JUDGMENT : Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J. 1. In the present case, petitioner, a Pharmacist at Cantonment Hospital, Agra has faced a Sessions Trial for an offence under Sections 302, 323, 452 IPC for an occurrence took place on 14.03.1988 wherein one person died and two persons got injured. The trial was concluded and trial Court by a judgment and order dated 28.04.2000 convicted the petitioner and other three accused under Sections 304/34, 323/34 and 452 IPC and petitioner was awarded sentence of six years rigorous imprisonment. 2. An appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order was filed which is still pending though petitioner was granted suspension of sentence vide an order dated 02.05.2000. 3. On basis of above referred conviction, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide an order dated 30.01.2004 passed by the Cantonment Executive Officer, Agra (Competent Authority). For reference, said order is quoted below :- “WHEREAS, Shri Indra Mohan Panday, Pharmacist, has been convicted by the Hon'ble Court of IV, Addl. Session Judge, Agra in judgment and order dt. 28.4.2000 in S.T. No. 166 of 1000; AND WHEREAS, the conviction by the court has not been set-aside by any other Court/authority; AND WHEREAS, the judgement dt. 28.4.2000 of the Hon'ble Court of IV Addl. Session Judge, Agra in S.T. No. 166 of 1990 (State Vs Indra Mohan & others) has been perused by the undersigned and it is found that the gravity of misconduct committed by Shri Indra Mohan Panday, Pharmacist is prejudicial to the administration of the Cantonment Board and that he is not fit to remain in service; AND WHEREAS, the representation dt. Nil received in the office on 17.12.2003 from Shri Indra Mohan Panday has been considered by the undersigned; THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred upon the disciplinary authority under Rule 11 (2) (VIII) of CFSR 1937 Shri Indra Mohan Panday, Pharmacist is dismissed from the service with immediate effect.” 4. Immediately, thereafter, the petitioner has filed Departmental Appeal which remained pending for many years and finally vide order dated 03.09.2013, it was dismissed after taking note of judgment and order of conviction and punishment and relying upon a judgment of Supreme Court. 5. Initially this writ petition was filed wherein only the order dated 03.09.2013 (order passed in Departmental Appeal) was challenged, however, later on by way of amendment, order dated 30.01.2004 whereby punishment awarded in disciplinary proceedings was also challenged. 6. 5. Initially this writ petition was filed wherein only the order dated 03.09.2013 (order passed in Departmental Appeal) was challenged, however, later on by way of amendment, order dated 30.01.2004 whereby punishment awarded in disciplinary proceedings was also challenged. 6. Sri Shrinath Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Swapnesh Singh, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgments of this Court in Ram Kishan vs. State of U.P. and others, 2020:AHC:7131, Vishwanath Vishwakarma vs. State of U.P. and others, 2023:AHC-LKO:59434 and Gulab Dutt Dubey vs. State of U.P. and others, 2024:AHC-LKO:22623 and submitted that in the impugned order, concerned respondent has not assigned any consideration about conduct of petitioner leading to his conviction and has prayed that impugned order be set aside and petitioner may be given consequential benefits. 7. In rebuttal, Sri C.B. Gupta, learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon judgment of Supreme Court in Deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Admin.) Madras vs. S. Nagoor Meera, AIR 1995 SC 1364 as well as referred Clause 12(A)(1) and 12(E) of The Cantonment Fund Servants Rules, 1937. For reference, relevant Clause 12(E) is quoted below :- “12(E) – Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 12 to 12 D - (i) Where any penalty is imposed on a servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonable practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit.” 8. I have considered above submissions and perused the records. 9. Before considering the rival submissions, it would be necessary to reproduce reasons given by the trial Court while convicting the petitioner and others for committing an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, voluntarily causing hurt and mischief in furtherance of common intention of all accused :- 10. I have considered above submissions and perused the records. 9. Before considering the rival submissions, it would be necessary to reproduce reasons given by the trial Court while convicting the petitioner and others for committing an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, voluntarily causing hurt and mischief in furtherance of common intention of all accused :- 10. Learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that while passing the impugned order, conduct of petitioner leading to conviction was not considered whereas argument of learned counsel for respondents was that since conviction was for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, a serious offence, and petitioner was directly involved in the crime and that impugned order was based on the judgment and order of trial Court, therefore, there was no requirement to assign specific reason or to mention specific conduct of the petitioner. 11. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records. 12. Above referred Regulation 12(E) provides an exception to Rule 12 that no order imposing any penalty specified in Clause 4 to 8 of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry held as far as may be in the manner provided in the Rule 12 and Rule 12-A except where any penalty imposed on service on a ground of conduct which has led to his conviction in a criminal case, therefore, in present case where impugned order was passed without conducting proper inquiry is not an illegal order. 13. Now Court proceeds to consider whether the conduct of petitioner which has led his conviction is mandatory to be mentioned in impugned order of imposing any penalty or if the contents of impugned order are on basis of perusal of the order of conviction wherein petitioner has a direct role would be sufficient. 14. Court takes note of a judgment on which learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner has placed reliance which are essentially based on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Shankar Das vs. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 358 wherein employee was convicted under Section 409 IPC and on basis of conviction, he was dismissed from service and since it was a pity offence, therefore, in given circumstances, penalty of dismissal was interfered making observation that right to impose a penalty carries with it a duty to act justly considering a ground of conduct which has led to conviction of employee. 15. 15. In aforesaid circumstances, Court is of the view that only on a ground that conduct of petitioner led to his conviction was not specifically mentioned in impugned order would not render the order impugned absolutely illegal since concerned respondents have taken note of order of conviction and punishment and considered the gravity of misconduct and an order of dismissal from service was passed. 16. I have already mentioned relevant paragraph of judgment of conviction that petitioner along with other accused were directly involved in committing offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, voluntarily causing hurt and mischief with common intention of all accused, therefore, role of petitioner in committing said crime was direct and specific. 17. In view of above, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order whereby petitioner was dismissed from service after taking note of gravity of offence and judgment of conviction. 18. Accordingly, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order, hence, present writ petition is dismissed.