JUDGMENT : S.V. PINTO, J. 1. The appeal is filed by the appellant State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”) in Criminal Case No. 74/2000 on 30.09.2011, whereby, the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent for the offence punishable under Sections 7(1) and 7(5) and Section 16 of The Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short). 1.1 The respondent is hereinafter referred to as “the accused” as he stood in the original case for the sake of convenience, clarity and brevity. 2. The brief facts that emerge from the record of the case are as under: 2.1 On 30.08.2000 at around 16.00 hours, Babubhai Malsing Ganva, Food Inspector, Ahmedabad visited Shri Shakti Dairy at Noble Nagar, Naroda, District Ahmedabad and found the accused present at the shop and he was selling different brands of pouches of milk for human consumption. After giving the notice, in Form VI, the Food Inspector purchased two pouches of milk of 500 ml each which were pasteurized, standardized Anup Shakti Milk and cleaned the pouches with a clean cloth and poured the milk from the pouches in a clean, dry, odorless, moistureless vessel and mixed the milk properly with a clean spoon, purchased 750 ml of milk from the accused and paid an amount of Rs. 11.25/- paise, as the sale price of the milk was Rs. 15 per litre. The milk was placed in three clean, dry, odorless, colorless, glass bottles in equal quantities and 20- 20 drops of formalin was placed in each bottle and the bottles were closed with a cork and sealed with a brass seal. The entire procedure was followed and one sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Vadodara and the remaining two samples were sent to the Local Health Authority. The entire procedure was followed and one sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Vadodara and the remaining two samples were sent to the Local Health Authority. After analysis, the report of the Public Analyst was received as the sample did not conform to the standards and provisions laid down under the provision of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 the Local Health Authority gave the notice under Section 13.2 to the accused and after the sanction to file the complaint was given, the complaint was filed before the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad which came to be registered as Criminal Case No. 74 of 2000. 2.2 The accused was duly served with the summons and after the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, the due procedure under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was followed. As the case was a private warrant case, the complainant stepped into the witness box and the precharge evidence was recorded at Exh. 7 and documentary evidence from Exh. 8 to Exh. 39 were produced on record. As there was enough evidence on record to frame a charge against the accused, a charge at Exh. 41 was framed and the plea was recorded at Exh. 42 and the further evidence of the complainant was recorded. 2.3 To prove the charge, the prosecution examined 1 witness and produced 31 documentary evidences on record in support of the case and after the complainant filed the closing pursis, the further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded, wherein, the accused denied all the evidence of the prosecution on record. The accused refused to step into the witness box or examine witnesses on his behalf and stated that a false case has been filed against him. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit the accused from the charges levelled against him. 3. After the arguments of the learned APP and the learned advocate for the accused were heard, the learned Trial Court by the impugned judgement and order was pleased to acquit the accused from the charges levelled against him. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal, the appellant - State has filed the present appeal mainly stating that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to law and evidence on record and the learned Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that all the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and during the cross-examination, nothing adverse has been elicited in favor of the respondent. The case has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and the prosecution has successfully established the case against the respondent and the judgment and order of acquittal is unwarranted, illegal, and without any basis in the eyes of the law and the reasons stated while acquitting the respondent are improper, perverse and bad in law. Hence the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Heard learned APP Ms. C.M. Shah for the appellant State. Though served, the respondent has not remained present either in person or through an advocate. Perused the impugned judgement and order of acquittal and have reappreciated the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case. 5. Learned APP Ms. C.M. Shah has taken this Court through the entire evidence of the prosecution on record of the case and submitted that the complainant has fully supported the facts of his complaint. The impugned judgement and order is perverse and learned APP has urged this Court to quash and set aside the same and find the respondent guilty for the offences. 6. At the outset, before discussing the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations of the Apex Court regarding the scope of interference in acquittal appeals in the case of Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 (4) SCC 415 , wherein, the Apex Court has observed as under: Recently, in Kallu Vs. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 , this Court stated: "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 7. The law with regard to acquittal appeals is well crystallized and in acquittal appeals, there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and it has finally culminated when a case ends in an acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and when the learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubts, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened. There is no inhibition to re appreciate the evidence by the Appellate Court but if after re appreciation, the view taken by the learned Trial Court was a possible view, there is no reason for the Appellate Court to interfere in the same. 8. In light of the above settled principle of law, the evidence of the prosecution is dissected and the prosecution has examined PW1 – Babubhai Malsing Ganva - the complainant at Exh. 7 and he has produced all the documents on record at Exhs. 8 to 39. The Food Inspector has deposed the entire procedure that he had undertaken at the time of taking the sample and he has stated that he had broken both the pouches after shaking them properly and had measured 750 ml of milk with the measuring can that was with the accused and thereafter, the milk was placed in three bottles in equal parts. In the cross examination, the witness has admitted that V-Corks were used which are soft and with holes and the sanction was given by Y.D. Chauhan who was the Incharge Deputy Commissioner. In the cross examination, the witness has admitted that V-Corks were used which are soft and with holes and the sanction was given by Y.D. Chauhan who was the Incharge Deputy Commissioner. There was no person posted as a Deputy Commissioner and the remaining two samples were received by Y.D. Chauhan and the sanction was also given by him as an In-Charge Deputy Commissioner. The pouches were marketed by Kuldeep Enterprise, Ahmedabad written on them and the utensils and the bottles that were utilised at the place were not cleaned at the place where the sample was taken. The witness has admitted that if the sample was not properly taken, the report would not be proper and in the document produced at Exh. 26, it is not mentioned that the wooden box was sealed. 8.1 The complainant has produced his certificate at Exh. 8, the Gazette at Exh. 9 and Exh. 10, the notification of his appointment at Exh. 11 and the Gazette at Exh. 12, the notification at Exh. 13, the intimation in Form VI given to the accused at Exh. 14, the receipt of Rs. 11.25/- at Exh. 15, bill received from the accused at Exh. 16, the label that was affixed on the sample at Exh. 17, the milk packet at Exh. 18, the rojkam at Exh. 19, licence at Exh. 20, Form VII at Exh. 21, the receipt by which the sample was sent to the Public Analyst, Vadodara at Exh. 22, letter sent to the Public Analyst at Exh. 23 and the report of the Public Analyst at Exh. 31. As per the report, the milk fat contained 3% whereas, the PFA limit was minimum 4.5 percent and the milk solids not fat was 7.7 percent whereas, the PFA limits is minimum 8.5 percent. The report states that the sample was received on 05.09.2000 and the report is dated 14.09.2000 but the date of examination is not mentioned in the report. The report was signed on 14.09.2000 and the report is dated 15.09.2000. 8.2 As per the evidence on record, the remaining two samples were sent to the Local Health Authority, Deputy Commissioner Food, Gandhinagar vide the document at Exh. 25 and the Local Health Authority had called for information by the letter at Exh. 30 from the Food Inspector. The letter seeking permission to file the complaint is at Exh. 8.2 As per the evidence on record, the remaining two samples were sent to the Local Health Authority, Deputy Commissioner Food, Gandhinagar vide the document at Exh. 25 and the Local Health Authority had called for information by the letter at Exh. 30 from the Food Inspector. The letter seeking permission to file the complaint is at Exh. 33 and the sanction is produced at Exh. 34. 8.3 If the procedure for taking of the samples as stated by the Good Inspector on record is perused, the Food Inspector has stated that he had taken two pouches of 500 ml each and had cleaned the pouches and cut them and poured the milk in a utensil and had thereafter from the 1 liter of milk, purchased 750 ml of milk. There is no evidence as to how this sample of 750 ml of milk was taken and thereafter it was divided equally and placed in three bottles. The sample was taken with the measuring can of the accused and there is no evidence on record that the utensil in which the milk was taken, the measuring cup with which the milk was measured and the bottles in which the samples were placed, were cleaned at the spot. This Court in State of Gujarat v. Kaushik Ambalal Patel in Criminal Appeal No. 489 of 2022 and in State of Gujarat v. Kanubhai Keshavlal Patel in Criminal Appeal 996 of 2004 has held that when the vessels and utensils that were used to take the sample were not cleaned on the spot and there was no positive evidence on record that the vessels and bottles were cleaned on the spot, the mandatory provisions of Rule 14 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, were not complied with. 8.4 As far as the sanction is concerned, it is on record that the sanction was given by the In-Charge Local Health Authority and this court has in State of Gujarat v. Ramesh B. Kachrabai Patel in Criminal Appeal 1332 of 2004 and State of Gujarat v. Dheerajlal Amritpal Kansara reported in 1975 0 GLR 982 held that when the sanction was accorded by a person who was holding charge of the post, the sanction was not said to be issued by a Competent Authority and the prosecution stood vitiated and the In-Charge Officer cannot be permitted to discharge the statutory functions and the accused was entitled to an acquittal. 9. In view of the above settled position of law, the learned Trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence in proper perspective and there does not appear to be any infirmity and illegality in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The learned Trial Court has appreciated all the evidence and this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court was completely justified in acquitting the accused of the charges leveled against them. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are absolutely just and proper and no illegality or infirmity has been committed by the learned Trial Court and this Court is in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order and the present appeal is devoid of merits and resultantly, the same is dismissed. 10. The impugned judgement and order of acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad in Criminal Case No. 74/2000 on 30.09.2011, is hereby confirmed. 11. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.