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2025 DIGILAW 1091 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Hardev Singh

2025-05-29

SUSHIL KUKREJA, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “NDPS Act”), the State has filed the instant appeal with a prayer to set aside the impugned judgment dated 25.11.2014, passed by the learned Special Judge-II, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 77 of 2014. 2. Briefly stating facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution story are that on 23.02.2014, around 09:30 A.M., a police party was on patrolling and traffic checking duty towards Sheetala Mata temple and near bridge, one Mahindra Tempo bearing No. HP-66-1992 came from Shishamati Bihal which was signaled to stop. The aforesaid vehicle was being driven by accused Hardev Singh. The accused was asked to produce the documents of the aforesaid tempo, however, he could not produce the same and got perplexed. The Investigating Officer Yog Raj started checking the aforesaid vehicle and the accused told that nothing was in the vehicle and he was going to get the spare tyre (stepney) of the vehicle repaired. On this, Investigating Officer Yog Raj gave a hand blow on the spare tyre (stepney) of the tempo and checked the same and he suspected that some articles of theft might have been kept inside the tyre and felt it necessary to get the spare tyre (stepney) checked. Accordingly the accused was taken to H.R.T.C. workshop at Bashing. The Investigating Officer informed Pawan Kumar Sharma Regional Manager H.R.T.C. Kullu Depot about the checking of stepney and made written request in this behalf, upon which, Regional Manager constituted a team of mechanics Beni Madhav, Trilok Chand and Kanshi Ram and the aforesaid mechanics removed the stepney in the presence of accused and police officials. Inside the stepney, sticks and round shaped black coloured substance wrapped in polythene was found which on its checking was found to be charas/cannabis. The recovered charas was put in a cloth parcel and weighed with an electronic scale and its weight was found to be 1 Kg and 33 grams with cloth parcel. Two samples of 25 grams each were taken out from the recovered charas and sealed in separate cloth parcels. The recovered charas was put in a cloth parcel and weighed with an electronic scale and its weight was found to be 1 Kg and 33 grams with cloth parcel. Two samples of 25 grams each were taken out from the recovered charas and sealed in separate cloth parcels. The big parcel was sealed with eight seals of seal 'X' while the two small parcels were sealed with four seals each of seal 'X' and the samples of seal were separately obtained on a piece of cloth and NCB-1 form and the seal after its use was handed over to Kanshi Ram. The case property, i.e., parcels containing charas and the vehicle alongwith its keys and stepney were taken into possession vide memo which was duly signed by witnesses as well as accused. The Investigating Officer Yog Raj prepared rukka and sent the same to Police Station through ASI Dhiraj for registration of case. Pursuant to which FIR was registered and on his return ASI Dhiraj handed over the case file to Investigating Officer at Bashing. The Investigating Officer prepared spot map and recorded statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and also handed over special report to Addl. S.P. Nihal Chand who after making endorsement handed over the same to his Reader HHC Kashmi Ram, who also made entry in the relevant register at serial No. 17. Thereafter the Investigating Officer on his arrival at Police Station produced the case property before the then Station House Officer Sub-Inspector Sher Singh who resealed the parcels of charas with seal 'M' and after obtaining the sample of seal, handed over the parcels to MHC Rakesh Kumar for depositing the same in the Malkhana who made entry in the Malkhana register at serial No. 53. Thereafter Head Constable Rakesh MHC sent the sealed parcel alongwith NCB-1 form, copy of FIR, copy of seizure memo and other relevant documents through Constable Yash Pal by filling column No. 12 of NCB-1 form for deposit at FSL Junga vide R.C. No. 86/2014 and he deposited the same at FSL Junga and on his return handed over the receipt to Head Constable Rakesh. The sample parcel sent to FSL Junga was analyzed in the laboratory and the recovered contraband was found to be the sample of charas. 3. The sample parcel sent to FSL Junga was analyzed in the laboratory and the recovered contraband was found to be the sample of charas. 3. On the completion of the investigation and receipt of the SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 4. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 19.07.2014 framed charge against the accused under Section 20 of NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as eleven witnesses. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him, besides pleaded to be innocent and being falsely implicated. However, the accused did not examine any witness in his defence. 6. The learned trial Court, after evaluating the oral as well documentary evidence, acquitted the respondent, hence the present appeal. 7. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General contended that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is based on hypothetical reasoning and the accused has been acquitted on the flimsy grounds. He further contended that the learned trial Court had wrongly ignored the oral as well as documentary evidence and had relied upon minor contradictions of the official witnesses, hence, the judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside and accused is liable to be convicted as per law. 8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true perspective. He has further contended that there are major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, hence, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the respondent and also carefully examined the entire records. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 11. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under:- “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 13. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 14. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 15. Now reverting back to the facts of the case on hand. The prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses, however, its case mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1, Kanshi Ram, PW-9, ASI Dhiraj Singh and PW-11, Investigating Officer S.I. Yog Raj in order to prove search, seizure and recovery of the contraband in question. PW-1 is an independent witness, whereas, PW-9 and PW-11 are police/official witnesses. 16. PW-1 Kanshi Ram deposed that he had worked as Blacksmith in HRTC Workshop Kullu for the last eight years. On 23.2.2014 around 11:00 A.M. Regional Manager, HRTC, Kullu constituted one committee consisting of mechanic Trilok Chand and Head Mechanic Beni Madhav. The committee was directed to open the spare tyre of vehicle No. HP-66-1992. The said spare tyre was opened by the committee in the presence of police officials and owner of the aforesaid vehicle namely Hardev Singh and inside the tyre black colour substance in stick and ball shapes was recovered and it was found that the said substance was charas as told by the accused. The said substance was weighed and its weight was found 1 kg & 12 grams. The said substance was weighed and its weight was found 1 kg & 12 grams. In cross-examination, he feigned ignorance as to from where the spare tyre was brought by the police. He stated that before his arrival in the Workshop, the Tempo alongwith tyre was already parked inside the Workshop. The tyre Ex. P-7 was not removed by them from the place available in the Tempo for spare tyre. The tyre was open at that time and its tube was outside when they came in the Workshop. At that time, rim was inside the tyre which was in open condition. He admitted that Inside the tyre one can easily put any article even at that time since the tyre was open. He further admitted that as tyre and rim were open even at that time, even without the opinion of expert it could have been ascertained what was inside the tyre. 17. PW-9 ASI Dhiraj Singh and PW-11, S.I. Yog Raj, Investigating Officer, have deposed in one voice that on 23.02.2014, a police party was on patrolling and traffic checking duty towards Sheetla Mata Temple and were present near the bridge at 09:30 a.m. In the meanwhile, one Mahindra Tempo, bearing registration No. HP-66-1992 came from the side of Shisha Matati Bihal which was signaled to stop and the driver of the tempo stopped the tempo. He was asked to produce the documents, but he could not produce the same. He was asked about his name and address by the Investigating Officer and he disclosed his name as Hardev Singh R/o Shisha Mati Bihal. The accused was perplexed and he stated that the documents of the vehicle have burnt due to house fire. While the Investigating Officer started checking his vehicle, the accused stated to the Investigating Officer that there was nothing in the vehicle and said that he was going to get the Tyre of the tempo repaired. The Investigating Officer checked the stepny by hitting the same with his feast and observed that something was hiding inside the vehicle. The Investigating Officer entertained the suspicion that some goods of theft might be kept inside the tyre. Therefore, Investigating Officer felt it necessary to get the stepny checked. Thereafter, the accused was asked to take the vehicle to the HRTC Workshop at Bashing. They alongwith accused went to HRTC Workshop in the aforementioned vehicle. The Investigating Officer entertained the suspicion that some goods of theft might be kept inside the tyre. Therefore, Investigating Officer felt it necessary to get the stepny checked. Thereafter, the accused was asked to take the vehicle to the HRTC Workshop at Bashing. They alongwith accused went to HRTC Workshop in the aforementioned vehicle. Investigating Officer informed the R.M and also made written request to the R.M. to get the tyre checked. On the application of police, RM constituted a team of Mechanics namely, Beni Modhav, Trilok Chand and Kanshi Ram. The mechanics removed the stepny in my presence and on checking the stephny, inside it, stick and round shape black colour substance wrapped in polythene was found. The substance was taken out from the tyre and on opening the polythene, the same was found to be cannabis/Charas. On weighment its weight was found to be 1 kg & 33 grams. 18. We have carefully gone through the entire evidence on record and after close scrutiny thereof, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, as there are various infirmities and contradictions, which go to the root of the case. It is settled law that if there are minor discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses, they have to be ignored for the simple reason that all witnesses cannot be expected to give depositions without minor and normal discrepancies. If the discrepancies are minor and do not affect the core of prosecution story adversely than they have to be ignored. However the contradictions in material particulars that go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Naresh reported in JT 2011 (3) SC 508, has held as under:- “35. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely; errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Naresh reported in JT 2011 (3) SC 508, has held as under:- “35. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely; errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility. Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited 36. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Tehsildar Singh & Anr V. State of U.P., [ AIR 1959 SC 1012 ]; Pudhu Raja & Anr. V. State, Rep. By Inspector of Police, [JT 2012 (9) SC 252]; and Lal Bahadur v. State (NCT of Delhi), [ (2013) 4 SCC 557 )]. Thus, it is evident that in case there are minor contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses the same are bound to be ignored as the same cannot be dubbed as improvements and it is likely to be so as the statement in the court is recorded after an inordinate delay. Thus, it is evident that in case there are minor contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses the same are bound to be ignored as the same cannot be dubbed as improvements and it is likely to be so as the statement in the court is recorded after an inordinate delay. In case the contradictions are so material that the same go to the root of the case, materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution case, the court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and find out as to whether their depositions inspire confidence.” 19. In Yogesh Singh vs. Mahabir Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 , the Supreme Court had held as under: "29. It is well settled in law that the minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. The test is whether the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. If the evidence is incredible and cannot be accepted by the test of prudence, then it may create a dent in the prosecution version. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs no special emphasis to state that every omission cannot take place of a material omission and, therefore, minor contradictions, inconsistencies or insignificant embellishments do not affect the core of the prosecution case and should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence. The omission should create a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of a witness. It is only the serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution but not every contradiction or omission. (See Rammi Vs. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649 ; Leela Ram Vs. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 ; Bihari Nath Goswami Vs. Shiv Kumar Singh., (2004) 9 SCC 186 ; Vijay Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ; Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124 ; Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796 )." 20. Shiv Kumar Singh., (2004) 9 SCC 186 ; Vijay Vs. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ; Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124 ; Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796 )." 20. In Shyamal Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646 , the Supreme Court held that serious inconsistencies or omissions amounting to contradiction creates a serious doubt as to the credibility of the witnesses. The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: "68. From the above discussion, it precipitates that the discrepancies or the omissions have to be material ones and then alone, they may amount to contradiction of some serious consequence. Every omission cannot take the place of a contradiction in law and therefore, be the foundation for doubting the case of the prosecution. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies or embellishments of trivial nature which do not affect the core of the prosecution case should not be taken to be a ground to reject the prosecution evidence in its entirety. It is only when such omissions amount to a contradiction creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvements or contradictions before the court in order to render the evidence unacceptable, that the courts may not be in a position to safely rely upon such evidence. Serious contradictions and omissions which materially affect the case of the prosecution have to be understood in clear contra-distinction to mere marginal variations in the statement of the witnesses. The prior may have effect in law upon the evidentiary value of the prosecution case; however, the latter would not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. 69. Another settled rule of appreciation of evidence as already indicated is that the court should not draw any conclusion by picking up an isolated portion from the testimony of a witness without adverting to the statement as a whole. Sometimes it may be feasible that admission of a fact or circumstance by the witness is only to clarify his statement or what has been placed on record. Sometimes it may be feasible that admission of a fact or circumstance by the witness is only to clarify his statement or what has been placed on record. Where it is a genuine attempt on the part of a witness to bring correct facts by clarification on record, such statement must be seen in a different light to a situation where the contradiction is of such a nature that it impairs his evidence in its entirety." 21. In the present case, the testimony of prosecution witnesses raises serious doubts as to the case of the prosecution. PW-1 Kanshi Ram, the sole independent witness, as well as the employee of H.R.T.C deposed in his cross-examination that the tyre was opened and its tube was outside when he alongwith other employees came to the workshop and even the rim was inside the tyre in open condition, whereas when PW-9 ASI Dhiraj Singh and PW-11 Sub-Inspector Yog Raj were examined, they deposed that on the application of the police, Regional Manager of H.R.T.C. Kullu depot constituted a team of mechanics namely Beni Madhav, Trilok Chand and Kanshi Ram, who removed the stepney in their presence and the stepney was checked by the aforesaid mechanics in their presence by using tools and only then charas was found. It is also the case prosecution, as set up in rukka Ex.PW-9/A, wherein, it has been disclosed that the stepney was opened by mechanics Trilok Chand and Kanshi Ram under the supervision of Head Mechanic Beni Madhav and only then in the transparent polythene wrappers charas was found. The case of the prosecution stands falsified from the statement of PW-1 Kanshi Ram, who categorically deposed that tyre Ex.P-7 was not removed by them from the place available in the tempo for spare tyre and also that the tyre was open and its tube was outside even before their arrival in the workshop by also stating that one could easily put any article Inside the tyre since the tyre and rim were open and it could have been ascertained without seeking opinion of expert if anything was inside the tyre or not. The statement of this witness makes the case of prosecution doubtful, as when the tyre, rim and tube were already open in the workshop even before the arrival of team of mechanics, what was the necessity to get the tyre checked from the mechanic and further when official witnesses PW-9 ASI Dhiraj Singh and PW-11 Sub-Inspector Yog Raj have also admitted that 15-20 mechanic shops were available from the place of occurrence to H.R.T.C. workshop and there is no explanation why the said open tyre was not got checked by the Investigating Officer from the said mechanics. Even the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the spare tyre of the vehicle of accused Ex. P-7 was the same from which the case property was recovered as both PW-9 ASI Dhiraj Singh and PW-11 Sub-Inspector Yog Raj have stated in one voice that the iron wires of tyre shown to them in the Court were in broken condition which were not in broken condition when the same was found near Sheetla Mata Temple and by also admitting that no FIR No. was written on the tyre though the same was written on separate piece of cloth and the same was tagged with the tyre. One of the most significant infirmity in the prosecution case is that as per case of prosecution the accused was intercepted with his vehicle in the bazar, i.e., near Sheetla Mata Temple and from that place he was taken to H.R.T.C. workshop Bashing which is at a distant place and on the way from the place of occurrence to H.R.T.C. workshop Bashing, number of shops were available including the shops of mechanics. However, surprisingly no person from the said shops was associated by the Investigating Officer for search of the vehicle. Even case of the prosecution has not been supported by both Head Mechanic Beni Madhav and another mechanic Trilok Chand, who were given up by the prosecution having been won over by the accused. Moreover, the statements of officials witnesses have not been corroborated by the sole independent eye witness PW-1 Kanshi Ram, in whose presence the alleged tyre of the vehicle of the accused was opened. Moreover, the statements of officials witnesses have not been corroborated by the sole independent eye witness PW-1 Kanshi Ram, in whose presence the alleged tyre of the vehicle of the accused was opened. Therefore, the prosecution has not been able to prove on record beyond reasonable doubt that on the relevant date, time and place, charas was found inside the spare tyre of the vehicle of the accused. 22. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. Hence, in view of our discussion as aforesaid, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 23. It has been held in K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258 , that when two views are possible, appellate Court should not reverse the judgment of acquittal merely because the other view was possible. When judgment of trial Court was neither perverse, nor suffered from any legal infirmity or non consideration/mis-appreciation of evidence on record, reversal thereof by High Court was not justified. 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 1 SCC 401 , has held that where two views are reasonably possible from the very same evidence, prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 25. Thus, in view of what has been discussed hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent; and the well reasoned judgment of acquittal needs no interference as the same is the result of appreciating the evidence correctly and to its true perspective. 26. Accordingly, the appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Bail bonds are discharged. 27. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondent is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. 26. Accordingly, the appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Bail bonds are discharged. 27. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondent is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the respondent aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.