ORDER : SURAJ GOVINDARAJ, J. 1. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106387/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1,2 & 4 to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 29.04.2023 to 25.08.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Savanur Town Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or, Prayer AA) declare that the period of administrator being in charge of Savanur, Municipality between 29.4.2023 to 23.8.2024 is ultra-vires the Article 243U of the Constitution of India and violation of democratic principles, the 30 months period is commence from election of President for the Xth term and to compute the period of 5 years excluding the period between 29.4.2023 to 23.8.2024. b. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 2. The Petitioners in W.P.No.105638/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned notification dated 27.01.2025 bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB passed by Respondent No.2 vide Annexure-D so far petitioner is concerned. b. Grant any other relief, which is the Hon’ble Court medium fit in the interest of justice and equity. 3. The Petitioners in W.P.No.105784/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents no. 1,2 & 4 to permit the petitioners to complete period of 30 months i.e, (X term) excluding the period from 29.04.2023 to 23.08.2024 i.e, the period of Administrator being in charge of Shiggaon CMC appointed u/s 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act so as to be in compliance of democratic principles and/or, b. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 4. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106273/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order to quash the impugned communication dated 27.01.2025 issued by the 2 nd Respondent authority bearing No. SECK.ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB Annexure-F determining the date of completion of term as at of councillors and consequentially the committee insofar as relates to at Sl. no 152as contrary to sec. 18 and sec. 315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. no 152as contrary to sec. 18 and sec. 315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. b) Declare that the duration of the currency of the order dated 08-05-2023 appointing administrator to Ankola Town Municipal Council from 08-05-2023 to 19.08.2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the term of the Councillors. c) Issue writ of mandamus, directing the Respondent No.1 and 2 to calculate the five years terms of the council excluding the period from 08-05-2023 to 19.08.2024 and further be directed that term of Ankola Town Municipal Council would continue until completion of 30 months term by considering the grievance of the Petitioners vide representations dated 28-07-2025 as at annexure-H and J submitted to the Respondent No. 1 and 2 respectively, in the interest of justice and equity. d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Honourable Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice. 5. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106649/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari communication to quash the impugned the 1st dated 24.06.2025 issued by Respondent authority bearing No.NAE39MLR2025(E) as at Annexure-G determining the date of completion of tenure of Councilors and consequentially the Committee insofar as relates to at Sl.No.1, as contrary to Sec. 18 and Sec.315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, In so far petitioners are concerned. b) Declare that the duration of the currency of the order dated 25.05.2023 appointing Administrator to Gokak City Municipal Council from 25.05.2023 to 05.08.2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councilors. c) Issue Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents No.1 and 2 to calculate the five years term of the Council excluding the period from 25.05.2023 to 05.08.2024 and further be directed that term of Gokak City Municipal Council would continue until completion of 30 months tenure by considering the grievance of the Petitioners vide representation dated 29.08.2025 as at Annexure-H to H-3, in the interest of justice and equity. d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the fact and circumstance of the case and in the interest of justice. 6. d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the fact and circumstance of the case and in the interest of justice. 6. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106650/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a 1st Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned communication dated 24.06.2025 issued by the Respondent authority bearing No.NAE39MLR2025(E) as at Annexure-E determining the date of completion of tenure of Councilors and consequentially the Committee insofar as relates to at Sl.No.1, as contrary to Sec.18 and Sec.315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964. b) Declare that the duration of the currency of the order dated 25.05.2023 appointing Administrator to Town Panchayat Khanapur from 25.05.2023 to 05.08.2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councilors. c) Issue Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents No.1 and 2 to calculate the five years term of the Council excluding the period from 25.05.2023 to 05.08.2024 and further be directed that term of Town Panchayat Khanapur would continue until completion of 30 months tenure by considering the grievance of the Petitioners vide representation as per Annexure-F to F-18, in the interest of justice and equity. d) Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the fact and circumstance of the case and in the interest of justice. 7. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106716/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned Communication dated 27/01/2025 passed by Respondent No.5 bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB vide Annexure - E; b. Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned Circular dated 24/06/2025 passed by Respondent No.2 bearing No.NAE 39 MLR 2025(E) vide Annexure - F; c. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 and 5 to not to hold elections to the 4th Respondent Council until the expiry of the Petitioner's tenure of Presidentship of thirty (30) months from the date of 1st meeting of the second term dated 03/10/2024 i.e. up to 02/04/2027 vide Annexure - D; in the alternative d. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 to determine and pay appropriate Compensation to the Petitioner for loss of months of tenure of Presidentship of the 4th Respondent Council; e. Pass any such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to meet the ends of justice and equity. 8. 8. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106726/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned Communication dated 27/01/2025 passed by Respondent No.5 bearing Annexure E; No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB vide b. Issue a Writt of Certiorari quashing the impugned Circular dated 26/03/2025 passed by Respondent No.2 bearing No. 2 39 2 2025(2) vide Annexure - F; c. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 and 5 to not to hold elections to the 4th Respondent Council until the expiry of the Petitioner's tenure of Presidentship of thirty (30) months from the date of 1st meeting of the second term dated 26/08/2024 i.e. up to 25/02/2027 vide Annexure - D; in the alternative d. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 to determine and pay appropriate Compensation to the Petitioner for loss of months of tenure of Presidentship of the4th  Respondent Council; e. Pass any such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to meet the ends of justice and equity. 9. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106772/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication by the respondent no.1 bearing No:NAE39MLR2025(E)dated 24.06.2025 copy as per ANNEXURE-G as being arbitrary, illegal and contrary to section 42& 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 Act read with Article 243U of the constitution, and / or, b. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1 to 3&5to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 06.05.2023 to 26- 08.2024i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Kudachi Town Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or c. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 10. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106773/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 10. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106773/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1,2 & 4 to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 09.05.2023 to 22.08.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Mahalingpur Town Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or, b. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 11. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106777/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned communication/direction dtd: 27-01-2025 vide ANNEXURE-E bearing No.SECK /ULB/OTHR /1/ 2025-ULB issued/addressed by the Respondent No.5 to Respondent No.1, in the interest of justice and equity. b) Declare that the duration/currency of the order dtd: 03- 05-2023 vide ANNEXURE-C issued by No.PuSa/Vahi: unnumbered/2023-24 appointing Administrator to 4th bearing Respondent No.3 Respondent Haveri City Municipal Council from 30-04-2023 to 04-09-2024 shall not usurp the total five years/60 months, of the tenure of the Councillors/Petitioners. c) Issue Writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the Respondents No.1 and 2 to consider the representation of the Petitioners dtd: 04-09-2025 ANNEXURE-F and further direct the Respondents No.1 to calculate the five years/60 months, term of the Council by excluding the period from 30-04-2023 to 04-09-2024 for calculation of reminder 30 months term of the elected council/Petitioners, in the interest of justice and equity. d) Issue Writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the Respondents No.1 to 3 and 5 to permit the Petitioners to function as Councillors of the 4th Respondent elected body by completing the remainder 30 months term extending up-to June 2027 by excluding the period of the Administrator in respect of 4th Respondent Municipal Council from 30-04-2023 to 04-09-2024, in the interest of justice and equity e) Issue any Writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the fact and circumstance of the case and in the interest of justice. 12. 12. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106782/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned Communication dated: 26.03.2025 issued by the 1st Respondent authority bearing No. No.A.E 39 MLR 2025 (?) vide Annexure D; b. Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned Notification dated: 12/05/2023 issued by the 1st Respondent authority bearing No. Na.A.?. 48 MLR 2023 vide Annexure C in so far as Town Municipal Council Concerned; C. Declare that the duration of the currency of the order dated: 12/05/2023 appointing Administrator to Town to Municipal Nargund Council from 05/05/2023 19/08/2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councilors. d. Issue a writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents not to hold elections to the 4th Respondent Council until the expiry of the Petitioners' tenure up to 25/02/2027. 13. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106791/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication by the respondent no.1 bearing No: NAE39MLR2025(E) dated 26.03.2025 copy as per ANNEXURE-G as being arbitrary, illegal and contrary to section 42 & 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 Act read with Article 243U of the constitution, and / or, b. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1 to 4 to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 09.05.2023 to 25-08.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Terdal Town Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or, c. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 14. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106806/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned communication issued by Respondent no.1 bearing no. 14. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106806/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned communication issued by Respondent no.1 bearing no. Na Aa Ee 39 MLR 2025(E) dated 26.03.2025 vide Annexure 'G' insofar as it proposes to conduct elections to TMC, Huvinahadagali before completion of the 30-month tenure of the President and Vice-President elected on 20.02.2025; b) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents not to disturb or curtail the tenure of the present President and Vice-President of TMC Huvinahadagali until 20.08.2027, thereby considering the representation vide Annexure 'H', in accordance with law; c) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case, including costs. 15. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106847/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the impugned communication dated 26.03.2025 (Annexure-F), issued by the 1st Respondent bearing No.NA AA I 39 MLR 2025(I), as being arbitrary, unconstitutional, and contrary to Sections 18, 315, 316, and 318 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, and violative of Article 243-U of the Constitution of India; b) Declare that the appointment of an Administrator to the Kotturu Town Municipal Council for the period from 18.05.2023 to 31.08.2024 is without jurisdiction, illegal, and cannot be reckoned towards the five-year tenure of the duly elected Councilors; c) Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to recalculate the tenure of the Kotturu Town Municipal Council by excluding the period from 18.05.2023 to 31.08.2024 and thereby permit the Council to continue until completion of its constitutionally guaranteed five-year term, in view of the Petitioner's representation dated 06.09.2025 (Annexure-G); d) Pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity. 16. 16. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106887/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari to quash the impugned communication dated 27-01.2025 issued by the 1st Respondent authority bearing No.SECK/ ULB/OTHR/1/2025- ULB as at Annexure-F determining the date of completion of tenure of Councilors and consequentially the Committee insofar as relates to at Sl.No. 195, as contrary to Sec.18 and Sec.315 of Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964; to b. Declare that the duration of the currency of the order dated 25.05.2023 appointing Administrator Harapanahalli City Municipal Council from 17-05-2024 to 11-11-2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councilors. c. Issue Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents No.1 and 2 to calculate the five years term of the Council excluding the period from 17-05-2024 to 11-11-2024 and further be directed that term of Harapanahalli City Municipal Council would continue until completion of 30 months tenure by considering the grievance of the Petitioners. d. Issue any writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the fact and circumstance of the case and in the interest of justice. 17. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106895/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Notification bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025- ULB dated 27/01/2025 passed by the 2nd respondent vide Annexure-F, in the interest of justice and equity. ii. Grant any other relief, which is the Hon'ble court medium fit in the interest of justice and equity. 18. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106896/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Notification bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB dated 27/01/2025 passed by the 2nd respondent vide Annexure-F, in the interest of justice and equity. ii. Grant any other relief, which is the Hon'ble court medium fit in the interest of justice and equity. 19. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106897/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Notification bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025- ULB dated 27/01/2025 passed by the 2nd respondent vide Annexure-D, in the interest of justice and equity. ii.Grant any other relief, which is the Hon'ble court medium fit in the interest of justice and equity. 20. ii.Grant any other relief, which is the Hon'ble court medium fit in the interest of justice and equity. 20. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106902/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: i. Declare that duration of the currency of the order bearing No. NAE 48 MLR 2023 dated 25/05/2023 passed by Respondent No. 1 marked at Annexure appointing administrator to 4th Respondent Chikodi Municipal Council from 19/04/2023 to 12/09/2024 shall not usurp the total five years of the tenure of the Councillors and 30 months tenure of petitioner as President, ii. Issue a writ of mandamus to Respondents No. 1 and 2 to calculate the five year term of the Council and 30 months period of President and Vice-President excluding the period from 19/04/2023 to 12/09/2024 and further direct that term of 4th Respondent TMC would continue until completion of 30 months tenure by considering the grievance of the petitioner vide representation dated 25/08/2025 vide Annexure - J, iii. and grant any other relief as deemed fit in the interest of justice. 21. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106903/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Communication bearing No.SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB dated 27.01.2025 vide Annexure- C issued by Respondent No.2 in the interest of justice and equity. b) Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent No.1 and 2 to calculate the term of the Respondent No.4 TMC by Excluding the period where the Respondent No.4 TMC being managed by the Respondent No.3 Administrator. c) Pass such other writ, order or direction that this Hon'ble Court deems fit to pass in the circumstances of the case. 22. The Petitioners in W.P.No.106917/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the Respondents No.1,2 & 3 to permit the petitioner to complete period of 30 months excluding the period from 05/05/2023 to 21.08.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Yellapur Town Panchayat appointed u/s 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act so as to be in compliance of democratic principles, and/or b. Pass any such other order as this Hon’ble Court deems fit. 23. 23. The Petitioners in W.P.No.107101/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication by the respondent no.1 bearing No: NAE39MLR2025(E) dated 24.06.2025 copy as per ANNEXURE-G as being arbitrary, illegal and contrary to section 18, 42 & 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 Act read with Article 243U of the constitution, and/or, b. Declare that the period of Administration being in charge of Sankeshwar TMC between 27.04.2023 to 10.09.2024 is ultra-vires the Art. 243U of Constitution of India and violation of democratic principles, the 30 months period is commence from election of President for the X term and to compute the period of 5 years excluding the period CMC between 27.04.2023 to 10.09.2024. c. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1 to 3to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 27.04.2023 to 10.09.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Sankeshwar Town 16 Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India,and/or, d. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 24. The Petitioners in W.P.No.107102/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication in so far as the petitioner is concerned respondent no.1 bearing No: NAE39MLR2025(E) dated 24.06.2025 copy as per ANNEXURE-F as being arbitrary, illegal and contrary to section 18 & 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 Act read with Article 243U of the constitution, and/or, b. Declare that the period of Administration being in charge of Navalgund TMC between 18.05.2023 to 05.09.2024 is ultra-vires the Art. 243U of Constitution of India and violation of democratic principles, the 30 months period is commence from election of President for the X term and to compute the period of 5 years excluding the period CMC between 18.05.2023 to 05.09.2024. c. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. c. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1 to 3to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 18.05.2023 to 05.09.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of Navalgund Town Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or, d. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 25. The Petitioners in W.P.No.107103/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication in so far as petitioners concerned by the respondent no.1 bearing No: NAE39MLR2025(E) dated 24.06.2025 copy as per ANNEXURE-F as being arbitrary. illegal and contrary to section 18, 42 & 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 Act read with Article 243U of the constitution, and/or. b. Declare that the period of Administration being in charge of Nippani CMC between 01.05.2023 to 17.09.2024 is ultra- vires the Art. 243U of Constitution of India and violation of democratic principles, the 30 months period is commence from election of President for the X term and to compute the period of 5 years excluding the period CMC between 01.05.2023 to 17.09.2024. c. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction and direct the respondents no. 1 to 3to permit the Petitioner's to complete the period of 30 months i.e., (X term) excluding the period from 01.05.2023 to 17.09.2024 i.e., the period of Administrator being in charge of NippaniCity Municipal Council, in the spirit of democratic values and basic structure of the Constitution of India, and/or, d. Pass any such other order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit. 26. 26. The Petitioners in W.P.No.107109/2025 are before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned Communication dated 27/01/2025 passed by Respondent No.5 bearing No. SECK/ULB/OTHR/1/2025-ULB vide Annexure - D; b. Issue a Writt of Certiorari quashing the impugned Circular dated 26/03/2025 passed by Respondent No.2 bearing No. 2 39 2 2025(2) vide Annexure - E; c. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 and 5 to not to hold elections to the 4th Respondent Council until the expiry of the Petitioner's tenure of Presidentship of thirty (30) months from the date of 1st meeting of the second term dated 30/08/2024 i.e. up to 30/04/2027 vide Annexure - C, in the alternative d. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondent No.2 to determine and pay appropriate Compensation to the Petitioner for loss of months of tenure of Presidentship of the 4th Respondent Council; e. Pass any such other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to meet the ends of justice and equity. 27. Essentially in all the matters, what is sought for is for extension of the period of the term of the petitioner/s some of them who claim to be the President or Vice- President of the Town Municipal Council (TMC) / City Municipal Council (CMC) / Municipality and some others who claim to be members of the TMC / CMC / Municipality on the ground that though they had been elected on 30.11.2020, the first term of 30 months having expired around May 2023 since the reservation for the post of President and Vice-President was not finalised which resulted in several litigations. 28. The Deputy Commissioner, exercising powers under Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act (KMC Act), appointed an administrator, who had been administering the TMC / CMC / Municipality until August 2024 when elections were held. The petitioners in some of the above matters have been elected as President, and in some of the above matters, have been elected as Vice-President, and are to be given a period of 30 months as a second term of the municipality. 29. In view of the delay which has occurred during the litigation, as well as the period in which the administrator was appointed, the Council has not been exercising its powers or discharging its duties. It is the administrator who has substituted the Council. 29. In view of the delay which has occurred during the litigation, as well as the period in which the administrator was appointed, the Council has not been exercising its powers or discharging its duties. It is the administrator who has substituted the Council. Thus, the interregnum period between the completion of the first term and the commencement of the second term should be eschewed. The period of 30 months is to be calculated from the date of the first meeting of the second term, following the election of the President and Vice-President, the second term of 30 months would be calculated. 30. Similar is the contention of the members of the TMC /CMC / Municipality who contend that, since the administrator has been appointed, the Council was not functioning, the Councillors have not exercised any powers or discharged any duties. They were permitted to exercise their powers and discharge their duties only upon the election of the President and Vice- President, post which the administrator vacated office, and therefore, it is contended that the term of the Councillors also needs to be extended so as to make available the complete 30 months. These are the basic contentions raised. 31. Sri. Mruthunjaya Tata Bangi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.Nos.106387/2025 and 105784/2025, submits that: 31.1. There is a guarantee for the President and Vice- President for discharge of their second term, comprising 30 months. The said guarantee cannot be taken away due to the delay on the part of the Government in fixing the reservation. It was the duty of the Government to have fixed the reservation prior to the expiry of the term. The same not having been fixed, irrespective of the litigation which has ensued, the fact remains that the President and Vice-President have not had a term of 30 months. Therefore, this Court ought to intercede and permit the President and Vice-President to discharge their second term of 30 months. 31.2. The entire term is 60 months, which is, five years, divided into two terms of 30 months each. What is required to be considered is the terms of 30 months and not the entire term of 60 months. Any gap between the two terms is required to be excluded. 31.3. 31.2. The entire term is 60 months, which is, five years, divided into two terms of 30 months each. What is required to be considered is the terms of 30 months and not the entire term of 60 months. Any gap between the two terms is required to be excluded. 31.3. For the default on the part of the Government, the persons who have been elected as President and Vice-President cannot be deprived of the balance of the term of 30 months. This would be contrary to the principles of democracy and the rights that the President and Vice-President are entitled to exercise. 31.4. He also supports the case of the Councillors to contend that once an exercise of power has been made under Section 315, the administrator replaces the Council and, as such, the Councillors could not exercise any power. 31.5. If the Deputy Commissioner had exercised these powers under subsection (5) of Section 42 of the Municipalities Act, then the Council would continue to remain in session, whereby the Councillors would have exercised their powers in voting on any resolution. 31.6. In the present case, the Councillors, being deprived of exercising their rights as Councillors due to an administrator being appointed under Section 315, the time during which the Administrator was appointed would have to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the second term of the Councillors. 31.7. In this regard, he relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kiran Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 7 SCC 521 more particularly Para 3 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:- 3. With the passage of time, it was realised that there had been no real decentralisation of powers. In the absence of basic decentralisation of powers travelling to the mores in one of the largest democracies like India, it was felt that the real purpose of social transformation could not be achieved. It was acknowledged and accepted that the people at the grass root level deserved to be politically, economically and socially empowered and the Seventy-third Amendment was brought into the framework of our organic Constitution with the clear intent of having local self- government. The vision, it can be said with certitude, is sacred and the same is explicit from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Seventy-third Amendment to the Constitution. The vision, it can be said with certitude, is sacred and the same is explicit from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Seventy-third Amendment to the Constitution. It reads as follows: “ 1 . Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existence for a long time, it has been observed that these institutions have not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people's bodies due to a number of reasons including absence of regular elections, prolonged supersessions, insufficient representation of weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, inadequate devolution of powers and lack of financial resources. 2 . Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of the directive principles of State policy lays down that the State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self- government. In the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comings which have been observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them. 3 . In the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comings which have been observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them. 3 . Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part relating to panchayats in the Constitution to provide for among other things, Gram Sabha in a village or group of villages; constitution of panchayats at village and other level or levels; direct elections to all seats in panchayats at the village and intermediate level, if any, and to the offices of Chairpersons of Panchayats at such levels; reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population for membership of panchayats and office of Chairpersons in Panchayats at each level; reservation of not less than one-third of the seats for women; fixing tenure of 5 years for panchayats and holding elections within a period of 6 months in the event of supersession of any Panchayat; disqualifications for membership of panchayats; devolution by the State Legislature of powers and responsibilities upon the panchayats with respect to the preparation of plans for economic developments and social justice and for the implementation of development schemes; sound finance of the panchayats by securing authorisation from State Legislatures for grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State, as also assignment to, or appropriation by, the panchayats of the revenues of designated taxes, duties, tolls and fees; setting up of a Finance Commission within one year of the proposed amendment and thereafter every 5 years to review the financial position of panchayats; auditing of accounts of the panchayats; powers of State Legislatures to make provisions with respect to elections to panchayats under the superintendence, direction and control of the chief electoral officer of the State; application of the provisions of the said Part to Union Territories; excluding certain States and areas from the application of the provisions of the said Part; continuance of existing laws and panchayats until one year from the commencement of the proposed amendment and barring interference by courts in electoral matters relating to panchayats.” 31.8. By referring to Kiran Pal Singh's case, the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the 73 rd Amendment has been placed on record, and it is contended that Panchayati Raj institutions and or the local government are required to be sufficiently empowered to carry out their activities and for that reason, a tenure of five years having been fixed, that tenure of five years would have to enure to the benefit of the petitioners. 31.9. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Vishwantah Akhandappa v. State of Karnataka , (1980) 2 Kant LJ 398 , more particularly Para 6 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 6. As already pointed out, by reason of conversion of Panchayat into Town Municipal Council by virtue of S. 357(b) of the Act, the interim Municipal Council consisting of persons vacating office as members of the Village Panchayat and the Chairman and the Vice- Chairman of the Village Panchayat respectively become the Councillors and the President and Vice-President of the interim Municipal Council. Accordingly, Petitioners 1 and 2 came to be statutorily, continued as the President and the Vice-President of the interim Municipal Council and petitioner 3 and respondents 3 to 12 as the Councillors. The term of office of the Councillors of the Municipal Council as provided by s. 358(2) of the Act expires on the date immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the new Municipal Concil. Under S. 358(1) of the Act the State Government is required to take steps for holding elections for constituting a new Municipal Council within one year of the constitution of the interim Municipal Council. But, the State Government does not appear to have taken steps for holding the election; but that does not in any way affect the term of office of the interim Municipal Councilors. In the case of interim Municipal Council coming into existence by reason of conversion of Panchayat into Municipality the term of the office of the interim Municipal Councillors comes to an end only on the date immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the new Municipal Council as stated in S. 358(2) of the Act. Therefore, the interim Municipal Council continues to function until the first meeting of the newly elected Municipal Council takes place. Therefore, the interim Municipal Council continues to function until the first meeting of the newly elected Municipal Council takes place. Therefore, it was not a case where either any general election to a Municipal Council under the Act or any proceedings consequent thereon were stayed by an order of a competent court or authority nor the election of all the Councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of Councillors of the Municipal Council has been declared by a competent court or authority to be void. It was also not a case in which the term or the extended term of the Municipal Council can be said to have expired. The term of office of the interim Municipal Councillors, as already pointed out, continues till the previous day of the date of the first meeting of the new Municipal Council and that can happen only when the elections are held. The failure on the part of the State Government to hold elections for electing new Municipal Councillors does not enable the State Government under S. 315(1) of the Act to appoint the Administrator unless the term of office of the Municipal Councillors has also expired. In the case of interim Municipal Council coming into existence by reason of conversion of Panchayat Committee into Town Municipal Council, the term of office of the interim Municipal Councillors continues until the elections are held and the first meeting of the new Municipal Council takes place. That being so, there was no power vested in the State Government under S. 315(1) of the Act to appoint the Administrator to the interim Municipal Council, Jewargi. Consequently, it follows that the impugned notification dated 16-11-1979 (Ex-C) issued by the first respondent is without the authority of law and as such it is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notification bearing No. HUD 214 TML dated 16-11-1979 (Exhibit-C) issued by the first respondent is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute. 31.10. Consequently, it follows that the impugned notification dated 16-11-1979 (Ex-C) issued by the first respondent is without the authority of law and as such it is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notification bearing No. HUD 214 TML dated 16-11-1979 (Exhibit-C) issued by the first respondent is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute. 31.10. By relying on Vishwanath Akhandappa's case, it is submitted that when interim municipal councils come into being on account of conversion of Panchayat into Town Municipal Council, the existing members of the Panchayat would become the councillors and office bearers which would continue till the expiry of the term and as such, in terms of subsection (2) of Section 358, the term of the existing Municipal Councillors would only come to an end on the first meeting of the newly elected municipal council takes place. On that basis, it is contended that failure on the part of the State Government to hold elections for electing new municipal councillors would not enable the State Government under Section 315 to appoint an administrator, unless the term of the office of the municipal councillor has expired. In the present case, the second term of the council would commence on the date of the first meeting of the second term, which would last for a period of 30 months. Before the expiry of this 30-month period, no administrator could be appointed under Section 315 or election held. 31.11. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kalpana Manjunath v. State of Karnataka , (2021) 2 Kant 520 , more particularly Para 24 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 24. One another aspect which would require examination is the appointment of administrator. Section 315 provides for appointment of an administrator only under the circumstances mentioned therein. Section 315 does not provide for appointment of an administrator while an exercise is undertaken by the Government under Chapter XVI of the Act. This is also not a case of dissolution of the elected body. Therefore, an officer could not be appointed by the Government to take care of the affairs of the Municipal Council, invoking Section 366. Section 315 does not provide for appointment of an administrator while an exercise is undertaken by the Government under Chapter XVI of the Act. This is also not a case of dissolution of the elected body. Therefore, an officer could not be appointed by the Government to take care of the affairs of the Municipal Council, invoking Section 366. This Court in Vishwantah Akhandappa v. State of Karnataka [Vishwantah Akhandappa v. State of Karnataka, 1980 SCC OnLine Kar 198 : (1980) 2 Kant LJ 398] has held that Section 315(1) of the Act, does not enable the State Government to appoint an administrator unless the term of office of the Municipal Councillors had expired. It was held that in the case of interim Municipal Councils coming into existence by reason of conversion of Panchayat areas into Town Municipal Council, the term of the interim Municipal Councillors continues until the general election are held and the first meeting of the new Municipal Council takes place. It was held that the term of the interim Municipal Councillors in terms of Section 358(2) shall come to end only when the first meeting of the new Municipal Council is held. Until such term, just because the State Government did not hold elections as stipulated under Section 358(1), the Government could not appoint an administrator. 31.12. By relying on Kalpana Manjunath's case, it is submitted that until elections are held, in terms of subsection (1) of Section 358, the Government could not appoint an administrator. 31.13. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of V. Subba Reddy v. State of Karnataka , ILR 1989 KAR 101 , more particularly Paras 20 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 20 . Section 315 of the Act reads as follows:— “ Power to appoint administrator in certain cases. 31.13. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of V. Subba Reddy v. State of Karnataka , ILR 1989 KAR 101 , more particularly Paras 20 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 20 . Section 315 of the Act reads as follows:— “ Power to appoint administrator in certain cases. — (1) Whenever— (a) any general election to a Municipal Council under this Act or any proceedings consequent thereon have been stayed by an order of a competent Court or Authority, or (b) the election of all the Councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole member of Councillors of the Municipal Council has been declared by a competent Court or Authority to be void, or (c) the term or the extended term of Office of the Councillors of the Municipal Council has expired and the new Municipal Council has not been constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or (d) all the Councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of Councillors of the Municipal Council have resigned, the State Government shall by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint an administrator for such period as may be specified in the notification and may, by like notification, curtail or extend (either prospectively or retrospectively) the period of such appointment. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, on the appointment of an administrator under sub-section (1), during the period of such appointment, the said Municipal Council and committees thereof and (the President and vice- President) charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, or any other law, shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act or any other law and all such powers shall be exercised and all such duties and functions shall be performed and discharged by the administrator. (3) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint an advisory Council to advise and assist the administrator appointed under sub-section (1) in the exercise of the powers and the performance and discharge of the duties and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act or any other law. (3) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint an advisory Council to advise and assist the administrator appointed under sub-section (1) in the exercise of the powers and the performance and discharge of the duties and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act or any other law. The members of the Advisory Council shall hold Office during the pleasure of the State Government.” Clause (c) above clearly provides for the appointment of an administrator when the term has come to an end. In other words, there is no extension of the term of the Councillors generally or in particular cases on the appointment of an administrator in place of Municipal Councillors. It becomes imperative, so that the administration is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There cannot be any vacuum created by the expiry of the term of the Office of the Councillors. In that sense Section 315 is an enabling provision to ensure continuity in the administration of the Municipal affairs of the town. 21. On the other hand Section 316 is the specific power conferred on the Government to bring to book erring Municipal Councillors and also set right any maladministration in the Municipality. Section 316 of the Act reads as follows:— “ Power of Government to supersede a Municipal Council in certain circumstances — (1) If, in the opinion of Government any Municipal Council is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it by or under this Act, or any other law, or exceeds or abuses its power or refuses to carry out the directions given to it under the provisions of this Act or any other law (or is functioning in a manner prejudicial to the Municipality) the Government may, by an order published, together with a statement of the reasons therefor, in the Official Gazette, declare the Municipal Council to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and may supersede it for such period (not exceeding one year) as may be specified in the order: Provided that before making an order of supersession as aforesaid reasonable opportunity shall be given to the Municipal Council to show cause why such order should not be made. Provided further that for reasons to be recorded in writing the Government may extend the period of supersession by a further period not exceeding six months: Provided also that the Government may continue the supersession for any period beyond one year and six months if, in its opinion for reasons beyond its control which shall be recorded in writing, it is necessary so to do. (2) When the Municipal Council is superseded by an order under sub-section (1) the following consequences shall ensue:— (i) all the Councillors of the Municipal Council shall, on such date as may be specified in the order vacate their Office as such Councillors without prejudice to their eligibility for election under sub-section (4); (ii) during the period of supersession of the Municipal Council, all powers and duties conferred and imposed on the Municipal Council by or under this Act or any other law shall be exercised and performed by such Officer as the Government may from time to time appoint in that behalf; (iii) all property vested in the Municipal Council shall, until it is reconstituted, vest in the Government. (3) If, after enquiry made, the Government so directs, then notwithstanding the term of the Councillors of the superseded Municipal Council, the period of supersession with all the consequences aforesaid shall from time to time, be continued (either prospectively or retrospectively) by an order published as aforesaid until such date as may be fixed by the Government for reconstitution of the Municipal Council. (4) After the Municipal Council is superseded it shall be re-constituted by the election or appointment of Councillors under, the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder applicable thereto— (i) if no direction has been made under sub- section (3) before the expiration of the period specified in the order of supersession under sub-section (1), and (ii) if a direction has been made under sub- section (3) before such date as is fixed under that sub-section for the reconstitution of the Municipal Council. (5) An order of supersession of a Municipal Council under sub-section (1) and an order under sub-section (3) together with a statement of the reasons therefor shall be laid before both Houses of the State Legislature as soon as may be after it is made.” The provision is clear enough to indicate that the power exercised is quasi-judicial in as much as the affected Municipal Council is bound to be heard after specific charges are levelled against it in regard to any act of mis-management or persistent default. If this is borne in mind, then, on the undisputed facts, the following will emerge: (1) The power of the Government under Section 18 of the Act is executive powers to be exercised for the specific purpose of extending the term of Office of the Councillors and it does not confer any legal right on the Councillors to claim right of extension as a matter of Course. (2) Power under Section 315 of the Act conferred on the Government to appoint an administrator is again an executive power enabling the Government in several of given situations to provide continuity of administration by appointment of administrator and one such situation being the expiry of the term of the Councillors. (3) Section 316 of the Act on the other hand gives power to Government to supersede a Municipal Council and set right by the appointment of an administrator for the specified period for any act of mis-management or persistent default. 31.14. By referring to V.Subba Reddy's case, he submits that powers under Section 315, could only be exercised if the general election to a Municipal Council under the Act or any proceedings have been stayed by an order of the competent court or authority or the elections of all councillors or more than two-thirds or the whole member of the councillors of the Municipal Council has been declared by a competent court or authority to be void. The term or the extended term of office of the councillors of the Municipal Council has expired, and the new Municipal Council has not been constituted or, if more than two-thirds of the whole of the number of councillors have resigned. His submission is that none of these having occurred in the present matter, the powers under Section 315 could not be excised. His submission is that none of these having occurred in the present matter, the powers under Section 315 could not be excised. His further submission under Section 316, a specific power conferred on the Government to supersede a Municipal Council, which powers have also not been exercised, and as such, the appointment of an administrator under Section 315 without the requirement of Section 315 being satisfied cannot be done. 31.15. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Usha Mahesh Dasar v. State of Karnataka , 2025 SCC Online Kar 17173 , more particularly Para 13 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. A perusal of the above Sub-section (2) of Section 315 indicates that, if an administrator were to be appointed, during the period of such appointment, the Municipal Council and the committees thereof and the President and Vice- president charged with carryout out the provisions of this Act, or any other law, shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions conferred on them under the Act or any other law and all such duties and functions shall be performed and discharged by the administrator. 31.16. By relying on Usha Mahesh Dasar's case, he submits that the administrator would discharge all duties and functions of the council. Therefore, the council not being in operation, the period of the appointment of the administrator cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the term of the council. 31.17. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen and ors., , (2017) 2 SCC 629 more particularly Paras 74 to 77 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 74. The upshot of the above discussion clearly is that under the constitutional scheme mixing religion with State power is not permissible while freedom to practice, profess and propagate religion of one's choice is guaranteed. The State being secular in character will not identify itself with any one of the religions or religious denominations. This necessarily implies that religion will not play any role in the governance of the country which must at all times be secular in nature. The State being secular in character will not identify itself with any one of the religions or religious denominations. This necessarily implies that religion will not play any role in the governance of the country which must at all times be secular in nature. The elections to the State Legislature or to Parliament or for that matter or any other body in the State is a secular exercise just as the functions of the elected representatives must be secular in both outlook and practice. Suffice it to say that the constitutional ethos forbids mixing of religions or religious considerations with the secular functions of the State. This necessarily implies that interpretation of any statute must not offend the fundamental mandate under the Constitution. An interpretation which has the effect of eroding or diluting the constitutional objective of keeping the State and its activities free from religious considerations, therefore, must be avoided. This Court has in several pronouncements ruled that while interpreting an enactment, the Courts should remain cognizant of the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions accordingly. 75. In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar [Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 103], a Constitution Bench of this Court declared that while interpreting an enactment, the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to address. More importantly, the Court observed : (AIR p. 969, para 26) “26. … It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction.” 76. Extending the above principle further one can say that if two constructions of a statute were possible, one that promotes the constitutional objective ought to be preferred over the other that does not do so. 77. Extending the above principle further one can say that if two constructions of a statute were possible, one that promotes the constitutional objective ought to be preferred over the other that does not do so. 77. To somewhat similar effect is the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale [State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 469 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1762] wherein this Court held that as the vehicle of transforming the nation's life, the Court should respond to the nation's need and interpret the law with pragmatism to further public welfare and to make the constitutional animations a reality. The Court held that Judges should be cognizant of the constitutional goals and remind themselves of the purpose of the Act while interpreting any legislation. The Court said : (SCC p. 486, para 35) “35. The Judges, therefore, should respond to the human situations to meet the felt necessities of the time and social needs, make meaningful the right to life and give effect to the Constitution and the will of the legislature. This Court as the vehicle of transforming the nation's life should respond to the nation's needs and interpret the law with pragmatism to further public welfare to make the constitutional animations a reality. Common sense has always served in the court's ceaseless striving as a voice of reason to maintain the blend of change and continuity of order which is sine qua non for stability in the process of change in a parliamentary democracy. In interpreting the Act, the Judge should be cognizant to and always keep at the back of his/her mind the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions of the Act in the light thus shed to annihilate untouchability; to accord to the Dalits and the Tribes right to equality; give social integration a fruition and make fraternity a reality.” 31.18. By relying on Abhiram Singh's case, he submits that while interpreting the above provisions, the interpretation consistent with the purpose of the Act is required to be applied. If the State Government is permitted to hold elections, then that would trample upon the guarantee of the term of 30 months to the second term of the councillors. By relying on Abhiram Singh's case, he submits that while interpreting the above provisions, the interpretation consistent with the purpose of the Act is required to be applied. If the State Government is permitted to hold elections, then that would trample upon the guarantee of the term of 30 months to the second term of the councillors. The calculation of the second term would have to be specifically made from the date on which the first meeting of the second term of councillors was held. 31.19. Based on all the above, he submits that the Writ Petition is required to be allowed. 32. Sri. Shivaraj Balloli, learned counsel for the Petitioner in W.P.Nos.106726/2025, 106716/2025 and 107109/2025, submits that: 32.1. Section 18(1)(A) of the Municipalities Act provides for the term of an elected Councillor to be five years, and such term shall commence from the date of the first meeting of the Municipal Council. 32.2. Since the term has been bifurcated into two terms, his submission is that the date of commencement of the second term would have to be taken as the date on which the first meeting of the second term was conducted. This being so, since Section 42 provides for the election of the President of a Council and in terms of subsection (11) of Section 42, the President shall hold office for a period of 30 months. 32.3. His submission is that subsection (11) of Section 42 is to be read in consonance with Article 243-U to mean that a Councillor shall continue in his office for a period of 60 functioning months, split between two terms 30 months each held by a different President and Vice-President. 32.4. The word ‘continue’ used in Article 243-U would be for the entire period of five years in which the Councillor discharges his functions, and as such, the period during which the administrator had been appointed would have to be excluded from such period to constitute a five-year period. 32.5. The term of the President for each term of 30 months commencing from the date of the first day of the meeting, the same would have to be applied to the second term, and the period of 30 months would have to be calculated from the date of the first day of the meeting of the Council for the second term. 32.6. 32.6. If such an interpretation is not applied, the same would result in discrimination and violation of Article 14 inter se between the two terms, frustrating the intent and purport of Article 243- U of the Constitution. Both terms have to be equal, and there cannot be a difference between the terms. If there is a difference or shortfall, it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution. 32.7. He also relies on subsection (5) of section 42 and submits that during the vacancy in the office of the President, the Deputy Commissioner or any person nominated by the Deputy Commissioner could function as the President. However, the Council will continue to function. Juxtaposing the same to Section 315 of the Municipalities Act, he submits that an administrator would take over the Council and function as the Council. 32.8. His submission is also that the appointment of an administrator in all the present matters are contrary to Section 315 inasmuch as under Section 315 an administrator could be appointed only if an election to the Municipal Council had been stayed by a Court or if elections to all or more than two-thirds of the whole number of Councillors is declared to be void or more than two-thirds of the whole of the Councillors had resigned. None of these three situations having arisen, the appointment of an administrator by the State under Section 315 is not proper. Thus, the appointment of the administrator being void, the term during which the administrator occupied his position would have to be eschewed from the total term of the Council. 32.9. On the above basis, he submits that the Writ Petitions are required to be allowed. 33. Sri. Anoop Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 106273/2025, would also reiterate the above arguments and further submits that. 33.1. 32.9. On the above basis, he submits that the Writ Petitions are required to be allowed. 33. Sri. Anoop Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 106273/2025, would also reiterate the above arguments and further submits that. 33.1. He relies upon the decision in the case of Kishansing Tomar v.s Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad , LAWS (SC)-2006-10-68 , more particularly Paras 20 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: (20) It is true that there may be certain mad made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and d order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the e Municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no circumstance the Election Commission would be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Govt. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality, Going by the provisions contained in Article 243 U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. It is only when the Municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less s than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the Municipality for such period. (21) In our opinion, the entire provision in the Constitution was inserted to see that there should not be any delay in the constitution of the new Municipality every five years and in order to avoid the mischief of delaying the process of election and allowing the nominated bodies to continue, the provisions have been suitably added to the Constitution. In this direction, it is necessary for all the State Governments to recognize the significance of the State Election Commission, which is a constitutional body and it shall abide by the directions of the Commission in the same manner in which it follows the directions of the Election Commission of India during the elections for the Parliament and State Legislatures. In this direction, it is necessary for all the State Governments to recognize the significance of the State Election Commission, which is a constitutional body and it shall abide by the directions of the Commission in the same manner in which it follows the directions of the Election Commission of India during the elections for the Parliament and State Legislatures. In fact, in the domain of elections to the Panchayats and the Municipal bodies under the Part IX and Part IX A for the conduct of the elections to these bodies they enjoy the same status as the Election Commission of India. 33.2. By relying on Kishansingh Tomar's case, he submits that the exceptional circumstances which are taken into consideration for extension of time, the non-holding of election to the post of President and Vice President is also an exceptional circumstance which ought to be taken into consideration by this Court to come to a conclusion that the term of office of the second term has not been completed. 34. Sri.Anil Kale, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.106887/2025 also reiterates the above submissions. He additionally submits that the mandate of Article 243U would have to be read in conjunction with the requirement and or the mandate under Section 18 (1)(A) of the Municipalities Act, giving effect to both the terms of 30 months. 35. All the other counsel for the Petitioners adopt the submissions made by the arguing counsel. 36. Sri.J.M.Gangadhar, learned Additional Advocate General, would submit that: 36.1. The mandate under Article 243U is sacrosanct. The period of five years cannot be extended for any purposes, since the usage of the words under 243U is “and no longer”. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mr.C.K.Rama Murthy and anr., vs. State Election Commission and ors., , WP Nos.7939-40/2015 and connected matters dated 30.3.2015 more particularly Paras 35 to 39 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 35. I have considered this submission made on behalf of the State in light of the Article 243U of the Constitution. As already noted, sub-clauses (8) and (9) of Section 99 of the Act are in pari materia with clauses (3) and (4) of Article 243U of the Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze that Article. I have considered this submission made on behalf of the State in light of the Article 243U of the Constitution. As already noted, sub-clauses (8) and (9) of Section 99 of the Act are in pari materia with clauses (3) and (4) of Article 243U of the Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze that Article. Clause (1) of Article 243U categorically sates that every Municipality (Corporation in the instant case), unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force (Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, in the instant case) shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. The import of Clause (1) is that a period of five years from the date of the first meeting of the Corporation is the term fixed for a Corporation. This term is, however, subject to dissolution of the Corporation by the State Government. Therefore, the intent is to make it mandatory for a Corporation to function for a period of five years, in the absence of steps being taken for its dissolution. The second intent of sub-clause (1) becomes clear by the inclusion of the words “and no longer”. The purpose of inclusion of the aforesaid expression is that on the completion of five years, the Corporation cannot continue for any further duration. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the State Election Commission and other authorities including the State Government to carry out the mandate of the Constitution and ensure that a new body is constituted in time by holding election before expiry of five years as stipulated in the said clause. Thus, the period of five years is constitutionally stipulated and it is the maximum period. That is also the minimum period of a Corporation, unless dissolved earlier. For no reason whatsoever the term of five years can be extended beyond five years. Thus, by virtue of Clause (1) to Article 243U, the term of the Corporation has been fixed with certainty. Of course, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kishansingh Tomar has taken note of realities of life and stated that there could be exceptional circumstances for not holding election in time, such as natural calamities, but the fact that there could be certain reasons to postpone the election would not empower the Commission to justify delay in the process of conduct of election. Postponement of election must be under exceptional circumstances as stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, the object of Clause (1) of Article 243U is to ensure that there is no delay in the process of holding election in time by allowing urban bodies to continue beyond the statutory period of five years. Clause (2) of Article 243U is not relevant for this case and hence, would not necessitate any consideration. Clause (3) of Article 243U deals with reconstitution of a Corporation in two circumstances: (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in Clause (1) i.e., before five years from the date appointed for its meeting and (b) before the expiration of period of six months from the date of its dissolution. Thus, if the Corporation is dissolved and an Administrator is appointed, then the maximum period during which an Administrator could function is only six months from the date of dissolution and before that period Corporation has to be reconstituted. But proviso to sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) is significant. It states that when the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Corporation would have continued is less than six months, then it shall not be necessary to hold any election under that clause for constituting the Corporation for such period. The crucial words in this proviso are significant. It means that if the Corporation is dissolved, and having regard to the term of the Municipality being five years from the date of its first meeting, if the remainder period is less than six months, then it would not be necessary to hold election to reconstitute the Corporation for the remainder period. In such an event the reconstitution would have to be only under sub- clause (a) read with Clause (1) of Article 243U i.e., on completion of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting, which would in any case expire during the period the administrator is appointed. Hence, under no circumstance, can dissolution of a Corporation extend the term of the Corporation beyond five years from the date appointed for its first meeting, which would in any case expire during the period the administrator is appointed. This becomes further clear on a reading of Clause (4) of Article 243U. Hence, under no circumstance, can dissolution of a Corporation extend the term of the Corporation beyond five years from the date appointed for its first meeting, which would in any case expire during the period the administrator is appointed. This becomes further clear on a reading of Clause (4) of Article 243U. It states that a Municipality (Corporation in the instant case) constituted upon its dissolution before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under Clause (1), had it not been so dissolved. Therefore, the term of the Corporation is fixed as five years. If within that period of five years, the Corporation is dissolved and it is reconstituted before the expiration of five years, then the reconstituted Corporation would continue only for the remaining period within the said period of five years, had it not been dissolved. Thus, irrespective of the fact, that a Corporation being dissolved and reconstituted, its term of five years would not get altered. 36. Thus, on a conjoint reading of Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 243U, what emerges is that dissolution of the Corporation would not extend its term beyond five years from the date for its first meeting. If there are more than six months remaining on dissolution and its reconstitution, a Corporation would function only for the remainder period, till expiration of five years. But if the remainder of the period of dissolved Municipality is less than six months, then it is not necessary to hold any election for reconstituting the Corporation as the term of Corporation would automatically come to an end during the period Administrator is appointed and election would have to be held to reconstitute the Corporation under clause (1). 37. Thus, when the term of the Corporation expires, then automatically under Clause (1) r/w sub- clause (a) of Clause (3) of Article 243U, election would have to be held. This is irrespective of the fact as to whether the Corporation has been dissolved or not. If it is dissolved and reconstituted, then in terms of Clause (4) it is only for the remainder period of the five year term. This is irrespective of the fact as to whether the Corporation has been dissolved or not. If it is dissolved and reconstituted, then in terms of Clause (4) it is only for the remainder period of the five year term. On the other hand, if it is dissolved and if the remainder period is less than six months, then on expiry of the term, it would have to be reconstituted irrespective of the Administrator being appointed. Thus, the contention of the State that election need not be held on the expiry of the term of the present Council, in view of its dissolution and appointment of an Administrator being imminent, in which case, the Administrator could function for a period of six months from the date of dissolution and beyond the five year term is misconceived. 38. In the instant case, even if an Administrator is appointed immediately and the remaining period of Corporation being in any case, less than six months, then the Corporation would cease to function on the expiry of its term i.e., on 22.4.2015 and election would have to be held (although the Administrator would be functioning at the helm of affairs of the Corporation) and not prior to the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution. Therefore, if during the period of six months when the Administrator is appointed to a Corporation, the remainder of the term of the Corporation expires, then it has to be reconstituted forthwith and not wait till the expiry of six months from the date of its dissolution. That is why the proviso categorically states that when the remainder period of the dissolved Municipality is less than six months, then it is not necessary to reconstitute the Municipality under sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) as during the period of six months when the Administrator is functioning when the term of the Municipality would come to an end election would have to be held before the expiry of its duration under Clause (1) and sub-clause (a) of Clause (3). 39. As already noted, sub-clause (4) makes the aforesaid interpretation explicit by stating that any reconstitution of the dissolved Corporation under sub-clause (b) of (3) would be only for the remainder period for which the dissolved Corporation would have continued in Clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 39. As already noted, sub-clause (4) makes the aforesaid interpretation explicit by stating that any reconstitution of the dissolved Corporation under sub-clause (b) of (3) would be only for the remainder period for which the dissolved Corporation would have continued in Clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. Thus, reconstitution of the Corporation on its dissolution would not give a fresh lease of life to the Corporation by five years, but it is restricted upto the date when its five term would end from the date of its first meeting. Also sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) restricts the period during which an Administrator can function upto six months only from the date of its dissolution. Thus, reconstitution of a Corporation under Clause (1) of Article 243U read with sub-clause (a) of Clause (3) and reconstitution of a Corporation after dissolution under sub-clause (b) of Clause (3) are distinct. But the common aspect in both cases is that reconstitution on the expiry of the term of the Corporation or on dissolution cannot be beyond a period of five years as the term of a Corporation is five years and no longer. Thus, the contention of the State that dissolution of the Corporation would enable an Administrator to be appointed for a maximum period of six months and hence, till then, election need not be held even if by then the term of the Corporation ends is incorrect and rejected. 36.2. By relying on C.K.Ramamurthy's case, he submits that the Division Bench of this Court has categorically come to a conclusion that the term of the Corporation would be five years and no longer. It is this phrase, “and no longer” that he relies upon to contend that, irrespective of what may happen, the term of the council shall be five years and no longer. And as such, the Government, having issued a notification for the election, is in compliance not only with the constitutional mandate, but also with the interpretation in C.K.Ramamurty 's case. 36.3. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others , (2006) 8 SCC 352 , more particularly Paras 12, 13, 14, 19 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 12 . 36.3. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kishansing Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others , (2006) 8 SCC 352 , more particularly Paras 12, 13, 14, 19 and 21 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 12 . It may be noted that Part IX-A was inserted in the Constitution by virtue of the (Seventy Fourth) Amendment Act, 1992. The object of introducing these provisions was that in many States the local bodies were not working properly and the timely elections were not being held and the nominated bodies were continuing for long periods. Elections had been irregular and many times unnecessarily delayed or postponed and the elected bodies had been superseded or suspended without adequate justification at the whims and fancies of the State authorities. These views were expressed by the then Minister of State for Urban Development while introducing the Constitution Amendment Bill before the Parliament and thus the new provisions were added in the Constitution with a view to restore the rightful place in political governance for local bodies. It was considered necessary to provide a Constitutional status to such bodies and to ensure regular and fair conduct of elections. In the statement of objects and reasons in the Constitution Amendment Bill relating to urban local bodies, it was stated: "In many States, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result, urban local bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-Government. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to urban local bodies are incorporated in the Constitution, particularly for (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with respect to : (a) the functions and taxation powers, and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing. (ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections. (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women. Accordingly, it has been proposed to add a new Part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for. (ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections. (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women. Accordingly, it has been proposed to add a new Part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for. (f) fixed tenure of 5 years for the Municipality and re-election within a period of six months of its dissolution." 13. The effect of Article 243-U of the Constitution is to be appreciated in the above background. Under this Article, the duration of the Municipality is fixed for a term of five years and it is stated that every Municipality shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. Clause (3) of Article 243- U states that election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed - (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1), or (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date or its dissolution. Therefore, the constitutional mandate is that election to a Municipality shall be completed before the expiry of the five years' period stipulated in clause (1) of Article 243-U and in case of dissolution, the new body shall be constituted before the expiration of a period of six months and elections have to be conducted in such a manner. A Proviso is added to Sub-clause (3) Article 243-U that in case of dissolution, the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period. It is also specified in Clause (4) of Article 243-U that a Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under Clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 14. So, in any case, the duration of the Municipality is fixed as five years from the date of its first meeting and no longer. 14. So, in any case, the duration of the Municipality is fixed as five years from the date of its first meeting and no longer. It is incumbent upon the Election Commission and other authorities to carry out the mandate of the Constitution and to see that a new Municipality is constituted in time and elections to the Municipality are conducted before the expiry of its duration of five years as specified in Clause (1) of Article 243-U. 19. From the opinion thus expressed by this Court, it is clear that the State Election Commission shall not put forward any excuse based on unreasonable grounds that the election could not be completed in time. The Election Commission shall try to complete the election before the expiration of the duration of five years' period as stipulated in Clause (5). Any revision of electoral rolls shall be carried out in time and if it cannot be carried out within a reasonable time, the election has to be conducted on the basis of the then existing electoral rolls. In other words, the Election Commission shall complete the election before the expiration of the duration of five years' period as stipulated in Clause (5) and not yield to situations that may be created by vested interests to postpone elections from being held within the stipulated time. 21 . Commission shall take steps to prepare the electoral rolls by following due process of law, but that too, should be done timely and in no circumstances, it shall be delayed so as to cause gross violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Article 243-U of the Constitution. It is true that there may be certain man-made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the Municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no circumstance the Election Commission would be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Govt. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. Going by the provisions contained in Article 243-U, it is clear that the period of five years fixed thereunder to constitute the Municipality is mandatory in nature and has to be followed in all respects. It is only when the Municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the Municipality for such period.” 36.4. By relying on Kishansing Tomar's case, he submits that, since the duration of the municipality having been fixed for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, the period being specified, his submission is that, elections would have to be held by the respondent State. 36.5. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hemant Narayan Rasne vs. Commissioner and Administrator of Pune Municipal Corporation and others , (2022) 20 SCC 346 , more particularly Paras 18, 20, 21 and 22 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 18 . The relevant provisions referred to by the learned counsel for the parties and having bearing on the present discussion read as under: - 18.1 The Constitution of India “243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc.-(1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer: Provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution.” 18.2 The Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 “6. Duration of Corporation. (1) Every Corporation, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for a period of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. (2) A Corporation constituted upon the dissolution of a Corporation before the expiration of its duration, shall continue for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Corporation would have continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so dissolved. 6A. Term of office of Councillors.-The term of office of the Councillors shall be co-terminus with the duration of the Corporation.” “20. Constitution of Standing Committee.-(1) The Standing Committee shall consist of sixteen councillors. 6A. Term of office of Councillors.-The term of office of the Councillors shall be co-terminus with the duration of the Corporation.” “20. Constitution of Standing Committee.-(1) The Standing Committee shall consist of sixteen councillors. (2) The Corporation shall at its first meeting after general elections appoint sixteen persons out of its own body to be members of the Standing Committee. (3) One-half of the members of the Standing Committee shall retire every succeeding year at noon on the first day of the month in which the first meeting of the Corporation mentioned in sub-section (2) was held: Provided that all the members of the Standing Committee in office when general elections are held shall retire from office on the election of a new Committee under sub-section (2). (4) The members who shall retire under sub-section (3) one year after their election under sub-section (2) shall be elected by lot at such time previous to the date for retirement specified in sub-section (3) and in such manner as the Chairman of the Standing Committee may determine, and in succeeding years the members who shall retire under this section shall be those who have been longest in office: Provided that, in the case of a member who has been re-appointed, the term of his office for the purposes of this sub-section shall be computed from the date of his re-appointment. (5) The Corporation shall at its meeting held in the month preceding the date of retirement specified in sub-section (3) appoint fresh members of the Standing Committee to fill the offices of those who are due to retire on the said date. (6) Any Councillor who ceases to be a member of the Standing Committee shall be eligible for re-appointment.” “Section 25. Appointment of Transport Committee.-(1) In the event of the Corporation acquiring or establishing a Transport Undertaking, there shall be a Transport Committee consisting of thirteen members for the purpose of conducting the said undertaking in accordance with the provisions of this Act and subject to the conditions and limitations as are contained therein. Appointment of Transport Committee.-(1) In the event of the Corporation acquiring or establishing a Transport Undertaking, there shall be a Transport Committee consisting of thirteen members for the purpose of conducting the said undertaking in accordance with the provisions of this Act and subject to the conditions and limitations as are contained therein. (2) The Corporation shall at its first meeting after a Transport Undertaking is acquired or established, appoint twelve members of the Transport Committee from among persons who in the opinion of the Corporation have had experience of, and shown capacity in, administration or transport or in engineering, industrial, commercial, financial or labour matters and who may or may not be councillors. *** (5) One-half of the members of the Transport Committee appointed by the Corporation shall retire in every second year on the first day of the month in which the meeting referred to in sub-section (2) was held: Provided that, in the case of a councillor appointed a member of the Transport Committee, if at any time before the date of his retirement he ceases to be a councillor, he shall cease to be such member, and his office shall thereupon become vacant. The vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (9), as if it had occurred under Section 26……” “29A. Constitution of Wards Committees.- ….. (2) Each Wards Committee shall consist of - (a) the councillors representing the electoral wards within the territorial area of the Wards Committee; (b) the officer incharge of the territorial area of the Wards Committee; (c) such number of other members not exceeding three, nominated by the Councillors referred to in clause (a), from amongst the members of recognised non- Government Organisations and Community based organisations engaged in social welfare activities working within the area of the Wards Committee: Provided that such persons are registered as electors in the wards within the jurisdiction of the Wards Committee: Provided further that the norms for recognition of the Non-Government Organisations, the requisite qualification for nomination as members and the manner in which they are to be nominated shall be such as the State Government may prescribe. (3) The duration of the Wards Committees shall be co-terminus with the duration of the Corporation……” “Section 452. Power of State Government to dissolve Corporation. (3) The duration of the Wards Committees shall be co-terminus with the duration of the Corporation……” “Section 452. Power of State Government to dissolve Corporation. (1) If at any time upon representation made or otherwise it appears to the State Government that the Corporation is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of, the duties imposed upon it by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force or exceeds or abuses it powers, the State Government may, after having given the Corporation an opportunity to show cause why such order should not be made, by an order published, with the reasons therefor, in the Official Gazette dissolve the Corporation with effect from the date to be specified in the Order, (2) With effect from the date specified in the order passed under sub-section (1) or with effect from the date on which the Corporation stands dissolved under the proviso to article 243-ZF, the following consequences shall ensue:- (a) *** (b) *** (c) all powers and duties of the Corporation, the Standing Committee, the Transport Committee and all other committees constituted under the Act, shall, during the period of dissolution be exercised and performed by such Government Officer or Officers as the State Government may, from time to time, appoint in this behalf; (d) on dissolution of the Corporation all the property vested in the Corporation shall vest in the State Government. (e) the person or persons appointed under clause (c) may delegate his or their powers and duties to an individual of a committee or sub-committee. (f) the Government Officer or Officers appointed under clause (c), and the individual or the members of the committee or sub-committee referred to in clause (e) shall receive such remuneration from the Municipal Fund as the State Government may from time to time determine. (3) *** (4) The Corporation shall be re-constituted by election of councillors at general ward elections within the time specified for the purpose in clause (b) of section 6B: Provided that the person or persons appointed under clause (c) of sub-section (2) shall continue to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Corporation, the Standing, Committee and, as the case may be, the Transport Committee until the first meeting of the Corporation constituted by the election of councillors as aforesaid shall have been held. Section 452A. Section 452A. Power of State Government to appoint Government officer or officers to exercise powers and perform functions and duties of Corporation. (1) For every Municipal Corporation deemed to have been constituted or constituted for a larger urban area under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as the case may be, of section 3, the State Government may appoint a Government officer or officers to exercise all the powers and to perform all the functions and duties of a Corporation under this Act: xxx xxx xxx (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State Election Commission has brought to the notice of the State Government that it is not possible for the State Election Commission to conduct the general elections to the Corporation due to outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in the State, then the State Government may, by order, appoint a Government officer or officers, or extend the period of any officer appointed under sub-section (1), for such period as may be requested by the State Election Commission, which shall not extend beyond the 30th April 2021, to exercise all the powers and to perform all the functions and duties of the Corporation under this Act. (1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State Election Commission has brought to the notice of the State Government that it is not possible for it to conduct the general elections to the Corporation within the period specified in the order issued under sub-section (1A), due to COVID-19 pandemic situation in the State, then the State Government may, by order, appoint a Government officer or officers, or extend the period of any officer appointed under sub-section (1), for such period as may be requested by the State Election Commission, for exercising all the powers and performing all the functions and duties of the Corporation under this Act. (2) The officer or officers appointed under sub-section (1) shall hold office until the first meeting of the Corporation or for a period of six months from the date of specification of an area as a larger urban area, under sub-section (2) of section 3, whichever is earlier: Provided that the Administrator deemed to have been appointed as the Government officer under sub-section (1) shall hold office until the first meeting of the Corporation. xxx xxx xxx” 18.3 The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 “48. xxx xxx xxx” 18.3 The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 “48. The Standing Committee in existence on the day for the retirement of councillors shall continue to hold office until such time as a new Standing Committee is appointed under section 43, notwithstanding that the members of the said Committee or some of them may no longer be Councillors.” 20 . When it is apparent that the duration of the Corporation itself is for a period of five years and no longer, as per the mandate of Article 243U(1) of the Constitution of India, duly reflected in Section 6 of the Act of 1949; and the term of the office of Councillors has specifically been provided to be coterminous with the duration of Corporation in Section 6A of the Act of 1949; and then, the Standing Committee is to be consisting of “sixteen Councillors”, we are unable to find any logic in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the term of the Corporation comes to an end and even when the term of office of the Councillors comes to an end yet, the Standing Committee as existing on the date of completion of the terms of Corporation and Councillors shall continue to be in office until composition of the new Committee after elections. When no person could be said to be holding the office of the Councillor after completion of the term in view of the mandate of Sections 6 and 6A of the Act of 1949, it follows as a necessary corollary that the Standing Committee stands dissolved along with the completion of the term of the Corporation. 21 . The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of 1949 essentially comes in operation only in the eventuality when there are existing members of the Standing Committee in office when general elections are held and they are to retire on the election of a new Committee, i.e., at the first meeting of the Corporation after general elections. The proviso cannot be read to mean that notwithstanding the expiration of the duration of a Corporation and thereby, termination of the term of office of the Councillors, there could still be any Standing Committee in existence. It gets perforce iterated that the Standing Committee stands dissolved along with the completion of the term of the Corporation. 22 . The proviso cannot be read to mean that notwithstanding the expiration of the duration of a Corporation and thereby, termination of the term of office of the Councillors, there could still be any Standing Committee in existence. It gets perforce iterated that the Standing Committee stands dissolved along with the completion of the term of the Corporation. 22 . The other contention urged on behalf of the appellant by comparison of Sections 452 and 452A of the Act, particularly that no akin provision as that of Section 452(2)(c) is found in Section 452A, is also devoid of logic and substance. The provision of Section 452 essentially operates in relation to the contingency where the State Government takes the steps for dissolution of the existing Corporation after opportunity of show cause upon being satisfied that the Corporation is not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it or is persistently making default or is abusing its powers. Sub-sections (1A) and (1B) of Section 452A of the Act, which are operating in the present case, deal with a specific peculiar contingency where general elections could not be held during the time specified by the enactment even after the expiry of the term of the Corporation, essentially due to COVID-19 pandemic situation. Appointing of Administrator in such a contingency does not and cannot override the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution of India as also the provisions of Sections 6 and 6A of the Act as regards the tenure. As already noticed, end of the tenure of Corporation has its consequential effect of the end of the term of the office of the Councillor; and when no person including the present appellant could be said to be holding the office of Councillor after end of the term of the Corporation, existence of any Standing Committee thereafter, is simply out of question. Any other interpretation, in our view, shall be standing at conflict with the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution of India and Sections 6 and 6A of the 1949 Act.” 36.6. By relying on Hemant Narayan Rasne 's case, he again submits that when the duration of the Corporation itself is for a period of 5 years and no longer, as per Article 243U (1) of the Constitution, the term would expire after the period of 5 years 36.7. By relying on Hemant Narayan Rasne 's case, he again submits that when the duration of the Corporation itself is for a period of 5 years and no longer, as per Article 243U (1) of the Constitution, the term would expire after the period of 5 years 36.7. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Anjali Sanjay Kuligod vs. the State of Karnataka , WP No.102217/2021 more particularly Paras 4, 5, 6, 16 and 17 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 4. After constituting the Municipal Councils, the election to the post of President and Vice President has been held on 02.07.2016 for the term of 30 months and same came to an end on 31.12.2018. 5. Thereafter the State Government has issued notification on 03.09.2018 for reservation of seat of President and Vice President for second term and the same has been challenged before this Court on various grounds by the other Councillors of the Municipal Councils. The petitioners have not approached any Court of law and they were not parties in those proceedings. Since the matter was pending before this Court, no election has been held to the Post of President and Vice President. Since, office of President and Vice President fell vacant. The Tahasildar perform the function of the President under Section 42(5) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (“the Act” for short) 6. Thereafter in the month of November 2020, the election to the post of President and Vice President for the second term has been held. Before completing the term of the petitioners, the impugned notification has been issued by appointing the administrator on the ground that the 5 years term of the Councillors of the Municipal Councils is expired. Hence, the petitioners have given a representation to the respondents to extend their term. Since no order has been passed on their representations, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the writ petitions seeking direction to the respondents to extend their term. The writ petitions were disposed of with a direction to consider the representation. The respondents by order dated 03.06.2021 have rejected the request of the petitioners for extension of term of President and Vice President. Being aggrieved by the same, they are before this Court. 16. The petitioners are the Councillors of various Municipal Councils. The writ petitions were disposed of with a direction to consider the representation. The respondents by order dated 03.06.2021 have rejected the request of the petitioners for extension of term of President and Vice President. Being aggrieved by the same, they are before this Court. 16. The petitioners are the Councillors of various Municipal Councils. The election to the various Municipal Councils has been held in the month of April, 2016. The term of the Councillors of the Municipal Councils is for tenure of 5 years fixed under Section 18(1)(a) of the Act. Section 18(1)(a) of the said Act reads as follows: “18. Term of office of Councillors.- (1) the term of office of a councilor,- (a) Elected at a general election shall be five years;” This Section is enacted in terms of the mandate of Article 243U(1) of the Constitution of India which is as follows: “243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc. (1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer:” The language of Article 243U and Section 41 of the Act, place no manner of doubt that in any circumstances, the tenure of the elected body of the municipalities cannot be longer than five years. This becomes apparent by the expression and no longer employed in the said articles, the tenure of the 5 years is constitutionally prescribed policy. 17. In view of the above, no writ can be issued to continue the tenure of the elected body beyond 5 years. Therefore, the respondents have rightly rejected the request of the petitioners by issuing endorsement vide Annexure-H. 36.8. By relying on Anjali Sanjay Kuligod 's case, he submits that in that matter, election to the post of President and Vice President had been held on 2.7.2016 and the first term of 30 months came to an end on 31.12.2018, a notification issued on 3.9.2018 for reservation for President and Vice President for second term had been challenged, there being stay of proceedings, it is only in November 2020 that elections to the post of President and Vice President could be held for the second term. A request having been made for extension of the term, the same came to be rejected, and this Court, on a challenge being made, has categorically come to a conclusion that the language of Article 243U and Section 41 of the Act would place no manner of doubt that the tenure of the elected body of the municipalities cannot be longer than five years, and hence rejected the writ petition. His submission is that the said decision would apply on all fours to the present matter. 36.9. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxman Lakappa Ningannavar vs. The State of Karnataka , WA No.100111/2021 more particularly Para 3 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the papers, we decline to grant indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The tenure of elected local bodies like the panchayat & municipality, regardless of their varying nomenclatures is constitutionally fixed as being ‘five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer’ vide the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, 1992 w.e.f. 24.04.1993 & the Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act 1992 w.e.f. 01.06.1993; acceding to the prayer of the writ petitioners and thereby directing the respondent-State & the Election Commission to extend the tenure of these bodies militates against the constitutional mandate; it has been a well settled position of constitutional jurisprudence that no writ can issue to do what the law does not permit; this inarticulate premise has animated the impugned orders, absence of elaborate discussion therein, not withstanding. (b) The vehement submission of appellant-writ petitioners that in the absence of an enabling provision in the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, if Government can appoint the Administrators when statutorily prescribed prerequisites are lacking, it is open to the Government to issue appropriate orders for elongating the tenure of the elected body or its office bearers, cannot be countenanced; the observations of the Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar V. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad (2006) 8 SCC 352 do not lend support to such a wide proposition; our constitution envisages a limited government that can do what is permitted or sanctioned by law either expressly or by necessary implication; contention advanced on behalf of the applicants offends this well established norm. (c) In Kishansingh Tomar, supra the Apex Court having discussed the object of Seventy Fourth Amendment to the Constitution expressed its anguish against delaying and postponing of elections to the local bodies in many States; at paragraph 14, it observed that it is incumbent upon the Election Commission and other authorities to carry out the mandate of the Constitution that the duration of the municipality having been fixed as five year; the new municipality has to be constituted in time by holding periodical elections before the expiry of this duration; at paragraph 21, the Court only recognized certain exceptional circumstances that may justify delayed elections beyond the period of five years mandatorily fixed under Article 243-U; the last four lines in the paragraph being pertinent are reproduced below: “… It is only when the municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the municipality for such period.” (d) More than a century ago, Lord Halsbury in the celebrated case of Quinn V. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 had emphasized that a decision is an authority for the proposition that it actually lays down, and not for all that which logically follows from what has been so laid down; there is nothing in the decision cited at the Bar even remotely supportive of the contention of the writ petitioners that the Government and the State Election Commission have power to extend the tenure of elected local bodies of the kind in any circumstances whatsoever; the text & context of Seventy Third & Seventy Fourth amendments to the Constitution do not leave even a shadow of such power. (e) It hardly needs to be stated that the voters/electors elect their representatives to the local bodies for the tenure prescribed by the Constitution and the statute under which they are constituted; these representatives have the popular mandate for the specified tenure and not beyond that; this tenure sometimes may be cut short by operation of law or by an act authorized by law; that in such a gratuitous situation the popular mandate is shortened is true; however, the reverse logic that if the popular mandate can be cut short, it can be elongated too, in extraordinary situation like the COVID- 19 Pandemic is difficult to agree with; in the militant absence of statutory enablement, if the Government & the Election Commission accede to the request of the writ petitioners, that amounts to they donning the mantle of voters/electors; this offends the rudiments of democracy, which is a Basic Feature of the Constitution vide Kesavananda Bharti (1973)4 SCC 225 . 36.10. By relying on Laxman Lakappa Ningannavar ’s case, he submits that the interpretation is required to be given to any judgment would be on the basis of the facts of that judgment, and this Court ought to consider the present facts to apply the decisions relied upon by the petitioners, more so when there are categorical decisions to the contra than that relied upon by the petitioners. 37. Heard Sri.Mruthunjaya Tata Bangi, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.106387/2025 and 105784/2025, Sri.Shivaraj Balloli, learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.106726/2025, 106716/2025 and 107109/2025, Sri.Anoop Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.106273/2025, Sri.Anil Kale, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.106887/2025. All the other counsels for the petitioners have adopted the submission of the above- arguing counsel. Heard Sri.J.M.Gangadhar, learned Additional Advocate General for the State and perused papers. 38. The points that would arise for consideration are: i) Whether the term of the elected councillors can be extended beyond a period of five years, more so in view of the mandate under Article 243U of the Constitution? ii) Whether the petitioner, not having challenged the order appointing an administrator under Section 315 of the Municipalities Act, could now seek to challenge the appointment of the said administrator? iii) Could the time period during which the administrator was in office be required to be excluded from calculating the term of office of the council? ii) Whether the petitioner, not having challenged the order appointing an administrator under Section 315 of the Municipalities Act, could now seek to challenge the appointment of the said administrator? iii) Could the time period during which the administrator was in office be required to be excluded from calculating the term of office of the council? iv) Whether the notification issued by the State to hold elections would impinge on any of the rights of the petitioners? v) What order? 39. I answer the above points as follows: 40. Answer to Point No.1 : Whether the term of the elected councillors can be extended beyond a period of five years, more so in view of the mandate under Article 243U of the Constitution? 40.1. Article 243U of the Constitution of India is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: Article 243U: Duration of Municipalities, etc.- (1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer: Provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. (2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Municipality at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). (3) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed, - (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the Municipality for such period. (4) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 40.2. A perusal of Article 243U(1) of the Constitution would indicate that every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being enforced, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. 40.3. 40.2. A perusal of Article 243U(1) of the Constitution would indicate that every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being enforced, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. 40.3. The proviso to Article 243U(1) requires the municipality to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. That is to say, the proviso applies only if a dissolution were to happen prior to the five-year term. 40.4. The mandate of Article 243U(1) is clear in that the term of the municipality shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. There is no distinction made between two sessions or three sessions or the like. The term of the Municipality is one standard period of five years. In terms of Article 243U, it is required that an election to constitute a municipality shall be completed before the expiry of its duration specified in Clause (1) or before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution, provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for constituting the municipality for such period. 40.5. Thus, again Clause (3) of Article 243U provides for the duration to be five years and only if the municipality is dissolved, leaving more than six months as a balanced tenure, then elections will not have to be held, and if the balance tenure is less than six months, elections would have to be held immediately. 40.6. What is more important is Clause (4) of Article 243U, which provides that even where a municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a municipality before the expiration of a duration, the same shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued under Clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. Thus, even in the case of dissolution under Clause (4) of Article 243U, the period of dissolution is not excluded for the purpose of calculating the completion of the term. Thus, even in the case of dissolution under Clause (4) of Article 243U, the period of dissolution is not excluded for the purpose of calculating the completion of the term. The period of dissolution is also included, and after inclusion, the remainder of the period for which the municipality would have continued is taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the term of the municipality. 40.7. This being the position of law in terms of Article 243U, the same has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in C.K.Rama Murthy’s case and while interpreting Clause (1) of Article 243U, the Hon’ble Division Bench has come to a categorical conclusion that the term of the Corporation would be five years and no longer. It is that phrase “and no longer” which has been interpreted very succinctly by the Hon’ble Division Bench and this Court has come to a categorical conclusion that irrespective of what may happen, the term can be five years and no longer. 40.8. Similarly, the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kishan Singh Tomar's case, where the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the municipality, came to a conclusion that the term fixed for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer would require the calculation of the set term of five years to be made from the date on which the first meeting was fixed. 40.9. The Hon’ble Apex Court again in Hemant Narayan Rasne 's case while dealing with a situation where exemption was sought for, in respect of the covid pandemic when administrator was appointed came to a conclusion that even the covid period cannot be excluded to calculate the term of the municipality and in terms of Clause (1) of Article 243U, despite Covid the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the term would expire after a period of five years from date fixed for the first meeting. 40.10. A Coordinate Bench of this court in Anjali Sanjay Kuligod 's case when there was a delay in the earlier term, that is the term commencing from 2016, the first session of 30 months having come to an end on 31.12.2018, reservation having been notified on 3.9.2018, proceedings having been filed before various Courts, and the notification of reservation having been stayed, elections were held much subsequently. Even there, a Coordinate Bench came to a conclusion that the term under Clause (1) of Article 243U can only be five years and no longer. 40.11. The decisions which have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, I am afraid, will not be of much assistance to them in view of the above categorical judgments on the matter. The decision in Kiran Pal Singh ’s case has been relied upon for the purpose of placing on record the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the 73 rd amendment and on that basis, Sri.Mruthunjaya Tata Bangi, learned counsel, has contended that the tenure of five years would have to be made available to the councillors. His contention is that such tenure of five years would have to exclude any break in the tenure. The said argument is contrary to the dicta laid down in Anjali Sanjay Kuligod 's case, where the stay by this Court was not taken into consideration for extending the term as also the decision in Hemant Narayan Rasne 's case, where even COVID-19 did not result in extension of the term, would negate this interpretation. 40.12. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Vishwanath Akhandappa's case to contend that it is only after the date for the first meeting of the second term is fixed that the period of second term would commence and as such, the date of fixing of the meeting for the first term cannot be taken into consideration for calculating of the entire term of five years. 40.13. This is an artificial distinction which is sought to be made out by Mr.Bangi, learned counsel inasmuch as in Vishwanath Akhandappa's case, what was dealt with was the establishment of an interim municipal council on account of the conversion of a panchayat into a municipality. That situation is completely different from the present situation inasmuch as, on the conversion of a panchayath to a municipal council, there are various modalities which have to be followed. In the present case, none of the municipalities has arisen due to the upgradation of a panchayat or the like. 40.14. In the above background, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the term of elected councillors cannot be extended beyond a period of five years in terms of mandate under Clause (1) of Article 243U of the Constitution. 41. In the present case, none of the municipalities has arisen due to the upgradation of a panchayat or the like. 40.14. In the above background, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the term of elected councillors cannot be extended beyond a period of five years in terms of mandate under Clause (1) of Article 243U of the Constitution. 41. Answer to Point No.2 : Whether the petitioner, not having challenged the order appointing an administrator under Section 315 of the Municipalities Act, could now seek to challenge the appointment of the said administrator? 41.1. Section 315 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 315 . Power to appoint administrator in certain cases .—(1) Whenever,— (a) any general election to a municipal council under this Act or any proceedings consequent thereon have been stayed by an order of a competent court or authority, or (b) the election of all the councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council has been declared by a competent court or authority to be void, or [(c) x x x] (d) all the councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council have resigned, the State Government shall by notification in the official Gazette, appoint an administrator for such period as may be specified in the notification and may, by like notification, curtail and extend [either prospectively or retrospectively] the period of such appointment [so however, the total period of such appointment shall not exceed six months]. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, on the appointment of an administrator under sub- section (1), during the period of such appointment, the said municipal council and committees thereof and [the President and Vice-president] charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, or any other law, shall cease to exercise any powers and perform and discharge any duties or functions conferred or imposed on them by or under this Act or any other law and all such powers shall be exercised and all such duties and functions shall be performed and discharged by the administrator. (3) The State Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint an advisory council to advise and assist the administrator appointed under sub-section (1) in the exercise of the powers and the performance and discharge of the duties and functions conferred or imposed on him under this Act or any other law. The members of the advisory council shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. 41.2. By relying on Clause (a), (b) and (d) of subsection (1) of Section 315, it is sought to be contended that it is only under those circumstances that an administrator could be appointed under Section 315. Since none of those circumstances are attracted in the present matter, the question of appointment of an administrator would not arise. The circumstances under Clause (a) being if any general election to a municipal council had been stayed by an order of a competent court or authority. Under Clause (b), being the election of all councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council having been declared by a competent court or authority to be void or under Clause (d), all the councillors or more than two-thirds of the whole number of councillors of the municipal council having resigned. 41.3. The submission learned counsel for the petitioners being that none of these three fact situations have been attracted, the question of appointment of an administrator pending the finalization of reservation and or an account of stay of the reservation would not entitle the State to appoint an administrator. 41.4. I am unable to agree with this submission for the reason that a challenge having been made to the reservation, until that challenge were to be decided, the question of holding any elections would not arise. Therefore, the same, in effect, was a stay on the elections to be conducted and as such, in my considered opinion, would come under Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 315. 41.5. Be that as it may, at the time when such an appointment of an administrator was made, none of the present petitioners had challenged the appointment of an administrator, but continued to litigate the challenge made to the reservation. 41.5. Be that as it may, at the time when such an appointment of an administrator was made, none of the present petitioners had challenged the appointment of an administrator, but continued to litigate the challenge made to the reservation. Thus, at the relevant point of time, there being no challenge made to the appointment of an administrator, it is only now, when the entire term of the municipality is coming to an end, that this ground has been taken up, and in a few of the matters, a challenge has been made to the appointment of an administrator, belatedly, and as such, in my considered opinion, the appointment of an administrator has been acquiesced to by the petitioners and the challenge now made is hit by delay and latches. Thus, in the present case, all three elements, that is, acquiescence, delay and latches, would disentitle the petitioners from any equitable consideration. 41.6. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Kalpana Manjunath's case that was again a decision relating to an interim municipal council coming into existence by reason of the conversion of panchayat areas into Town Municipal Councils, attracting subsection (2) of Section 358, which is not the case in the present matter. 41.7. Reliance has been placed on V.Subba Reddy's case to contend that it is only under the circumstances detailed in subsection (1) of Section 315 that an administrator could be appointed. This contention has been dealt with hereinabove by me and for that reason I hold that the decision in V.Subba Reddy's case does not apply to the present matter. Reliance is placed on Usha Mahesh Dasar's case to contend that there is a distinction in an administrator appointed under Section 42 of the Municipalities Act and an administrator appointed under subsection (1) of Section 315. 41.8. Sub-section (11) of Section 42 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 42 . President and Vice-President:- (11) Save as otherwise provided under this Act, the President and Vice-President shall hold office for a period of thirty months from the date of their election, provided that in the mean-time they do not cease to be councillors. 41.9. 41.8. Sub-section (11) of Section 42 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 42 . President and Vice-President:- (11) Save as otherwise provided under this Act, the President and Vice-President shall hold office for a period of thirty months from the date of their election, provided that in the mean-time they do not cease to be councillors. 41.9. By relying on subsection (11) of Section 42, it is sought to be contended that the president and vice-president shall hold office for a period of 30 months from the date of their election and on that basis, it is contended by Sri.Shivaraj Balolli that there is a guarantee of a period of 30 months even for the second term. I am unable to accept this argument as held supra the term of the municipality under Clause (1) of Article 243U is five years from the date of the first meeting, the Constitution not providing for splitting of the term merely because the Municipalities Act provides for it cannot dilute the requirements of the Constitution. 41.10. Article 243U of the Constitution will on any day override Section 42 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 and any provision in any enactment contrary to the provision of the Constitution would be ultra vires to the Constitution. 41.11. In that view of the matter, I answer Point No.2 by holding that the petitioners, not having challenged the order appointing an administrator under Section 315 of the Municipalities Act, at the time of such appointment or soon thereafter cannot now seek to continue to hold office on the ground that the initial appointment of an administrator was allegedly bad in law. I have come to the conclusion that the appointment of an administrator under subsection (1) of Section 315 is proper and valid. 42. Answer to Point No.3 : Could the time period during which the administrator was in office be required to be excluded from calculating the term of office of the council? 42.1. Much has been sought to be made out as regards the time period to be excluded by juxtaposing Section 315 with subsection (5) of Section 42. Both provisions have been extracted hereinabove. 42.1. Much has been sought to be made out as regards the time period to be excluded by juxtaposing Section 315 with subsection (5) of Section 42. Both provisions have been extracted hereinabove. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners by referring to subsection (5) of Section 42 is that during a vacancy in the office of the president of a municipal council, and where there is no vice president to take his place or if a vice president fails to assume charge of the office of the president which has fallen vacant, then without prejudice to any action under subsection (10) of Section 42, the Deputy Commissioner or the person performing the duties of the Deputy Commissioner for the time being in the case of a City Municipal Council and, in the case of Town Municipal Council any officer nominated by him in this behalf not below the rank of the Municipal Commissioner, etc., shall perform the function of the president. 42.2. Based on subsection (5) of Section 42, it is sought to be contended that it is only if the President and Vice President are unable to perform their obligations and or discharge their duties or assume charge of the office, that the Deputy Commissioner or the person nominated, depending on the various situations enumerated therein, would perform the function of the President. 42.3. Thus, it is contended that though the Deputy Commissioner would perform the duties of a President of the Municipality, the Council would continue to be in session, the Deputy Commissioner only discharging the role of the President, the Council would be in session with all the councillors exercising their rights as councillors. 42.4. Whereas under Section 315, it is contended that an administrator once appointed, the council is no longer in session, the councillors would no longer be able to exercise their powers as councillors, and as such, during a term when the administrator is in office, the councillors not being able to discharge their functions as councillors, that period is required to be excluded. 42.5. Though at first blush, this argument sounds very inviting, the fact remains that this argument would have to be considered in relation to Clause (1) of Article 243U. 42.5. Though at first blush, this argument sounds very inviting, the fact remains that this argument would have to be considered in relation to Clause (1) of Article 243U. The scope, ambit and import of Clause (1) of Article 243U being to the knowledge of the petitioners and all those who had challenged the reservation, knowing fully well that an administrator had been appointed, it was to their knowledge that the clock was continuing to tick and the longer it took for the resolution of the matter, the term of the council continuing to tick, would become shorter. 42.6. The councillors, by themselves, challenging the reservations, cannot now take the benefit of contending that the term would continue, since the President and Vice President, being unable to be appointed, the Deputy Commissioner ought to have discharged his roles as the President with the Council continuing. 42.7. As indicated supra, in my answer to Point No.2, there was no challenge made to the appointment of Administrator, nor did any of the councillors who were before this Court contend that it should be subsection (5) of Section 42 which would apply and not subsection (1) of Section 315. It is only when the term is coming to an end that this argument is sought to be advanced by interpreting the provision in the manner as done. 42.8. Clause (1) of Article 243U, not contemplating any exclusion of the period during which an administrator was appointed, and in fact, Clause (4) of Article 243U, not even excluding the period in which the Municipal Council was dissolved, would clearly, categorically and unimpeachably establish that there is no provision for exclusion of any period, be it with the appointment of administrator or otherwise, for calculating the term of office of the Council. 42.9. Hence, I answer Point No.3 by holding that the time period during which the administrator was in office, an administrator appointed under subsection (1) of Section 315, cannot be excluded for calculating the term of office of the council. 43. Answer to Point No.4 : Whether the notification issued by the State to hold elections would impinge on any of the rights of the petitioners? 43.1. 43. Answer to Point No.4 : Whether the notification issued by the State to hold elections would impinge on any of the rights of the petitioners? 43.1. In view of my answers to Points No.1 to 3, it is clear that the term of office was coming to an end, and in terms of clause (2) of Article 243, there is a requirement to hold elections before the expiration of a period of 6 months from the date of dissolution. As the term of the five-year Council is coming to an end, it is required that elections be held to constitute the next Council. The steps taken by issuing a notification to hold elections are the proper thing to do by the State. No fault can be found with the said actions, and as such, issuance of notification would not impinge on any rights of the petitioner. 43.2. Hence, I answer Point No.4 by holding that the notification issued by the State to hold elections would not impinge on any rights of the petitioners. 44. Answer to Point No.5 : What order? 44.1. In view of my answers to Points No.1 to 4 above, it being clear that the term of office of the City Municipal Council, being a period of five years and no longer, there could not be any exclusion of the time period during which the administrator was in office. There being a stay of the reservation notification satisfying the requirements of Clause (a) of Subsection (1) of Section 315, the present writ petitions do not make out any ground, and as such, all the Writ Petitions stand dismissed.