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2025 DIGILAW 1082 (KER)

G. v. Mayakrishnan, S/o. K. Gopalakrishnan Nair VS Kerala Financial Corporation

2025-04-11

P.M.MANOJ

body2025
JUDGMENT : The writ petition is preferred challenging Ext.P24 whereby the 1 st respondent rejected the findings of the de novo enquiry and the appeal of the petitioner herein. 2. The petitioner entered into the service of the 1 st respondent as Assistant on 20.12.1995. While working as Assistant Manager in Thiruvananthapuram Branch Office, he was transferred to District Office Kattappana on 21.03.2007 based on a complaint preferred by one Gladstine Samuel. Thereafter, he was suspended from service on 28.07.2007. Memo of charges dated 02.06.2007 has been served on him, which was denied as per his defence statement dated 16.06.2007. 3. Since the explanation given was not satisfactory, domestic enquiry has been conducted by appointing an Advocate and Notary as Enquiry Officer. The petitioner raised challenge against the charges as they are illegal, unjustifiable and absolutely unheard. The primary reason for challenge was that the memo of charges itself prescribes punishment to revert him to lower rank if his explanation is not satisfactory. Thereby the memo of charges itself is in the nature of a show cause notice. According to the petitioner, it is in violation of Regulation 39(v) of KFC Staff Regulations . During the enquiry, modifications to the charges made by the enquiry officer in prejudice to the interest of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry unilaterally without considering his contentions and pleadings. 4. The enquiry report was submitted on the dictate of the Presenting Officer, who conducted the preliminary enquiry on the alleged complaint of Gladstine Samuel, who was not examined as witness in the enquiry. 5. On submission of enquiry report dated 21.02.2008, the petitioner was served with Ext.P7 show cause notice proposing to impose punishment of compulsory retirement with effect from 28.07.2007 as per Regulation 39(vi) of KFC Staff Regulations . On finding that the proposed punishment was disproportionate, on the very same day the petitioner had submitted Ext.R3(a) explanation to Ext.P7 show cause notice. A personal hearing was offered by the Managing Director. Thereafter, he was reverted to the post of junior-most Assistant with immediate effect on the very next date as per Ext.P8. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Ext.P26 appeal to the Managing Director. The order of punishment was on 29.02.2008 and the appeal was preferred on 30.07.2009. A personal hearing was offered by the Managing Director. Thereafter, he was reverted to the post of junior-most Assistant with immediate effect on the very next date as per Ext.P8. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Ext.P26 appeal to the Managing Director. The order of punishment was on 29.02.2008 and the appeal was preferred on 30.07.2009. Since the appeal was preferred after a huge delay, the same was treated as only a representation. Even then the punishment was modified and restored him as junior-most Assistant Manager with prospective effect, as per Ext.P9. Such steps were taken, on taking a lenient view and giving him a chance of reformation. However, it was clarified that the petitioner would not be eligible for any monetary benefit consequent to the modification of the punishment. 6. According to the petitioner, the punishment was imposed as a hasty measure since the punishment was proposed on 28.02.2008. On the very same day, he preferred his reply to show cause notice. However, the punishment was imposed on 29.02.2008. According to the petitioner, it was without proper application of mind and without properly examining the evidence and findings in the enquriy report. 7. It is contended by the petitioner that the charges framed under Sections 25, 26, and 32(1) of the KFC Staff Regulations are devoid of any merit and unsustainable. The General Manager, who issued the memo of charges, is not the competent authority to issue the same. The withdrawal of complaint by the defacto complainant during the enquiry was not considered by the enquiry officer nor permitted the complainant to examine himself as a witness. Thereby a chance to establish his innocence has been denied which is in violation of principles of natural justice. This is the circumstance in which Ext.P26 appeal was preferred to the Managing Director to exonerate him from the charges and cancel the punishment awarded by the Managing Director as per Ext.P8 proceedings. According to the petitioner, the punishment was imposed on 29.02.2008, i.e., on the immediate next day of issuance of notice dated 28.02.2008. 8. Normally, 15 days time was given for submitting explanation. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an appeal on 30.07.2009 to the Managing Director of the Corporation. Since the appeal was belated, same was not placed before the Board. According to the petitioner, the punishment was imposed on 29.02.2008, i.e., on the immediate next day of issuance of notice dated 28.02.2008. 8. Normally, 15 days time was given for submitting explanation. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an appeal on 30.07.2009 to the Managing Director of the Corporation. Since the appeal was belated, same was not placed before the Board. Even then, it was considered, he was issued with a lesser punishment to restore him to the post of junior-most Assistant Manager, instead of junior-most Assistant. Thereafter, Ext.P10 review petition was preferred on 07.12.2011 for reconsidering Ext.P26 appeal, which was preferred on 30.07.2009. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Grievance Redressal Committee for condoning the delay and for recommending to place the appeal before the Board. However, the Management placed Ext.P10 review petition before the Board instead of Ext.P26 appeal. 9. Considering Ext.P10 representation and Ext.P11 report of the Vigilance Officer, the Managing Director decided to order a de novo enquiry. Thereafter, Ext.P12 enquiry report was submitted. As per Ext.P12 report, it was claimed by the petitioner that he was completely exonerated from the charges levelled. However, by Ext.P13, the request for restoring his seniority to the original level was declined. The petitioner has preferred Ext.P14 review petition before the Board of Directors as well as Ext.P15 representation to the Chairman and Managing Director, and also preferred writ petition as WP(C) No.5444 of 2015. 10. While considering the matter, taking into consideration the contentions with respect to seniority, a direction was given to the Management either to accept or reject the findings in de novo enquiry. It was also left open to the Management to take a decision, considering the findings in de novo enquiry. It was further directed that, if the Management intended to restore the original seniority of the petitioner, they should hear all the affected parties and directed to take appropriate decision within the stipulated time. In compliance with the said direction, the matter was placed before the Board as per Ext.P19 and thereafter, by Ext.P20 memo, the Board, in its meeting held on 26.05.2015, decided to issue notice to all the necessary parties. Notices were issued to such persons as per Ext.P21. Thereafter, after hearing the objections of all concerned, by Ext.P24, the Board decided that de novo enquiry cannot be accepted as it lacks credibility. Notices were issued to such persons as per Ext.P21. Thereafter, after hearing the objections of all concerned, by Ext.P24, the Board decided that de novo enquiry cannot be accepted as it lacks credibility. Since it completely absolved the petitioner from the charges which were proved in the earlier enquriy, there was a concern that taking such a step would give the impression of total corruption within the Corporation. Accordingly the findings in the de novo enquiry and the appeal of the petitioner were rejected in toto. 11. The petitioner preferred this writ petition alleging that Ext.P24 order is passed by the Board without any authority as per the Regulations. Therefore, the decision taken by the Board is vitiated by errors of law and liable to be set aside as illegal and arbitrary. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get release of all the charges and to get promotion with retrospective effect from 27.07.2007. 12. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel Smt.Dhanya P.Ashokan, instructed by Adv.M.R.Venugopal, submitted that in fact Ext.P24 was issued by the Board in compliance with Ext.P17 judgment, wherein it is specifically observed that if the Corporation intends to restore the original seniority it was imperative to hear all the affected parties before making a final decision. Accordingly, the matter was pleaded before the Board on 26.05.2015. During the discussion, it was acknowledged that de novo enquiry was conducted after significant lapse of time. Therefore, it should not be served a valid basis for overturning the findings of the original disciplinary enquiry. Even then, as a compassionate gesture, the Board considered the possibility of restoring the petitioner’s seniority prospectively contingent upon the responses of the affected Officers. Accordingly notices were issued to all Deputy Managers senior to the petitioner as per Ext.P21 for obtaining their written objections for considering the prayer of the petitioner. 13. Altogether 16 affected Deputy Managers were required to be responded to the notices sent by the Corporation. Out of which 13 Officers opposed the proposed decision to restore the seniority and only 2 officers agreed, on a condition that their own promotion should also be considered. One person did not respond. Thereby it can be seen that none of the affected persons consented to restore the seniority of the petitioner. 14. Out of which 13 Officers opposed the proposed decision to restore the seniority and only 2 officers agreed, on a condition that their own promotion should also be considered. One person did not respond. Thereby it can be seen that none of the affected persons consented to restore the seniority of the petitioner. 14. After evaluating the responses received from the affected officers, it was decided by the Board that de novo enquiry was not credible and could not be accepted as basis for absolving the petitioner from the charges proved in the original enquiry. The Corporation has to maintain integrity and uphold the discipline fairly and consistently. Since any extended leniency would create a dangerous precedent and it will be an encouragement in similar claims in future, the request was rejected. The findings in de novo enquiry was communicated to the petitioner vide HRD No.1695 dated 07.09.2015. 15. Having heard the contentions raised on both sides, it appears that, being a disciplinary proceeding, the jurisdiction to be exercised under Art.226 is quite limited as held by the apex court in CISF and others v. Santhosh Kumar Pande [ 2022 SCC Online SC 1734 ]. The Apex Court held that: “Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits, and adequacy or inadequacy of evidence, unless the court finds that the findings recorded are based on no evidence, perverse or are legally untenable in the sense that it fails to pass the muster of the Wednesbury principles. Power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India enables exercise of judicial review to correct errors of law, including procedural law, leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of fairness, without normally venturing into reappreciation of evidence.” 16. Going by the aforementioned ratio prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is quite limited. Moreover the issue has already considered by this Court in Ext.P17 judgment. But this Court has never entered into the merits of the issue regarding de novo enquiry. However, going through the procedure followed by the Bank, it was quite unheard off. Once a memo of charge was issued and on being not satisfactory with reply, domestic enquiry has been conducted and on submission of enquiry report, show cause notice was issued with a proposed punishment on 28.02.2008. However, going through the procedure followed by the Bank, it was quite unheard off. Once a memo of charge was issued and on being not satisfactory with reply, domestic enquiry has been conducted and on submission of enquiry report, show cause notice was issued with a proposed punishment on 28.02.2008. Surprisingly, on the very next day, proceedings were issued on 29.02.2008 reverting the petitioner to junior most Assistant with immediate effect. The other interesting fact is that original punishment was compulsory retirement from 28.07.2007 as per Regulation 36(vi) of the KFC Staff Regulation, however, taking a lenient view and giving him a chance for reformation, lesser punishment of reverting him to the junior-most Assistant with immediate effect was imposed. Though it was referred in the proceedings, the explanation to show cause notice and the date of such explanation was not mentioned. However, the respondent has produced the same as Ext.R3(a) on a later point of time in order to show that the petitioner has admitted his fault in the reply to show cause notice. However, those contentions were declined by the petitioner on citing the date of such reply that it was submitted on the very same day, as no sufficient time was offered. Normally 15 days time would be given to prefer reply to show cause notice. 17. However, one thing to be noted is that though the petitioner has preferred an appeal on 30.07.2009 against Ext.P8 order dated 29.02.2008, it was not considered as an appeal, and was treated as representation and punishment was modified on 30.07.2009, whereby he was restored as junior-most Assistant Manager. However, no explanation was offered by the petitioner with respect to the delay in filing the appeal. Whatever by the nature, the said appeal/representation has been considered taking a lenient view and punishment was modified with prospective effect, i.e., from 30.07.2008. 18. Going by the pleadings, it can be seen that at the time of filing this writ petition the petitioner was again promoted and reached the position of Deputy Manager. Though the punishment was reduced in modification of the earlier order, the monetary benefits were denied to him. Thereafter, Ext.P10 review petition has been preferred, in which a mercy plea was also added that he is physically challenged person having disability in hearing, explained his incapacity while conducting the hearing. Though the punishment was reduced in modification of the earlier order, the monetary benefits were denied to him. Thereafter, Ext.P10 review petition has been preferred, in which a mercy plea was also added that he is physically challenged person having disability in hearing, explained his incapacity while conducting the hearing. However, this aspect was already considered by the Board as evident in Ext.R3(b). However, the fact is that though separate orders of recalling or setting aside earlier disciplinary proceedings, a de novo enuiry has been ordered. It appears that such de novo enquiry was ordered on the basis of Ext.P11 report submitted by the Vigilance Officer. 19. Going by the report of the Vigilance Officer, it appears that the Vigilance Officer acted as an appellate authority, who had completely evaluated the enquiry proceedings conducted by the enquiry officer. However, such report does not contemplate the authority of the Vigilance Officer to conduct such enquiry. Thereafter, on the basis of such order issued by endorsement on the representation given by the petitioner another person was appointed as enquiry officer to conduct de novo enquiry. Those are some unheard procedures followed in this case. Even the vigilance enquiry goes to an extent saying that CMD has set aside the enquiry report which is not evident from Ext.R3(b). 20. However, this Court has already considered the issue and limited further consideration to the aspect of relegating the matter to the Board to accept or not the decision of the de novo enquiry. In the absence of any challenge to the writ petition, I cannot traverse beyond Ext.P15 judgment. Hence, I am limiting my jurisdiction upto Ext.P17 judgment dated 18.03.2015 in WP(C) No.5444 of 2015. 21. Since the Board has taken a policy decision to decline the report in de novo enquiry, on evaluating the entire proceedings, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said order at this later point of time. However, as stated earlier, many irregular procedures are adopted in this case and a decision has been taken by the Managing Director to restore him to the junior-most Assistant Manager, it appears to me that it is unjust to decline him the benefit of the order from the date of that order, i.e., 30.07.2009 and in such circumstances upon his retirement from service, the notional benefits shall be given with effect from 30.07.2009. Solely due to the passage of time and to avoid unsettling a now settled issue, I am not venturing beyond the Ext.P17 judgment, in which the merits of the case were not considered. But I feel some injustice to deny him the entire benefits so I am restricting the reliefs to notional benefits, that too, from 30.07.2008, the date of the order. With the above observation, this writ petition is disposed of. Moreover, no specific ground is raised by the petitioner to unsettle Ext.P24 as stated in the reported decision in CISF’s case (supra).