JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. 1. This Regular First Appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 162/2012 on the files of the Sub Court, Tirur, challenging decree and judgment, dated 15.7.2021 therein. Respondents herein are defendants 1 and 2 in the above suit. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/1st defendant. 3. The parties in this appeal shall be referred as ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendants’ for brevity and convenience hereafter. 4. Plaintiff filed the suit to realise Rs. 21 Lakh from the defendants. The specific case of the plaintiff is that, on 10.9.2009, the defendants requested the plaintiff to lend 1,65,000/- Saudi Riyal for the purpose of running ZamZam Super Market in Gizan, Saudi Arabia. Pursuant to the said demand, after execution of an agreement on 1.11.2009, entered into between the plaintiff and defendants, plaintiff paid 70,000/- Saudi Riyal to the defendants. That apart, 95,000/- Saudi Riyal, as per the agreement also was given by two installments through the bank account of the 2nd defendant on 10.12.2009 and 10.12.2010. But, the amount was not repaid. 5. Defendants entered appearance and resisted the suit mainly denying the allegation that they owe the amount claimed in the plaint to the plaintiff. According to them, the agreement produced by the plaintiff is a fabricated one, since the signature in the agreement is not that of the 1st defendant. The defendants emphatically denied the agreement dated 1.11.2009, raising specific contention that, on 1.11.2009, an agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and defendants and the same was a rental agreement, as per which, the plaintiff purchased ZamZam Supermarket for a total sum of 1,40,000/- Saudi Riyal, out of which, 70,000/- Saudi Riyal towards the value for the shop and 70,000/- Saudi Riyal was fixed as the value of the goods in the supermarket. The shop was run by Shihabudheen (2nd defendant) and his partner. Accordingly, the plaintiff had given the amount to Shihabudheen and also given management right of the shop to the defendants. It was agreed to give 6,000/- Saudi Riyal as monthly rent to the plaintiff. It was specifically contended by the defendants that the rental agreement, dated 1.11.2009 had been in possession of the defendants in Saudi Arabia and would be produced. It was agreed to give 6,000/- Saudi Riyal as monthly rent to the plaintiff. It was specifically contended by the defendants that the rental agreement, dated 1.11.2009 had been in possession of the defendants in Saudi Arabia and would be produced. That apart, the defendants denied the signature of Ummer (the 1st defendant in the suit document, dated 1.11.2009) and contended that the said signature was forged and fabricated. The specific case of the defendants further is that, in continuation of the rental agreement executed in between the plaintiff and defendants on 1.11.2009, blank stamp papers signed by Shihabudheen were obtained on 1.11.2009 to make an agreement with respect to the transfer of the business. Now, the suit document was fabricated by putting the name and signature of Ummer also. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 6. The trial court raised three issues and thereafter, tried the matter. PW-1 was examined and Ext.A1 was marked on the side of the plaintiff. DW-1 and DW-2 were examined and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on the side of the defendants. Ext.C1 Expert report also was marked as Court Exhibit. 7. On analysis of evidence, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff palpably failed to prove that the defendants borrowed 1,65,000/- Saudi Riyal of the plaintiff. 8. While assailing the verdict of the trial court, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that, by the evidence of PW-1, the execution of Ext.A1, the suit document, is proved. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, even though there was attempt made by the plaintiff to examine one Abdul Salam, who is the second witness in Ext.A1 agreement, his examination was adjourned at the instance of the defendants during Covid 19 period and accordingly, his evidence could not be recorded, since he went abroad thereafter. It is submitted further that, as per the evidence given by PW-1, Ext.A1 was written by one Arun, though his name was not shown in Ext.A1 as scribe. It is submitted further that, as per the evidence given by PW-1, Ext.A1 was written by one Arun, though his name was not shown in Ext.A1 as scribe. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, even though as per Ext.C1 Expert report, it was found that the signature in Ext.A1, alleged to be put by the 1st defendant, is different from the specimen signatures supplied for comparison, there was deliberate attempt on the part of the defendants to hide the signature of Ummer/the 1st defendant right from the very beginning, since both the defendants appeared before the trial court by appointing separate power of attorneys without disclosing their signatures for comparison. The learned counsel has given much emphasis to Ext,B2, copy of lease agreement, which was referred in the written statement filed by the defendants, where the signatures of the plaintiff and defendants are there to contend that the signatures in Ext.B2 and Ext.A1 put by Ummer, are similar. On the above submission, the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought a remand of the suit for an opportunity to examine Abdul Salam and Arun, to prove Ext.A1. 9. Strongly defending the verdict under challenge, the learned counsel for the 1st defendant argued that, the execution of Ext.A1 could not be proved from the evidence already adduced or by examining Abdul Salam or Arun. According to the learned counsel for the 1st defendant, the specific contention raised by the defendants before the trial court is based on Ext.B2 lease agreement and as per which, it was stated that the plaintiff purchased ZamZam Supermarket near domestic Airport, Gizan, Saudi Arabia for 1,40,000/- Saudi Riyal and the above business was entrusted to be run by the defendants and it was agreed by the defendants to pay 6,000/- Saudi Riyal towards rent. Therefore, the possibility of executing Ext.A1 agreement, on the date of Ext.B2, is an outright impossibility and therefore, the trial court rightly found that the plaintiff failed to establish the transaction entitling Rs. 21 Lakh claimed by the plaintiff. He also pointed out that PW-1 also practically admitted the contention of the defendants during cross examination and also acceptance of 6,000/- Saudi Riyal towards rent for 2 to 3 months. 10. 21 Lakh claimed by the plaintiff. He also pointed out that PW-1 also practically admitted the contention of the defendants during cross examination and also acceptance of 6,000/- Saudi Riyal towards rent for 2 to 3 months. 10. Adverting to the rival arguments tendered by the learned counsel for the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in the matter in dispute, the points arise for consideration are: (1) Whether the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff failed to prove Ext.A1 agreement and entitlement of the suit amount based on Ext.A1 is erroneous? (2) Whether the matter requires a remand as sought for by the learned counsel for the plaintiff? (3) Reliefs and cost. 11. In the instant case, the entire dispute is centered around the genuineness of Ext.A1 agreement relied on by the plaintiff to contend that he had given 1,65,000/- Saudi Riyal to the defendants and that the defendants failed to repay the same. The trial court addressed the said question and found in negative. Even though the plaintiff’s case is that as per Ext.A1, defendants borrowed 1,65,000/- Saudi Riyal, the very execution of the document was denied by the defendants and the defendants raised a contention based on Ext.B2 agreement that they did not borrow any amount from the plaintiff, and contended that the agreement produced by the plaintiff is a fabricated one, since the signature in the agreement is not that of the 1st defendant. Although PW-1, the plaintiff supported Ext.A1 agreement during his chief examination, during cross examination when he was confronted with Ext.B2, he virtually accepted some stipulations in Ext.B2. The trial court discussed the same in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment as under: “..........This case of the defendants more or less established by the evidence of PW-1 in cross-examination with his deposition in the connected criminal proceeding. In cross examination, PW-1/plaintiff admitted that he knows the difference between lending and investing. Though he asserted first in cross examination that the amount due to him is the amount lent by him, he admitted that in Ext.B1 deposition given at JFCM Court in connection with the same transaction, he stated that such money was invested by him in the business with an expectation of getting profits. Though he asserted first in cross examination that the amount due to him is the amount lent by him, he admitted that in Ext.B1 deposition given at JFCM Court in connection with the same transaction, he stated that such money was invested by him in the business with an expectation of getting profits. It is also his admission that he had given evidence in Ext.B1 that there was an agreement between the defendants and himself for running the shop and that they paid 6000 Saudi Riyal as rent for running the shop by them under him. The admission as to the existence of an agreement by PW-1 probalizes the case of the defendants as to Ext.B2. This evidence of PW-1 in Ext.B1 is fatal to the case of the plaintiff in the plaint. It shows that the case of the plaintiff as to lending money to the defendants is unworthy of acceptance. If the plaintiff purchased the shop by paying money, he cannot claim back the money on the reason that the shop was closed subsequently due to loss. Consequently, the contention of the defendants that Ext.A1 is a created document by copying the signatures from Ext.B2 cannot be ruled out. In the absence of reliable evidence to prove that there was lending of money as claimed by the plaintiff, his suit must fail. The evidence available on record more probablizes the cases of the defendants than the case of the plaintiff.” 12. It is true that, as per the proceedings of the court below, one witness was also cited to be examined from the side of the plaintiff and according to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the witness is Abdul Salam and he could not be examined, since he went abroad, when his examination got adjourned by the defendants. 13. On perusal of Ext.A1 agreement, it is emphatically clear that, in the agreement, there are two witnesses, they are, Abdul Salam and Mohamed Anzari. Plaintiff has no case that any attempt was made to examine Mohamed Anzari as a witness to prove the execution of Ext.A1. PW-1 had given evidence that, one Arun had written the agreement in Saudi Arabia. The said fact is not disclosed in Ext.A1, and no attempt was made to examine Mohamed Anzari. Plaintiff has no case that any attempt was made to examine Mohamed Anzari as a witness to prove the execution of Ext.A1. PW-1 had given evidence that, one Arun had written the agreement in Saudi Arabia. The said fact is not disclosed in Ext.A1, and no attempt was made to examine Mohamed Anzari. It is relevant to note that the plaintiff had attempted to prove the genuineness of Ext.A1, where the signature of the 1st defendant Ummer was specifically disputed by the defendants and forwarded the same to get expert opinion from the Forensic Science Lab. In order to prove the dispute, signatures of the 1st defendant in Exts.A1 to A4, S1 to S80 and Q1 to Q3 were sent for examination before the Assistant Director (Documents), Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Thrissur and on comparison, Ext.C1 report was obtained, whereby, the Assistant Director (Documents), Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Thrissur, reported as under: “On comparison, it was found that the questioned signatures are executed with a superior skill compared to that of the standards. On comparison, the questioned signatures also differ from the standards in significant writing characteristics. Some of the individual writing characteristics in which they differ are the following. 1. The movement of writing the letter ‘U’. 2. The movement of writing the character ‘M’. 3. The nature of execution of the terminal character appearing like ‘R’. 4. The manner of combination of the terminal character with the underscoring. 5. The nature and extent of underscoring. In addition, the questioned as well as the standards are also differ in general writing characters such as speed, movement, Size of characters, relative size of characters, Spacing, alignment etc. The differences found between the questioned and the standards are highly significant. The differences found between the questioned and the standards are not due to natural variation or any intended disguise, but are only due to different authorship.” 14. It is the settled law that, in order to prove a document, parties who assert the same shall adduce substantive evidence, though opinion evidence as a piece of corroboratory evidence can also be relied on. But corroborative evidence has nothing to do independently without the support of substantive evidence. 15. Here, the substantive evidence available to prove Ext.A1 is that of the plaintiff alone, since none of the witnesses in Ext.A1 were examined. But corroborative evidence has nothing to do independently without the support of substantive evidence. 15. Here, the substantive evidence available to prove Ext.A1 is that of the plaintiff alone, since none of the witnesses in Ext.A1 were examined. On reading the evidence of PW-1, though he asserts execution of Ext.A1, his evidence during cross examination would show that he practically admitted execution of Ext.B2 agreement and entrustment of the shop to defendants to run the same after purchasing the same by him. He also admitted payment of 6,000/- Saudi Riyal per month as rent for 2 to 3 months. As of now, the shop was demolished due to road widening. Thus, the trial court rightly found that the case of the plaintiff as to lending of money as per Ext.A1 was unworthy of acceptance and the said finding is only to be justified. 16. Before concluding the finding on point No. 1, it is inevitable to address the argument tendered by the plaintiff seeking a remand of this matter so as to facilitate examination of the attesting witnesses in Ext.A1, and also the scribe who had written the same. Inasmuch as the remand of a case is concerned, Section 107(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the CPC’ hereinafter) empowers an appellate court to remand a case, as dealt in Order XLI Rules 23, 23A and 25 of the CPC. The same read as under: 23. Remand of case by Appellate Court - Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, which directions to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. 23A. 23A. Remand in other cases - Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a re-trial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers as it has under rule 23. 25. Where Appellate Court may frame issues and refer them for trial to Court whose decree appealed from - Where the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such Court to take the additional evidence required; and such Court shall proceed to try such issues, and shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefor within such time as may be fixed by the Appellate Court or extended by it from time to time. 17. Thus, power vested in an appellate court under Order XLI Rule 25 of the CPC can be exercised if the court finds that the trial court has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which is essential to the right decision of the suit upon merits. In such cases, the appellate court may, if necessary, frame issues and refer the same to the court from whose decree the appeal has been preferred, and in such event, after taking additional evidence as directed by the appellate court, the trial court would return the evidence of the appellate court together with its finding thereon. Before the introduction of Rule 23A of Order XLI of the CPC as on 1.2.1977, the power of the appellate court to remand a case was available in a case which was decided on a preliminary point. However, in view of Order XLI Rule 23A of the CPC, power to remand a matter has been enhanced exhaustively and thereby, even in a case which was not decided on a preliminary point when the appellate court finds that there are valid reasons warranting a re-trial, the appellate court can remand the matter. However, in view of Order XLI Rule 23A of the CPC, power to remand a matter has been enhanced exhaustively and thereby, even in a case which was not decided on a preliminary point when the appellate court finds that there are valid reasons warranting a re-trial, the appellate court can remand the matter. 18. In the decision in Purushotham Reddy and Another v. M/s. Pratap Steels Ltd. 2002 KHC 1159 : AIR 2002 SC 771 : 2002 (2) SCC 686 , the Apex Court held that an Appellate Court should be circumspect in ordering a remand when the case is not covered either by R.23 or 23A or R.25 of Order XLI of the Code. An unwarranted order of remand gives the litigant an undeserved lease of life and therefore must be avoided. It is therefore clear that an appellate Judge should possess the ability and wisdom to foresee the difficulties and prejudices that is likely to be suffered by a party, who will be compelled to fight another round of litigation in an inferior Court. Remand of a case shall be made only when compelling legal grounds exist and it becomes necessary to do complete justice between the parties. 19. Thus, the power of remand can be exercised in a case where the trial court has disposed of the suit on a preliminary issue. An issue is to be termed as preliminary issue, if decision of the said issue is sufficient to dispose of the whole suit without the necessity of decision on other issues. Such preliminary issue may be one of fact or law, but the decision thereon must have avoided the necessity for a full hearing of the suit. No remand can be ordered by the appellate court under Rule 23 of Order XLI of the CPC, unless the decision of the lower court on the preliminary issue is reversed in appeal. Remanding a case is the discretion of the appellate court and the appellate court shall exercise the discretion within strict parameters. As a general rule, if appellate court can do complete justice on the basis of the record before it, the appellate court must not remand the case as it will entail more time and money of the litigants. Remanding a case is the discretion of the appellate court and the appellate court shall exercise the discretion within strict parameters. As a general rule, if appellate court can do complete justice on the basis of the record before it, the appellate court must not remand the case as it will entail more time and money of the litigants. A remand order may be proper in the cases of irregular, illegal or defective proceedings before the lower court and where vital or essential points have been ignored or not touched upon. A remand order should be carefully passed. An appellate court should decide matters finally instead of remanding the cases, unless there is a chance of miscarriage of justice. In the event that oral and documentary evidence is already on record and the parties had satisfactorily availed the opportunity of leading evidence, the case must be decided by the appellate court and should not be remanded. Where evidence on record was sufficient for appellate court to decide the matter itself, remand could not be ordered and discretionary power was to be used only in exceptional situation. Only those cases could be remanded which could not be decided on the basis of available material on record. If the controversy could be resolved on the basis of available evidence, then the question of remand would not arise. Where an amendment in pleadings is of essence for settling the controversy and the amendment sought for is denied by the trial court, it is not a “proper trial”. Likewise, non-framing of an essential issue makes it mandatory on the appellate court to frame the issue itself and to decide the case by the appellate court. No case can be remanded enabling a party to produce additional evidence unless proper opportunity was not afforded or denied to such party to lead evidence. Thus, an order of remand has to be made when the contingencies mentioned in Rules 23, 23A and 25 of Order XLI of the CPC, are available. 20. In the decision in Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2012 KHC 4190 : 2012 (5) SCC 443 : 2012 (2) KLT SN 64, it was held in paragraph No. 83 as under: “So also, no remand ought to be made only to enable a party to produce additional material. 20. In the decision in Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2012 KHC 4190 : 2012 (5) SCC 443 : 2012 (2) KLT SN 64, it was held in paragraph No. 83 as under: “So also, no remand ought to be made only to enable a party to produce additional material. A remand is neither mechanical nor a routine affair. If there is nothing wrong in the orders under challenge, there is no question of interference with the same. There is no reason for this Court to set the clock back and start a process which would take the parties another decade or so to come to terms with the problem.” 21. In the decision in Hameed and Others v. Kummottummal Kunhi P.P. Amma, (2007) 15 SCC 155 , it was held in paragraph No. 10 as under: “It is seen from the judgment passed by the Trial Court that apart from Exts. A1 and A2, which are the copies of adangal registers, no other documents are produced by the plaintiffs to show that they or their predecessors have got title to the plaint schedule property. This apart, the plaintiff was given sufficient opportunity to produce the documents. In spite of opportunity, no other documents were filed and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court should not have remanded the matter with liberty to produce documents in order to fill lacuna in the evidence.” Therefore, there cannot be a remand merely for the purpose of a remand, and such a view cannot be exercised unduly and unreasonably. The Courts are not expected to set the clock back to the starting stage by driving the parties again to start afresh the matter unnecessarily, so as to drive them to further decades to get the matter settled. A remand is akin to compelling a person who completed graduation to start afresh from LKG and go through all classes prior to graduation and to suffer the ordeals repeatedly. Therefore, remand should not be used as a weapon for easy disposal of appeals unless the reasons espoused hereinabove have been established. A remand cannot be made merely for the purpose of enabling a party to fill up the lacuna in the evidence. 22. In the instant case, the plaintiff was given sufficient opportunity to examine the witnesses and adduce evidence. A remand cannot be made merely for the purpose of enabling a party to fill up the lacuna in the evidence. 22. In the instant case, the plaintiff was given sufficient opportunity to examine the witnesses and adduce evidence. Therefore, plea of remand raised for the purpose of examining two witnesses omitted to be examined by using the first opportunity, is not permissible within the ambit of Order XLI Rules 23 and 23A of the CPC. Therefore, plea of remand raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is not liable to be allowed. 23. In this connection, it is relevant to refer Order XLI Rule 24 of the CPC which provides that, where evidence on record is sufficient, appellate court has to determine the case finally. It has been provided that, where the evidence upon the record is sufficient to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce judgment, the Appellate Court may, after resettling the issues, if necessary, finally determine the suit, notwithstanding that the judgment of the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has proceeded wholly upon some ground other than that on which the Appellate Court proceeds. 24. Coming back to point No. 1, as already discussed, going by the evidence given by PW-1 virtually admitting the contentions in Ext.B2 would throw light on the fact that the execution of Ext.A1, which runs contra to Ext.B2, is an improbability. Therefore, the trial court rightly found that the plaintiff failed to prove execution of Ext.A1 so as to get the suit amount realised from the defendants. 25. In view of the above finding, the decree and judgment do not require any interference and accordingly, this appeal fails. Point Nos.1 and 2 answered thus. 26. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost in this appeal. All interlocutory orders stand vacated and all interlocutory applications pending in this appeal, stand dismissed. 27. Since the appeal has been filed as C.M.C.P. and this Court allowed the appellant to proceed with the appeal without paying court fee, as an indigent person, he is bound to pay court fee. Therefore, Registry is directed to take necessary steps in this regard. 28. The plaintiff is directed to pay court fee of Rs. 27. Since the appeal has been filed as C.M.C.P. and this Court allowed the appellant to proceed with the appeal without paying court fee, as an indigent person, he is bound to pay court fee. Therefore, Registry is directed to take necessary steps in this regard. 28. The plaintiff is directed to pay court fee of Rs. 4,26,640/- (Rupees Four Lakh Twenty Six Thousand Six Hundred and Forty only) within a period of one month from today and on failure, Registry is directed to forward a copy of the decree to the District Collector concerned to realise the same from the plaintiff, as per law, without fail, at any rate within a period of two weeks, on completion of one month passed to pay the court fee with specific direction to the District Collector to realise the court fee, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the decree.