JUDGMENT : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J. I.A. No. 680 of 2025 1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 377 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 07.12.2023 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 34 of 2022. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that the passing of the impugned order was informed by the counsel for the respondents to the Finance Department of the State of Jharkhand immediately; after receiving the letter on 16.10.2024, the case file was put up before the Deputy Secretary of the applicants’ Department to examine the legal impact of the outcome of the order passed on 07.12.2023 and thereafter a decision was taken to place the case file along with entire records before the Law Department with respect to filing the appeal on 18.10.2024. 3. It is then stated that on 21.10.2024, the file was put up before the Special Secretary of the Finance Department to take appropriate steps in regard to the filing of the appeal; he then took a decision to place the case file along with entire records before the Law Department; in the meantime, legal opinion was sought from the Advocate General in regard to filing of the appeal; the Advocate General on 28.10.2024, through the Senior Standing Counsel-I advised the filing of the appeal; on 29.10.2024 the Retainer Advocate of the applicants’ Department was directed to prepare grounds of appeal; on 29.11.2024 he prepared the grounds and placed before the Deputy Secretary of the applicants’ Department for approval; on 10.12.2024 the grounds of appeal were placed before the Special Secretary, Finance Department to authorize a competent authority to file the appeal; on 13.12.2024 they were approved by the applicants’ Department; papers were then again sent to the Senior Standing Counsel-I to prepare the memo of appeal and the appeal was filed on 17.01.2025. 4. It is stated that due to reasons beyond the control of the applicants, delay occurred in filing the appeal. It is further stated that there are good chances for the success of the appeal and so the delay of 377 days may be condoned. 5. 4. It is stated that due to reasons beyond the control of the applicants, delay occurred in filing the appeal. It is further stated that there are good chances for the success of the appeal and so the delay of 377 days may be condoned. 5. The counsel for the State Government placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh , Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025 in support of his claim that the delay is liable to be condoned. 6. The contents of the application seeking condonation of delay indicate that though the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on 07.12.2023 in W.P. (S) No. 34 of 2022, the appeal was, in fact, filed on 17.01.2025, with a delay of 377 days. 7. In paragraph 4 of the application it is stated that immediately after the order was pronounced the counsel for the respondents had informed the applicants’ Department about the outcome of the said writ petition. Why the applicants had to wait till 16.10.2024, almost 11 months thereafter, to move the file for the purpose of preparing appeal, is not explained by the respondents. Even the certified copy of the impugned judgment pronounced on 07.12.2023 was applied for on 17.12.2024, as can be seen from the copy of the certified copy filed along with the memorandum of appeal. 8. It is not denied by the counsel for the applicants that the time for filing a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in a writ petition is 30 days only. 9. When the judgment was pronounced in open court in the presence of the counsel for the applicants, why the applicants’ Department did nothing to secure the certified copy of the judgment at the earliest and take steps to file the appeal within a reasonable time is not explained anywhere. 10. The applicants seem to be of the view that they can file the appeal at any point of time, and it does not really matter for them how much time they take to get instructions for filing Letters Patent Appeal. This attitude is to be strongly deprecated. 11. The applicants cannot contend that the file was being moved from table to table and, therefore, they were reasons beyond their control. 12. This attitude is to be strongly deprecated. 11. The applicants cannot contend that the file was being moved from table to table and, therefore, they were reasons beyond their control. 12. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] , the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 3 SCC 159 , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 2 SCC 327 ] , Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others , [ (2021) 11 SCC 557 ] , Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another , [ (2022) 9 SCC 263 ] , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others , [ (2022) 9 SCC 266 ] 14. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir , 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 , the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 15. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt. 29.11.2024 16. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1) referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. 17. 17. Reliance has been placed on certain judgments of the Supreme Court, particularly in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra , [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 ] and also the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India , [ (2023) 10 SCC 531 ] , to take the view that liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. 18. Inder Singh (supra 1) was also a case where the learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of 1537 days and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the same. 19. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra 8) and in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra 9), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It also stated that if there is a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical consideration. 20. In Sheo Raj Singh (supra 11), referred to in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1), the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court. 20. In Sheo Raj Singh (supra 11), referred to in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1), the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; that the law is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate power should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly wrong and not when it is merely not right. 21. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since, in the instant application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the period of delay. It is not considering an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to condone it. 22. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicants have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. 23. Therefore, the application is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. 24. All pending applications shall stand closed.