JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. 1. This is a revision petition of tenant under Section 24 (5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short the ‘Act’) against judgment dated 27.1.2018, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Hamirpur in Rent Appeal No. 3 of 2014, whereby the eviction order dated 18.9.2014, passed by the learned Rent Controller-I, Hamirpur in Rent Petition No. 2 of 2012 has been affirmed. 2. The petitioner and the respondents shall hereinafter be referred as the tenant and the landlords respectively. 3. Rent Petition No. 2 of 2012 was filed by the landlords against the tenant seeking his eviction from the premises having one shop in the ground floor and one shop on the first floor of building comprised in Khasra No. 1294, situated in Up-Mohal Gandhinagar, Tehsil and District Hamirpur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘premises’).The grounds were that the tenant had failed to pay the rent w.e.f. the month of October, 2009 till the filing of the petitioner and the premises were required by the landlords for their bonafide personal use and occupation, as their children despite having professional qualifications were unemployed and the landlords were having no other building which could be used by them for their personal use and occupation. In the prayer clause of the petition, it was also mentioned that the landlords had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application in the said urban area. 4. The tenant contested the petition. He raised objection as to maintainability of the petition. As regards the payment of rent, his submission was that he was ready and willing to pay the rent and whenever retendered the same the landlords refused to accept. The alleged requirement of the landlords for bonafide personal use was specifically denied. The landlords were also blamed for not having approached the Court with clean hands and of having suppressed the material facts. 5. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:- “i) Whether the respondent in arrears of rent from October, 2009 till date as claimed?OPP. ii) Whether the shop is in question is bonafide required for personal use by the petitioners as claimed? OPP. iii) Whether the respondent made a valid tender to the petitioner but he refused the rent as claimed? OPP. iv) Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged? OPR. v) Relief.” 6. ii) Whether the shop is in question is bonafide required for personal use by the petitioners as claimed? OPP. iii) Whether the respondent made a valid tender to the petitioner but he refused the rent as claimed? OPP. iv) Whether the petition is not maintainable as alleged? OPR. v) Relief.” 6. Issues No. 1 and 2 were decided in affirmative and the remaining issues were answered in negative. The petition of the landlords was allowed. The tenant was held liable to pay rent due to the tune of Rs. 1,66,232.50/- and the tenant was also ordered to be evicted from the premises on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlords. 7. The tenant assailed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller before the learned Appellate Authority, Hamirpur but remained unsuccessful. Hence this petition. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 9. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Counsel representing the tenant would contend that the petition lacked basic jurisdictional facts and in absence thereof, no order of eviction could have been passed on the ground of personal bonafide requirement. He submitted that the landlords had not categorically pleaded that they were not occupying any other similar accommodation in the same urban area and also that they had not vacated any such premises without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the petition. 10. He would further assert that it was not clear as to for whose use the premises was required by the landlords. The plea raised by the landlords in the eviction petition was quite vague and indefinite. He pointed out that on one hand landlords stated that the premises were required for their bonafide personal use and occupation as their children were unemployed and on the other, it was submitted that the landlords Krishan Chand, Raj Kumar and Mangla Devi were also unemployed. The premises are non-residential. The landlords were required to plead clearly the purpose for which the premises were required by them. 11. On the other hand, Shri G.D. Verma learned Senior Advocate representing the landlords has not only refuted the contentions raised on behalf of tenant he has raised a genuine caution as to the limited and restrictive jurisdiction of this Court under section 24(5) of the Act. 11. On the other hand, Shri G.D. Verma learned Senior Advocate representing the landlords has not only refuted the contentions raised on behalf of tenant he has raised a genuine caution as to the limited and restrictive jurisdiction of this Court under section 24(5) of the Act. For such purpose reliance has been placed on the judgments in Kalidass Chunni Lal vs. Savitaben and others, (2016) 12 SCC 544 and D. Sasi Kumar vs. Soundararajan, (2019) 9 SCC 282 . He would contend that acquisition of a share in the ownership of premises during pendency of eviction proceedings will not affect the merits of the claim of the landlord. Reliance has been placed on judgments in Pramod Kumar Jaiswal vs. Bibi Husn Bano and others, (2005) 5 SCC 492 . 12. Having considered rival submissions, in the first instance it becomes imminent to ascertain as to under which provision of the Act has the eviction been sought.Section 14(3)(a) reads as under: “(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession- (a) in the case of a [residential and non-residential building], if- (i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another [residential and non-residential building] owned by him in the urban area concerned: Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area; 13. Section 14(3)(d) of the Act reads as under: (d) in the case of [residential and non-residential building], if he requires it for use as an office, or consulting room by [his son or his daughter] who intends to start practice as a lawyer, an architect, a dentist, an engineer, a veterinary surgeon or a medical practitioner, including a practitioner of Ayurvedic Unani or Homoeopathic System of Medicine or for the residence of his son who is married, if- (i) his son as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office consulting room or residence, as the case may be; and (ii) his son as aforesaid has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause, after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned: 14. It appears from the nature and contents of the petition as also the tone and tenor of issue No.2 that the eviction has been sought on the ground as detailed in Section 14(3)(a) of the Act. The petition nowhere states that the sons and daughters of petitioners had intended to start practice as engineers and for such purpose required to establish office or consulting room. It has simply been stated that the sons and daughter of petitioner though professionally qualified were unemployed. The issue No.2 has also been framed as under: ii) Whether the shop in question is bonafide required for personal use by the petitioners as claimed? OPP 15. Further, it is evidently clear that the landlords have made mention only of they themselves not having any other building for their use or having vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of petition. Nothing has been said about their children not having any other similar accommodation in their possession in the same urban area or the said children not having vacated such an accommodation within five years of the filing of the petition, which otherwise is the statutory requirement of the Act. 16. Witness PW-4 is the son of landlord Krishan Chand. This witness though stated about the professional degrees of himself and his cousins but he also did not depose that either of them intended to start private practice. 17. In case the petition is construed to be one under section 14(3)(d) of the Act, it will definitely fail for having not pleaded basic jurisdictional facts. 18. However, since the petition has been found to be one under section 14(3)(a) of the Act, the facts will be examined in that context only. 19. In light of the law laid down in Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Mehal, 2002 (5) SCC 397 and Dwarka Prasad vs. Niranjan & another, 2003 (4) SCC 549 , it cannot be denied that the requirement of landlords would include the requirement of their family member(s) who are dependent on them. 20. The findings of facts recorded by learned Rent Controller and as affirmed by learned Appellate Authority that the sons and daughters of landlords were unemployed and that the premises were required for them cannot be faulted with. Such findings are backed with the evidence on record. 20. The findings of facts recorded by learned Rent Controller and as affirmed by learned Appellate Authority that the sons and daughters of landlords were unemployed and that the premises were required for them cannot be faulted with. Such findings are backed with the evidence on record. PW-4 is Pankaj Indoria, who is son of landlord Krishan Chand. He specifically deposed that he had degree in B.Tech; a copy of which was exhibited as PW-5/A. His cousin Vaneet Kumar had the degree in Chemical Engineer, who was son of landlord Baini Prasad. He further stated that another cousin of his family namely Aarti, daughter of landlord Mangla Devi had also a diploma in engineering. All of them were unemployed and the premises were required by them. Statement of PW-4 has been corroborated by landlord Sh. Raj Kumar, who appeared as PW-5. He also canvassed the need for the premises for settling his unemployed nephews and nieces. 21. The conclusion drawn by learned appellate court that the acquisition of a share in the premises by tenant would not affect the merits of the case is upheld being in line with the settled legal position. 22. Now looking at other statutory requirements, it was required to be pleaded and proved that the landlords were not occupying another non-residential building owned by them in the urban area concerned and also that they had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area. What can be found from the contents of the petition is that the landlords had simply stated that they did not have any other building which could be used by them for their personal use and occupation. In the relief clause, the landlords have stated that they had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years from the filing of the application in the said urban area. 23. Thus, so far as the pleadings are concerned, these can be construed as having been substantially compliant to the requirement of the provisos appended to section 14 (3) (a) of the Act. 23. Thus, so far as the pleadings are concerned, these can be construed as having been substantially compliant to the requirement of the provisos appended to section 14 (3) (a) of the Act. The only noticeable omission is non-mentioning of the factum of the landlords being not in occupation of any other building of the same nature in the same urban area, however, since the landlords had stated that they were having no other building which could be used by them for their personal use and occupation can reasonably be taken as inclusive of an import that they were not in occupation of any such building. The purpose is that the tenant should be put to notice of such fact and in my considered view in the case in hand, it has been substantially done. The tenant cannot say that he has been prejudiced. The tenant also did not lead any evidence to contrary. 24. However, the learned Rent Controller as also by the learned Appellate Authority have completely omitted to notice an important and material aspect of the case. The purpose of second proviso to Section 14 (3) (a) of the Act is not fulfilled only by making necessary averments in the petition these need to be established also. The landlord should not have vacated the building of the same nature within five years preceding the filing of the application for eviction and if it was so, it should have been for some sufficient cause. As a necessary corollary it can be taken to mean that the landlord cannot seek the eviction of tenant on the ground of personal bonafide requirement within five years of putting him in possession of the premises as tenant; for it will mean that the landlord had vacated such premises within five years of the filing of the petition and had then rented out the same to the tenant. The exceptions can always be there but in the case in hand the material on record does not carve out any exception in favour of landlords. 25. Record reveals that the eviction petition was instituted by the landlords before the learned Rent Controller on 29.5.2012. Their own case is that the premises were rented out to the tenant on 16.4.2008. The exceptions can always be there but in the case in hand the material on record does not carve out any exception in favour of landlords. 25. Record reveals that the eviction petition was instituted by the landlords before the learned Rent Controller on 29.5.2012. Their own case is that the premises were rented out to the tenant on 16.4.2008. The landlords have also relied upon two separate rent deeds in respect of ground and first floors of the premises executed on 16.4.2008 and have exhibited these documents as Ext. P-2 and Ext. P-3. In view of this admission of the landlords, the petition was not maintainable having been filed within five years of the creation of tenancy. The landlords have nowhere explained that they were not in possession of the premises immediately before the induction of the tenant by execution of rent deeds Ext. P-2 and Ext. P-3. The landlords being owner of the premises will be presumed to be in possession thereof especially in absence of any evidence to the contrary. 26. The tenant had taken a specific objection as to maintainability of the petition and the learned Rent Controller as also the learned Appellate Authority should have decided the said objection in light of the admitted factual position on record. 27. There cannot be any dispute with the settled proposition of law that this Court has a limited revisional jurisdiction under the Act. However, in the facts of the case, it has been found that the error has been committed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority as to the basic jurisdictional facts and for such reason a case for interference is clearly made out. Reference in this regard can be made to the following extract in judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple vs. R. Sathyamoorthy, (1999) 3 SCC 115 “20. Reference in this regard can be made to the following extract in judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple vs. R. Sathyamoorthy, (1999) 3 SCC 115 “20. ……It has been held by this Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi [ AIR 1959 SC 492 ] that even in matters arising under Section 115 CPC, the High Court can certainly decide whether jurisdictional facts have been correctly decided by the subordinate court or not, on the basis of the well-known principles laid down by Lord Esher, M.R. in R. v. CIT, (1888) 21 QBD 313…..” The revisional powers of this court under section 24(5) of the Act are wider than the revisional powers under section 115 of the Code. 28. As regards the eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, no interference is required for the reasons that the order is based on the finding of fact which in turn are warranted by the material on record. In fact, the tenant had made an admission as to arrears of rent. His case was that though he tendered the rent for being paid to the landlords but they had refused to accept the same. In case the tenant has deposited the rent due in terms of the order passed by the learned Rent Controller within thirty days from the date of passing of order, the order of eviction on this ground shall otherwise be rendered infructuous. 29. In light of above discussion, the revision is partly allowed. The judgment dated 27.1.2018, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Hamirpur in Rent Appeal No. 3 of 2014 and the order dated 18.9.2014 passed by learned Rent Controller-I, Hamirpur in Rent Petition No. 2 of 2012,are set aside to above extent and the petition is dismissed on the ground of personal bonafide requirement. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.Records be sent back forthwith.