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2025 DIGILAW 1090 (ALL)

Pooran Lal v. Saurabh Kumar

2025-09-02

MANISH KUMAR NIGAM

body2025
JUDGMENT : MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J. 1. Heard Shri Gaurav Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 26.05.2025 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), Pilibhit in Original Suit no. 261 of 2025 (Saurabh Kumar Vs. Pooran Lal) by which an application filed by the defendant-petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. has been rejected. The revision filed against the order dated 26.05.2025 has also been dismissed by the revisional court i.e. District Judge, Pilibhit by order dated 30.05.2025. The order passed by the revisional court is also under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Brief facts of the case are that Original Suit No. 261 of 2025 was instituted by the plaintiff-respondent for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his agents from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the land which was given to the plaintiff on the basis of a lease deed. The second prayer made in the plaint was that a mandatory injunction be granted directing the defendant to accept the rent from the plaintiff and issue a receipt for the same and in case, the same is not done, the plaintiff be permitted to deposit the rent in the court. Case of the plaintiff as set up in the plaint is that the property in dispute was leased to the plaintiff vide lease deed dated 11.10.2019 and the plaintiff-respondent is in peaceful possession over the land in dispute. The defendant-petitioner started interfering with the possession of the plaintiff of which he had no right and therefore, the suit for permanent injunction was filed for restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff. The averments were also made that the defendant has accepted rent till 31.12.2020 and thereafter, though, defendant received rent till 2023 but did not issue receipts. Later on, the defendant did not accept the rent for the year 2024, other pleas were also taken. The defendant in the suit moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint on ground that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent was barred under Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (hereinafter referred as 'Act of 2021') and therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected. The plaintiff-respondent filed objection to the said application. The plaintiff-respondent filed objection to the said application. The trial court by its order dated 28.05.2025 rejected the application filed by the defendant- petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. The revision filed by the defendant-petitioner was also rejected by the order impugned dated 30.05.2025. Hence the present petition. 4. Though the initial application was filed only on the ground that the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 14 of Act of 2021 but at the stage of argument, it was also contended by defendant-petitioner before trial court that the suit was barred by Sections 94, 95 and 206 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 5. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that lease of agricultural land can be granted only for a period of fifteen years as per Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 at a time and since the lease in the present case relied upon by the plaintiff, is of thirty years therefore, the same is not valid. It has also been contended by counsel for the petitioner that sub-Section 7 of Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 provides that in case of any dispute arising out of private lease agreement granted by bhumidhar or regarding any term and condition thereof the lessee and lessor shall make all efforts to amicably resolve and settle the dispute amongst themselves or if, mutually agreed by using mediation by a third party, arbitrator or Gram Panchayat or Village Revenue Committee. It has been further contented that as per sub-Section (7)(b) of Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, if the dispute is not settled through mechanism mentioned in clause (a) either party may file a petition before the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Sub Divisional Magistrate shall adjudicate the dispute using summary procedure within a period of 30 days from its institution. Against the order of Sub Divisional Magistrate, an appeal is provided under sub-Section 7(d) of Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. It has also been submitted by counsel for the petitioner that Section 206 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 provides for jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts and in view of the provisions of Section 94, 95 read with Section 206 U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, the civil suit is not maintainable before the civil court as the Revenue Code provides for a mechanism to settle the dispute. Learned counsel also submitted that the suit even otherwise is bad as the same was hit by Section 14 of the Act of 2021. 6. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to look into the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 as well U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. Sections 94, 95(7) and 206 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 are quoted as under:- " [94]. Private Lease by a Bhumidhar. (1) A Bhumidhar may lease out his holding or any part thereof to any person, firm, company, partnership firm, limited lability partnership firm, trust, society or any other legal entity for agriculture or for setting up a solar energy plant. Such lease shall be known as the private lease by a bhumidhar. (2) Private lease by a Bhumidhar means a contract based on an agreement, with mutually agreed terms and conditions, between Lessor, who may be a Bhumidhar and the Lessee who wishes to undertake agricultural activities or set up a solar energy plant, by which the Lessor grants permission to the Lessee to use the land or holding or any part thereof for agricultural purposes or for establishment of solar energy plant, against a consideration in cash or kind or a share of produce, payable to the Lessor as per the lease agreement. (3) Period of private lease by a bhumidhar— maximum period of the private lease by a Bhumidhar shall not exceed fifteen years at a time. Provided that, after the expiration of the first lease period, the duration of lease period may be further extended by mutual consent of the Lessor and the Lessee: Provided further that for purpose of establishing a solar energy plant, the maximum period may be upto thirty years. (4) Conditions of the private Lease by a bhumidhar- The terms and conditions of the private lease by a bhumidhar shall be as mutually agreed between the Lessor and Lessee. The general conditions of the lease shall be in such manner as may be prescribed.” '95. 1...6…... (4) Conditions of the private Lease by a bhumidhar- The terms and conditions of the private lease by a bhumidhar shall be as mutually agreed between the Lessor and Lessee. The general conditions of the lease shall be in such manner as may be prescribed.” '95. 1...6…... (7) Disputes arising out of private lease by a bhumidhar- (a) In an event of a dispute arising out of the private lease agreement by a bhumidhar, or anyterms and conditions thereof; the Lessee and the Lessor shall make all efforts to amicably resolve and settle the dispute amongst themselves or if mutually agreed, by using mediation by a third party arbitrator or Gram Panchayat or Village Revenue Committee. (b) If the dispute is not settled through the mechanism mentioned in clause (a)either party may file a petition before the Sub-Divisional Officer. (c) The Sub-Divisional Officer shall adjudicate the dispute using the summary procedure within a period of thirty days of its institution. (d) An appeal against the order, other than an interim order, passed by a Sub-Divisional Officer, shall lie before the Commissioner. The decision of Commissioner shall subject to the provision of section 210, be final.” "206.Jurisdiction of civil Courts and revenue courts "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of this Code, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit, application or proceeding to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, any Revenue Court or revenue Officer is, by or under this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub- section (1), and save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Code- (a) no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the matters specified in the Second Schedule;and (b) no Court other than the revenue Court or the revenue officer specified in column 3 of the Third Schedule shall entertain any suit, application or proceeding specified in column 2 thereof. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, an objection that a Court or officer mentioned in sub-section (2)(b) had or had no jurisdiction with respect to any suit, application or proceeding, shall not be entertained by any appellate, revisional or executing Court, unless the objection was taken before the Court or officer of the first instance, at the earliest opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 7. Section 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 is also quoted as under:- "14.Deposit of Rent with Rent Authority (1) Where the landlord refuses to accept any rent and other charges payable or refuses to give a receipt, the rent and other charges shall be paid to the landlord by postal money order or any other method, in such manner as may be prescribed, consecutively for two months, and if the landlord refuses to accept the rent and other charges within such period, then the tenant may deposit the same with the Rent Authority in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The deposit shall be accompanied by an application by the tenant containing the following particulars, namely:- (a) the premises for which the rent and other charges payable are deposited alongwith a description sufficient for identifying the premises; (b) the period for which the rent and other charges payable are deposited; (c) the name and address of the landlord or the person or persons claiming to be entitled to such rent and other charges payable; (d) the reasons and circumstances for which the application for depositing the rent and other payable charges is made; (e) such other particulars as may be necessary. (3) Where the tenant is unable to decide as to whom the rent is payable during the period of tenancy agreement, the tenant may, in such case, deposit the rent with the Rent Authority in such manner as may be prescribed. (4) Where the rent is deposited under sub-section (3), the Rent Authority shall enquire the case as to whom the rent is payable and pass orders as he may deem fit on the basis of the facts of the case. (4) Where the rent is deposited under sub-section (3), the Rent Authority shall enquire the case as to whom the rent is payable and pass orders as he may deem fit on the basis of the facts of the case. (5) The withdrawal of rent and other charges payable, deposited under subsection (1) or sub-section (2), shall not by itself operate as an admission against the landlord or any other claim made by the tenant, if the landlord withdraws it to the extent of rent upon under the tenancy agreement." 8. So far as contention of counsel for the petitioner that the present suit is barred by Section 14 of Act of 2021 is concerned, it would be relevant to note that The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was repealed and the present Act of 2021 was passed by the U.P. Legislature in view of the directions given by the Supreme Court in certain matters, the Draft Model Tenancy Act prepared by Central Government and on the basis of recommendations made by the U.P. Law Commission in this regard. Provisions of Act of 2021 applies to the premises (as defined under the Act of 2021) let out. 9. Sub-Section (c) of Section 2 of Act of 2021 provides the definition of ‘premises’, which is quoted as under:- "(2)(c) "premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let on rent for the purpose of residence or for commercial or for educational use, except for industrial use and includes,- (i) garden, garage or closed parking area, vacant land, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building; and (ii) any fitting to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include premises such as hotel, lodging house, dharamshala or inn;" 10. From the perusal of the definition of ‘premises’ as provided by sub-Clause (c) of Section 2 of Act, 2021, it is apparent that Act of 2021 applies only to buildings or part of buildings which is let out and not the open land. Sub-clause (c)(i) of Section 2 of Act of 2021 though, provides that the premises will include grounds, if the same is appertinent to such building or part of building. Sub-clause (c)(i) of Section 2 of Act of 2021 though, provides that the premises will include grounds, if the same is appertinent to such building or part of building. Here, in this case, the lease granted to the plaintiff was regarding an open piece of land. 11. Section 14 of the Act of 2021 provides for deposit of rent with rent authority. Section 14 of the Act of 2021 only provides a mechanism for deposit of rent and does not bar filing of any suit and therefore, the contention of counsel for the petitioner that the suit is barred under Section 14 of the Act of 2021 is wholly misconceived as firstly, the Act of 2021 does not apply to open piece of land unless the same comes within the definition of ‘premises’ as provided by sub-Section (c) of Section 2 of Act of 2021 and secondly, that the Section 14 of the Act of 2021 only provides for method for deposit of rent and nothing beyond. Provisions of Act of 2021 applies to urban building and not to open piece of land. 12. It will be useful to examine the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC before considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 11 of the Order VII CPC is quoted as under :- "11. Provisions of Act of 2021 applies to urban building and not to open piece of land. 12. It will be useful to examine the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC before considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 11 of the Order VII CPC is quoted as under :- "11. Rejection of plaint ” The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:” (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; [(e) where it is not filed in duplicate]; [(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9]; [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]" 13. In Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra ; (2003) 1 SCC 557, the Apex Court while considering Order VII Rule 11 of the Code held as under: (SCC 560, Para 9) :- "A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage...." 14. In case of Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy Vs. Syed Jalal ; (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602 ; the Apex Court has summarized the legal position as follows :- "The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage." 15. Recently, the Apex Court in case of Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat and others ; (2021) 9 SCC 99 has reiterated the same principle (paras 25, 25.1 and 25.2), which are as follows :- "25. On a perusal of the above authorities, the guiding principles for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) can be summarized as follows: 25.1 To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to; 25.2 The defense made by the defendant in the suit must not be considered while deciding the merits of the application;" 16. In case of Srihari Hanumandas Totala (Supra), the Apex Court was considering with an objection regarding bar of res judicata and not of limitation. 17. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the civil court to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is barred either specifically or impliedly. A litigant having a grievance of civil nature has, independently of any statue, has a right to institute a suit in a civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 18. In Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Company A.I.R. 1940 PC 105, Privy Council has observed that it is settled law that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. 18. In Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Company A.I.R. 1940 PC 105, Privy Council has observed that it is settled law that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. 19. The Supreme Court in case of Abdul Waheed Khan Vs. Bhawani and others reported in 1966 (SC) 1718 has held in paragraph no. 9 as under: "Under s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a civil court can entertain a suit of a civil nature except a suit of which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is settled principle that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil court to establish his contention. It is also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed." 20. In case of Dhulabhai etc. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. reported in 1969 SC(78) in paragraph no. 32 has summarized the position as under:- "32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya(1) or Kamla Mills(2) can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows :- (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all ques- tions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3)... (4)... (5)... (6)... (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 21. The Supreme Court in case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam reported in A.I.R. 1986 (SC) 794, in paragraph no. 14 has held as under:- "14. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai's case (supra) it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the civil Court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of civil Court's jurisdiction." 22. Again in case of Nagri Pracharini Sabha and another Vs. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi and others reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36 in paragraph no. 2 and 3 of the judgment has held as under: "2. A litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statue, a right to institute a suit in the civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The position is well settled that exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied. 3. Reliance has been placed by Mr. The position is well settled that exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied. 3. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Mukhoty before us on the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in K.S. Venkataraman & Company v. State of Madras, where reference has been made to the Privy Council case in Raleigh Investment Company Limited v. The Governor General in Council. It has been laid down that the Civil Court's jurisdiction would be presumed unless the contrary is indicated. Mr. Mukhoty has also relied upon two other decisions being Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Others, and Dhulabhai v. The State of M.P. The legal position thus seems to be clear and it is not necessary to quote further authorities." 23. Thus, from the case laws as discussed above, it is clear that normally there will be a presumption as to the jurisdiction of the civil court unless the same is expressly or impliedly barred and the burden will be upon the person who asserts the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court. 24. So far as contention of counsel for the petitioner that private lease of agricultural land can be made by a bhumidhar under Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. Sub-Section 3 of Section 94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 provides that the maximum period of private lease by bhumidhar shall not exceed 15 years at a time and in case of lease for the purpose of establishing a solar energy plant, the maximum period may be up to thirty years. It has been further contended by counsel for the petitioner that admittedly in the present case, the lease has been granted for the purpose of running a petrol pump for a period of thirty years which is in violation of sub-Section (3) of Section 94 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and as such the lease is not valid and is hit by Section 94(3) of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. It has been further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of sub-Section (7) of Section 95 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, the dispute regarding lease, if any, has to be settled between the bhumidhar and his lessee amicably, failing which, either of the party may file a petition before the Sub Divisional Officer, who shall adjudicate the dispute within thirty days. Any person aggrieved with the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer under sub-Section (7)(c) of Section 95 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 may file an appeal before the Commissioner and the decision of the Commissioner subject to the provisions of Section 210 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 will be final. 25. The U.P. Revenue Code is a special law. Application of provisions i.e. Section 94 & 95 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is only in cases where the private lease is made of agricultural land and not otherwise as the lease of land which is not agricultural land can be made under general law i.e. Transfer of Property Act. 26. Since while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C., it is only the averments in the plaint has to be seen. I have perused the plaint, with the help of learned counsel for the petitioner, the description of the property given in the plaint is Gata No. 340 area 0.60 hectares situated village Jiraunia, Pargana, Tehsil and District- Pilibhit. The boundaries of the property in dispute has also been given. In paragraph No. 2 of the plaint, it has been stated by plaintiff that the plaintiff has taken the property in dispute from the defendant through a registered lease deed dated 11.10.2019 and since the date of lease, the plaintiff is in possession over the property described in the plaint. There is no averment in the plaint to the effect that the property taken by the plaintiff on lease from the defendant was an agricultural property. The description of the property in the plaint, Gata No. 340 and the property has not been described as bhumidhari land of the defendant. 27. There is no averment in the plaint to the effect that the property taken by the plaintiff on lease from the defendant was an agricultural property. The description of the property in the plaint, Gata No. 340 and the property has not been described as bhumidhari land of the defendant. 27. Further, I have perused the lease deed which has been annexed by the petitioner at Page No. 68 of the writ petition, and filed by the plaintiff before the court below therein also the property leased out to the plaintiff is described as part of Gata No. 340, which was leased out for the purposes of running a petrol pump for a period of thirty years. In the lease deed also there is no mention that the agricultural property is being leased out to the plaintiff-respondent. 28. In case of Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia and others reported in AIR 2025 SC 2933 , it has been held by Supreme Court that position of law is that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped. At this preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims. If any triable issues arise from the pleadings, the suit cannot be summarily rejected. 29. Thus, from the bare reading of the plaint, it cannot be said that the property which was leased out to the plaintiff was an agricultural property requiring a lease under Section 94 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. It is only the contention of the defendant that the land leased out to petitioner was agricultural land which in my view cannot be seen at the stage of deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. 30. It is only the contention of the defendant that the land leased out to petitioner was agricultural land which in my view cannot be seen at the stage of deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. 30. Further in view of Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, if the agricultural land is being used for the commercial or residential purposes, the Sub Divisional Magistrate may suo moto or on an application moved by the Bhumidhar, after making such inquiry as may be prescribed to make a declaration that the land is used not for the purpose not connected with the agriculture. Even under the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, the lease of bhumidhari plot can be granted by the bhumidhar after getting a declaration under Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. The effects of a declaration under Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 are being provided under Section 81 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 which is quoted as under:- “81. Consequences of declaration: Where a declaration has been made under Section 80 the following consequences shall, in respect of such holding or part to which it relates ensue : (a) all restrictions imposed by or under this Chapter in respect of transfer of land shall cease to apply to the bhumidhar with transferable rights; (b) notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XI, the land shall, with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year following the date of declaration, be exempted from payment of land revenue; (c) the bhumidhar shall, in the matter of devolution be governed by the personal law to which he is subject.” 31. From the averments made in the plaint as well as in the lease deed, it cannot be said that the lease of the land granted by the defendant-petitioner to the plaintiff-respondent was of an agricultural land. 32. As the property leased out is not described as bhumidhari land, the objection as to the validity of the lease granted by the defendant-petitioner to the plaintiff-respondent can be adjudicated only after framing an issue in this regard and after considering the evidence led by the parties in the suit and not at the stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. 33. So far as contention of counsel for the petitioner that suit is not cognizable by civil court in view of Section 206 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is concerned, this Court has taken a view in case of Smt. Kushma Devi Vs. Darshan Singh And 4 Others in Matters Under Article 227 No. 113 of 2024 decided on 12.02.2024, relying upon various judgments of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that for filing the suit for injunction simpliciter there is no prohibition in any of the clauses of Section 206 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. The jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for injunction is neither expressly barred nor by implication. 34. Paragraph Nos. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 & 32 of the judgment in case of Smt. Kushma Devi v. Darshan Singh and 4 others passed in Matter under Article 227 No. 113 of 2024 by this Court is quoted as under: “18. From the perusal of provisions of Section 206 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, it is clear that in the first place, Section 206 of the Code makes a general declaration that no civil court shall entertain any suit, application or proceeding to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, any revenue officer or a revenue court is empowered to determine, decide or dispose of under this Code. 19. Then comes Section 206 (2) of the Code which has been divided in two parts. i. Clause (a) of the Section expressly excludes the jurisdiction of civil court on all matters specified in the Second Schedule. ii. Clause (b) of 206 (2) further lays down that no court other than revenue court or revenue officer specified in the Third Schedule shall entertain any suit, application or proceedings specified in the said schedule. 21. Section 206 (2) (a) refers to the Second Schedule and provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction over any of the 16 matters specified in the said schedule. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Clause 15 and 16 of the Second Schedule and has contended that the suit is barred by Section 206 of the Code. Section 206 (2) (a) refers to the Second Schedule and provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction over any of the 16 matters specified in the said schedule. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Clause 15 and 16 of the Second Schedule and has contended that the suit is barred by Section 206 of the Code. Clause 15 relates to any claim regarding possession over any land and Clause 16 states that any claim to establish right of co-tenure holder in respect of any land. 23. From the pleadings as noted above neither the Clause 15 nor Clause 16 applicable in the present case. As from the plaint’s allegation, it is clear that it has been contended by the plaintiff- respondents that the defendants in the suit has no right to the property as they have already sold their share much before filing the present suit. So, there is no question of any claim to establish the right of a co-tenure holder as stated in paragraph 16 of the Second Schedule. The Clause-15 will also not apply for the reason, the petitioner is claiming an injunction, restraining the defendant-petitioners in the suit from interfering with their possession. 24. So far as the proceedings covered under the Third Schedule do not include the suit for injunction except for there is a mention of Section 133 and 137(1) of the U.P. Revenue Code, in the Third Schedule, it has been mentioned that the suit for injunction, compensation etc. (Section 133) and suit for possession, compensation and injunction (Section 137). 25. Section 133 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 relates to suit for injunction, compensation etc. Section 133 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is quoted as under: "133. Suit for injunction, compensation etc.- The [Gram Panchayat] or the land-holder may, in lieu of suing for ejectment of an asami under Section 131, file a suit in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer. (a) for injunction restraining him from putting the land to any unauthorised use or causing any waste or damage to it; (b) for compensation for such use, waste or damage; or (c) for repair of the waste or damage caused to the land." 26. (a) for injunction restraining him from putting the land to any unauthorised use or causing any waste or damage to it; (b) for compensation for such use, waste or damage; or (c) for repair of the waste or damage caused to the land." 26. From the perusal of Section 133 it is clear that Section 133 contemplates a suit by the Gram Panchayat or by the land-holder for injunction restraining the asami from putting a land to any unauthorized use or causing any waste or damage to it instead of suing for ejectment of asami under Section 131 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 27. Section 133 of the Code will not apply to the suit simpliciter for injunction as in the present case. 28. Section 137 provides for remedies for wrongful ejectment. Section 137 of U.P. Revenue Code 2006 is quoted as under:- "137. Remedies for wrongful ejectment: (1) An asami ejected or apprehending ejectment from or prevented from obtaining possession of any land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of any law for the time being in force, may sue the person so ejecting him, trying to eject him or keeping him out of possession - (i) for possession of the [land; or] (ii) for compensation for wrongful dispossession; or (2) When a decree is passed for compensation for wrongful dispossession but not possession the compensation awarded shall be for the whole period during which the asami was entitled to remain in possession." 29. Section 137 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 provides only for compensation and possession in case of asami is ejected or apprehends ejectment and the provisions of 137 will clearly not be applicable in the present case. 31. This court in case of Rajeshwar Gupta and another Vs. Smt. Gauri Devi and others reported in 2017 (134) RD 34 has held as under:- "14. It is settled law that a suit for injunction can be maintained also on the ground of possessory title. A person in possession over some property can defend his possession and claim an injunction for protecting such possession, from the entire world, except the true owner." 32. From the discussion made above that it is clear that for filing a suit simpliciter for injunction there is no prohibition in any of the clauses of section 206 of the UP Revenue Code, 2006. From the discussion made above that it is clear that for filing a suit simpliciter for injunction there is no prohibition in any of the clauses of section 206 of the UP Revenue Code, 2006. The jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for injunction is neither expressly barred nor by implication.” 35. The Supreme Court in case of Rame Gowda (dead) by LRS. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRS. reported in (2004) 1 SCC 769 , held that a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed even by true owner without taking recourse to law. Paragraph no. 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 of the judgment in case of Ram Gowda (Supra) are quoted as under: “6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors. AIR 1924 PC 144 , Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 . In-between, to quote a few out of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203 , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs. Lakshmi Das ( AIR 1959 All. 1 ,4): "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. Lakshmi Das ( AIR 1959 All. 1 ,4): "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause." (AIR p.5, para 13) In the oft- quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors. (1968) 3 SCR 163 , this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The court quoted Loft's maxim 'Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (He that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)' and said, (AIR p. 1175, para 20) "A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time". In M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. Vs. V. Manickavasagam and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 48 , this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration (1968) 2 SCR 455 , Puran Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram Rattan and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 188 . The authorities need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram & Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re- enter and re- instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and Ors.'s case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase 'settled possession' does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of 'settled possession' (SCC p.527, para 12) i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case; iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession. 10. In the cases of Munshi Ram and Ors.(supra) and Puran Singh and Ors. (supra), the Court has approved the statement of law made in Horam Vs. Rex AIR 1949 Allahabad 564, wherein a distinction was drawn between the trespasser in the process of acquiring possession and the trespasser who had already accomplished or completed his possession wherein the true owner may be treated to have acquiesced in; while the former can be obstructed and turned out by the true owner even by using reasonable force, the latter, may be dispossessed by the true owner only by having recourse to the due process of law for re-acquiring possession over his property.” 36. The facts of the present case as stated in the plaint are that the plaintiff has claimed himself to be in possession over the land in dispute. The plaintiff came in possession on the basis of a lease deed executed in his favour by the defendant/petitioner in the year 2019. Even if, there is defect in the grant of lease as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, the fact remains the plaintiff/respondent is in possession over the land in dispute. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Rame Gowda (supra), the suit for relief No. 1 i.e. for grant of decree for prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant/petitioner from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the disputed land, is maintainable and cannot be said that such relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff in case, he is able to prove the plaint allegations by leading cogent evidence in this regard. 37. So far as the contention of the defendant/petitioner that the second relief i.e. mandatory injunction directing the defendant in the suit to accept rent and issue receipts for the same and failing which the plaintiff may be permitted to deposit the rent in court, cannot be granted in view of provisions of Act of 2021, is concerned, is also misconceived and the suit as filed by the plaintiff/respondents cannot be dismissed in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for two reasons. Firstly, as I have held above that provisions of Act of 2021 will not apply to a lease of open piece of land and secondly, even if assuming the said relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff/respondent, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. for the reason that a plaint has to be rejected in totality and not in part. The Supreme Court in case of Kum. Geetha, D/o Late Krishna & others v. Nanjundaswamy & others passed in Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023 held in paragraph no. 11 & 12 as under: “11. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable. In an application under Order VII Rule 11,CPC a plaint cannot be rejected in part. Geetha, D/o Late Krishna & others v. Nanjundaswamy & others passed in Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023 held in paragraph no. 11 & 12 as under: “11. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable. In an application under Order VII Rule 11,CPC a plaint cannot be rejected in part. This principle is well established and has been continuously followed since the 1936 decision in Maqsud Ahmad v. Mathra Datt & Co, AIR 1936 Lahore 1021.This principle is also explained in a recent decision of this Court in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd, (2018) 11 SCC 780 , which was again followed in Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (2019) 7 SCC 158 . The relevant portion of Madhav Prasad (supra) is extracted hereinunder: “10. We do not deem it necessary to elaborate on all other arguments as we are inclined to accept the objection of the appellant(s) that the relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant(s). In other words, the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. Indeed, the learned Single Judge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s) by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the same High Court. However, we find that the decision of this Court in Sejal Glass Ltd. [Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 256] is directly on the point. In that case, an application was filed by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The civil court held that the plaint is to be bifurcated as it did not disclose any cause of action against the Director's Defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that basis, the High Court had opined that the suit can continue against Defendant 1 company alone. The question considered by this Court was whether such a course is open to the civil court in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. On that basis, the High Court had opined that the suit can continue against Defendant 1 company alone. The question considered by this Court was whether such a course is open to the civil court in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The Court answered the said question in the negative by adverting to several decisions on the point which had consistently held that the plaint can either be rejected as a whole or not at all. The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaint qua any particular portion of a plaint including against some of the defendant(s) and continue the same against the others. In no uncertain terms the Court has held that if the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/or properties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial. … 12. Indubitably, the plaint can and must be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC on account of non-compliance with mandatory requirements or being replete with any institutional deficiency at the time of presentation of the plaint, ascribable to clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC. In other words, the plaint as presented must proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole but not in part...” (emphasis supplied) 12. In view of the above referred principle, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court committed an error in rejecting the plaint in part with respect to Schedule-A property and permitting the Plaintiffs to prosecute the case only with respect to Schedule-B property. This approach while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC is impermissible. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court even on this ground.” 38. In view of the law laid down by Supreme Court and the facts of the present case, the suit for the relief No. 1 claim in the plaint is maintainable as held by me above, the plaint cannot be rejected even if, the relief No. 2 cannot be granted to the plaintiff. 39. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgment in case of Mangleshwar Prasad Vs. State Of U.P. And 6 Others in Writ C No. 24877 of 2023 decided on 03.10.2023. 39. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgment in case of Mangleshwar Prasad Vs. State Of U.P. And 6 Others in Writ C No. 24877 of 2023 decided on 03.10.2023. The said judgment will not apply to the facts of the present case as in the said case, the prayer was made in the petition for quashing the lease deed. After considering the provisions of Sections 94 and 95 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, this Court held that the validity of lease deed in view of the provisions contained under Sections 94 and 95 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 as well as the U.P. Solar Energy Policy, 2022 cannot be examined in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 40. Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Ashik Ali Vs. Harigen in Second Appeal No. 439 of 1985 decided on 21.09.2015. The said judgment has been given in a second appeal, which was filed after decision of the suit on merits. The suit in question was a suit for permanent injunction, which was dismissed by the trial court and the appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. The second appeal filed before this Court was dismissed. 41. In the case in hand, this Court has to consider whether the application filed by the defendant-petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. has been rightly rejected or not. Of course, the plea of jurisdiction as to whether the civil court or the revenue court will have the jurisdiction can always be decided after considering the evidence of the parties. Similarly, the plea that the suit is barred by statute can also be considered after evidence of the party. 42. As noted above, from the bare reading of the plaint, it cannot be said that the suit was barred either by the provisions of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 or the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. 43. In my view, the courts below have committed no illegality in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. 44. Consequently, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.