JUDGMENT : Kshitij Shailendra, J. 1. Heard Shri S.P. Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Shri Vivek Kumar Singh, for the appellants and Shri V. K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Ankur Azad, for the respondent. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the Union of India and its officers challenging the order dated 10.04.2007 whereby learned Single Judge allowed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5262 of 2001 (Constable Driver Girwar Singh Tomar vs. Union of India & others) setting aside the punishment order as well as appellate and revisional orders and remanded the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law after taking into account the principles laid down in the decisions referred to in the order itself. BRIEF FACTS 3. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent who was working as Constable Driver in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was charge-sheeted on 12.07.1999 on two charges; first, that while being on duty on 19.06.1999, he was found under influence of alcohol and, secondly, that at about 07.30 p.m. on the said date, while coming back to the headquarter, he caused damage to a cycle in a market by his negligent driving, but did not inform the higher Authorities about the incident. 4. After conduct of departmental proceedings, the respondent was dismissed from service by an order dated 21.10.1999. The departmental appeal and revision preferred by respondent were dismissed, respectively on 07.02.2000 and 25.09.2000. Being aggrieved of the aforesaid orders, the respondent filed the aforesaid writ petition. 5. The learned Single Judge, after noticing the facts of the case and by placing reliance upon decision in Sahdeo Singh vs. U.P. Public Services Tribunal : 2001 (2) ESC 511, and Amarjeet Singh vs. State of U.P. : 2004 (1) ESC (All) 366, allowed the writ petition setting aside the orders impugned therein and remanded the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. The learned single judge also noticed the incident giving rise to the disciplinary proceedings. The relevant observations made by learned Single Judge in this regard read as under:- “The accident which had taken place is said to have been caused by the rear part of the vehicle driven by the petitioner, in which a cycle was damaged. The learned single judge also noticed the incident giving rise to the disciplinary proceedings. The relevant observations made by learned Single Judge in this regard read as under:- “The accident which had taken place is said to have been caused by the rear part of the vehicle driven by the petitioner, in which a cycle was damaged. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the accident was not of such nature in which any person had been injured. It has also been submitted that no complaint with regard to any such accident was ever lodged. As regards the consumption of liquor by the petitioner, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had consumed liquor after returning back and not prior to going on duty. In support of the same he has placed reliance on the evidence adduced by the co-passenger in the vehicle who has stated that he did not consume liquor in his presence. The petitioner was, however, medically examined and it was found that he had consumed liquor. In evidence it has also come that another Hawaldar had asked the petitioner to bring a bottle of English wine for him and that the petitioner had consumed one peg of liquor and then went away with the vehicle. The explanation of the petitioner is that the said consumption of liquor was made by the petitioner after returning from duty. On this basis, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner had not consumed liquor while on duty. Be that as it may, in the facts of this case, even if it is accepted that the two charges are proved against the petitioner, then too the ultimate punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh and totally disproportionate to the charges proved against him.” 6. An interim order was passed in this appeal on 30.08.2007 noticing a suggestion made to the learned counsel for the respondent that he may make a representation before the authorities to claim benefits of service he had already put in, however, on the insistence of learned counsel that he wanted to contest the matter, the appeal was admitted and order of remand passed by learned Single Judge was stayed till disposal of this appeal. The suggestion made by the Court to learned counsel for the respondent and his insistence to contest the matter, as noted in 6 th and 7 th paragraphs of interim order dated 30.08.2007, are reproduced hereunder:- “6. We suggested learned counsel for the respondent that he may make a representation, if he so wants, to claim all benefits for the service he has already put in. 7. He however wants to contest the matter, the appeal is, therefore, admitted. The order of learned Single Judge is stayed till the disposal of appeal.” SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS 7. While assailing the order of learned Single Judge, Shri. S.P. Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General of India submits that the respondent being a member of Disciplined Reserved Force, was guilty of gross misconduct and once in the inquiry proceedings, which were held in accordance with law, the charges against the respondent were proved, learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that the punishment was too harsh and, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, punishment in terms of dismissal from service was rightly awarded. 8. Elaborating his submissions, attention of this Court has been drawn by Shri Singh towards record of inquiry proceedings wherein statement of one Constable Guman Singh (Witness No. 1) was recorded wherein he stated that he had given one peg of alcohol to the respondent, which was consumed by the respondent then and there and he started his vehicle. Further reference to a report of Medical Officer was made, wherein he had opined that the respondent had consumed alcohol, effects whereof were obvious and he appeared to be under influence of alcohol clinically. 9. It is further contended that the respondent was granted sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, however, he chose not to cross-examine them and, therefore, after due observance of principles of natural justice and following the provisions of law, punishment was rightly awarded, which should not have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge merely on the pretext that a lenient view should have been taken by awarding lesser punishment. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 10. Per contra, Shri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate submits that witness No. 2, namely, Constable Pratap Singh clearly stated that he was sitting towards left hand side of driver and that the respondent had not consumed alcohol in his presence. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 10. Per contra, Shri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate submits that witness No. 2, namely, Constable Pratap Singh clearly stated that he was sitting towards left hand side of driver and that the respondent had not consumed alcohol in his presence. Submission is that statement of second witness has not been taken into consideration and, therefore, the entire departmental proceedings leading to passing of the orders impugned stand vitiated. 11. Shri V.K. Singh has further drawn attention of this Court towards charge sheet, inquiry report, punishment order as well as appellate and revisional orders in the light of provisions of Central Reserved Police Force, Act, 1949 (in short ‘Act of 1949’) and submission has been made that Sections 9 and 10 thereof describe two categories of offences, i.e. (i) More heinous offences and (ii) Less heinous offences. It is further contended that since the entire proceedings refer to invocation of Section 11 of the Act, no major penalty of dismissal from service could be awarded as the provision itself is meant for ‘Minor Punishment’ whereas dismissal from service is a major punishment. 12. It is further contended that no medical examination was conducted by the Department, rather, reliance was placed only on an opinion furnished by the Medical Officer, which was not sufficient to arrive at a concrete and definite conclusion that at the time of alleged incident, the respondent was under influence of liquor. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly found the punishment as too harsh in nature and, therefore, the respondent is entitled to be reinstated in service, in the alternative, the order of remand to examine award of lesser punishment cannot be said to be illegal. He prays for dismissal of special appeal. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find that the provisions of Central Reserved Police Force, Act, 1949 and Central Reserved Police Force Rules, 1955 govern the disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case, it would be apt to refer Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, as under:- “9. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find that the provisions of Central Reserved Police Force, Act, 1949 and Central Reserved Police Force Rules, 1955 govern the disciplinary proceedings. In the instant case, it would be apt to refer Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, as under:- “9. More heinous offences.- Every member of the force who- (a) begins, excites, causes or conspires to cause or joins in any mutiny, or being present at any mutiny, does not use his utmost endeavour to suppress it, or knowing, or having reason to believe in, the existence of any mutiny, or of any intention or conspiracy to mutiny or of any conspiracy against the State does not, without delay, give information thereof to his superior officer; or (b) uses, or attempts to use, criminal force to, or commits an assault on, his superior officer, whether on or off duty, knowing or having or having reason to believe him to be such; or (c) shamefully abandons or delivers up any post or guard which is committed to his charge, or which it is his duty to defend ; or (d) directly or indirectly holds correspondence with, or assists or relieves any person in arms against the State or omits to discover immediately to his superior officer any such correspondence coming to his knowledge; or who, while on active duty,- (e) disobeys the lawful command of his superior officer; or (f) deserts the Force; or (g) being a sentry, sleeps upon his post or quits it without being regularly relieved or without leave; or (h) leaves his commanding officer, or his post or party , to go in search of plunder ; or (i) quits his guard, picquet, party or patrol without being regularly relieved or without leave; or (j) uses criminal force to, or commits an assault on, any person bringing provisions or other necessaries to campo or quarters, of forces a safeguard or breaks into any house or other place for plunder, or plunders, destroys or damages property of any kind; or (k) intentionally causes or spreads a false alarm in action or in camp, garrison or quarters; or (l) displays cowardice in the execution of his duty, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with fine which may extend to three months pay or with fine to that extent in addition to such sentence of transportation or imprisonment.” “10. Less heinous offences.- Every member of the force who- (a) is in a state of intoxication when on, or after having been warned for, any duty or on parade or on the line of march ; or (b) strikes or attempts to force any sentry; or (c) being in command of a guard, piquet or patrol, refuses to receive any prisoner or person or person duly committed to his charge or without proper authority releases any person or prisoner placed under his charge or negligently suffers any such prisoner or person to escape; or (d) being under arrest or in confinement, leaves his arrest or confinement, before he is set at liberty by lawful authority; or (e) is grossly in-subordinate or insolent to his superior officer in the execution of his office ; or (f) refuses to superintend or assist in the making of any fieldwork or other work of any description ordered to be made either in quarters or in the field; or (g) strikes or otherwise ill-uses any member of the force subordinate to him in rank or position ; or (h) designedly or through neglect injures or loses or fraudulently disposes of his arms, clothes, tools, equipments, ammunition or accountrement or any such articles entrusted to him or belonging to any other person ; or (i) malingers or feigns or produces disease or infirmity in himself, or intentionally delays his cure, or aggravates his disease or infirmity; or (j) with intent to render himself or any other person unfit for service, voluntarily causes hurt to himself or any other person; or (k) does not, when called upon by his superior officer so to do or upon ceasing to be a member of the force forthwith deliver up, or duly account for, all or any arms,. Ammunition, stores, accountrements or other property issued or supplied to him or in his custody or possession as such member; or (l) knowingly furnishes a false return or report of the number or state of any men under his command or charge or of any money, arms ammunition, clothing, equipments, stores or other property in his charge, whether belonging to such men or to the Government or to any member of or any (m) person attached to the force or who through design or culpable neglect, omit, or refuses to make or send any return or report of the matters aforesaid ; or (n) absent himself without leave, or without sufficient cause overstays leave granted to him: or (o) is guilty of any act or omission which, though not specified in this Act, is prejudicial to good order and discipline : or (p) contravenes any provision of this Act for which no punishment is expressly provided: or who, while not on active duty:- (q) commits any of the offences specified in clauses (e) to (l) (both inclusive) of section 9, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to three months pay, or with both.” 14. The categorisation of offences in ‘More heinous offences’ and ‘Less heinous offences’ reflects that, in case the department is inclined to proceed against a delinquent employee, it has to be ascertained by the department as to under which category the offences committed by the employee would fall; that is to say, as to whether the offence falls under Section 9 or under Section 10. 15. Since, in the present case, the department has throughout invoked Section 11 of the Act, it would be appropriate to refer the same, which is reproduced as under:- “11. 15. Since, in the present case, the department has throughout invoked Section 11 of the Act, it would be appropriate to refer the same, which is reproduced as under:- “11. Minor punishments.- (1) The Commandant or any other authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this Act award in lieu of or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the force whom he considered to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force, that is to say :- (a) reduction in rank; (b) fine of any amount not exceeding one month’s pay and allowances; (c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for a term not exceeding one month; (d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not more than twenty eight days with or without punishment drill or extra guard, fatigue or other duty; and (e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force. (2) Any punishment specified in clause (c ) or clause (b ) of sub-section (l) may be awarded by any gazetted officer when in command of any detachment of the force away from headquarters, provided he is specially authorised in this behalf by the Commandant. (3) The Assistant Commandant, a Company Officer or a Subordinate Officer , not being below the rank of Subedar or Inspector commanding a separate detachment or an outpost, or in temporary command at the headquarters of the force, may, without a formal trial, award to any member of the force who is for the time being subject to his authority any one or more of the following punishments for the commission of any petty offence against discipline which is not otherwise provided for in this Act or which is not of a sufficiently serous nature to require prosecution before a Criminal Court that is to say:- (a) confinement for not more that seven days in the quarterguard or such other place as may be considered suitable, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances during its continuance; (b) punishment drill, or extra guard, fatigue or other duty, for not more than thirty days, with or without confinement to quarters, lines, or camp. (4) A jemadar or Sub-Inspector who is temporarily in command of a detachment or an outpost may in like manner and for the commission of any like offence award to any member of the force for the time being subject to his authority any of the punishment specified in clause (b) of sub-section (3) for not more than fifteen days.” 16. A bare perusal of Section 11 of the Act reflects that minor punishments prescribed under sub-clauses (a) to (e) of Sub- Section (1) can be imposed on any member of force in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal, in a case where the authority finds that the member of the force is guilty of disobedience, negligent of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member. 17. In the instant case, right from the issuance of charge sheet till the revision of the respondent was decided, Section 11 (1) was referred. Therefore, it was incumbent for the respondent to minutely examine as to whether the alleged act of the respondent falls within Section 9 or Section 10 of the Act, that is to say whether the act is a more heinous offence or less heinous offence. The entire proceedings leading to passing of the orders impugned completely ignore the fact that even if the respondent was allegedly found under influence of alcohol on 19.06.1999, what act of misconduct and to what gravity was committed by him. It has come on record, as also noticed by the learned Single Judge, that a cycle was damaged by the rear part of the vehicle driven by the respondent and the accident was not of such a nature in which any person had been injured. Under such circumstances, the question of considering the award of punishment in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal, as provided under Clauses (a) to (e) of sub-Section (1) of Section 11 should have been critically analyzed by the Authority, however, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was awarded to the respondent and despite raising all possible grounds of challenge to the order of punishment as well as validity of the inquiry proceedings, appeal and revision preferred by the respondent were dismissed. 18. We also find that the respondent was not subjected to any blood test etc. 18. We also find that the respondent was not subjected to any blood test etc. so as to form a conclusive opinion regarding his drunken state at the time of incident. Mere report of the medical officer mentioning that “clinically” the respondent appeared to be under influence of alcohol, in our view, was not sufficient to arrive at a definite conclusion in that regard, particularly when there were contradictory statements of the witnesses regarding consumption of alcohol by the respondent. The report of the Medical Officer, based upon the clinical examination of the respondent and expressing opinion against him, reads as under:- “In my opinion Ct/Drv G.S. Tomar has consumed alcohol and effects of alcohol are obvious and he appears to be under influence of alcohol clinically.” 19. The law relating to quantum of punishment corresponding to the gravity of misconduct, if any, has been laid down time and again. The Apex Court, in the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Others., AIR 1987 SC 2386 , has held that "the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Marital, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." 20. In the case of Union of India and others v. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215 , the Apex Court has held that over- staying of leave subsequent to the order of rejection of application for extension of leave could not be considered to be a sever enough charge to warrant punishment of dismissal from service and the same was held to be harsh and disproportionate. 21. 21. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Harpal Singh v. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and Ors., 2000 (86) FLR 334 , has held that where it was on account of negligence of the constable of the G.R.P. that one passenger was misbehaved with and was murdered, the same could not be a case of serious misconduct and held that the punishment of dismissal from service was totally disproportionate to the offence and thus directed reinstatement of the employee in service, with half back wages and also ordered that he be given a severe warning. 22. In the case of Alexandar Pal Singh v. Divisional Operating Superintendent, 1987 (2) ATC 922 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that ordinarily the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion of the punishing authority in imposing particular penalty but this rule has an exception. If the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct committed, then the Court can interfere. The railway employee on being charged with negligence in not reporting to the railway hospital for treatment was removed from service. The Supreme Court found it fit to interfere with the punishment of removal from service and modified it to withholding of two Increments. 23. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, the broad principle which emerges is that, normally, it is the disciplinary authority which should be best left with the duty of imposing the punishment after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, however, in case, if on the admitted facts, the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offence, which shocks the conscience of the Court, the Court has the power and jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed. 24. In view of aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that while the learned Single Judge did not err in setting aside the order of punishment, we have to examine as to whether remand to the Disciplinary Authority can be resorted to at this stage. If we simply dismiss the appeal, necessary consequence would be that matter would go back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order which, when passed in either way, would give rise to further litigation in terms of appeal, revision and writ petition at the instance of the party aggrieved of the same. 25. If we simply dismiss the appeal, necessary consequence would be that matter would go back to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order which, when passed in either way, would give rise to further litigation in terms of appeal, revision and writ petition at the instance of the party aggrieved of the same. 25. We have been informed by the learned counsel for both sides that the respondent is now aged about 54 years and the age of superannuation is 60 years. Therefore, even if we find that the order of dismissal from service was rightly set aside by the learned single judge, remanding the matter to the Disciplinary Authority would be an inappropriate exercise of power by us at this stage and we can mould the relief to be granted in order to sub-serve the ends of justice considering the fact that dismissal order was passed in the year 1999, the writ petition was filed in the year 2001, which was decided in the year 2007 and the present special appeal has remained pending for a period of about 18 years. 26. We may also mention that the instant appeal was filed in the year 2007 as a defective one on account of delay of 68 days. Although delay was condoned by order dated 30.08.2007, on which date the appeal was admitted and an interim order was also passed, the order sheet reveals that the appellants did not pursue the appeal with diligence, probably on account of an interim order having been passed in their favour which was directed to remain operative till disposal of the appeal. Later on, the appeal was assigned a regular number in the year 2012 and on 20.09.2017, none appeared to press the appeal even in the revised list although the appeal has been filed by Union of India and its officials. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. On a restoration application filed by the appellants in the year 2017, the appeal was restored to its original number after four years by order dated 28.10.2021. Even thereafter, the appeal was not pursued by the appellants and was taken up for consideration on 14.07.2025, on which date order for listing of the appeal in top ten cases was passed. Thereafter, the appeal was listed on three occasions and was heard finally on 19.08.2025. 27. Even thereafter, the appeal was not pursued by the appellants and was taken up for consideration on 14.07.2025, on which date order for listing of the appeal in top ten cases was passed. Thereafter, the appeal was listed on three occasions and was heard finally on 19.08.2025. 27. The aforesaid proceedings demonstrate that for a period of 18 years, the appellants were not diligently prosecuting the lis and, for this additional reason also, we, for delay occurred on account of procedural lapses attributable to the appeellants, are inclined not to penalize the respondent whose services were terminated in the year 1999 and who succeeded from the writ Court in the year 2007. The appellants cannot earn premium on account of laches/lapses on their own part and, hence, for this reason too, we are inclined to mould relief. 28. We are of the view that since about 6 years are left for the respondent to reach the age of superannuation, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the appeal accordingly by moulding relief. The normal rule is that when the dismissal order is set aside, reinstatement with full back wages has to be granted vide Kesoram Cotton Mills vs. Gangadhar, (1963) II LLJ 371 (SC); Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Its Employees, 1978 L/C 1667 (SC) and M.L. Bose vs. Its Employee, AIR 1961 SC 1178. 29. In the facts of the case, we direct the appellants to reinstate the respondent in service within a period of three weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon them on the current pay-scale applicable for the post of Constable Driver and he would be entitled for all notional benefits of service. The order of dismissal would not come in the way of computing the length of his services for the purpose of granting pensionery and other post retiral benefits. The respondent shall also be entitled to get 25% back-wages/salary from the date of his dismissal, i.e. w.e.f. 21.10.1999 till the date of his reinstatement. The aforesaid benefits shall be computed and released in favour of the respondent within a period of two months from service of copy of order. 30. With the aforesaid observations, the special appeal stands disposed of.