ORDER : J. SREENIVAS RAO, J. This Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) by the petitioner/accused seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.142 of 2019 on the file of the XIX Special Magistrate, Erramanzil at Hyderabad, for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act’). 2. Brief facts of the case: 2.1 Respondent No.1 is SBPL Infrastructure Limited, being represented by its Managing Director Mr.Gowri Shanker Gupta, filed a complaint against the petitioner stating that in the first week of March 2017, Mr. Satyajit Agarwal, who is none other than the husband of the petitioner, approached the respondent No.1 and requested a loan of Rupees One Crore to meet his financial needs. Accordingly, the respondent No.1 has given the above said amount to Mr. Satyajit Agarwal through RTGS on 28.03.2017 and in turn he had executed a promissory note in favour of the respondent No.1 agreeing to repay the same with an interest at 2% per month. The petitioner stood as surety for the said amount. In spite of several demands made by the respondent No.1, the husband of the petitioner failed to repay the loan amount along with accrued interest, and therefore, the petitioner, being the surety, issued cheque bearing No.000050 dated 06.11.2018 for Rupees One Crore drawn on HDFC Bank, Rikab Gunj, Hyderabad, in favour of the respondent No.1 towards part payment of the outstanding loan amount of Rs.1,38,72,877/- as on 06.11.2018. The respondent No.1 presented the said cheque for collection through his banker, ICICI Bank, but it was returned unpaid vide cheque return memo, dated 09.11.2018, stating ‘insufficient funds’." 2.2 It is further averred that the respondent No.1 had issued notice dated 08.12.2018 to the petitioner calling her to pay the cheque amount, but the said notice was returned back to the respondent No.1 with an endorsement ‘no such addressee’. Accordingly, respondent No.1 filed the complaint against the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The petitioner filed the present criminal petition seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.142 of 2019. 3. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel, representing M/s. Bharadwaj Associates appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri U.Venkat Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 4. The petitioner filed the present criminal petition seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.142 of 2019. 3. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel, representing M/s. Bharadwaj Associates appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri U.Venkat Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 4. Submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner: 4.1 Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner has not committed the alleged offence. Even according to the complaint, the husband of the petitioner, Satyajit Agarwal, has borrowed the amount from the respondent No.1 and he executed a promissory note on 28.03.2017 to that effect and the petitioner has not received any amount from the respondent No.1 and the cheque dated 06.11.2018 is also not issued in respect of the alleged promissory note dated 28.03.2017 and there is no legal enforceable debt between the petitioner and the respondent No.1. Hence the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act do not attract against the petitioner. Hence, the initiation of the proceedings against the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is clear abuse of the process of law. 4.2 He further submitted that even in the alleged promissory note, which was filed along with the complaint, the petitioner has not stood as surety and the surety column is kept blank. Hence, the allegations made by the respondent No.1 that the petitioner stood as surety to the amount taken by her husband through promissory note dated 28.03.2017 and the petitioner issued cheque dated 06.11.2018 in respect of part payment of the outstanding loan amount, are absolutely not true and correct. 4.3 He also submitted that the respondent No.1 filed complaint without complying the statutory requirement of sending legal notice to the petitioner to her correct address as required under the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Respondent No.1 sent legal notice to the wrong address of the petitioner and the said notice was returned with a postal endorsement “no such addressee”. Hence, the complaint filed by the respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is not maintainable and the same is liable to be quashed. 4.4 He further submitted that the respondent No.1 has already filed a suit in O.S.No.487 of 2019 against the petitioner and her husband for recovery of the very same amount. Hence, the complaint filed by the respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is not maintainable and the same is liable to be quashed. 4.4 He further submitted that the respondent No.1 has already filed a suit in O.S.No.487 of 2019 against the petitioner and her husband for recovery of the very same amount. Hence, continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is clear abuse of process of law. 5. Submission of learned counsel for respondent No.1: 5.1 Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that that the husband of the petitioner borrowed an amount of Rupees One Crore from the respondent No.1 on 28.03.2017 and he executed a promissory note, wherein the petitioner stood as surety and the said promissory note was filed along with the complaint before the learned Magistrate. The petitioner herself had issued a cheque towards part of the debt and the said cheque was returned with an endorsement “insufficient funds”. Respondent No.1, after complying with the statutory requirements, including by issuing notice to the petitioner, filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and the learned Magistrate after going through the record had rightly took cognizance and issued summons to the petitioner in C.C. No.142 of 2019, especially the petitioner had received the Court summons at the very same address. Hence, the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel that the respondent No.1 sent notice to the wrong address is not tenable under law. 5.2 He also submitted that whether the petitioner is residing at the very same address or not, and whether the notice was sent to the correct address or not, are disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in this criminal petition, and there are no grounds to quash the proceedings. Hence, the criminal petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 5.3 In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and others , (2007) 6 SCC 555 . Analysis: 6. This Court considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and perused the material available on record. The specific complaint of the respondent No.1 is that he provided hand loan of Rupees One Crore to the husband of the petitioner on 28.03.2017. Analysis: 6. This Court considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and perused the material available on record. The specific complaint of the respondent No.1 is that he provided hand loan of Rupees One Crore to the husband of the petitioner on 28.03.2017. Accordingly, he had executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said amount along with interest @ 2% per month and the petitioner signed as surety for the above said amount in the promissory note and when the respondent No.1 made several demands for the amount, husband of petitioner failed to repay the same and the petitioner had issued her personal cheque bearing No.000050 dated 06.11.2018 for an amount of Rupees One Crore and the said cheque was returned by the respondent No.1’s Bank on the ground that “insufficiency of funds” vide return Memo dated 09.11.2018. 7. The record further reveals that the respondent No.1 sent a notice/letter to the petitioner by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due under Section 138 (a) proviso (b) of the N.I. Act calling upon her to pay the cheque amount within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice, failing which, the respondent No.1 intended to initiate the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The said notice was returned with a postal endorsement ‘no such addressee’. The respondent No.1 filed a complaint before the XIX Special Magistrate at Erramanzil, at Hyderabad, on 17.01.2019 and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the same and issued summons on 11.06.2019 directing the petitioner to appear before the Court on 10.07.2019. 8. The specific case of the respondent No.1 is that he sent legal notice to the correct address of the petitioner and the Court below issued the summons in C.C. No.142 of 2019, to the very same address and the petitioner has received the summons. From perusal of the copy of summons issued by the learned Magistrate in C.C. No.142 of 2019, it reveals that the address mentioned in the summons and the address mentioned in the legal notice is one and the same. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that, the petitioner is residing in the very same address as on today and in her Aadhar Card also very same address is continuing. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submitted that, the petitioner is residing in the very same address as on today and in her Aadhar Card also very same address is continuing. Whether the petitioner is residing in the very same address and whether the address mentioned in the notice is correct or not, and whether the petitioner received the summons from the Court at the very same address or not, are disputed questions of fact and the same cannot be adjudicated in the present case and the same will be determined during the course of trial. 9. In C.C. Alavi Haji (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court considered whether service of statutory notice under Section 138 of the NI Act can be presumed when a drawer avoids receiving it. Referring to D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa , [ (2006) 6 SCC 456 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that while actual service or refusal completes notice, even unserved notice due to “not available” or “premises locked” can amount to service, if the respondent No.1 proves deliberate evasion. The Court, however, pointed out that D.Vinod Shivappa did not account for Section 114 of the EVIDENCE ACT , which allows Courts to presume the regularity of postal endorsements as official acts. This presumption, though rebuttable, places the burden on the petitioner to disprove it, provided the complaint contains clear averments that the petitioner manipulated or avoided service. Thus, the ruling strengthened the principle that dishonest drawers cannot escape liability merely by dodging postal delivery. 10. It is trite law that once the issuance of the cheque is not in dispute, a statutory presumption under section 139 of the N.I. Act operates in favour of the payee that the cheque has been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. However, such presumption is rebuttable and the drawer is entitled to present a plausible defense that the cheque was not issued to discharge a legally enforceable debt or liability. 11. In ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer , [ (2002) 6 SCC 426 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “11. The issue as regards the coextensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. 11. In ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer , [ (2002) 6 SCC 426 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “11. The issue as regards the coextensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. The language of the statute depicts the intent of the law-makers to the effect that wherever there is a default on the part of one in favour of another and in the event a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. “Any cheque” and “other liability” are the two key expressions which stand as clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual context within the ambit of the provisions of the statute. Any contra-interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature. The High Court, it seems, got carried away by the issue of guarantee and guarantor's liability and thus has overlooked the true intent and purport of Section 138 of the Act. The judgments recorded in the order of the High Court do not have any relevance in the contextual facts and the same thus do not lend any assistance to the contentions raised by the respondents.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment observed that Section 138 of the N.I. Act applies to any cheque issued for discharge of a debt or liability, whether in part or whole, including cases involving a guarantor or surety. The Kerala High Court in that case erred by focusing on the guarantor’s liability and overlooked the legislative intent, which is to give Section 138 of the N.I. Act a wide application. 12. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in ICDS Ltd (supra), the ground raised by the petitioner that there is no legally enforceable debt existing between the petitioner and the respondent No.1, as the loan was availed by the petitioner’s husband and she acted merely as a surety, and that initiation of proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I Act against the petitioner is abuse of the process of law, is not tenable under law. 13. 13. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any ground to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.142 of 2019 on the file of the XIX Special Magistrate, Erramanzil, Hyderabad. 14. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. However, taking into consideration that the petitioner is a woman, her presence before the trial Court in C.C. No.142 of 2019 is dispensed with, unless her presence is specifically required during the course of trial, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall be represented by her Counsel on each and every date of hearing. In case of non-appearance of the petitioner on specific date so fixed by the trial Court, the learned trial Court is entitled to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. It is made clear that any of the observations made in this order are only confined for the purpose of deciding this case. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.