ORDER : SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM, J. This petition is filed seeking to quash the FIR in Crime No.412/2024 of Hiriyur Rural Police Station, Dist.Chitradurga, registered for offences punishable under Sections 281, 125(a), and 106(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, against the deceased husband of the petitioner, and the consequent abated charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 1137/2024. 2. The petitioner further seeks to set aside the order dated 13.12.2024, whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the abated charge-sheet and recorded abatement, and prays for a direction to respondent No. 2 to conduct a fresh investigation and to register an FIR against respondent No. 3/ the lorry driver alleged to have caused the accident. Facts in Brief: 3. The undisputed facts reveal that the petitioner’s husband, late Sri Siddhalingaswamy, while driving from Bengaluru to Hospet on 30.09.2024 along with his mother, met with a fatal accident near Hiriyur Polytechnic College when his car collided with the rear of a lorry bearing No. TN-52-F-1775. The lorry driver—respondent No.3 lodged a complaint alleging that the deceased driver was rash and negligent. Respondent No.2 registered FIR No. 412/2024, investigated the matter, and filed an abated charge-sheet against the deceased driver of the car. The petitioner contends that the investigation was perfunctory, one-sided and unfair, conducted without recording her statement, and that her attempt to lodge a counter-complaint against respondent No.3 was refused. She accordingly seeks quashing of the FIR and a direction for reinvestigation by a competent and independent agency. Question for Consideration: 4. The principal question that arises for determination is: “Whether, after filing of a final report or abated charge-sheet, this Court can, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to direct a reinvestigation into the matter; and what criteria govern the exercise of such power?” Judicial Power to Order Re-Investigation: 5. The power to order a re-investigation lies not with the Magistrate but with the superior courts in exercise of extraordinary or inherent jurisdiction. There are numerous judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court clarifying the same. 6. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that: “The Magistrate has no power to direct re- investigation or de novo investigation in a police-report case.” 7. There are numerous judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court clarifying the same. 6. In Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that: “The Magistrate has no power to direct re- investigation or de novo investigation in a police-report case.” 7. However, the High Court and Supreme Court, in exercise of their inherent or constitutional powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226, may direct further, fresh or re-investigation in exceptional circumstances, where the ends of justice so demand. The Hon’ble Apex Court further clarified that such direction must be issued sparingly and with circumspection, and may include transfer of investigation to another agency when credibility of the existing investigation stands eroded. 8. In Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that when an investigation suffers from want of fairness, impartiality, or effectiveness, the submission of a charge-sheet or pendency of trial is no bar to ordering further or fresh investigation. The ultimate concern of the Court is to secure justice on the basis of true facts unearthed through a competent agency. 9. Similarly, in Himanshu Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 884, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the satisfaction of lack of fair or effective investigation is the precondition for directing reinvestigation, and the power must be exercised only when the record discloses serious procedural lapses that have undermined the credibility of the earlier investigation. 10. This principle was reiterated in Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553, which clarified that: “Further investigation is a continuation of the earlier investigation based on discovery of fresh material;” 11. Re-investigation or de novo investigation can be ordered only by a higher court, with reasons recorded showing that the earlier investigation is incapable of being acted upon. 12. In Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (2023 SCC OnLine SC 2233), the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the governing principles thus: (a) A Magistrate may order further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. if circumstances so warrant. (b) In appropriate cases, where the High Court finds the investigation tainted, biased, or directionless, it may, in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., direct re- investigation or further investigation. (c) Such powers are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in exceptional cases to secure real and substantial justice. 13. (b) In appropriate cases, where the High Court finds the investigation tainted, biased, or directionless, it may, in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., direct re- investigation or further investigation. (c) Such powers are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in exceptional cases to secure real and substantial justice. 13. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Hemendra Reddy, (2023) 16 SCC 779 , relying upon Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2009) 6 SCC 346 , the Court reiterated that “further investigation” means additional or supplemental investigation in continuation of earlier inquiry, while “re-investigation” commences ab initio only when the earlier investigation is rendered wholly unreliable. Application to the Present Case: 14. At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the Investigating Officer (I.O.) has strangely rested the core causation finding namely, that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the deceased; almost entirely on a purported statement of the petitioner/wife recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This approach is legally untenable for at least three reasons: (i) the petitioner is admittedly not an eyewitness; (ii) a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence and can at best be used for contradiction as contemplated by Section 162 Cr.P.C.; and (iii) the alleged statement itself is disputed by the petitioner, who asserts that she neither witnessed the occurrence nor attributed negligence to her husband. 15. The jurisprudence is settled that a Section 161 statement cannot be the foundation for a determinative finding on culpability; it has limited utility only to contradict a witness in trial. The I.O.’s reliance on a hearsay narration by a non-eyewitness to conclusively brand the deceased as negligent is contrary to law and vitiates the fairness of the investigation at inception. Petitioner’s non-eyewitness status and disputed attribution of negligence: 16. This court deems it fit to extract the 161 statement allegedly given by the petitioner. The same is extracted, which reads as under: 17. The petitioner’s consistent case is that she was in Hospet at the time of the accident. She learnt of the incident at around 4:30 p.m. from her uncle and reached Hiriyur Government Hospital only by 7:30 p.m. She categorically denies having given any inculpatory statement or having witnessed the manner of collision. The petitioner’s consistent case is that she was in Hospet at the time of the accident. She learnt of the incident at around 4:30 p.m. from her uncle and reached Hiriyur Government Hospital only by 7:30 p.m. She categorically denies having given any inculpatory statement or having witnessed the manner of collision. Even assuming the I.O. recorded a statement, any opinion therein that “the accident happened due to the carelessness of my husband” is, at best, an uninformed inference by a layperson and inadmissible as to the fact in issue. The I.O.’s use of such a non-expert opinion, without independent forensic, mechanical, or scene-of-occurrence corroboration betrays a pre-determined investigative approach. 18. On reading the witness statement extracted above, it in itself manifests internal infirmities: it cites lorry No. TN-52 F-1755, whereas the FIR/spot proceedings mention TN-52 F-1775. This registration-number discrepancy is not a trivial clerical error, it goes to the identity of the colliding vehicles and underscores why an independent reconstruction of the incident by the eyewitness (speed, lane discipline, braking profile, point of impact) is indispensable. Yet, the I.O. has brushed aside these inconsistencies by leaning on a non-eyewitness 161 statement. Section 161 Cr.P.C.: limited evidentiary value ignored by I.O.: 19. It is trite that statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are not evidence of the truth of their contents; they are previous statements usable only for contradiction of the maker during trial. They do not, by themselves, prove negligence, speed, lane discipline, or causation. The I.O.’s conduct in elevating a 161 statement into the determinative proof of rashness amounts to misapplication of law and violates the mandate of a fair, impartial and scientific investigation. Failure to collect and analyze primary/technical evidence: 20. The investigation record itself shows that the spot mahazar, drawn between 5:50 p.m. and 6:50 p.m. on 30.09.2024, is conspicuously silent on critical measurements: while “tyre marks” are noted along with length, neither the width nor the inter-track distance is recorded. Without these metrics, attribution of skid/tyre marks to a particular vehicle is speculative. The omission defeats even a basic accident-reconstruction protocol. 21. The I.O. has further disregarded vehicle-borne electronic evidence that is ordinarily available and crucial in modern accident analysis: ESC/ABS footprints and event logs; Event Data Recorder (EDR)/airbag control module downloads; ECU speed and brake-pedal application profiles; Dash-cam/CCTV retrievals from the highway corridor and toll plazas. 22. The omission defeats even a basic accident-reconstruction protocol. 21. The I.O. has further disregarded vehicle-borne electronic evidence that is ordinarily available and crucial in modern accident analysis: ESC/ABS footprints and event logs; Event Data Recorder (EDR)/airbag control module downloads; ECU speed and brake-pedal application profiles; Dash-cam/CCTV retrievals from the highway corridor and toll plazas. 22. The petitioner specifically pointed out that the car was equipped with Electronic Stability Control and Anti-lock Braking System, these systems prevent wheel lock and materially affect the existence and morphology of skid marks. The I.O. neither tested these assertions nor secured the corresponding datasets, yet hastened to a conclusion of “rear-end = driver rashness,” which is an invalid presumption in law and science. 23. The illegality is compounded by the police refusal, on 14.12.2024, to register the petitioner’s complaint against the lorry driver (Respondent No. 3), followed by an administrative “closure” communication dated 09.01.2025 citing the abated charge-sheet without notice to the petitioner. A fair inquiry demanded that the counter-version be registered and probed and instead, the I.O. chose the path of least resistance by fastening negligence on the deceased via a non-eyewitness 161 statement, thereby foreclosing a two-sided investigation. Consequence: erosion of credence; need for fresh, independent probe: 24. In the above circumstances, the credence and reliability of the investigation stand eroded. The I.O.’s reliance on a non-eyewitness 161 statement as the central plank for determining fault, coupled with basic forensic lapses (non-measurement of tyre-mark geometry; non-collection of ESC/ABS/EDR data; unresolved registration- number discrepancy), renders the existing investigation incapable of being acted upon. The record therefore meets the well-established threshold for directing re-investigation by a senior, independent officer/agency, while treating the petitioner’s representation dated 06.12.2024 as a separate FIR for a full, technology-assisted reconstruction of the accident. 25. In the present case, the FIR was registered against a deceased person, and an abated charge-sheet was filed without any material against a living accused. The petitioner/ widow of the deceased was neither examined nor informed of the proceedings. The spot mahazar prepared by the investigating officer reveals glaring omissions, including failure to record critical measurements necessary to identify tyre marks. 26. The record also shows that the petitioner’s subsequent complaint against the lorry driver (respondent No. 3) was not registered, and was closed by a mere administrative communication citing the abated charge- sheet. The spot mahazar prepared by the investigating officer reveals glaring omissions, including failure to record critical measurements necessary to identify tyre marks. 26. The record also shows that the petitioner’s subsequent complaint against the lorry driver (respondent No. 3) was not registered, and was closed by a mere administrative communication citing the abated charge- sheet. Such perfunctory approach strikes at the root of fair and impartial investigation, rendering the entire process suspect. 27. In light of the above factual background, this Court finds that the investigation conducted by respondent No. 2 is neither fair nor credible, and has failed to examine vital aspects bearing on causation of the accident. The credence and reliability of the investigation stand seriously eroded. 28. Accordingly, the case falls squarely within the principles laid down in Pooja Pal, Himanshu Kumar, and Devendra Nath Singh, warranting judicial intervention to ensure that the truth is unearthed and justice is done to both sides. For the foregoing reasons, the point for consideration is answered in the ‘affirmative’. Conclusion and Directions: 29. For the reasons stated above, this Court holds that: The FIR in Crime No. 412/2024 and the consequent abated charge-sheet in C.C. No. 1137/2024 are unsustainable in law, having been registered and pursued against a deceased person. The investigation conducted by respondent No. 2 suffers from serious procedural irregularities and lack of fairness. The petitioner’s grievance merits fresh examination by an independent and competent agency. 30. This Court is conscious that the power to direct re-investigation must be exercised rarely and only where the original investigation stands vitiated by palpable unfairness. However, where the investigation itself begins against a deceased person and concludes without examining material witnesses or collecting essential evidence, such process cannot be allowed to stand in the way of discovering the truth. 31. Justice cannot rest on procedural finality when the foundation of investigation itself is flawed. The ultimate duty of this Court, as repeatedly emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is to ensure that justice is secured on the basis of true facts, unearthed through a committed, fair, and competent investigating agency. 32. Accordingly, it is ordered as follows: ORDER i. Petition is allowed. ii. The FIR in Crime No. 412/2024 of Hiriyur Rural Police Station, Dist. Chitradurga and the consequent abated charge-sheet in C.C. No. 1137/2024 are hereby quashed. iii. 32. Accordingly, it is ordered as follows: ORDER i. Petition is allowed. ii. The FIR in Crime No. 412/2024 of Hiriyur Rural Police Station, Dist. Chitradurga and the consequent abated charge-sheet in C.C. No. 1137/2024 are hereby quashed. iii. A direction is issued to the Superintendent of Police, Chitradurga District, to entrust the case to a senior officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, who shall conduct a re-investigation into the circumstances of the accident, strictly in accordance with law. iv. The investigating officer shall treat the petitioner’s representation dated 16.12.2024 as a formal complaint, register the same, and proceed in terms of Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. v. The investigation shall be completed within a period of three months, and a report shall be submitted to the jurisdictional Magistrate.