporation which may be refunded. In fact, as we have already indicated that on date we do not have before us any other viable counter or higher offer. 18. Shri Hegde also urged before the Court that there has been some excess payment on behalf of the borrower to the Corporation which may be refunded. We are afraid we cannot go into the said issue as not only the said question is disputed but the same is beyond the scope of the dispute entertained and decided by the High Court. If the borrower (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9593 of 2010 before this Court) has any claim in this regard, it will naturally be open to it to approach the competent forum for the enforcement thereof. 19. Consequently, and in the light of the above, both the appeals are dismissed. The order dated 9-1-2009 of the High Court in Sri Lakshminrayana Industries v. Karnataka State Financial Corpn. is affirmed.” 11. While considering proviso (ii) to sub-section (5) of Section 80 of the Act of 1956 as well as Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1994, it is quite vivid that the aforesaid provisions are not applicable to the present matter as the property is not being sold, but, only it is being leased out in favour of the Petitioner for a period of 30 years. At this state, after lase of about 18 years of issuance of the bid certainly the rates of the lease would have been increased and the rate quoted by the Petitioner at the rate of Rs.260 per square feet would not be proper and in order to do equitable justice I deem it appropriate to enhance the same. A proposal has been made to Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, who, after seeking instructions from the Petitioner, submits that the Petitioner is ready to propose Rs.350 per square feet in order to get the premises on lease and according to him it would be an appropriate rate as the Petitioner has already deposited a huge some which is still lying deposited with the Corporation. The rates and other things have been escalated and now the Petitioner has to invest a huge amount in the leased premises, as such this point is also required to be seen so that the Petitioner may get justice. The rates and other things have been escalated and now the Petitioner has to invest a huge amount in the leased premises, as such this point is also required to be seen so that the Petitioner may get justice. After considering the entire matter and examining the same with all angles the action taken by Respondent No.3/Municipal Corporation seems to be unjustified and without any plausible reason. The matter which has already been finalised by the Mayor-in-Council after following due process of law, it cannot be rejected only for the sake of justification of onerous ground while holding that the amount proposed is very meager. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.12.2011 (Annexure P1) is liable to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, while quashing the impugned notice dated 28.12.2011 (Annexure P1), I direct the Respondents authorities to re-consider the amount of lease and it may be considered reasonably and to pass appropriate orders in respect of the Petitioner while granting lease of the subject premises within a period of two months from today looking to the fact that the lease was granted way back on 16.9.2006 and thereafter 18 years have already passed. 13. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition is hereby allowed. 14. No order as to costs.