JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J. 1. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “12A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this petition. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or writ in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 09/02/2016 Passed by the Respondent No.1 in Revision Application No.MVV/GHARKHED/SNR/7/2012 preferred by the present petitioner against order dated 21/02/2012 passed by the Respondent No.2 the District Collector, Surendranagar in GHARKHED ORDI. APPEAL CASE NO. 03/2011-12. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the order dated 09/02/2016 at annexure A passed by Respondent No. 1 in Revision Application No. MVV/GHARKHED/SNR/7/2012 preferred by the present petitioner against order dated 21/02/2012 passed by the Respondent No.2 the District Collector, Surendranagar in GHARKHED ORDI. APPEAL CASE ??. 03/2011-12. (D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or writ in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to direct the Mamlatdar Chotila (E-Dhara) to delete the name of the Respondent no.3 from the revenue record and enter name of present petitioner in to the same. (E) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition Your Lordships may be pleased to restrain the Respondent No.3 to sale the land in question.” 2. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the father of the petitioner was an agriculturist as he was holding agricultural land bearing Survey No.82 of Village Rajawad, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar. That the name of the petitioner is also included in the revenue records by entries in respect of the said land. That thereafter the petitioner purchased agricultural land bearing Survey No.112 at Village Nawa, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar by way of registered sale deed dated 11.02.1980. Mutation entry No.498 came to be recorded in Village Form No.6. The said entry also came to be certified on 23.04.1980 by the competent authority. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that after about 31 years, the Mamlatdar, Surendranagar by proposal dated 21.10.2010 to the Dy. Mutation entry No.498 came to be recorded in Village Form No.6. The said entry also came to be certified on 23.04.1980 by the competent authority. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that after about 31 years, the Mamlatdar, Surendranagar by proposal dated 21.10.2010 to the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar stated that the sale transaction dated 11.02.1980 was in violation of Section 54 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement And Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 [“Ordinance of 1949” for short] as the petitioner was a non-agriculturist. Based on the proposal, the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar initiated proceedings being Gharkhed Case No.67 of 2010. By order dated 30.04.2011 passed by the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar, the petitioner was ordered to be summarily evicted from the land in question. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Gharkhed Appeal No.3 of 2011-2012 challenging the order dated 30.04.2011 passed by the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar. The Collector, Surendranagar by order dated 21.02.2012 was pleased to confirm the order passed by the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar upholding the eviction of the petitioner. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Revision Application No.MVV/GHARKHED/SNR/7/2012 before the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. By the impugned order dated 09.02.2016, the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department has rejected the revision application of the petitioner and confirm the orders passed by the revenue authorities below. 3. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that the impugned orders are bad in law and in contravention of the law laid down by this Court as well as dehors the facts. He submits that the initiation of the suo motu proceedings on the proposal of the Mamlatdar, Surendranagar is not tenable since they have been initiated after more than 30 years. He submits that the suo motu powers have not been exercised within a reasonable period of time. He submits that the sale transaction has taken place in the year 1980, however, the suo motu proceedings have been initiated in the year 2011. He further submits that the authorities below have also not taken into consideration the fact that the father of the petitioner was also an agriculturist in respect of Survey No.82 of Village Rajawad, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar and thereafter, the name of the petitioner has also been entered into revenue records in respect of the said land and therefore, the petitioner is also an agriculturist as defined under the Ordinance of 1949. He submits that the said facts have not been taken into consideration in the suo motu proceedings against the petitioner. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2024(4) GLH 410 – The State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai Meman wherein it has been held that the suo motu proceedings by the revenue authorities have to be initiated within a reasonable period of time and as such, proceedings beyond reasonable period, unsettle the position after a lapse of time which cannot be justified from any angle as the sale deeds have remained valid for a considerable long period of time. Further, it may not be possible to bring relevant documents on record in such an inquiry. 4. Per contra, Mr. Jeet R. Jotangia, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that the petitioner herein was ordered to be evicted from the land in question vide order dated 30.04.2011 by the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar. He submits that the concurrent findings of the authorities below do not call for any intervention. He submits that the land is purchased by the petitioner in violation of Ordinance of 1949. He submits that the Ordinance of 1949 no where provides any limitation period for initiating inquiry if the land is found to be occupied unauthorizedly or possessed wrongly by any person and such occupant is required to be evicted summarily in terms of Section 54 r.w. Section 75 of the Ordinance of 1949. He submits that the inquiry came to be initiated based on the report dated 04.02.2009 submitted by the Inquiry Team. He further submits that in respect of the contention that the petitioner’s father was an agriculturist residing at village Rajawad, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar also cannot be taken into consideration since at the relevant point of time in the year 1996, there was a bar to purchase the land beyond periphery of 8 kms. He submits that therefore the purchase by the petitioner in the year 1980 being beyond 8 kms. periphery, the same cannot be taken into consideration and it has to be held that the petitioner was not an agriculturist. He, therefore, submits that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue authorities below. He submits that therefore the purchase by the petitioner in the year 1980 being beyond 8 kms. periphery, the same cannot be taken into consideration and it has to be held that the petitioner was not an agriculturist. He, therefore, submits that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue authorities below. He submits that the impugned orders have been rightly passed in the present case and the present Special Civil Application be dismissed. 5. Heard learned advocates for the parties, perused the documents and considered the submissions. 6. The admitted facts in the present case are that the petitioner has purchased agricultural land in question on 11.02.1980 by way of registered sale deed in respect of Survey No.112 at Village Nawa, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar. Mutation entry No.498 came to be recorded in Village Form No.6 on 03.03.1980 and the same came to be certified after a proper inquiry by the competent authority on 23.04.1980. The proceedings under Section 54 r.w. Section 75 holding the sale transaction to be violative of the Ordinance of 1949 came to be initiated on 21.10.2010. After about 31 years, the petitioner was ordered to be summarily evicted from the land in question by order dated 30.04.2011 passed by the Dy. Collector, Surendranagar which was upheld by the Collector, Surendranagar vide order dated 21.02.2012 and the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department by order dated 09.02.2016. It is also an admitted position that father of the petitioner was an agriculturist in respect of Survey No.82 at Village Rajawad, Taluka Chotila, District Surendranagar and was cultivating the said land. After the death of his father, the names of the petitioner along with other legal heirs have been entered in the revenue records in respect of the said land. 7. The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 2024(4) GLH 410 – The State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai Meman has held as under:- “104. Moreover, the proceedings for eviction had been initiated after a long lapse of time, which would raise a question with regard to the validity of the action taken by the Collector for summary eviction of the transferees, who are in settled possession of the lands-in-question for a sufficient long time. v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai Meman has held as under:- “104. Moreover, the proceedings for eviction had been initiated after a long lapse of time, which would raise a question with regard to the validity of the action taken by the Collector for summary eviction of the transferees, who are in settled possession of the lands-in-question for a sufficient long time. The question before us is as to whether it was reasonable on the part of the Collector to initiate proceedings for summary eviction of the transferees, who are the holders of the lands in the area for considerably long period of time and who are admittedly carrying on agricultural operations. There is a categorical submission of the petitioners in the bunch of the writ petitions that the lands-in- question have been put to agricultural use since after the date of transfer and are also in agricultural use till date. The status or nature of the lands has not been changed by the transferees, who may not fall within the meaning of agriculturists under Section 2(c) of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. The vehement submission of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners is that the notices issued by the office of the Collector/Deputy Collector are ex facie barred by delay. 105. This issues has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2016) 2 GLH 1021] wherein dispute was pertaining to the provisions of Section 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance' 1949. In the said case, the first transfer was of the year 1970, mutation of which was entered in the year 1973. The land had exchanged many hands and no dispute was raised by the executant of the original sale deeds. However, a private respondent, thereafter, had intervened by filing a separate writ petition inter alia praying for a direction to complete the inquiry. In the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance, show cause notice was challenged by the occupants of the land on the ground that after 37 years from the date of revenue entry, the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance were ex facie barred by delays. In the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance, show cause notice was challenged by the occupants of the land on the ground that after 37 years from the date of revenue entry, the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance were ex facie barred by delays. The Division Bench of this Court examined three aspects of the matter; firstly the question of reasonable period for initiation of action of issuance of the show cause notice under the Ordinance; the second was as to whether initiation of action is without jurisdiction and the third aspect was about the locus of the respondent therein whose father had executed sale deed and received consideration and by his volition parted with the possession, seeking for invalidation of transfer after death of his father, who did not raise any grievance during his life time. 106. On the question of reasonable period, the Division Bench has considered the decision of the Apex Court in Patel Raghav Natha which pertains to the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, to note that the "revisional powers must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time must be determined on the facts of the said case and the nature of the order which is being refused". 107. The Division bench judgment of this Court in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya was noted, wherein the question was of delay in initiation of the action under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The relevant observations in paragraph Nos. 12' and 13' whereof are noted hereinunder :- "12. Indisputably, the land in question is a new tenure land, to which the provisions of Section 43 of the Act are applicable. It is also well settled that if a person wants to get the land converted from new tenure to old tenure, then as per the Government Resolutions passed from time to time and other provisions of the Act, the Collector has to determine the amount of premium due and payable by the person who seeks conversion and as per the guidelines laid down such amount determined by the Collector if is paid, then necessary orders are being passed by the authorities converting the land from new tenure to old tenure thereby lifting the restrictions as imposed under Section 43 of the Act. It is also well settled that question is if the land is transferred in violation of the provisions of Section 43 of the Act, then such transactions could definitely be termed as void transactions. However, the question is whether such void transactions could be annulled at any point of time and whether the authorities could be justified in taking over the possession of the land for the purpose of vesting in the Government at any point of time. 13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed for a considerable period and by a passage creating valuable rights in favour of a considerable section of people, like the appellants in the present case, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the competent authority under the Act would be entitled to exercise powers under Section 84(C) of the Act at any point of time." 108. What would be the reasonable time as explained by the Apex Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar was taken note of in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya in the following manner in paragraph No. 16' as under :- "16. In the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar reported in 2007(1) SCC 584 , the Supreme Court has elaborately explained this principle of action to be taken within a reasonable period of time. It would be appropriate for us to quote paragraph Nos.35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. "35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 36. "35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. 36. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha ( 1969 (2) SCC 187 ) it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to (2007) 1 SCC 584 be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently reasonableness "belongs to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the courts". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar ( 1987 (4) SCC 497 ) and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. ( 1989 (1) SCC 532 ) . (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar ( 1987 (4) SCC 497 ) and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. ( 1989 (1) SCC 532 ) . As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson (41 LJ Ch 472) it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others v. P.Mangamma and Others ( 2003 (4) SCC 488 ) . 38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal ( 2002 (1) SCC 134 ), it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case; a "reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea". 39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows: "That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer. "Reasonable Time" is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. If it is proper to attempt any definition of the words "reasonable time", as applied to completion of a contract, the distinction given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested, namely, that a "reasonable time" means as soon as circumstances will permit. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case. The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in question. A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea. Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the case. (Kinney) It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments for use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has been completed and the owner has demanded their return. (AIR 1930 Oudh 395). The expression "reasonable time" means so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case". [See: Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew ( 2005(7) SCC 667 )] 40. In all these cases at hand the factual aspects have not been examined, because the grievance appears to have been focused on the applicability of Section 77 (1A)(b).". 109. In paragraph No. 19' in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya, it was concluded that:- "19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not prescribe time limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction." 110. Taking note of the law discussed in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya, the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda has further proceeded to note another Division Bench judgment in Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, which also pertains to Section 54 of the Ordinance, 1949 and the question wherein was of reasonable time to initiate action under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 for summary eviction of the occupant, transfer in whose favour was alleged to be invalid. While dealing with various contentions about the validity of the transaction and the effect of the same due to the delay, it was noted therein that at the time when the transaction was executed and the entry was mutated in the revenue record, the petitioner had merely submitted a certificate issued by the Talati of village certifying that the petitioner was preparing agri-tools. However, at that stage, the authority did not demand any other details or clarification from the petitioner and/or did not initiate any action. The State authorities allowed the transaction to operate for years. Subsequently, when the action to annul the transaction came to be initiated after 17 years, the petitioner raised objection on the ground that the action was unsustainable because of the inordinate delay and that since the time when the transaction was entered into, he had put the land-in- question to the agricultural use only, and further the status and the nature of the agricultural land had been retained and maintained by the transferee. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of that case, considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter specifically that the transferee had not changed the nature or status of the land and also has incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil, it was held therein that the aforesaid factors would be relevant and would deserve due consideration. It was, thus, observed in paragraph No. 20' as under :- "20. It was, thus, observed in paragraph No. 20' as under :- "20. Even if the concept that the void action cannot be validated on the ground of belated action is applied in present case, then also, in view of the special facts and circumstances of present case it would be appropriate to take into account the peculiar facts of present case which emerge from the record viz:- (a) during the entire period of 17 years the vendor has not taken out any action in law against the transaction and any suit or proceeding for declaration or for any other relief does not appear to have been filed by the vendor. (b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time when the transaction was executed and was tiling and cultivating various agricultural lands. (c) The petitioner was also artisan i.e. engaged in the activity of preparing agri-tools. (d) more important is the fact that even after purchasing the land in question the petitioner has, as claimed by him, continued to use the land for agricultural purpose and the status or nature of the land in question as agricultural land is not changed and it continues to be agricultural land (said factual assertion by the petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents and any contrary evidence is not placed on record) (e) the petitioner has also claimed that he has incurred substantial expenditure in improving quality of soil. (f) another important factor which, in the facts of present case, has emerged is that in view of the orders of the authorities it is only the vendor who will stand to gain/benefit since the land, even after the orders, will not vest in the government in absence of any provision providing for such consequential." 111. While holding so, though it was found by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda that the decision of the competent authority in holding the transaction-in-question as void is in consonance with the provisions of the Ordinance and cannot be faulted, but it was concluded that in the interest of justice and equity, it cannot be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of powers under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the petitioner after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 17 years, cannot be justified. It was held that the eviction order completely overlooked that the petitioner has continued to put the land to use for agricultural purposes and has not changed the status and the nature of the land, rather he has invested further amounts for betterment of the agricultural land. The reasons for delay of 17 years has remained unexplained and unjustified and the only defence was that the transaction is statutorily void. 112. Taking note of the above decisions in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya and Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, it was, however, observed by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda in paragraph No. 10' as under:- "In our view, the above referred well considered two decisions of this Court makes the position abundantly clear that if the action is to be initiated for setting aside of a transaction under the Ordinance by invoking section 54 read with section 75 of the Ordinance, it has to be within reasonable period. The above referred two decisions are in respect of the cases wherein the powers were exercised and proceedings were initiated after 5 years and 17 years respectively, whereas in the present case, it is after more than 35 years. Hence, we find that the initiation of the action itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and the bar of delay and laches could operate against the authority in initiation of the action. The aforesaid aspect is coupled with two additional circumstances, one is that the land has changed hands further during the period of delay and the ownership is transferred by the purchaser to the another person and the second is that the revenue entries were mutated. Thereafter, they were also certified by the competent authority and in spite of that, no action was taken for cancellation of such entry or otherwise or even for declaration of the transaction as invalid within reasonable period. If during the period of delay, the rights of the parties in the properties are altered, the delay would operate as a bar with more gravity and when the ownership is changed during the period of delay, the bar for not taking action within reasonable period would also operate with more gravity against the authority in initiation of the action." 126. As noted by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda the settled position cannot be unsettled in a belated action taken by the revenue authorities. As noted by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda the settled position cannot be unsettled in a belated action taken by the revenue authorities. The notices issued to the petitioners to show cause for invalidating the transactions under Section 54 of the Ordinance and the action for eviction as contemplated under Section 75, having been initiated after a long lapse of time and in most cases after the death of both the original transferees and even the original transferor, cannot be said to be justified from any angle. 127. For the above discussion, we do not find any good ground to deviate from the legal position settled with the Division Bench judgments of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda and Bhanji Devshisinh Luhar where belated actions taken for eviction of the transferee under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949, were found to be inequitable and unjustified. Exercise of powers in a reasonable time where the legislature does not fix the time limit for exercise of such powers is a well settled position of law, which cannot be unsettled on the submissions of the learned Additional Advocate General that the decision in Patil Raghav Natha was rendered while making scrutiny of the exercise of revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Revenue Code, 1879 and hence is not applicable to the proceedings initiated under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 for summary eviction. 128. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that a declaration of the sale deed as invalid was required to be made after an inquiry which must have been conducted within a reasonable time before the Summary eviction. The sale deeds remained valid for considerable long period of time and moreover, they are binding on the vendors. The inquiry into the status of the predecessor-in-title of the petitioners or the petitioners herein after such a long lapse of time, can not be permitted, as it may not be possible to bring on record all the relevant documents in such an inquiry(s). A transaction hit by Section 54 is not void ab initio, but may be invalidated and hence remains valid till it is declared invalid. The settled position of law that the transaction which remained valid and effective for a considerable period of time cannot be unsettled, is not to be deviated. A transaction hit by Section 54 is not void ab initio, but may be invalidated and hence remains valid till it is declared invalid. The settled position of law that the transaction which remained valid and effective for a considerable period of time cannot be unsettled, is not to be deviated. Further, there is no vesting contemplated under the Ordinance, 1949 and as noted hereinbefore, the show cause notices are prescribing for not only eviction of the transferees, but resumption of the land in favour of the State Government by directing for entry of the name of the State in the revenue records after deletion of the entries, even of the original landholders while deleting the name of the transferees, which is wholly without jurisdiction.” 7.1 In the present case, the delay in initiating the suo motu proceedings under Section 54 r.w. Section 75 of the Ordinance of 1949 is after a period of 31 years. Therefore, the present case is squarely covered by the legal position laid down by the Division Bench in The State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai Meman (supra). 8. Further, the contention of the respondents is that at the relevant point of time, the petitioner could not be considered to be an agriculturist since there was a bar to hold agricultural land beyond periphery of 8 kms. However, it is required to be noted that the said bar was removed by way of amendment on the date such suo motu proceedings came to be initiated against the petitioner in the year 2010. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader deserves to be rejected out-rightly. For the aforesaid reasons and discussion, the present Special Civil Application is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. Rule is made absolute to aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.