JUDGMENT : J. SREENIVAS RAO, J. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the appellant/accused No.1, aggrieved by the judgment passed by the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad, dated 17.06.2013, in S.C.No.280 of 2010, where under, the appellant/accused No.1 was found guilty for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for short 'IPC'), convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 376 of IPC and also sentenced to pay Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 506 of IPC. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as they were arrayed before the trial Court. 3. The case of the prosecution in nutshell: 3.1 The de facto complainant lodged a complaint on 03.04.2009 at about 8:00 A.M., to the Police, Bahadurpura Police Station, stating that she and accused No.1 fell in love with each other since four years and while so, in the month of November, 2008, accused No.1 asked her to come to Himayathsagar for which she refused. On 21.11.2008, taking advantage of the absence of her parents, accused No.1 entered into her house at 10:00 P.M, and chit chatted about 5 to 10 minutes and thereafter started misbehaving with her and also threatened her with dire consequences and had sexual intercourse with her forcibly and went away. Having come to know the said incident, the family members of accused No.1 and also his maternal uncle i.e., accused No.2, came to her house and tried to pacify the matter. While pacifying the matter, accused No.2 told her that they are not willing to perform the marriage of accused No.1 with her and also threatened with dire consequences, if she discloses the said incident to anyone. Due to which, she did not disclose the incident to anyone and failed to lodge complaint before the Police immediately. But on 03.04.2009, she came to the police station and submitted a report for taking necessary action against accused Nos.1 and 2. Due to which, she did not disclose the incident to anyone and failed to lodge complaint before the Police immediately. But on 03.04.2009, she came to the police station and submitted a report for taking necessary action against accused Nos.1 and 2. Basing on the said complaint, Crime No.84 of 2009 was registered against accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences under Sections 376 , 417, 506 r/w 34 of IPC and the Investigating Officer after conducting investigation filed charge sheet and the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad took cognizance of the same and numbered it as PRC No.41 of 2009 and committed the case to the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge’s Court, Hyderabad, who in turn made over the case to the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Hyderabad. 3.2. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.P1 to P8 got marked. On behalf of defence, no witnesses were examined and no document was marked. 3.3. Learned Sessions Judge after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, convicted accused No.1 for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC as stated above. Aggrieved by the same, accused No.1 has preferred the present appeal. 4. Heard Sri C.Sharan Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Sri M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, appearing for respondent-State. 5. Submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant: 5.1 Learned counsel submitted that the appellant/accused No.1 has not committed the alleged offences levelled against him. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint/Ex.P1, the alleged offence took place on 21.11.2008. However, PW.1 lodged a complaint/Ex.P1 on 03.04.2009, i.e. after a lapse of more than four months, without giving any explanation for the said delay. He further submitted that PW.1 herself stated in the complaint that accused No.1 had been in love with her since four years and she too accepted his love. In view of the same, the allegation of committing offence under Section 376 of IPC is not attracted and the relationship was consensual. He also submitted that PW1 in her evidence specifically stated that she lodged the complaint against accused No.1 solely to pressurize him to marry her. 5.2. He further submitted that PW.1. In view of the same, the allegation of committing offence under Section 376 of IPC is not attracted and the relationship was consensual. He also submitted that PW1 in her evidence specifically stated that she lodged the complaint against accused No.1 solely to pressurize him to marry her. 5.2. He further submitted that PW.1. either in her complaint dated 03.04.2009 or in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. did not state anything about accused No.1 throwing a tablet into her mouth and closing her mouth with a handkerchief while committing the offence. However, she developed the above said version during the course of trial, and the same is clearly shows that it is an afterthought. He also submitted that the prosecution has not produced any other corroborative evidence to prove that accused No.1 had committed the alleged offence. Except PW1’s evidence, the prosecution has not elicited anything from the evidence of PWs.2 and 3. He further submitted that PW.5, Doctor, who examined PW.1, opined that the age of PW.1 is above 18 years. PW.6, Doctor, in his evidence specifically opined that there is no evidence of recent sexual intercourse. Despite the same, the learned Sessions Judge solely relying on the evidence of PW.1, convicted accused No.1 for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC and the same is contrary to law. 5.3. He further submitted that to attract the ingredients of Section 376 of IPC, the evidence of PW.1 has to be corroborated by medical evidence and prosecution has not produced any medical evidence. Hence PW.1 evidence cannot be taken into consideration. He also submitted that the learned Sessions Judge while holding that the prosecution failed to establish that accused No.1 had sexual intercourse with PW.1 with a false promise of marriage, acquitted accused No.1 for the offence under Section 417 of IPC, on the other hand, convicted him for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC and the same is contrary to law. 5.4 In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court; i) Prakash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , [ (2019) 5 SCC 628 ] ii) Vijayan v. State of Kerala , [ (2008) 14 SCC 763 ] iii) Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar v. The State of Bihar , (2020) 3 SCC 443 ; and iv) Mahendra Singh and others v. State of M.P. , (2022) 7 SCC 157 6. Submissions of learned Assistant Public Prosecutor: 6.1 Per contra, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that PW.1 in her complaint specifically stated that accused No.1 has forced her to have sex with him and there is no consensual relationship. Hence, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is consensual relationship between PW.1 and accused No.1, is not true and correct and the learned Sessions Judge rightly convicted accused No.1 for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC by giving cogent reasons. There are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and on perusal of the record, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge convicting the appellant for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC is sustainable under law? (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled for any relief in the present appeal? (iii) To what relief? Analysis: Point Nos. (i) and (ii):- 8. It is not in dispute that basing upon the complaint/Ex.P1 lodged by PW.1 dated 03.04.2009, Crime No.84 of 2009 was registered against accused Nos.1 and 2. In the said complaint, PW.1 stated that accused No.1 had been in love for the past four years and she also accepted his love. On 21.11.2008, accused No.1 came to her house in the absence of her parents, misbehaved and had sexual intercourse with her forcibly and threatened her not to disclose the same to anybody. After the said incident, she fell ill and underwent treatment and she further stated that in the month of January, 2009, accused No.1 told PW.1 that if she is pregnant, take medical care and also gave promise that he will marry her. But, parents of accused No.1 had not accepted their marriage. After the said incident, she fell ill and underwent treatment and she further stated that in the month of January, 2009, accused No.1 told PW.1 that if she is pregnant, take medical care and also gave promise that he will marry her. But, parents of accused No.1 had not accepted their marriage. PW.1 further stated that accused No.2, who is maternal uncle of accused No.1, tried to pacify the matter. However, accused No.2 subsequently told that parents of accused No.1 are not accepting to perform the marriage of accused No.1 with PW.1. The Investigating Officer after recording the statement of LWs.1 to 16, and after completion of investigation filed a charge sheet against accused Nos.1 and 2. 9. On behalf of prosecution, PWs.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. PW-1 is victim, PWs.2 and 3 are parents of PW.1, PW.4 is mediator, PW.5 is Doctor, who conducted the test for determining the age of PW.1, PW.6 is Assistant Professor, MGMH, Hyderabad, PW.7 is Police Constable and PW.8 is the Investigating Officer. 10. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1 in the complaint/Ex.P1 or in her statement, which was recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., has not stated about the allegation of throwing a tablet into her mouth and closed her mouth with handkerchief and forcibly committed the offence. The specific case of learned counsel for the appellant that PW.1 had made the above said allegation for the first time during the course of trial and the same is an afterthought. It is pertinent to mention that PW.1 in her cross-examination specifically mentioned that she lodged a complaint to see that accused No.1 marry her. 11. The record discloses that PW.6, Doctor, in her evidence, deposed that no external and internal injuries, the hymen was not intact, and vagina admitted two fingers, and there was no fresh tear, bleeding or discharge. She opined that there was no evidence of recent sexual intercourse. 12. 11. The record discloses that PW.6, Doctor, in her evidence, deposed that no external and internal injuries, the hymen was not intact, and vagina admitted two fingers, and there was no fresh tear, bleeding or discharge. She opined that there was no evidence of recent sexual intercourse. 12. It is pertinent to mention that the learned Sessions Judge in respect of charge No.2, held that the prosecution has failed to prove that accused No.1 promised to marry PW.1 and with such promise, accused No.1 had sexual intercourse with PW.1, but subsequently failed to fulfill his promise and thereby cheated PW.1 and acquitted accused No.1 for the offence under Section 417 of IPC, however, convicted accused No.1 for the offence under Section 376 of IPC basing upon the very same evidence of PW.1, though the prosecution has failed to produce any medical evidence to corroborate with the evidence of PW.1. 13. In Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying on the principle in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana , [ (2011) 7 SCC 130 ] , reiterated that while the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can form the basis of conviction, such evidence must be of sterling quality trustworthy, unblemished, and inspiring of confidence. On examining the record, however, the Court found material contradictions in the deposition of the prosecutrix, including inconsistencies about the manner of occurrence, discrepancies between oral and written complaints, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and absence of corroborative support from medical and forensic reports. Furthermore, prosecution witnesses did not support her version, and there was admitted enmity between the parties. In these circumstances, the Court held that the prosecutrix failed to qualify as a “sterling witness” and her solitary testimony could not be accepted as gospel truth. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, with the benefit of doubt extended to the accused. 14. In Parkash Chand supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that though delay in lodging an FIR in cases of sexual assault is not necessarily fatal and may be explained by factors such as trauma, fear, or social pressures, an inordinate and unexplained delay can seriously undermine the prosecution case. The Court observed that prompt reporting not only lends inherent credibility to the version of the prosecutrix but also enables timely medical examination which could reveal signs of resistance or injuries, thereby serving as valuable corroboration. The Court observed that prompt reporting not only lends inherent credibility to the version of the prosecutrix but also enables timely medical examination which could reveal signs of resistance or injuries, thereby serving as valuable corroboration. In that case, however, the FIR was lodged after a delay of seven months without satisfactory explanation, depriving the prosecution of medical evidence, and the High Court erred in relying solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix and alleged extra-judicial confessions. The ruling thus underscores that while the sole testimony of the prosecutrix may, in appropriate cases, suffice to sustain conviction, unexplained and substantial delay in filing the FIR necessitates stronger corroborative evidence. 15. In Vijayan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a prosecution rests solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, unexplained or inordinate delay in lodging the FIR makes it highly unsafe to convict the accused. In that case, the complaint was lodged after seven months on the explanation that the accused had promised to marry the prosecutrix, during which period no grievance was raised either to the police or to her parents. The Court observed that such delay deprived the prosecution of crucial corroborative evidence like medical examination, injuries, or DNA testing, leaving the accused completely defenceless. It was noted that if the prosecutrix had voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse and remained silent for several months, conviction based only on her oral testimony would be hazardous. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 376 IPC was set aside, reaffirming the principle that while the testimony of the prosecutrix can form the sole basis for conviction, unexplained delay coupled with absence of corroboration makes it unsafe to uphold a charge of rape. 16. In Mahendra Singh supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the classic principle laid down in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras , AIR 1957 SC 614 that it is the quality of evidence, not the quantity , which determines guilt or innocence. Oral testimony, the Court observed, falls into three categories (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories, the Court’s task is simple: conviction or acquittal may follow even on the testimony of a single witness if found absolutely trustworthy, or be rejected if wholly unreliable. Oral testimony, the Court observed, falls into three categories (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories, the Court’s task is simple: conviction or acquittal may follow even on the testimony of a single witness if found absolutely trustworthy, or be rejected if wholly unreliable. However, in the third category, where the witness is partly reliable and partly not, the Court must exercise circumspection and look for corroboration in material particulars from reliable, direct, or circumstantial evidence. This principle continues to guide the appreciation of evidence, particularly in cases resting on the testimony of a solitary witness, including sexual offence trials. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, in a catena of judgments, has held that to convict an accused for the offence under Section 376 IPC, the testimony of the prosecutrix must ordinarily inspire confidence. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, [ (1996) 2 SCC 384 ] , as reiterated in Manak Chand @ Mani v. State of Haryanai , [2023 SCC OnLine SC1397] , it has been categorically laid down that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to base a conviction and the Court need not insist upon corroboration by medical or other evidence. However, the Supreme Court has also cautioned that in cases where the testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence or is riddled with inconsistencies, the Court must look for corroboration. 18. It is already stated supra that in the case on hand, the testimony of PW.1 does not inspire such implicit confidence. Neither in the complaint/Ex.P1 nor in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., PW.1 has not stated that accused No.1 forcibly threw a tablet into her mouth. This version was introduced for the first time during trial. There are material discrepancies and contradictions in the complaint, and in her evidence before the Court below. Significantly, in cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that she lodged the complaint with an intention to pressurize accused No.1 to marry her. Thus, unlike the cases where the prosecutrix’s evidence is of sterling quality warranting conviction even without corroboration, this Court finds it unsafe to rest a conviction solely on PW.1’s testimony in the absence of corroborative medical or other evidence. CONCLUSION: 19. Thus, unlike the cases where the prosecutrix’s evidence is of sterling quality warranting conviction even without corroboration, this Court finds it unsafe to rest a conviction solely on PW.1’s testimony in the absence of corroborative medical or other evidence. CONCLUSION: 19. In view of foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as stated supra, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charged offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC against the appellant/accused No.1 beyond reasonable doubt and the impugned judgment dated 17.06.2013 passed by the Court below convicting the appellant/accused No.1 for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC is liable to be set aside and the appellant/accused No.1 is deserves the relief of acquittal. Accordingly point Nos.(i) and (ii) are answered. POINT NO.(iii) : 20. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the judgment passed by the learned V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad, dated 17.06.2013, in S.C.No.280 of 2010 convicting accused No.1 for the offence under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC is set aside and the appellant/accused No.1 is acquitted for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC and his bail bonds shall stand discharged. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this petition stand closed.