ORDER : 1. Heard learned senior counsel for the applicant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the 'applicant') as also learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 and for respondent no.2. PREMISE: 2. The underlying Criminal Appeal was dismissed by way of the detailed Final Judgment and Order[ 2025 INSC 500 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 810] dated 17.04.2025, upholding the conviction and sentence, by which an amount of Rs.8,26,696/- was to be paid and the applicant was to suffer six months' incarceration. 3. By way of the instant Miscellaneous Application preferred on behalf of the applicant, it is urged that, inadvertently, the plea for release of the applicant under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') could not be pressed before the Court, when submissions were addressed. Modification, therefore, of the Final Judgment and Order is prayed for. SUBMISSIONS: 4. It was submitted by Mr Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel, that the applicant is not a criminal, much less a hardened criminal, has no criminal antecedents and in a purely money dispute, where he has already paid the amount in question, even if belatedly, having two young children and a wife, the Court may consider his release under the Act. Mr. Dave further relied on the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.2065 of 2025 (Chellammal vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police) dated 22.04.2025, reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870. 5. Though learned counsel for both respondents have appeared, on this issue, learned counsel, in unison, very fairly submitted that it is for this Court to take a view thereon. CONSIDERATION AND DECISION: 6. In Chellammal (supra), it was stated thus: '28. 5. Though learned counsel for both respondents have appeared, on this issue, learned counsel, in unison, very fairly submitted that it is for this Court to take a view thereon. CONSIDERATION AND DECISION: 6. In Chellammal (supra), it was stated thus: '28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.' (emphasis supplied) 7. In Chellammal (supra), reference has been made to Hari Singh v Sukhbir Singh, (1981) 4 SCC 551. The relevant passage from Hari Singh (supra) reads as under: '8. The question next to be considered is whether the accused are entitled to the benefit of probation of good conduct? We gave our anxious consideration to the contentions urged by counsel. We are of opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in this regard also. Many offenders are not dangerous criminals but are weak characters or who have surrendered to temptation or provocation. In placing such type of offenders, on probation, the court encourages their own sense of responsibility for their future and protects them from the stigma and possible contamination of prison. In this case, the High Court has observed that there was no previous history of enmity between the parties and the occurrence was an outcome of a sudden flare up. In placing such type of offenders, on probation, the court encourages their own sense of responsibility for their future and protects them from the stigma and possible contamination of prison. In this case, the High Court has observed that there was no previous history of enmity between the parties and the occurrence was an outcome of a sudden flare up. These are not shown to be incorrect. We have already said that the accused had no intention to commit murder of any person. Therefore, the extension of benefit of the beneficial legislation applicable to first offenders cannot be said to be inappropriate.' (emphasis supplied) 8. We are of the opinion that the relevant circumstances peculiar to the applicant ought to have been brought to the notice of the Court earlier. Be that as it may, upon a conspectus of the aforesaid, we are inclined to accede to the applicant's prayer. Accordingly, Paras 26A and 26B be read into between Paras 26 and 27 of the Final Judgment and Order dated 17.04.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.2036 of 2025, as under: '26A. However, having regard to the circumstances peculiar to the Appellant viz. of him being a first time offender, having no criminal antecedents and having paid the amount(s) in question albeit belatedly, we direct that instead of undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for six months as awarded by the Courts below and affirmed vide Para 26 above, the Appellant be released under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 26B. The Appellant is released on probation upon entering into a bond furnishing a surety of Rs.50,000 (Rupees Fifty Thousand) and shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour for the next three years. Any violation of the aforesaid terms would entail forfeiture of the surety amount and revival of the sentence awarded. The Appellant's conviction has not been interfered with and only the sentence is substituted, as provided above.' 9. In Chellammal (supra), it was also stated: '30. We are conscious that in MCD (supra)[ (2005) 4 SCC 605 ], since followed in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Man Singh[ (2019) 10 SCC 161 ], this Court has held that the report of the probation officer referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Probation Act is a condition precedent and, therefore, must be complied with by the trial courts and the high courts. Importantly, it has also been held that the courts may not be bound by such report. In such view of the matter, we need to make appropriate directions. ' (emphasis supplied) 10. All the same, this Court is not bound to call for a Report from the Probation Officer, and the same is dispensed with, in the interest of justice. 11. At Paras 4 and 5 of I.A. No.108501/2025, blame has been attributed to erstwhile learned counsel for the applicant in the Criminal Appeal. We deprecate such averments, while reminding the applicant that we would be well within our province to refuse him relief 'for the reason that the appellant did not raise such plea before the three courts below though it was available to him at all stages of the proceedings. '[Nagaraj v Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 255 ]. Yet, we have granted relief to sub-serve the cause of justice. 12. I.A. No.108501/2025 is accordingly allowed. The Miscellaneous Application stands disposed of in the afore-mentioned terms. 13. It is made clear that the precedential value of the Final Judgment and Order dated 17.04.2025 has not been watered down in any manner. 14. Ex abundanti cautela, it is recorded that while Final Judgment and Order dated 17.04.2025 was authored by one of us [Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.] for a different coram [Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.], the Registry has confirmed that the instant Miscellaneous Application was marked to a Bench including one of us [Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.]. In these circumstances, we have dealt with and disposed of the same.