JUDGMENT : SOUMITRA SAIKIA, J. Heard Mr. KN Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. GR Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B Gogoi, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam for the Health Department, Mr. BD Chowdhury, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 and Mr. S. Sancheti, learned counsel for the respondent no.4. 2. The petitioner before this Court is a Medical Doctor by profession. She is a qualified Radiologist and had also undergone fellowship in Oncoimaging and Interventions from the Tata Medical Centre, Kolkata. 3. The respondent no. 3, namely, Assam Cancer Care Foundation is a joint partnership of the Government of the Assam and Tata Trust which was set up in the month of December, 2017 in a first of its kind venture to provide Cancer Care in a Three Level Cancer Grid in the State. The respondent No. 4 is the Tata Trust which is a philanthropic Organization. The respondents No. 1 & 2 are the Health Department of the Government of Assam. 4. Pursuant to the joint venture partnership of respondents no. 3 and 4 along with the Government of Assam, in order to provide the specific consultancy and treatment in the Health Care Sector, more particularly, in Cancer Treatment, the respondent No. 3 appointed several specialist medical professionals. The petitioner was one such medical professional who was appointed as a Consultant, Radiologist, Dibrugarh Cancer Centre. Pursuant to her engagement, a contract agreement dated 04.05.2022 was executed by and between the respondent No. 3 and the petitioner, whereby the petitioner was appointed on contract for a period of one year commencing from 01.08.2022 till 22.07.2023 on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The professional fee payable to the petitioner during the period is also specified. The contract agreement inter-alia contained a termination Clause which provided for termination of the contract by giving 30 (thirty) days notice or by paying one month’s fee in lieu of the notice. 5. The case projected before this Court by the petitioner is that pursuant to her engagement she continued to render her services in terms of the contract agreement dated 04.05.2022. At the end of the contract period, her tenure was extended with effect from 01.08.2023 to 31.07.2024. 5. The case projected before this Court by the petitioner is that pursuant to her engagement she continued to render her services in terms of the contract agreement dated 04.05.2022. At the end of the contract period, her tenure was extended with effect from 01.08.2023 to 31.07.2024. Towards the end of the extended tenure, an online meeting on 26.07.2024 was held between the respondent No. 3 in which the petitioner was given verbal assurance of her contract renewal along with an increment of 6%. During the meeting, it is contented on behalf of the petitioner that she informed the respondent authorities for the first time on 26.07.2024 that she was pregnant. After completion of her tenure although the petitioner received her salary/pay for the month of August, 2024, the contract extension letter along with 6% increment as promised to the petitioner during the online meeting dated 26.07.2024 was not issued. Subsequently, on 09.09.2024, the respondent No. 3 issued a letter, whereby the petitioner was informed that the management had decided to exit the engagement contract and not renew the same because she had demanded a share of the profits. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the termination of her contract was issued without giving her any opportunity of hearing as the respondent agency had assured the petitioner of extension during the online meeting held on 26.07.2024. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there is no demand for the share of profit as alleged and the petitioner had only demanded remuneration of the extra work that she was required to perform which was beyond the scope of the contract. It is submitted that the termination of the petitioner was stigmatic, inasmuch as, she was wrongly terminated on the ground that she was demanding profits. It is also submitted that the real reason for termination of the petitioner was her pregnancy as the respondents sought to deny the maternity benefits to the petitioner as per the Maternity Benefit Act, 2017. 6. The respondents have contested the case of the petitioner by filing affidavits. The respondents dispute the contentions made by the petitioner and submit that the engagement of the petitioner being on contract basis, the authorities decided not to extend her services. 6. The respondents have contested the case of the petitioner by filing affidavits. The respondents dispute the contentions made by the petitioner and submit that the engagement of the petitioner being on contract basis, the authorities decided not to extend her services. The respondents in their counter affidavit state that the averments made in the writ petition are false and concocted and a complete misrepresentation on the actual facts. It is stated that during the course of discussion with the petitioner, she had issued threats to project bad picture before the external medical personnel, so that her replacement is not found to fill up her position by the respondent No. 3. The respondents state that an online meeting held on 26.07.2024 was only to convey the petitioner that they were not inclined to extend the contract. The further contention of the respondents is that the respondent No. 3 is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable. It is further stated that the contract agreement contains a specific Clause for Arbitration and if the petitioner has any grievances to be redressed, she has a proper remedy under the contract executed for raising these disputes by demanding an arbitration. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to the following Judgments in support of their contentions: i) Adi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Others vs. VR Rudani and Others reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 . ii) Sri Amarjit Barman & Others vs. State of Assam and Others in WA No.5/2022. iii) Chander Mohan Khanna vs. NCERT reported in (1991) 4 SCC 578 . iv) SBI vs. SN Goyal reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92 . 7. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, by filing rejoinder reiterates his submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. It is further urged before the Court that it is no longer res-integra that alternative remedy is no bar for invocation of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further disputes the contention of the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable. It is further urged before the Court that it is no longer res-integra that alternative remedy is no bar for invocation of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further disputes the contention of the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable. Referring to the Articles of Associations enclosed to the pleadings, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 3 is incorporated as a Company under the Companies Act, 2013 and it is a private limited company within the meaning of Section 2(68) of the Companies Act, 2013 and is limited by Guarantee. The number of members which the company proposes to register is two but the Board of Directors may from time to time increase the number of members but not exceeding 200 at any point in time. It is further submitted that there is a substantial funding by the State of Assam and the utilization of this fund and the services are closely scrutinized by the Department of Health, Government of Assam. The service rendered by the Society/the Company has far reaching effect as it offers diagnosis and treatment in the entire North-eastern Region and in cancer care which perhaps has been offered by the Society because of the failure of the State Health Department to do so. It is submitted that the total project cost for setting up the society/company is Rs. 1,910 Crore out of which this Government of Assam had invested an amount of Rs. 1080 Crore and the respondent No. 4 has invested an amount of Rs. 830 Crore. Therefore, the Government of Assam being a majority investor, its role is not limited to that of gap funding as stated by the society. The list of members of the Directors, which are available in the portal in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, reveals several Government functionaries including the Chief Minister and Health Minister of the State as Members. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the society/the company is an instrumentality of the State and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following Judgments: 1. Pradip Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 2. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following Judgments: 1. Pradip Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 2. Chander Mohan Khanna vs. National Council Of Educatonal Research and Training and Others reported in (1991) 4 SCC 578 3. Gridco Limited and Another vs. Sadananda Doloi and Others reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16 4. Union of India and Others vs. Tantia Construction Pvt Ltd. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 697 8. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard. Pleadings available on record have been carefully perused along with the Judgments cited above. 9. The issues which fall for determination before this Court can be classified under three heads, namely: (i) Whether the appointment of petitioner is contractual and the termination thereof is vitiated and/or is in conflict of the provisions of the contract and whether such Order of termination issued by the respondent no.3 is amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? (ii) Whether judicial review under Article 226 is barred in view of the existence of an alternative remedy available to the petitioner? (iii) Whether the respondents no. 3 is an instrumentality of the State and whether writ is maintainable against actions of the respondent no.3? 10. In order to decide the issue no.1, it is necessary to refer to the appointment letter dated 04.05.2022 issued to the petitioner as well as the agreement executed by and between the petitioner and the respondent on.3. By the said communication no.ACCF/HR/APPO/22-23/CONS0160 dated 04.05.2022, the petitioner was appointed as a consultant radiologist at Dibrugarh Cancer Centre on contract with the respondent no.3 for a period of 1 (one) year commencing from 01.08.2022 till 31.07.2023 on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The terms and conditions of the agreement executed clearly specifies that the appointment is contractual and that the engagement would be for the period 01.08.2022 till 31.07.2023 and which shall be reviewed at the end of the period of contract. The agreement also contains 4 (four) Annexure/enclosures. Annexure/Enclosure-IV lays down the roles and responsibilities of the petitioner. The terms and conditions also specified the payment schedule and further, that the petitioner would be entitled to 30 (thirty) days of leave in a year. Clause-9 of the Contract provides for Termination of the Contract. The agreement also contains 4 (four) Annexure/enclosures. Annexure/Enclosure-IV lays down the roles and responsibilities of the petitioner. The terms and conditions also specified the payment schedule and further, that the petitioner would be entitled to 30 (thirty) days of leave in a year. Clause-9 of the Contract provides for Termination of the Contract. Clause-9 reads as under: 9. Termination of Contract: 9.1. ACCF shall be entitled to terminate this contract at any time by giving you 30 days’ notice or by paying one month’s fees in lieu of notice. 9.2. You shall be entitled to seek termination of Contract at any time by giving 30 days’ notice or by paying one month’s fees in lieu of notice. 9.3. In case ACCF terminates this contract for any misconduct found on your part during the contractual period, the termination shall be with immediate effect and you shall not be entitled to any compensation. 11. Clause 11 of the Contract provides for arbitration. Clause -11 reads as under: 11. Arbitration In the event of any dispute or difference arising between you and ACCF, it shall be referred to Arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitration proceedings shall be held in Guwahati. The language of the Arbitration shall be English. The Courts in Assam along shall have jurisdiction in the matter 12. The petitioner after the initial period of contract was given an extension by Ref No.ACCF/HR/APPO/23-24/CONS 0160 dated 04.08.2023. Her engagement or employment was extended upto 31.07.2024 and the professional fee also stood revised at Rs.50,88,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Eighty Eight Thousand Only) per annum effective from 01.08.2023. The e-mail forwarded by the petitioner to the respondent authorities on (22/08/2024 and 23/08/2024) 20.09.2024 reveals that the petitioner requested for some revision of pay scale and special bonus/incentives for doing proceedings for free. Subsequently, email sent on the same day also shows that the petitioner had requested for procedural charges specifying the charge for each procedure and which are to be treated as extra remuneration. The respondent authority by communication dated 09.09.2024 rejected the request made by the petitioner for profit sharing of the procedures as profit sharing is not available for full time consultants of the Society. By the said letter, the petitioner was intimated that the Management decided to exit the engagement contract with the petitioner and not renew the same. The respondent authority by communication dated 09.09.2024 rejected the request made by the petitioner for profit sharing of the procedures as profit sharing is not available for full time consultants of the Society. By the said letter, the petitioner was intimated that the Management decided to exit the engagement contract with the petitioner and not renew the same. It is this communication dated 09.09.2024 which is presently impugned in the present writ petition. Pursuant to the communication dated 09.09.2024 the petitioner replied to the authorities on 16.09.2024 disputing the statements in the email of the respondent no.3. Similar other communications were addressed to the authorities but her request for extension of the contract was not renewed. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition is filed. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not invoke the arbitration Clause as per the contract agreement executed on 04.05.2022. 13. At this stage the judgment relied upon by the parties before the Court may be referred to. In Pradip Kumar Biswas (supra) a Constitution Bench of 7 (seven) Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court had considered the correctness of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court earlier in Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India reported in (1975) 1 SCC 485 . The Constitution Bench of 7 (seven) Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court after detailed re-examination of the matter by a majority view overruled the findings of the Apex Court’s judgment rendered in Sabhajit Tewary (supra). In Sabhajit Tewary (supra) the contention of the employee before the Apex Court was that Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is an agency of the Central Government on the basis of the CSIR Rules and the Apex Court rejected the contention that the CSIR is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India as the Government controls the functioning of the CSIR in all aspects. Although the Apex Court noted that the Central Government was taking special care, nevertheless the writ petition filed by Sabhajit Tewary was dismissed by the Apex Court on the following 2 (two) premises : (i) The society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a Society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Society's Registration Act" and (ii) This Court has held in Praga Tools Corpn. Vs. It is a Society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Society's Registration Act" and (ii) This Court has held in Praga Tools Corpn. Vs. CA Imanual, Heavy Engg Mazdoor Union vs. State of Bihar and in SL Agarwal (Dr) vs. G.M. Hindustan Steel Ltd. that the Praga Tools Corporation, Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union and Hindustan Steel Ltd. are all companied incorporated under the Companies Act and the employees of these companies do not enjoy the protection available to government servants as contemplated in Article 311. The companies were held in these cases to have independent existence of the Government and by the law relating to corporations. These could not be held to be departments of the Government. 14. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) by examining the various earlier authorities and precedents laid down by the Apex Court, it was held that it does not really matter what guise the State adopts for the purpose, whether by a corporation established by statue or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act or formed under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Neither the form of the corporation, nor its ostensible autonomy would take away from its character as “State” and its constitutional accountability under Part-III vis-à-vis the individual if it were in fact acting as an instrumentality or agency of the Government. 15. The Apex Court held that the genesis of the corporation is immaterial and finally the Apex Court held that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The question in each case would be whether in the light of cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statue or otherwise it would not serve to make body a State. Accordingly, the judgment of Sabhajit Tewary (supra) was overruled. 16. If this is found then the body is a State within the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statue or otherwise it would not serve to make body a State. Accordingly, the judgment of Sabhajit Tewary (supra) was overruled. 16. In Chander Mohan Khanna (supra), the Apex Court was deciding an issue whether the NCERT which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 would be included within the State. On the facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the NCERT is not a State with the definition of Article 12. The Apex Court held that the Government Control over NCERT is confined only to it proper utilisation of grants. The NCERT is thus largely an autonomous body and does not fall within the definition of the State. 17. In Gridco Limited and Another (supra), the Apex Court had decided an issue which is largely similar to the facts of the present case. In that case the questions before the Apex Court were : 1. What was the true nature of the appointment of the respondent? In particular, was the appointment regular or simply contractual in nature? and 2. If the appointment was contractual, was the termination thereof vitiated by any legal infirmity to call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. The Apex Court upon consideration of the first question came to the conclusion that the appointment of the respondents therein was not a regular appointment and the same was an employment on contract as per the appointment order itself. The Apex Court held that the fact that the Corporation extended the tenure of the respondents therein was clearly suggestive that the parties had understood the appointment was a tenure appointment, extendable under the discretion of the Board of directors and consequently, came to the conclusion that the nature of appointment made by the appellant Corporation was contractual and not regular. 19. In respect of the second question before the Apex Court it was held that the judicial review of matters that fall in the realm of contracts is also available before the Superior Courts, but the scope of any such review is not all pervasive. It does not extend to the Court substituting its own view for that taken by the decision making authority. It does not extend to the Court substituting its own view for that taken by the decision making authority. Judicial review and resultant interference is permissible where the action of the authority is malafide arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable. Judicial Review is not permissible, if the petitioner’s challenge is based only on the ground that the view taken by the authority may be less reasonable than what is a possible alternative. The Apex Court, however, held that the fact that the dispute fell within the domain of the contractual obligations did not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with its basic requirement under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. In Uttar Pradesh Power transmission Corporation Limited and Another (supra) the question before the Apex Court was whether the judicial review before the Superior Court, if permissible, where alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved party. The Apex Court held that alternative remedy is not a bar for judicial review in the following circumstances: (i) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; (ii) Where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) Where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (iv) The vires of an Act is under challenge. 21. Tantia Construction Private Limited (supra) has been pressed into service by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is support of its contention that the judicial review is permissible notwithstanding the alternative remedy available to the aggrieved party including the Arbitration Clause in the agreement. The Apex Court in the said matter declined to interfere with the orders passed by the High Court holding that the variation as specified in the contract therein will not amount to substantial variation so as to result in novation of the contract. Before the Apex Court it was urged that the High Court ought not to have exercised its writ jurisdiction in view of the presence of the Arbitration Clause. The Apex Court turned down the contention of the Union of India and declined to interfere with the findings arrived at by the High Court on the facts of that case and it was held by the Apex Court that presence of an Arbitration Clause which is an alternative remedy prescribed will not be a bar to invoke the writ jurisdiction, if the facts necessitated the invocation of the writ jurisdiction . 22. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3, on the other hand, relied on the judgments of the Apex Court rendered in Adi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be used or specific performance of the contractual service or for declaration for continuation of service. In paragraph nos. 17 & 20 of the said judgment the Apex Court held as under: “17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The 'public authority' for them mean everybody which is created by statute--and whose powers and duties are defined by statue. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities'. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus'. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. …… 20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the con- text, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation .owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” 23. The judgments rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal no.5/2025 and Writ Appeal No.168/2019 dismissed the writ appeals filed by the appellants who were employed under the Assam State Cooperative Union which is a registered Co-operative Union seeking a direction to the State Government for payment of their monthly salary and other emoluments and to continue to provide the grants-in-aid. The Division Bench upheld the orders passed by Single Bench by rejecting and dismissing the appeal. 24. Upon a careful perusal of the judgments discussed above it is evident that the law regarding the instrumentality of the State has undergone a sea change. The earlier judgments had considered that determine whether a body falls within the definition of the ‘State’ under Article 12 in terms of the law laid down in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 and subsequently, followed in Ajay Hasia (supra) the conditions specified therein must be satisfied. In Ajay Hasia (supra) the Apex Court after referring to earlier precedents of the Apex Court, had summarised the tests laid down in the case of International Airport Authority (supra). These tests summarised in Ajay Hasia (supra) are extracted as under: (1) "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government." (2) "Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character." (3) "It may also be a relevant factor.......whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected." (4) "Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality." (5) "If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government." (6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." 25. Further, in the subsequent judgments of the Apex Court and which have been elaborately considered and explained in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) it is evident that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia (supra) are not to be treated as a rigid set of principles, so as to hold that if a body satisfies any one of them, it must necessarily be considered a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The question, whether a body is considered to be a State within the meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to be considered in the light of the facts involved in each case. The body must be financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. It is only then the body is a State within the Article 12 of the Constitution of India where the control is merely regulatory whether under the Statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State. 26. To decide the question whether the respondent no.3 is a State under the Article 12 of the Constitution of India, this Court will necessarily require the facts to be considered to determine the true nature of grievance of the writ petitioner for invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. In the facts of the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent no.3 on contractual basis as a consultant radiologist. This is evident from the appointment letter enclosed to the writ petition as Annexure-A issued by the respondent authorities by the communication dated 04.05.2022. The appointment letter, inter alia, clearly specifies the duration of the contract which is for a period of 1 (one) year commencing from 01.08.2022 to 31.07.2023 and which is to be reviewed at the end of the period of contract. Clause-9 provides for termination of contract and the procedure required to be followed in that case. The appointment letter also inter alia describes the roles and responsibilities to be performed by the petitioner which is enclosed as Annexure-IV to the appointment letter. Annexure-5 of the appointment letter includes an undertaking by the petitioner not to engage in any form of private practice, solicit, seek, engage or be interested or concerned either directly or indirectly alone or jointly with any other trade, business or occupation during the tenure of service. It has also provided that the petitioner will not claim any additional cost of the services rendered. The tenure of the employment of the petitioner stood further extended by communication No. dated 04.08.2023. The employment stood extended from 01.08.2023 till 31.07.2024. 28. It has also provided that the petitioner will not claim any additional cost of the services rendered. The tenure of the employment of the petitioner stood further extended by communication No. dated 04.08.2023. The employment stood extended from 01.08.2023 till 31.07.2024. 28. As such, from these documents enclosed to the writ petition itself it is evident that the employment of the writ petitioner is an employment on a contractual basis and the same was extended after the completion of the initial period of service. These documents, under no circumstances, can be construed to suggest that the petitioner's employment was regular and not contractual. The claims of the petitioner that she was employed as Consultant Radiologist but had also performed additional duties as an Interventional Radiologist raises the question of whether she was medically qualified to function as Interventional Radiologist. However, such facts are not before this Court and therefore, this Court is not required to decide on the issue as to whether the services rendered by the petitioner as an Interventional Radiologist can also be treated to be professional services rendered over and above the terms of the contract executed by and between the petitioner and the respondent no.3 on 04.05.2022. 29. The contention of the petitioner that the termination was made effective without giving any notice to the petitioner also cannot be accepted to be a ground to invoke the writ jurisdiction, inasmuch as, there is no dispute that the petitioner had accepted the terms of the contract. It is not brought to the notice of this Court that any provision of the contract stipulates a requirement of prior notice in cases of termination. The termination is to be effective as specified in Clause-9 of the agreement which provides for termination by giving 30 (thirty) days’ notice or by paying one month’s fee in lieu of notice. It is not disputed by the petitioner that her contract period expired on 21.07.2024 and that, she had received her salary or pay for the month of August, 2024 also. Therefore, it has to be accepted that the respondent no.3 has complied with the provisions of Clause-9.1. That apart, there have been several exchanges of emails and communications by and between the petitioner and the respondents authorities. Subsequent communication of the petitioner requesting for her extension of service appears to have not been answered to by the respondent authorities. Therefore, it has to be accepted that the respondent no.3 has complied with the provisions of Clause-9.1. That apart, there have been several exchanges of emails and communications by and between the petitioner and the respondents authorities. Subsequent communication of the petitioner requesting for her extension of service appears to have not been answered to by the respondent authorities. That apart, there was a video conferencing with the petitioner and the respondent authorities on 09.09.2024 prior to issuance of the impugned order of termination dated 09.09.2024. The averments made in the writ petition raise the grievance of the writ petitioner that her benefits under the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 was denied to her and that the termination of the writ petitioner was only on the ground of her pregnancy with the sole motive to deny her the benefits under the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961. However, during the course of arguments, no specific reference has been made to the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 and/or any claims made by the petitioner before the Authorities to the extent that the claims made thereunder, if any, have been denied to the petitioner. During the arguments the relevant provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 were not referred to by the petitioner and therefore, it must be accepted that this claim is not seriously urged by the petitioner before the Court. It is well established that writ jurisdiction is to be invoked only to examine the decision making process and not the decision itself. While exercising its powers of judicial review, the Court will not substitute its own view for the view taken by the decision making authority. Judicial review and the resultant interference is only permissible when the decision making process by the concerned authority has been found to be malafide, arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable. 30. As have been discussed herein above, the sole ground is before the Court is non-issuance of prior notice to the petitioner before the issuance of termination letter by the respondent authority. However, the contract agreement which was wilfully entered into by and between the petitioner and the respondent no.3 does not contain any specific Clause for issuance prior notice before termination of the agreement. The Clause-9.1 of the agreement letter dated 04.05.2022 provides for payment of one month’s salary in lieu of any notice. However, the contract agreement which was wilfully entered into by and between the petitioner and the respondent no.3 does not contain any specific Clause for issuance prior notice before termination of the agreement. The Clause-9.1 of the agreement letter dated 04.05.2022 provides for payment of one month’s salary in lieu of any notice. The petitioner’s extension having been completed on 31.07.2024 and it is admitted by the petitioner that she had received the pay for the month of August, 2024, the requirement under Clause 9.1 appears to have been satisfied by the respondent authority. No malafide has been alleged against any Officer. Malice in law, in the facts and circumstances as discussed above, is also not made out. The decision by the authority to terminate the petitioner being a consequence of the terms of the contract does not appear to the Court to be malafide, arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable. 31. Under such circumstances, on the facts pleaded before the Court and the materials available before the Court does not inspire the Court to invoke its power of judicial review to interfere with the impugned order of termination dated 09.09.2024. 32. In any view of the matter, in principle the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be available in matters of breach of contract also where public law element is involved. However, as have been discussed above in the facts of the case, there is no dispute on facts that the petitioner’s employment was contractual and termination and/or the non- extension of the contract was carried out by the respondents authorities in terms of Clause 9 of the contract. The only ground urged before this Court is non-issuance of notice prior to termination even though there is no specific requirement for issuance of notice prior to termination. In the facts of the present matter even assuming that pre decisional notice is required to be issued to the petitioner, such notice would not have made any difference to the facts which are discussed above and from the communications exchanged by and between the petitioners and the respondents no.3 and from the terms of the contract, subsequent extension given to the petitioner, it is clear that the petitioner was on contractual service for a period of 1 year extendable by the respondent no.3. It cannot be accepted to understand that the extension in terms of the contract is mandatorily required to be given. It is a decision to be taken on the respondent no.3, which, however, has to be invoked on the attending facts and circumstances of each case. In the facts of the present case non issuance of pre-decisional notice did not cause any prejudice to the petitioner in the opinion of the Court as the terms and conditions governing the employment of the petitioner as is evident from the contract agreement executed and are not disputed by the petitioner. 33. Under such circumstances, no prejudice is found to have been caused to the petitioner. Non compliance of the principal of natural justice unless it causes prejudice does not automatically entitle one to a relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in all circumstances. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of a judiciary to reach out in appropriate cases to remedy injustice. Every breach of audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself lead to a conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. 34. As a natural consequence, where the Court is not inclined to invoke its power of judicial review on the facts as discussed above, the question of whether the respondent no.3 is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and whether a writ is maintainable against the respondent no.3 or respondent no.4 or the Society, would be purely an academic endeavour as the Court has already come to a conclusion on the pleadings, materials and arguments made before the Court that in the facts of the circumstances of the case, invocation of judicial review is not found necessary. The question, therefore, is not required to be decided in the present proceedings and is left open to be decided in any appropriate proceedings. Finally, the question of the availability of judicial review in the face of an alternative remedy does not require any further discussion, inasmuch as the law laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments has made it clear that the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar for invocation of the writ jurisdiction. Finally, the question of the availability of judicial review in the face of an alternative remedy does not require any further discussion, inasmuch as the law laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments has made it clear that the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar for invocation of the writ jurisdiction. Therefore, while this Court has accepted the contention of the petitioner that the presence of alternative remedy is no bar for invocation of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the foregoing discussions since the Court has already come to a conclusion that the facts of the present proceedings do not warrant invocation of judicial review, no further discussion is called for on this aspect also. The writ petition therefore, being devoid of any merit, the same is dismissed. No order as to cost. 35. It is, however, made clear that the dismissal of the writ petition shall not foreclose the claims of the petitioner, if any, for invoking the Arbitration Clause as is provided under Clause-11 of the Agreement dated 04.05.2022. In the event the petitioner seeks to invoke the Arbitration Clause, the period during which the matter was pending before the Court shall be excluded while computing the limitation period, if any.