JUDGMENT : H.P.SANDESH, J. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent finding of both the Courts. 2. This matter is listed for admission. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 3. The factual matrix of the case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property through a registered sale deed dated 02.09.2008 and the same was executed by its earlier owner i.e., M/s Tunga Rice and Oil Industries Limited and put the plaintiff in constructive possession of the suit schedule property. The defendant has occupied the schedule premises as a tenant through lease deed dated 12.11.1985 under the vendor of the plaintiff. It is further contended that the vendor of the plaintiff informed the defendant regarding the sale transaction held between plaintiff and his earlier owner. Further, the defendant did not pay the rent to the erstwhile owner M/s Tunga Rice and Oil Industries Limited and also to the plaintiff from September 2008. The lease of the defendant commenced from 24.09.1985 and the same had expired on 28.05.1990. Even though the defendant was continued in the suit schedule premise without any bilateral contract. The plaintiff requires the said property for comprehensive improvement of the entire property including the suit schedule property by taking up construction based on a comprehensive plan or to entrust the land to a developer with a view to develop and to market the built area. The plaintiff further contended that he has been requesting the defendant since September 2008 to vacate the schedule premises. Initially the defendant promised to vacate the schedule premises on the plea that all garages are in the process of shifting to auto complex and the defendant is also in the process of shifting the premises and there is no difficulty for the defendant to vacate the schedule premises. The plaintiff believed the version put forward by the defendant since it was a fact that based on the policy of the District Administration, all garages in garden area were shifted to auto complex. As of now, it appears that in total defiance of the directives of even the District Administration of defendant has not been vacating the premises, despite having acquired alternative accommodation at auto complex. As of now, it appears that in total defiance of the directives of even the District Administration of defendant has not been vacating the premises, despite having acquired alternative accommodation at auto complex. The plaintiff further contended that he has issued a legal notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant and the same was delivered on 18.08.2011 and thereafter, another notice was also issued to the defendant on 28.01.2012 but the defendant refused the said notice and continued in the suit schedule premises as a illegal possession. The plaintiff further contended that the defendant has not paid the rent from 01.09.2008 and as such he is in arrears of rent in a sum of Rs.14,490/- for a period of 42 months commencing from 01.09.2008 to 29.02.2011 on which date the tenancy would stand terminated. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for the relief of ejectment of the defendant to quit and deliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule property along with the damages at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month. 4. The defendant appeared and filed the written statement contending that he is a tenant of the Tunga Rice and Oil Industries since 1974 and at that time, the entire premises was about to acquired by the government. So the management of Tunga Rice and Oil Industries decided to rent out the premises by forming sites to get control over the entire premises and to avoid the acquisition proceedings by the government. At that time, the entire premises is not in a position to make use of the same and this entire site was got leveled by filling up the mud to make it as a levelled site converted the same to form sites. The landlord of the defendant have orally assured that they will give sites to the tenants and the tenants will be given first preference in case if the management decided to sell the sites which were already occupied by the tenants. On the basis of the promise made by the landlord, this defendant has put up construction and invested lakhs of rupees to carry on the business under the name and style “Prabath Industries.” 5. It is further contended that the defendant continued his tenancy after 1974. As per the promise to the tenants, the landlord sold two sites i.e., one to a sawmill owner and another site which is adjacent to the said site. It is further contended that the defendant continued his tenancy after 1974. As per the promise to the tenants, the landlord sold two sites i.e., one to a sawmill owner and another site which is adjacent to the said site. Thereafter, this defendant approached the Secretary of the management and put forth the desire of purchasing the schedule premises and after without the knowledge of the defendant, the alleged sale was made in favour of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint by the management and it is only after notice issued by the management to the defendant, the defendant came to know that the management has executed a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, at the outset it clearly establishes that it is a collusive act between the plaintiff and the landlord of the defendant. Hence, prays to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. 6. The Trial Court considering the pleadings of the parties, framed the Issues and allowed the parties to lead their evidence. The Trial Court having considered both oral and documentary evidence available on record comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff proves that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and the defendant has occupied the suit schedule property as a tenant even after the expiry of the lease period and the defendant is in arrears of rent from 01.09.2008 to 29.02.2011 and the plaintiff by issuing legal notice, terminated the tenancy of the defendant and the defendant failed to prove that there was no attornment of tenancy between him and M/s. Tunga Oil and Rice Industries Limited and the defendant failed prove that the plaintiff to pay ad-voleram Court fee as per the value of the suit schedule property as mentioned in the registered sale deed dated 02.09.2008 for a sum of Rs.34,13,000/- and the plaintiff has paid the sufficient Court fee and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, an appeal was preferred by the defendant. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, an appeal was preferred by the defendant. The First Appellate Court considering the grounds which have been urged in the appeal, formulated the points and having reassessed both oral and documentary evidence placed on record comes to the conclusion that there is a attornment of tenancy and notice was issued immediately after the property was sold by the original owner in favour of the plaintiff and defendant did not reply to the notice and there was an agreement of rent between the original owner and the defendant and notice was issued before filing of eviction suit. inspite of service of notice, The defendant did not give reply and there is clear admission on the part of defendant that he has not given any reply to the notice. Hence, the First Appellate Court considering both oral and documentary evidence placed on record confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the concurrent finding of both the Courts, the present second appeal is filed before this Court. 8. The main contention of the counsel for the appellant that there is no attornment of tenancy. The counsel would vehemently contend that the boundaries which are mentioned in the sale deed as well as the suit not tallies with regard to the property which is in occupation of the defendant/appellant. The counsel also would vehemently contend that both the Courts have committed an error in appreciating both oral and documentary evidence placed on record. The counsel also would vehemently contend that the sale deed which is the basis for claiming the jural relationship is not pertaining to the suit schedule property. Under such circumstances, both the Courts ought not to have granted the relief. The counsel also would vehemently contend that the First Appellate Court committed an error in applying Section 116 of the Evidence Act to the case where the plaintiff based his claim on derivative title and when the suit is filed after determination of the lease period in view of the settled principle of law that Section 116 of the Evidence Act applies only during the continuation of the tenancy. Hence, prayed this Court to admit the appeal and to frame substantial question of law. 9. Hence, prayed this Court to admit the appeal and to frame substantial question of law. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to notice of this Court that the Trial Court in detail discussed the evidence available on record particularly the answer elicited from the mouth of PW1 and held that where there is clear admission on the part of defendant with regard to the issuance of notice for having purchased the property and also with regard to eviction notice, the same are not replied and even when the attornment of tenancy notice was issued by the original owner in terms of Ex.P4, the same was also not replied and he continued in the premises even though the property was sold long back in favour of the plaintiff without payment of rent either to the earlier owner or to the present plaintiff. Hence, the Court has to take note of the conduct of the appellant. The respondent counsel also admits that the plea only took forth before the Trial Court that the earlier owner has promised that property will be sold to him and not disputed the very boundaries mentioned in the sale deed and also the tenancy but, now an ingenious method adopted before this Court sating that boundaries is not tallies. Once he admits that earlier owner i.e., vendor the plaintiff had agreed to sell the property, now he cannot dispute the very identity of the property. Hence, prays this Court to dismiss the second appeal. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and also considering the material on record particularly taking note of the document of Ex.P1 rent agreement dated 12.11.1985, it discloses that the same was between the original owner as well as the appellant/defendant. The appellant not disputes this rental agreement. Hence, once he admits that he was a tenant at the hands of the original owner, he cannot dispute the very title of subsequent purchaser i.e., the plaintiff. The only defence taken in the written statement that earlier owner promised him to sell the property but he has not sold the same to him. Hence, the grievance is only against the original owner as he has not sold the property as agreed. But, now, he cannot contend that he is not a tenant under the present plaintiff. 11. The only defence taken in the written statement that earlier owner promised him to sell the property but he has not sold the same to him. Hence, the grievance is only against the original owner as he has not sold the property as agreed. But, now, he cannot contend that he is not a tenant under the present plaintiff. 11. It is also important to note that in terms of Ex.P4, letter was sent by M/s Tunga Rice and Oil Industries Limited immediately after the property was sold in favour of the present plaintiff but no reply was given. Apart from that when this respondent also given notice in terms of Ex.P6 to P13, no reply was given to the said notices also. But categorical admission was given by the defendant that he has received the notice of continue to pay the rent as well as to quit the premises. But no reply was given and he did not respond even to the earlier owner or to the present respondent and the defendant as a tenant is squatting on the suit schedule property without payment of rent even after the expiry of the period of five years as contended by the appellant. Thus, this Court has to take note of the conduct of the defendant. Being a tenant, he continued in the premises without payment of rent to erstwhile owner to the subsequent owner i.e., respondent herein. The Apex Court held that a tenant is always a tenant. 12. However, the counsel relies upon the judgment of Apex Court reported in (2017) 2 SCC 274 in the case of BISMILLAH BE (DEAD) BY LRS vs MAJEED SHAH and brought to notice of this Court paragraph 24 wherein an observation is made that though by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of his landlord during continuance of the tenancy, yet the tenant/lessee is entitled to challenge the derivative title of an assignee/vendee of the original landlord of the demised property in an action brought to by the assignee/vendee against the tenant for his eviction from the demised property under the rent laws. This right of a tenant is, however, subject to one caveat that the tenant/lessee has not attorned to the assignee/vendee. This right of a tenant is, however, subject to one caveat that the tenant/lessee has not attorned to the assignee/vendee. In other words, if the tenant/lessee pays rent to the assignee/vendee of the tenanted property then it results in creation of an attornment between the parties which, in turn, deprives the tenant/lessee to challenge the derivative title of an assignee/vendee in the proceedings. 13. In the case on hand, when the property was sold by the very erstwhile owner in favour of respondent/plaintiff, immediately, he had communicated the same to the defendant to continue to pay the rent in favour of the subsequent purchaser and Ex.P4 also served on him but no reply was given. Subsequent purchaser also issued notice to him but no response to the said notice also. The admission on the part of DW1 is very clear that he did not respond to the notice issued by the earlier owner and by the subsequent purchaser and only contention is taken that identity of the property is in dispute. But in the written statement he has not disputed the identity of the property and only contention is taken that earlier owner promised him to sell the property but did not sell to him. When such pleading is made in the written statement, only an after thought, the defence is taken that the identity of the property is in dispute. Having taken note of the fact that property was sold in the year 2008 in favour of plaintiff and the defendant also promised to vacate the premises earlier as pleaded in the plaint but he did not vacate the premises and without any other alternative, the plaintiff approached the Court in the year 2012. Now, We are in 2025 and the defendant squatting on the property without paying of rent even to the original owner or to the subsequent purchaser. The appellant taking advantage of the sale made in favour of the respondent, not paying the rent and squatting on the property without paying the rent, as such, the appellant forgotten his status as tenant and the tenant is always a tenant and he cannot dispute the title of the plaintiff. Thus, I do not find any error in the judgment of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. Thus, I do not find any error in the judgment of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. Hence, I do not find ground to admit and frame substantive question of law invoking Section 100 of CPC. 14. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The second appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs.50,000/-. The cost to be paid to the registry within a period of two weeks. If cost is not paid within two weeks, list the matter before the Court on27.11.2025.. In view of dismissal of the main appeal, I.A. if any, does not survive for consideration and the same stands dismissed.