JUDGMENT : (MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA, J) 1. Heard Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu, the learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Vanneihsiami, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as Ms. Emily L. Chhangte, the learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 (Father of the victim). 2. This appeal has been registered on receipt of a petition of appeal from the appellant, namely, Sh. H. Lalhruaitluanga, through the Superintendent of Central Jail, Aizawl, where the appellant is presently serving out his sentence. 3. As the appellant was not represented by any counsel, hence, this Court by order dated 25.10.2024 had appointed Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu as Amicus Curiae to represent the appellant. 4. In this appeal the appellant has impugned the judgment dated 28.06.2023 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court (POCSO), Aizawl in Sessions Case No. 26/2022 (Criminal Trial No. 252/2022).By the said judgment, the appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 20 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. 5. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant Appeal, in brief, are that on 14.12.2021, the victim girl had lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of All Women Police Station, inter-alia, alleging that in the month of July 2020, the appellant, namely, Sh. H. Lalhruaitluanga, who is the son of the paternal aunt of the victim girl, had committed forceful sexual intercourse with her at his residence on two occasions. It is also stated in the FIR that as the victim was scared of the appellant, there was a delay in lodging of the FIR. 6. On receipt of the said FIR, the Officer-in-Charge of All Women Police Station had registered All Women Police Station Case No. 58/2021 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and initiated the investigation. Ultimately, after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was laid against the above-named appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 7. The appellant faced major portion of the trial by remaining in custody, he was released on bail on 29.08.2022. On 23.03.2022, the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was framed against the appellant. Ultimately, after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was laid against the above-named appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 7. The appellant faced major portion of the trial by remaining in custody, he was released on bail on 29.08.2022. On 23.03.2022, the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was framed against the appellant. When the same was read over and explained to him, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. To bring home the charge against the appellant, the prosecution side examined as many as seven prosecution witnesses. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 during which he admitted of having sexual intercourse with the victim girl on two occasions in his home. He adduced evidence of one defence witness in his defence. 9. Ultimately, by the judgment and order which has been impugned in this appeal, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in the manner as has been described in the paragraph No. 5of this judgment herein before. 10. Before considering the rival submissions of the learned counsel for both sides, let us go through the evidence which is available on record. 11. The PW-1, who is the victim girl (hereinafter referred to as 'X') has deposed before the Trial Court on 26.05.2022. In her deposition she has stated that her date of birth is 07.08.2002. She has also deposed that she was having a boyfriend who was trying to have physical relationship with her but she didn’t want the same. She told this fact to her friend Tetei, who is the girlfriend of the present appellant. She has also deposed that on a day in the month of July 2020(she does not remember the exact date), the appellant called her to his house and when the PW-1 reached there he told her that he knew about the fact that she was having a boyfriend who is trying to have sex with her and the appellant threatened her that he will inform her father about the same. She has further deposed that thereafter the appellant pulled her inside the room and raped her. 12. The PW-1 has further deposed that in the next week also the appellant raped her again by threatening her. She has further deposed that thereafter the appellant pulled her inside the room and raped her. 12. The PW-1 has further deposed that in the next week also the appellant raped her again by threatening her. She has deposed that as her parent did not allow her to have a boyfriend so she was afraid that they may know about her having boyfriend secretly if the appellant discloses the same to them. She has also deposed that whenever the appellant called her to his house, he always tried to rape her again but she always escaped except on first two occasions. 13. It is also deposed by the PW-1 that the appellant is a drug addict and he always asked the victim for money to buy the drugs by threatening her. The PW-1 has also deposed that on one occasion, she has given money to the appellant by borrowing it from others. 14. The PW-1 has further deposed that in the month of November 2021, the appellant again called her to his house for raping her but she did not want to go there, then the appellant asked for money which the victim did not give to him. She has further deposed that thereafter the appellant disclosed to the other cousin of the victim about her having a boyfriend secretly and also said that her boyfriend has also raped her. The said cousin informed her mother who is the aunt of the victim girl about the said facts. Thereafter the said aunt informed the mother of the victim girl about the said fact. The PW-1 has deposed that it is only at that point of time she revealed about the incident to her parents without fear. She has produced her original birth certificate before the Court and exhibited photocopy of the birth certificate as Exhibit M-1. 15. During her cross examination, the PW-1 has deposed that she will attain the age of 20 years on 07.08.2022. She also deposed that she does not remember the exact date of the incident, what she remembers is that it was in the month of July 2020. She has also deposed during cross examination that “it is not a fact that the accused sexually assaulted her on that day when she went to his house as she had mentioned in her deposition”. She was given many other suggestive questions which were denied by her. She has also deposed during cross examination that “it is not a fact that the accused sexually assaulted her on that day when she went to his house as she had mentioned in her deposition”. She was given many other suggestive questions which were denied by her. 16. The PW-2, Smt. Lalramhluni, who is the mother of the victim girl, has deposed that on 29.11.2021, her husband’s sister told her that her daughter victim 'X' is having a boyfriend and she was even raped by him, she also stated to her that this fact was informed to her husband's sister by the present appellant. The PW-2 has further deposed that when she asked about the matter to her daughter victim 'X', she denied the fact, but she has stated that she was raped by the present appellant. She was also informed by the daughter that the present appellant used to ask money for purchasing drugs. The PW-2 has further deposed that she didn?t allow her daughter victim 'X' having a boyfriend, therefore, she was afraid of the fact that they may know about the incident. 17. The PW-2 has further deposed that after coming to know about the incident, she informed her husband about the same. He became very angry and when he went to the house of the appellant, the appellant admitted the matter and asked for forgiveness. 18. She further deposed that thereafter, the family members discussed about the matter and decided to lodge an FIR for the safety of their daughter and accordingly, victim 'X' lodged the FIR. 19. During cross-examination, the PW-2 has deposed that she knows the appellant as he is the son of the sister of her husband. She has also stated that she does not have any personal knowledge about the incident of rape of her daughter by the appellant. She denied others suggestions put to her by the defence side. 20. The PW-3, Mr. Zoramchhani, who is the father of the victim girl, has deposed that the appellant is the son of his elder sister. He submits that in the month of November 2021, his wife told her that his daughter victim 'X' was sexually assaulted by the appellant in the year 2020. Accordingly, the victim 'X' filed an FIR. 21. The PW-3, Mr. Zoramchhani, who is the father of the victim girl, has deposed that the appellant is the son of his elder sister. He submits that in the month of November 2021, his wife told her that his daughter victim 'X' was sexually assaulted by the appellant in the year 2020. Accordingly, the victim 'X' filed an FIR. 21. He also submits that the police of All Women Police Station had seized the birth certificate of the victim and he had put his signatures on the seizure list. He has also deposed that he is not aware as to whether original or photocopy of the birth certificate of the victim girl was seized by the police. He was asked some other suggestive questions by the defence side, which were all denied by him. 22. The PW-4, Smt. Vanlalmuanpuii has deposed that on 14.12.2021, the police seized the birth certificate of victim 'X' from her possession in his presence and he had put his signatures on the seizure list. 23. During cross-examination, she has deposed that Exhibit M-1 is the original birth certificate. She has also deposed that she was not explained about the seizure list by the police before she was asked to put her signatures there. 24. The PW-5 Dr. Lalremruati Hmar has deposed that on 14.12.2021, at around 11.00 am, when she was on duty in the Civil Hospital Aizawl, she examined the victim girl on police requisition and during examination, she found that her hymen was ruptured (old). She exhibited the medical examination report of the victim as Exhibit P-3. 25. During cross-examination, the PW-5 has deposed that she was informed by the victim girl that she had no previous intercourse prior to the alleged incident. She denied that she has deposed falsely before the Court. 26. The PW-6 Dr. Thanmawii has deposed that on 14.12.2021, at around 4.30 pm, when he was on duty at Civil Hospital Aizawl, he conducted medical examination on the appellant in connection with the sexual assault case. During examination, he found that the appellant was able to perform sex normally. At the time of examination, the appellant also informed the PW-6 that he had sexual relationship with victim girl in the month of July 2020 at his residence. During examination, he found that the appellant was able to perform sex normally. At the time of examination, the appellant also informed the PW-6 that he had sexual relationship with victim girl in the month of July 2020 at his residence. It is also deposed by the PW-6 that the appellant also told him that he asked for money from victim 'X' for buying heroin, which was given to him by her at the second sexual encounter. 27. During cross examination, the PW-6 had denied the suggestions put to him by the defence side. 28. The next Prosecution Witness, though 7 th in number, however, mentioned as the PW-8 in the Trial Court record, is the Investigating Officer S.I. Rothangliani. He has deposed that on 14.12.2022, he received the FIR from the victim girl, wherein it was alleged that she was raped by the present appellant in the month of July 2020 when she was 17 years old. He has deposed that during investigation he found that the victim girl was blackmailed by the appellant by threatening her that he would disclose to her father about her having a boyfriend, since her father was totally against her having a boyfriend. 29. He has deposed that he seized the birth certificate of the victim girl from her possession, which he exhibited as Exhibit M-1. He also deposed that after completion of the investigation and after finding sufficient materials against the appellant, the charge-sheet was laid against the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 30. During his cross examination, the PW-8 has deposed that during investigation he could find that the victim cannot definitely say about the date of the incident. The PW-8 has denied other suggestions put to him by the defence side. 31. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, during which he admitted that he had sexual intercourse twice with the victim 'X' in the month of July- August 2020. He also admitted that the victim 'X' came to his house and he had sexual intercourse with her on two occasions in his room. 32. The DW-1, Mr. Jonathan Maizawmzuala, has deposed that the appellant is his childhood friend and in the month of July 2020, he went to the house of the appellant and had break-fast there. He also admitted that the victim 'X' came to his house and he had sexual intercourse with her on two occasions in his room. 32. The DW-1, Mr. Jonathan Maizawmzuala, has deposed that the appellant is his childhood friend and in the month of July 2020, he went to the house of the appellant and had break-fast there. He also deposed that the victim 'X' also came to the house of the appellant and they played cards and other online games. They remained there till 5.00 p.m. and thereafter, they left. He has deposed that since he was there along with the victim and the appellant, he is assured that there was no chance for committing sexual assault on the victim by the appellant on that day. 33. During cross-examination by prosecution side, he has deposed that he had spent only one day together with the victim girl and the appellant, as deposed by him in his examination-in-chief and he is not aware whether victim 'X' used to visit the house of the appellant or not. 34. Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu, the learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant has submitted that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 merely on the basis of sole testimony of the victim girl though, her testimony was not reliable and was also full of contradiction. He submits that for convicting the appellant on the basis of sole testimony of the victim girl, the same has to be free from all blemish and the witness must be of sterling quality to inspire confidence. 35. He has submitted that during her cross examination, the PW-1 (Victim girl) has categorically denied a suggestion given to her by the defence side that the appellant sexually assaulted her on the day when she went to his house as mentioned by her in her deposition. He submits that this contradiction by the appellant in the testimony of the PW-1 (Victim girl) collapses the entire prosecution case as the victim herself has denied that she was sexually assaulted by the appellant. 36. He submits that this contradiction by the appellant in the testimony of the PW-1 (Victim girl) collapses the entire prosecution case as the victim herself has denied that she was sexually assaulted by the appellant. 36. He further submits that though the alleged incident happened in the month of July 2020, however the FIR was filed on 14.12.2021 i.e., after a period of more than 500 days and the only justification given by the victim girl in the FIR that she was afraid of the appellant is not a valid justification as the appellant was her own cousin and she could have told about the incident to her parents immediately after the offence was committed, had it actually happened. He submits that such a long delay is fatal to the prosecution side and benefit of doubt must be given to the appellant on that count. In support of his submission, the learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant has cited the following rulings: (i) Prakash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2019) 5 SCC 628 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “6. The first question we have to consider is the impact of delay of nearly 7 months in lodging the complaint with the police. The appellant seeks support mainly from the judgment of this Court in Vijayan v. State of Kerala [Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2008) 14 SCC 763 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 585]. The High Court in the impugned judgment [Parkash Chand v. State of H.P., 2010 SCC OnLine HP 1167] has on the other hand relied upon (at SCC OnLine HP para 19) the judgment of this Court in State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekari [State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekari, (2004) 8 SCC 153 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 327 : AIR 2004 SC 4404 ] . Therein, this Court (in Shree Kant Shekari case [State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekari, (2004) 8 SCC 153 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 327 : AIR 2004 SC 4404 ] , at SCC pp. 159-60, para 18) has essentially relied upon the principles about the impact of delay as noticed by it in the judgment of this Court in Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa [Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 44] wherein rape was committed on a girl whose mental ability was undeveloped. 159-60, para 18) has essentially relied upon the principles about the impact of delay as noticed by it in the judgment of this Court in Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa [Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 44] wherein rape was committed on a girl whose mental ability was undeveloped. This is what the Court had to say about the fact of delay: (Tulshidas Kanolkar case [Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 44] , SCC p. 592, para 5) “5. … In any event, delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in lodging the first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubting its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. In a case if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of such delay, it is a relevant factor. On the other hand, satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication or vulnerability of the prosecution case. As the factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of the catastrophe which had befallen her. That being so, the mere delay in lodging of the first information report does not in any way render the prosecution version brittle.” (ii) State (GNCT of Delhi) vs. Vipin alias Lalla reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 78, wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “7. The Trial Court observed that there was a delay in the FIR which has not been reasonably explained inasmuch as the offence was committed on 16.09.2014 and the FIR was lodged on 18.09.2014 that is after a gap of two days and vide order dated 28.03.2018 came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case, beyond all reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges framed against him. 10. 10. Although it is absolutely true that in the case of rape, conviction can be made on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix as her evidence is in the nature of an injured witness which is given a very high value by the Courts. But nevertheless when a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness and thus the testimony of such a witness must inspire confidence of the Court. The testimony of the prosecutrix in the present case thus has failed to inspire absolute confidence of the Trial Court, the High Court and this Court as well.” 37. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the conviction of the appellant cannot be on the sole basis of the statement of the appellant, which was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as the same is not a substantial piece of evidence and it can be used only for appreciating other evidence on record. He submits that the only other evidence is that of the prosecutrix (PW-1) and in her testimony there are inherent contradictions, which makes her testimony unworthy of any credence. 38. He submits that the Trial Court had erred in relying on the statement of the appellant, which was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973, in arriving at the finding of the guilt of the appellant. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has cited the following rulings: (i) Raj Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2013) 5 SCC 722 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “ 41. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that statement under Section 313 CrPC is recorded to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice as it requires that an accused may be given an opportunity to furnish explanation of the incriminating material which had come against him in the trial. However, his statement cannot be made a basis for his conviction. His answers to the questions put to him under Section 313 CrPC cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution witnesses in their depositions. However, his statement cannot be made a basis for his conviction. His answers to the questions put to him under Section 313 CrPC cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution witnesses in their depositions. Thus, the statement of the accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and therefore, it can be used only for appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution, though it cannot be a substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. In case the prosecution evidence is not found sufficient to sustain conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The statement under Section 313 CrPC is not recorded after administering oath to the accused. Therefore, it cannot be treated as an evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the accused has a right if he chooses to be a witness, and once he makes that option, he can be administered oath and examined as a witness in defence as required under Section 315 CrPC. An adverse inference can be taken against the accused only and only if the incriminating material stood fully established and the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the same. However, the accused has a right to remain silent as he cannot be forced to become a witness against himself.” (ii) Mohan Singh vs. Prem Singh and Another reported in (2002) 10 SCC 236, wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “30. The statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used for appreciating evidence led by the prosecution to accept or reject it. It is, however, not a substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. As held in the case of Nishi Kant [ (1969) 1 SCC 347 : AIR 1969 SC 422 ] by this Court, if the exculpatory part of his statement is found to be false and the evidence led by the prosecution is reliable, the inculpatory part of his statement can be taken aid of to lend assurance to the evidence of the prosecution. If the prosecution evidence does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” 39. If the prosecution evidence does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” 39. The learned Legal Aid Counsel has submitted that as the sentence imposed on the appellant is very harsh, it was the bounden duty of the prosecution side to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, which it has failed. He, therefore, submits that the appellant is entitled to get benefit of doubt and accordingly, prays that the impugned judgment may be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and may be set at liberty. 40. On the other hand, Ms. Vanneihsiami, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the Trial Court has correctly arrived at the finding of the guilt of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 on the basis of reliable evidence on record and the same does not require any interference by this Court. She submits that though, there was delay in lodging of the FIR, however, the said delay is not fatal to the prosecution case, as in sexual offences generally the victim come forward belatedly due to sense of shame. She further submits that in the instant case, the victim girl has categorically deposed before the Trial Court that as her parents were against her having a boyfriend, she was threatened by the appellant that he would disclose that fact to her parents and on that account, he used to blackmail the victim girl. 41. She also submits that the fact that the victim girl was sexually assaulted by the appellant on two occasions is apparent from the testimony of the victim girl herself, which is even admitted by the appellant during his examination of the Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 42. She has submitted that due to the stigma attached to the offence of such crime, the victim or her family members are usually reluctant in approaching the law enforcing agencies or the Court in such matters and therefore, mere delay in lodging the FIR may not be a ground for disbelieving the otherwise trustworthy testimony of the victim girl. 43. She has submitted that due to the stigma attached to the offence of such crime, the victim or her family members are usually reluctant in approaching the law enforcing agencies or the Court in such matters and therefore, mere delay in lodging the FIR may not be a ground for disbelieving the otherwise trustworthy testimony of the victim girl. 43. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further submitted that if the testimony of the victim is found to be trustworthy the conviction can be sustained on her sole testimony. 44. In support of her submissions she has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in case of “ Satpal Singh vs. State of Haryana ” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 714 , wherein it has observed as follows: “15. This Court has consistently highlighted the reasons, objects and means of prompt lodging of FIR. Delay in lodging FIR more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of a coloured version, an exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity. Thus, FIR is to be filed more promptly and if there is any delay, the prosecution must furnish a satisfactory explanation for the same for the reason that in case the substratum of the evidence given by the complainant/informant is found to be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be rejected in its entirety. (Vide State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao [ (2008) 15 SCC 582 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1123] .) 16. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down in this regard. In case of sexual offences, the criteria may be different altogether. As honour of the family is involved, its members have to decide whether to take the matter to the court or not. In such a fact situation, near relations of the prosecutrix may take time as to what course of action should be adopted. Thus, delay is bound to occur. This Court has always taken judicial notice of the fact that: “ordinarily the family of the victim would not intend to get a stigma attached to the victim. In such a fact situation, near relations of the prosecutrix may take time as to what course of action should be adopted. Thus, delay is bound to occur. This Court has always taken judicial notice of the fact that: “ordinarily the family of the victim would not intend to get a stigma attached to the victim. Delay in lodging the first information report in a case of this nature is a normal phenomenon.” (Vide Satyapal v. State of Haryana [ (2009) 6 SCC 635 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 108 : AIR 2009 SC 2190 ] , SCC p. 641, para 21.)” 45. She has further submitted that even without any corroboration the testimony of prosecutrix may be relied upon if the same is found to be trustworthy. In support of her submission she has stated that the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of the State of “ Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh ” reported in (2019) 16 SCC 759 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “10. The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix. 11. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.” 46. Ms. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.” 46. Ms. Emily L. Chhangte, the learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 has submitted that she has adopted all the submission made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this case. She has further submitted that even the appellant has not denied the truthfulness of the testimony of the prosecution witness and he has categorically admitted, during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, that on two occasions he had sex with the victim girl. She submits that such an admission during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be utilized for appreciating the evidence which is available on record and if that is done, then there remains no doubt as regards the testimony of the PW-1 that she was raped on two occasions by the appellant. 47. She also submits that it is only because the victim was scared of the appellant disclosing her having a boy friend secretly which her parent were not aware of to them that she did not disclosed about the alleged incident to her parent and did not approach the law enforcing agency. 48. She also submits that seeking corroboration of the testimony of the victim girl cannot be treated as a matter of course as it may amount to adding insult to injury. In support of her submissions she has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Santhosh Moolya and Another vs. State of Karnataka ” reported in (2010) 5 SCC 445 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as follows: “ 16. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [ (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] speaking for the Bench Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was) has observed thus: (SCC pp. 395-96, para 8) “8. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [ (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] speaking for the Bench Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was) has observed thus: (SCC pp. 395-96, para 8) “8. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.” 49. The learned Legal Aid Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 has submitted that in the instant case also the testimony of prosecutrix when looked at in the light of the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it leaves no room for doubt that the victim girl was raped on two occasions by the appellant, therefore, she submits that the judgment of the Trial Court does not warrants any interference by this Court. 50. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record including the records of the Trial Court, which was requisitioned in connection with this appeal. We have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides. 51. 50. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record including the records of the Trial Court, which was requisitioned in connection with this appeal. We have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides. 51. The point to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the appellant committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim girl in the month of July 2020 on two occasions, while she did not attain the age of majority. The other point which we are required to look into is as to whether the Trial Court had correctly convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 52. At the very beginning it is to be noted that the punishment prescribed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 as well as the punishment which has been imposed on the appellant by the Trial Court is a very harsh punishment of 20 years of imprisonment. 53. We are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned Legal Aid Counsel that harsher the punishment heavier is the burden on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. 54. In the instant case, the only eye witness to the alleged offence is the victim girl herself who has stated that the alleged offence was committed by the appellant in the month of July 2020. 55. It is pertinent to note that after the happening of the alleged incident she reported the matter to no one till November 2021 i.e., for almost more than one year four month she did not disclose the matter to anybody and for the first time she disclosed it to her mother and thereafter, on 14.12.2021 an FIR was alleged. What is also important to note in this case is that even after the victim told about the alleged incident to her mother in the last part of November 2021, more than 14 days were taken thereafter for lodging the FIR by the victim girl as the FIR was lodged only on 14.12.2021. No reason as been shown in the FIR as to why when the victim had disclosed the incident to her parent in the month of November 2021 itself, it took 14 more days to lodge the FIR. 56. No reason as been shown in the FIR as to why when the victim had disclosed the incident to her parent in the month of November 2021 itself, it took 14 more days to lodge the FIR. 56. It appears that the Trial Court while arriving at the guilt of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 had mainly relied on the testimony of the PW-1 (victim girl) as well as the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in which he admitted that he had sex with the victim girl in the month of July-August 2020 on two occasions. 57. Apart from the PW-1, the other witnesses namely, the PW-2 and the PW-3, who are the parents of the victim girl are only reported witness and the fact that they were reported about the incident after a gap of 14 months is also relevant. 58. As the conviction of the appellant is based mainly on the testimony of the victim girl we have to see as to whether she falls within the category of a sterling witness so that the appellant may be convicted solely on her testimony. 59. As regards who can be regarded as sterling witness, in the case of Rai Sandeep vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 , the Apex Court has observed as follows: “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 60. We have to see whether the PW-1 (Victim) comes within the criteria laid down by the Apex Court to regard her as sterling witness. We have already discussed herein above that in this case the FIR has been lodged after a gap of more than 14 months and the victim girl is unable to mention the exact dates of the incident. She has also not indicated in her testimony whether the incident occurred in the first part of July 2020 or the last part of July 2020. We have to remember that on 07.08.2020 the victim had become major. She has also not indicated in her testimony whether the incident occurred in the first part of July 2020 or the last part of July 2020. We have to remember that on 07.08.2020 the victim had become major. The appellant has also not mentioned about any specific dates on which he had sex with the victim girl. He has only stated that he had sex with her in the month July-August 2020. No clarification was sought for, during the trial, as to whether it was in the month of July or in the month of August and what was the specific date on which the alleged incident occurred. Such a clarification was necessary in view of the fact that the victim had attained the age of majority on 07.08.2020, and if the incident had occurred after that date, it would have different implications. Under such circumstances, the testimony of the victim girl, wherein she had simply stated that the alleged incident occurred in the month of July 2020 without mentioning about specific dates, does not inspire confidence as regards the exact date and time of the alleged offence. 61. Most importantly, while she was cross-examined by the defence side, she has categorically stated that “it is not a fact that the accused sexually assaulted her on that day when she went to his house as she mentioned in her deposition”. This piece of deposition, if taken into consideration demolishes her entire evidence which she had deposed in her examination-in-chief. 62. It also appears that the cross-examination of the victim girl was not very lengthy so as to unsettle her and compel her to depose wrongly during her cross examination. The Apex Court in the case of “ Rai Sandeep v s. State (NCT of Delhi)” (Supra) has observed that to regard a witness to be a sterling witness there should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness and she should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstances should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence. However, in the instant case, it appears that the PW-1, during her cross examination, by denying that the appellant has sexually assaulted her on that day when she went to his house has nullified her testimony during her examination-in-chief, wherein she had alleged that the appellant has sexually assaulted her in the month of July 2020. 63. Another aspect which is relevant in this regard is that admittedly the victim girl had herself kept her relationship with her boyfriend secret even from her parents for a long period and it is only when she was accused of having physical relationship with her boyfriend, she accused the appellant of raping her, that too such accusation was made after 14 months of the alleged incident. We therefore, are of the considered opinion that the PW-1 cannot be categorized in the category of a sterling witness. 64. The evidence of the PW-5 and the PW-6, i.e., the doctors, who examined the victim girl as well as the appellant on 14.12.2021, are in our considered opinion, not of much relevance as there is no dispute in the settled proposition that in cases involving sexual offences, the medical examination is relevant only if such examination is done at the earliest, that is, as soon as possible after commission of the alleged offence. However, in the instant case, the medical examination was done after more than 14 months of the alleged offence, hence, the finding of such medical examination which was conducted after 14 months of the alleged sexual offence does not have much relevance in this case. 65. In view of the discussion made in foregoing paragraphs, wherein we have discussed as to how during the cross examination the defence side had demolished the evidence of the PW-1, and under such circumstances her testimony in our considered opinion is not enough to convict the appellant for an offence which entails such a harsh punishment of 20 years imprisonment. 66. Now if the testimony of the PW-1 is discarded, what remains on record is that the statement of the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein he admitted that he had sex with the victim girl on two occasions in the month of July-August 2020. 67. 66. Now if the testimony of the PW-1 is discarded, what remains on record is that the statement of the appellant during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein he admitted that he had sex with the victim girl on two occasions in the month of July-August 2020. 67. We have already discussed in paragraph No. 60 of this judgment herein before, that the appellant has also not mentioned, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, about any specific dates on which he had sex with the victim girl. He had only stated that he had sex with her in the month of July-August 2020. No clarification was sought for as to whether it was in the month of July 2020 or August 2020. Such a clarification was imperative, considering the fact that the victim girl had attained the age of majority on 07.08.2020. Hence, if the incident had occurred after the said date and the victim had not disclosed it anyone for more than 14 months, it would have different implications, which may tilt the case in favour of the appellant. 68. The question which is now before us is as to when the victim herself is not found to be a sterling witness, can the conviction of the appellant may be sustained merely on the basis that during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the appellant had admitted of having sex with the victim girl on two occasions in the month of July-August 2020. 69. We have seen that in the case of “ Raj Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan ” (Supra) , the Apex Court has observed that the statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be made a basis for his conviction. His answers to questions put to him under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution witnesses in their depositions. The statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not a substantive piece of evidence, therefore, it can only be used for appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution side. It cannot be a substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. 70. The statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not a substantive piece of evidence, therefore, it can only be used for appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution side. It cannot be a substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. 70. In the instant case when the sole testimony of the victim girl has been demolished during her cross examination, no credible substantial evidence remains on record which can be appreciated in the light of the statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot itself be treated as evidence in the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment. 71. The Apex Court in the case of Mohan Singh vs. Prem Singh and Another (Supra) has also observed that if the prosecution evidence does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. 72. In the instant case also after demolition of the testimony of the PW-1 during her cross-examination, what remains on record is the statement of the appellant which was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, in the light of the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs as well as in the light of the observations made in the judgments of the Apex Court referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, such a statement of the appellant cannot be treated as evidence and cannot be the basis of his conviction. 73. Under such circumstances, we are constrained to give benefit of doubt to the appellant in this case and accordingly, he is acquitted of charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 on getting benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment of the Trial Court is accordingly, set aside. 74. The appellant shall be released forthwith if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. 75. Send back the Trial Court records along with the copy of the judgment.