JUDGMENT : MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA, J. 1. Heard Mr. Lalpianfela Chawngthu, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State of Mizoram as well as Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu, the learned Legal-aid-counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 (informant). 2. This appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been filed by the appellant, Shri Tommy Lalbiakmawia, impugning the judgment and order dated 26.10.2023, passed by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Special Court, (POCSO) in Sessions Case No. 113/2019, arising out of Criminal Trial No. 1908/2019. 3. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10(ten) years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 3(three) years. 4. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are that, on 23.07.2019, one R. Lalngilneihi, had lodged an FIR before the Officer- in-charge of Serchhip Police Station, inter alia, alleging that on 22.07.2019, in between 10:00 PM to 12:00 Midnight, the appellant raped the daughter of the elder sibling of the informant (hereinafter referred to as “X”). It is further stated in the FIR that the “X” was raped twice inside the Maruti-800 vehicle by the appellant near the Mat River, about 13 kilometers away from Sailam. 5. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, the Officer-in-charge of Serchhip Police Station registered Serchhip P.S. Case No. 38/2019 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and entrusted Ms. Melody Lalmuanpuii, SI to investigate the case. During investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the victim girl and other witnesses. She also arranged the victim to be examined under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Judicial Magistrate and also got medical examination of the victim as well as the accused (appellant). Ultimately, on completion of the investigation, the charge- sheet was laid against the appellant Shri Tommy Lalbiakmawia under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 6. The appellant was released on bail on 25th of October, 2019 and he faced the trial remaining on bail. Ultimately, on completion of the investigation, the charge- sheet was laid against the appellant Shri Tommy Lalbiakmawia under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 6. The appellant was released on bail on 25th of October, 2019 and he faced the trial remaining on bail. On 14th of February, 2020, the Trial Court, after considering the materials on record and after hearing both sides framed the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 against the appellant. When the said charge was read over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. Though, 10(ten) prosecution witnesses were enlisted in the charge- sheet, however, to bring home the charge against the appellant, the prosecution side, examined only four witnesses, including the victim girl. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 during which he pleaded his innocence and denied the truthfulness of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. However, ultimately, on conclusion of the trial, by the judgment and order which has been impugned in the instant appeal, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the manner as already described in paragraph No. 3 of this judgment hereinbefore. 8. Before considering the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides, let us go through the evidence which is available on record. 9. The PW-1, Miss Lalngilneihi, who is also the first informant, in this case has deposed that the victim “X” is her elder sister’s daughter and her mother passed away in the year 2015. She has also deposed that the victim “X” was born on 09.11.2004 and she has stopped going to school and used to work in the day time in the house of the appellant. 10. The PW-1 has further deposed that on 22.07.2019, the victim “X” was asked by the wife of the appellant to stay in their house as the appellant had to go to Aizawl. The PW-1 has further deposed that on the next morning, the victim came running to her and was crying uncontrollably and she told her that she was raped by the appellant at Thenzawl and Mat River Road. She has further deposed that when the PW-1 had telephoned the appellant, he denied doing anything as alleged by the victim “X”. The PW-1 has further deposed that on the next morning, the victim came running to her and was crying uncontrollably and she told her that she was raped by the appellant at Thenzawl and Mat River Road. She has further deposed that when the PW-1 had telephoned the appellant, he denied doing anything as alleged by the victim “X”. She has further deposed that thereafter, she along with her mother and the victim went to the house of appellant and the appellant took them to Serchhip Police Station where she filed the FIR. She has further deposed that later on, on 15.10.2019, her mother handed over the birth certificate of the victim “X” to police and the police seized the birth certificate. She has also stated that she signed on the birth certificate as seizure witness. 11. During her cross-examination, she has deposed that the appellant is of a good character and is not flirtatious. She has also deposed that the victim has got married to the person with whom she was in love. 12. The PW-2, victim girl “X” has deposed that the appellant is known to her. She has also deposed that she was born on 09.11.2004 and used to live with the appellant as her maid on monthly payment basis of Rs.3,500/- as salary. She has also deposed that in the year 2019, the appellant shifted to Hmar Veng, Serchhip and at that time, she was staying at P&E Veng, Serchhip. She has deposed that the appellant and his wife came to her house and offered her to work for them only during day time on daily wage basis. So she started working again in the month of July, 2019. She has deposed that she used to go to the house of the appellant in the morning at 6:00 AM and return to her house in the evening at around 5:00 PM. 13. The PW-2 has further deposed that on 22.07.2019, she had gone to the market along with the appellant and his family. When they returned to his house at around 1:00 PM, the appellant received a phone call saying that one of his friends has passed away at Aizawl and he had to go to attend the funeral at 6:00 PM, accordingly, he left his house at around 6:00 PM. When they returned to his house at around 1:00 PM, the appellant received a phone call saying that one of his friends has passed away at Aizawl and he had to go to attend the funeral at 6:00 PM, accordingly, he left his house at around 6:00 PM. She has further deposed that at around 9:00 PM on that night, the appellant said that he had to attend some emergency duty and his wife asked her to spend the night in their house. 14. The PW-2 has further deposed that when she was lying down on a long chair in the sitting room and was about to go to sleep, the appellant came and said that he wanted her to accompany him to his work as it involved apprehending suspected drug dealers. The PW-2 has further deposed that though she was not inclined to go out in the night, however, the appellant brought some warm clothes and asked her to put them on and thereafter, she went along with him in his Maruti car. The PW-2 has further deposed that while they were going on the Thenzawl road and only she and the appellant were inside the vehicle and she was sitting in the front passenger seat, the appellant stopped the car on the road and went out calling someone on his mobile phone. She has further deposed that thereafter, the appellant returned to his car and said that they had to go to Keitum Road. 15. The PW-2 has further deposed that after getting on the Keitum Road, the appellant stopped near Mat River Road and took out a bottle of liquor and poured some in a glass. She has further deposed that the appellant also offered her as to whether she would like to drink some liquor. She has deposed that she poured about half a cup and drank it and started feeling dizzy and said that she wanted to sleep. She has also deposed that thereafter, the appellant inclined the front seat and bent towards her and thereafter pushed her into the rear seat and removed her clothes and thereafter, he took off all his clothes and had sex with her on two occasions by inserting his penis into her vagina. She has deposed that the appellant tried to put his penis in her mouth, but she did not let him do so. She has deposed that the appellant tried to put his penis in her mouth, but she did not let him do so. Thereafter, he put on his clothes, and she also got dressed herself in the rear seat. She has deposed that after that they returned to the house of the appellant at Serchhip, she spent her night in the house of the appellant, sleeping on the long chair in the sitting room. 16. The PW-2 has further deposed that on the next morning after preparing the morning meal, she left for the home at around 07:30 AM and on reaching her home, she told everything to Miss R. Lalngilneihi, her maternal aunt, about what had happened. On coming to know about the incident her aunt telephoned the police and the police asked them to come to the police station along with the appellant. Thereafter, they went to the house of the appellant along with her grandmother and her aunt. The appellant thereafter took all of them to the police station in his car, where he was arrested. 17. The PW-2 has further deposed that in the police station, her aunt, Ms. R. Lalngilneihi, filed an FIR. She has further deposed that thereafter she was taken to District Hospital at Serchhip, where she was medically examined. She has also deposed that thereafter she was taken to District Court, where she gave her statement to the Magistrate. She has exhibited the statement given before the Court as Exhibit P-1 and her birth certificate as Exhibit M-1. 18. During her cross-examination, she has deposed that apart from the assault on 22.07.2019, the appellant had never misbehaved with her. She has also deposed that they left the house of the appellant at around 9:00 PM and returned back at around 10.30 PM. She has stated that there were no houses near the place where the appellant stopped the car and assaulted her. She has also deposed that the appellant undressed himself first and thereafter disrobed her. She has also deposed that she did not tell the wife of the appellant anything after returning back to the house of the appellant. She has also deposed that when she woke up in the morning, her private part was swollen, however, she was not aware if there was any bleeding as she had washed up as soon as she woke up in the morning. She has also deposed that when she woke up in the morning, her private part was swollen, however, she was not aware if there was any bleeding as she had washed up as soon as she woke up in the morning. She has also denied that the wife of the appellant had asked her to spend the night in their house on 22.07.2019. She was asked also some questions by the Trial Court to which she answered appropriately. 19. The third witness to be examined was the PW-6, namely, Laithangpuii, who has deposed that the victim “X” is her grand-daughter. She has deposed that after the demise of the mother of the victim on 30.08.2015, the victim used to stay with them at P&E Veng, Serchhip. She has deposed that on 15.10.2019, the police had seized the original birth certificate of the victim girl in her presence and in presence of two other witnesses. She exhibited the seizure list as Exhibit-P3. 20. During her cross-examination, the PW-6 has stated that her statement was not recorded by the police in connection with the case. 21. The fourth prosecution witness to be examined on behalf of the prosecution side is the PW-10, namely, Ms. Melody Lalmuanpuii, who is the Investigating Officer of the case. She has deposed that after registration of Serchhip P.S. Case No. 38/2019, she was entrusted to do the investigation of the case. She has stated that during the course of investigation, she had visited the place of occurrence, examined the complainant and the victim, and seized the birth certificate and extracted copy of the register of birth, Economics and Statistics Department search report in respect of the victim. She has also deposed that she got the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Serchhip. She has also deposed that during the course of the investigation, the appellant was arrested and was interrogated and the victim as well as the appellant were both sent for medical examination. She has exhibited the statement of the victim girl recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the FIR, the seizure memo, the copy of register of Birth Economic and Statistics Department Search Report, the medical examination report of victim girl as well as the appellant. 22. She has exhibited the statement of the victim girl recorded under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the FIR, the seizure memo, the copy of register of Birth Economic and Statistics Department Search Report, the medical examination report of victim girl as well as the appellant. 22. During her cross-examination, she has deposed that she could not get any direct eye-witness of the alleged incident. She also deposed that the FIR was written by her, however, it was signed by the complainant after she duly accepted the same. 23. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 during which he has denied the accusations made against him by the prosecution witnesses and he pleaded his innocence. He, however, stated that it was the victim girl who insisted to accompany him on that night and when his wife gave permission, the victim eventually accompanied him. He has also stated that he never gave her alcohol and it was due to the drug overdose that she might have stated that her body was helpless. He has also stated that on that day, they went to Thenzawl Road and not to Keitum. In support of his defence, the appellant examined two witnesses, namely, the appellant himself as the DW-1 and his wife Lalramthari as the DW-2. 24. The appellant, while deposing as DW-1, has stated that in the year 2018, the victim girl used to work in their house at a monthly salary of Rs.3,500/-. However, when they realized that she is into intoxicating drugs and there were three episodes of drug overdose within a span of two weeks, they decided to let her go. After that, the victim came to their house on many occasions, asking to take her back in the work. Ultimately, in the month of July 2019, the appellant decided to re-employee her on the promise that she will stop drug addiction. 25. The DW-1 has stated that on 22.07.2019, at around 10:25 PM, the victim has insisted on accompanying him while he was going out to throw garbage. However, when she asked the wife of the appellant, he allowed her to accompany him to throw garbage at a garbage dump site at Sailam Kawn. The appellant has stated that they returned home at around 11:05 PM. However, when she asked the wife of the appellant, he allowed her to accompany him to throw garbage at a garbage dump site at Sailam Kawn. The appellant has stated that they returned home at around 11:05 PM. He has further deposed that on that night when they reached the garbage disposal site, he got down from the vehicle and took the garbage from the bag and after throwing it at a distance when he came back to the vehicle, he found the victim was motionless. He has deposed that he thought that the victim had fallen asleep. However, when he called her name, she did not respond to him. At this, he lowered the window glass of the vehicle and returned back to his home. When they reached home, the victim got down on her own. He also stated that the victim did not appear to be uneasy as she was busy with the laptop. He has further stated that on the next day when he woke up, the victim had already left after cooking meal in the morning. The DW-1 has further deposed that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated as an accused in this case. 26. During his cross-examination by the Special Public Prosecutor, he has deposed that he had never seen the victim taking drugs. He also denied the suggestion that he went to Keitum Road with the victim on that night. He was given some other suggestions by the prosecution side which was all answered in the negative by him. 27. The DW-2, Ms. Lalramthari, who is the wife of the appellant, has deposed that on 22.07.2019 at around 10:25 PM, the victim asked her husband if she could accompany him to throw the garbage on that, her husband (the appellant) asked the victim to obtain her permission. The DW-2 has further deposed that she gave her permission to go along with the appellant and they left the house at around 10:25 PM. She has further deposed that after that someone who was believed to be the boyfriend of the victim came to their house. She has also deposed that her husband and the victim came back at around 11:05 PM and victim did not say anything, neither had she showed any feeling of being uneasy. Thereafter, they had tea together and then touched the laptop and was using Facebook. She has also deposed that her husband and the victim came back at around 11:05 PM and victim did not say anything, neither had she showed any feeling of being uneasy. Thereafter, they had tea together and then touched the laptop and was using Facebook. She has further deposed that on the next morning, she found victim cooking meal, however, when she got up from the bed, she had already left after preparing morning meal. She has further deposed that when her husband was detained in the lock up, the victim’s aunt came to her and asked for money, which she refused. Instead, she gave the remaining salary of the victim i.e., Rs.1050/-. She has deposed that her husband has been falsely implicated in this case. 28. During her cross-examination by the prosecution side, she has stated that she had allowed the victim to go along with her husband to Sailiam Kawn. She has deposed that as the waste products were packed properly, it would have taken only five minutes to throw them in the dumping ground. However, they reach at 11:05 PM. She has also deposed that the victim did not seem to be intoxicated with any drug on that night. She denied the suggestions that there was an extra-marital affair of his husband with the victim girl. 29. Mr. Lalpianfela Chawngthu, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Trial Court has come to the finding of guilt of the appellant merely on the basis of the statement of the victim which she had made before the Police during the investigation as well as her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Serchhip. He submits that as the statement under Section 161 as well as Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be regarded as substantial evidence, hence, it was wrong on the part of the Trial Court to come to the finding of guilt of the appellant on the basis of such statement. In support of his submission, he cited the following rulings:- (i) “ C. Vanramnghaka –Vs- State of Mizoram and Anr. (In Criminal Appeal No. 12/2023, Judgment dated 25.01.2024) (ii) Ram Kishan Singh –Vs- Harmit Kaur and Anr., reported in “ (1972) 3 SCC 280 (iii) Shri J. Sanglura –Vs- The State of Mizoram and Anr. In support of his submission, he cited the following rulings:- (i) “ C. Vanramnghaka –Vs- State of Mizoram and Anr. (In Criminal Appeal No. 12/2023, Judgment dated 25.01.2024) (ii) Ram Kishan Singh –Vs- Harmit Kaur and Anr., reported in “ (1972) 3 SCC 280 (iii) Shri J. Sanglura –Vs- The State of Mizoram and Anr. (In Criminal Appeal No. 4/2023) 30. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Trial Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the testimony of the victim girl, in the instant case, is not that of a sterling witness as her deposition is available of contradiction. He submits that though in her deposition, the victim girl has deposed that she had a wash as soon as she woke up in the next morning, however, the medical examination report which is exhibited as Exhibit-7 shows that she did not take bath nor had a wash after the incident. 31. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that though this case involves a serious offence like rape, however, the prosecution side failed to adduce the evidence of doctor who examined the victim girl as well as the appellant after the incident, thereby depriving the appellant of an opportunity of cross-examining the doctor to bring on record these circumstances which would have been favorable to the case of the appellant. He submits that in the medical examination report of the victim girl, which is exhibited as Exhibit- 7, no bruise or laceration, etc., was found on the external genitalia of the victim girl neither any seminal stains nor other stains were found on the clothes of the victim. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that in the medical examination report of the appellant, smegma was found around the corona of the glans penis which negates the possibility of incidence of any sexual intercourse by the appellant within 24 hours of finding such smegma. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Aman Kumar and Anr. –Vs- State of Haryana ” reported in “ (2004) 4 SCC 379 ” the Apex Court has observed as follows:- “ 7. Penetration is the sine qua non for an offence of rape. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Aman Kumar and Anr. –Vs- State of Haryana ” reported in “ (2004) 4 SCC 379 ” the Apex Court has observed as follows:- “ 7. Penetration is the sine qua non for an offence of rape. In order to constitute penetration, there must be evidence clear and cogent to prove that some part of the virile member of the accused was within the labia of the pudendum of the woman, no matter how little (see Joseph Lines, IC&K 893). It is well known in the medical world that the examination of smegma loses all importance after twenty- four hours of the performance of the sexual intercourse. [See S.P. Kohli (Dr) v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [ (1979) 1 SCC 212 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 252] .] In rape cases, if the gland of the male organ is covered by smegma, it negatives the possibility of recent complete penetration. If the accused is not circumcised, the existence of smegma around the corona gland is proof against penetration, since it is rubbed off during the act. The smegma accumulates if no bath is taken within twenty-four hours. ………….”. 33. The learned counsel for the appellant has also cited another ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe –Vs- State of Maharashtra, reported in “ (2006) 10 SCC 92 ” wherein it was observed as follows:- “ 8. It may also be noticed that the appellant was medically examined on the same day by PW 10. In his evidence, he stated that smegma was present around the corona glandis. He further deposed that his examination negatived sexual intercourse and for collection of smegma around corona glandis a period of 24 hours is required. This scientific evidence also did not support the prosecution. Had there been a vigorous sexual act as alleged by the prosecutrix there could not have been the presence of smegma on his private part”. 34. He further deposed that his examination negatived sexual intercourse and for collection of smegma around corona glandis a period of 24 hours is required. This scientific evidence also did not support the prosecution. Had there been a vigorous sexual act as alleged by the prosecutrix there could not have been the presence of smegma on his private part”. 34. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the instant case, the victim has deposed that the appellant had penetrative sex with her on two occasions on the previous night which could not have been the fact as the appellant was medically examined within next 24 hours and smegma was found around the corona of glans penis of the appellant. 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the age of the victim girl has also not been proved in the manner in which it should have been proved. He submits that the birth certificate which was produced to establish the date of birth of the victim girl was issued only on 25.09.2019 i.e., after the FIR was lodged in the instant case, which raises doubt about its veracity. He also submits that the authority which had issued the date of birth certificate was not examined as a witness for the prosecution side for proving the birth certificate. 36. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the version of the victim girl regarding the place of alleged offence is different at different stages. He has submitted that in the FIR, the place of occurrence of alleged offence has been stated near Mat River Road, which is 13 kilometers from Sailam at Thenzawl Road. However, in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the victim girl has stated that the place of occurrence was near a tank. He submits that at one stage, the victim has stated that they were going towards Keitum Road and at another stage, she has stated that they were going towards Thenzawl Road, which were on opposite directions. 37. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that as the victim girl was earlier removed from her services as maid by the appellant as she was into intoxicating drugs, hence, he has been falsely implicated by the victim girl. 37. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that as the victim girl was earlier removed from her services as maid by the appellant as she was into intoxicating drugs, hence, he has been falsely implicated by the victim girl. He also submits that the victim girl has stated in her deposition that at the time of alleged offence, there were some vehicles going up and down the Keitum Road. Hence, had the offence as alleged by her actually happened she would have certainly cried for help which was not done in this case. 38. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the testimony of the DW-2, who is the wife of the appellant, was also not taken into consideration by the Trial Court while coming to the finding of guilt of the present appellant, in as much as the DW-2 has categorically stated that she noticed nothing unusual in the behaviour of the victim girl when she returned back to the house of the appellant along with him. He submits that she was instead found busy on Facebook on the laptop, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant, cannot be a normal conduct by a girl who has been raped on two occasions sometime ago. 39. The learned counsel for the appellant has, therefore, submitted that considering the above aspects, the appellant is entitled to get benefit of doubt and accordingly, he may be acquitted of the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 40. On the other hand, Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, the learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 on the basis of the materials available on record. She submits that the victim girl, in her testimony, has explained vividly as to how she was raped by the appellant in the Maruti car on 22.07.2019. She also submits that the testimony of the victim girl has remained uncontroverted during her cross-examination apart from minor discrepancies, which does not go to the core of the case. 41. She submits that the victim girl, in her testimony, has explained vividly as to how she was raped by the appellant in the Maruti car on 22.07.2019. She also submits that the testimony of the victim girl has remained uncontroverted during her cross-examination apart from minor discrepancies, which does not go to the core of the case. 41. The learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the legal the proposition of law regarding the conviction on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix has been settled, and there is no dispute to the said proposition of law that if the testimony of the victim girl is found to be trustworthy, it is enough to convict an accused in the offence of rape without even looking for further corroboration. She further submits that there was no reason for the victim to falsely implicate the appellant in such a heinous offence of rape as there was no previous enmity between them. She submits that the prosecutrix, being the maid of the appellant, was exploited by him and, therefore, no leniency should be shown to the appellant and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence on the appellant may not be interfered with. 42. Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu, the learned Legal-aid-counsel representing the respondent No. 2 in this case has submitted that the Trial Court has correctly convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and the same needs no interference by this Court. He submits that the testimony of the PW-2, victim girl, when considered in the light of the testimony of the PW-1 establishes the foundational fact in respect of the accusations made against the appellant in this case. He submits that there was no reason for the victim girl to falsely implicate the appellant. He also submits that there was nothing on record to show that the victim had enmity with the appellant to make false accusation against him and, therefore, the Trial Court has correctly relied on the testimony of the victim girl. In support of his submission, the learned Legal-aid-counsel has cited a ruling of the Gauhati High Court in the case of “ Budeshwar Hazarika –Vs- State of Assam” reported in “ (2024) SCC OnLine Gau 130 ” 43. In support of his submission, the learned Legal-aid-counsel has cited a ruling of the Gauhati High Court in the case of “ Budeshwar Hazarika –Vs- State of Assam” reported in “ (2024) SCC OnLine Gau 130 ” 43. The learned Legal-aid-counsel for the respondent No. 2 has also submitted that the testimony of the victim girl regarding whether they proceeded towards Thenzawl Road or towards Kaitum Road does not result into a major contradiction, which would go to the core of the case. He submits that contradiction, if any, on this count can only be regarded as minor contradiction without affecting the merit of the case. He submits that undue importance to such minor contradictions cannot be given to give undue benefit to the accused in cases of sexual offences. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Yogesh Singh –Vs- Mahabeer Singh & Ors” reported in “ (2017) 11 SCC 195 ” 44. He also submits that the judgment of the Trial Court does not warrant any interference as much as the conviction in cases involving sexual offences can be based solely on the testimony of prosecutrix if such testimony is found to be trustworthy and of sterling quality. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Phool Singh v. State of M.P.,” reported in “ (2022) 2 SCC 74 45. The learned Legal-aid-counsel has also submitted that the presence of smegma in the corona of glans penis of the appellant as reported in his medical report is also not of any much significance and merely because of the presence of smegma, the prosecution case cannot be discarded if the other witnesses are found to be reliable and trustworthy. In support of his submission, the learned legal-aid-counsel has cited a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the case of “ State of Himachal Pradesh –Vs- Vijay Kumar ” (Judgment dated 10/06/2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 435 of 2011) wherein reference was made to book of Modi on Medical Jurisprudence to hold that the presence of smegma as a proof against sexual intercourse is not of any medico-legal value. Hence, he submits that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and his conviction and sentence imposed on him does not warrants any interference by this Court. 46. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record including the records of the Trial Court, which was requisitioned in connection with this case. 47. It appears that in the instant case, though total 10(ten) prosecution witnesses were enlisted in the charge-sheet, however, the prosecution side had examined only four witnesses and no reason has been cited for failure to examine remaining six witnesses, which includes material witnesses like the doctors who had medically examined the victim girl as well as the appellant. It is also to be noted that out of the four witnesses were examined by the prosecution side, only the victim girl is the eye-witness and the Trial Court has arrived at the finding of guilt of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 mainly on the basis of the testimony of the prosecutrix. 48. There is no dispute on the legal proposition that in cases involving sexual offences, the conviction of the accused may be on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix, even without corroboration. However, for doing so, the testimony of the prosecutrix should be trustworthy, reliable, and she should fall within the category of a sterling witness. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. 49. Thus, to sustain the conviction of the appellant, which is based mainly on the testimony of the victim girl, we have to see as to whether the victim girl falls in the category of sterling witness or not. 50. As regards who can be regarded as a sterling witness, the Apex Court in the case of “ Rai Sandeep -Vs- State (NCT of Delhi), ” reported in “ (2012) 8 SCC 21 ” has observed as follows:- “ 22 In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged”. 51. 51. Thus, when the conviction of the appellant is based mainly on the testimony of prosecutrix, we have to be careful to the fact that no material on record should give an indication which may belie the truthfulness of the testimony of the prosecutrix. The version of the prosecutrix should co-relate even with the scientific evidence and the medical evidence available on record. 52. In the instant case, the prosecutrix (the PW-2) has deposed that she was subjected to penetrative sexual intercourse by the appellant on two occasions on the night of 22.07.2019, however, when we peruse the Exhibit-9, which is the medical examination report of the appellant, it shows that the smegma was found present around his corona glandis and which may be considered as proof against sexual intercourse by the appellant. 53. We have seen that the Apex Court has observed in the case of “ Aman Kumar and Anr., -Vs- State of Haryana” (supra)” that in rape cases, if the gland of the male organ is covered by smegma, it negates the possibility of recent complete penetration. If the accused is not circumcised, the existence of smegma around the corona gland is proof against penetration, since it is rubbed off during the act. The smegma accumulates if no bath is taken within next twenty-four hours. 54. It also appears that the observations referred to by the learned Legal- aid-counsel in the case of “ State of Himachal Pradesh –Vs- Vijay Kumar ” (supra) wherein the quotation from the Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology that “the presence of smegma as proof against sexual intercourse is not of any Medico-legal value” is relevant only to the extent that legally to constitute the offence of rape, it is enough if the penis touches the vulva. However, when the victim girl has herself stated that the appellant had penetrative sexual intercourse with her on two occasions on the previous night i.e., within less than 24 hours of Medico-legal examination of the appellant, the finding of smegma in the corona glandis on the appellant negates the possibility of recent complete penetration by the appellant in 24 hours prior to his Medico-legal examination. 55. 55. Thus, the presence of smegma in the corona glandis of the male organ of the appellant within 24 hours of alleged incident belies the truthfulness of the testimony of the PW-2 to the effect that the appellant had penetrative sex with her on two occasions on the previous night. In the light of the fact that the scientific evidence has belied the truthfulness of the oral testimony of the PW-2, she no longer remains a witness who may be categorized in the category of a sterling witness. On the basis of sole testimony of such a witness, it may not be safe to convict the appellant for an offence which entails a harsh punishment. 56. For the above reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant is entitled to get benefit of doubt in this case, which this Court gives to him. 57. Thus, the prosecution side has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 beyond all reasonable doubt. The impugned judgment of conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and imposition of sentence on him is, accordingly, set aside and he is acquitted of said charge. 58. The appellant shall be released from custody forthwith, if he is not required in connection with any other case. 59. This appeal is accordingly allowed. 60. Send back the records of the Trial Court along with a copy of this judgment.