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2025 DIGILAW 1106 (BOM)

Yousef s/o. Yakub Londhe v. State of Maharashtra

2025-10-09

HITEN S.VENEGAVKAR, VIBHA KANKANWADI

body2025
ORDER : (PER : Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.) 1. The present criminal application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “Cr.P.C”). In the year 2019, it was initially filed seeking following reliefs :- (b) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to 'quash' and 'set-aside the Sessions Case No. 11/2019 & charge-sheet no. I-151/2017 filed on 13.03.2018, pending on the file of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Newasa, at Newasa, Dist.: Ahmednagar for offence punishable under Section 307, 120-B, 201, 341, 504, 506 of the IPC and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act & Section 37(1)(3) / 135 of the Bombay Police Act & F.I.R. registered vide C.R. No. I-15/2017 dated 06.02.2017 for offence punishable under Section 143, 149, 504, 506, 341 of the IPC and Section 37(1)(3)/135 of the Bombay Police Act, qua the Applicants. (c) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to 'quash' and 'set-aside the Sessions Case No. 11/2019 & charge-sheet no. I-151/2017 filed on 13.03.2018, pending on the file of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Newasa, at Newasa, Dist.: Ahmednagar for offence punishable under Section 307, 120-B, 201, 341, 504, 506 of the IPC and Section 3/25 of the Arms Act & Section 37(1)(3)/135 of the Bombay Police Act against the Applicants. During the pendency of the application for admission, learned APP inform the Court that on 22.09.2025, cognizance has been taken by learned trial Court, post filing of charge-sheet. Therefore, in view of the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra and another, [Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No.13424 of 2025] dated 03.09.2025, the Advocate for the petitioner sought leave to amend the petition and challenge the order of cognizance. He further submitted that the co-equal Bench at Principal Seat of this Court in case of Zain Shroff vs. State of Maharashtra and another in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3901/2021 dated 11.09.2025, wherein by taking into consideration the decision in Pradnya kulkarni (supra) and also the Appellate Side Rules of this Court, have passed an order directing similar type of matters to be placed before the Single Bench of this Court. He further argued that taking into consideration Paragraph No. 9 of the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni’s case (supra), the matter will pertain to Division Bench of this Court. He further argued that taking into consideration Paragraph No. 9 of the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni’s case (supra), the matter will pertain to Division Bench of this Court. Upon hearing the submission of the petitioner’s Advocate and also after perusing the order of the Co-ordinate Bench at Principal Seat dated 11.09.2025 mentioned above, we passed following order and place the matter for arguments on 25.09.2025. :- Learned APP informs that cognizance of the matter has been taken by the trial Court. 2. In view of Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. The State of Maharashtra and another in Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No.13424 of 2025 decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 03.09.2025 learned Advocate for applicants seeks leave to amend. However, he expresses that taking into consideration the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra) the matter will not lie before the Single Bench of this Court and this submission has come from him by taking note of the order of co-equal Bench at Principal Seat in Zain Shroff vs. The State of Maharashtra and another in Criminal Writ Petition No.3901 of 2021 dated 11.09.2025, wherein taking into consideration the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra), the Appellate Side rules of this Court, it has been observed that- "12 The learned Counsel for the Petitioner is pressing this Petition also under Section 482 of Cr.PC. Therefore, for the sake of consistency it is necessary that the matters claiming similar relief under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., under Section 528 of BNSS or under Article 227 of the Constitution are placed before one particular bench to avoid inconsistency of placing the matters in the same category before different benches. Since as mentioned earlier, the Single Judge's roster specifically mentions Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Section 528 of BNSS, this Petition shall be placed before the appropriate Single Judge Bench by the registry." 3. Learned Advocate for applicants places reliance on paragraph No.9 of the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra) and submits that even taking into consideration the decision in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra) and Appellate Side rules the matter would lie before the Division Bench. 4. We would like to hear these submissions in detail, however, it may depend upon the amendment that would be carried out and, therefore, we direct applicants to carry out the amendment first i.e. on or before 24.09.2025 and copy of same be given to other side, in advance. 4. We would like to hear these submissions in detail, however, it may depend upon the amendment that would be carried out and, therefore, we direct applicants to carry out the amendment first i.e. on or before 24.09.2025 and copy of same be given to other side, in advance. 5. Place the matter for submissions on 25.09.2025. 2. On 25.09.2025, when the matter reached for admission, the learned APP invited our attention to one more order passed by the Co- ordinate Bench presided over by Hon’ble Chief Justice dated 09.09.2025 whereupon petitioner by expressly giving up the prayers pertaining to the challenge of First Information Report (for short “F.I.R”) and charge-sheet and further seeking opportunity to pursue the matter only against the order of cognizance before the Single Judge, the petition was sought to be withdrawn. The Hon’ble Division Bench presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice permitted withdrawal after relying upon Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules. These two orders of the Co- ordinate Benches passed at the Principal Seat were placed before us in which the former arose upon the petitioner expressly giving up his prayers and withdrawing the matter with liberty to challenge the order of cognizance before the Single Judge of this Court. Later suggested that once the cognizance is taken and the petition is under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C with or without aid of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the roster would require the matter to be placed before a Single Judge. 3. As we have come across several such petitions in past two weeks in which the cognizance has been already taken during the pendency of the criminal applications filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and the frequency with such situations are arising with regards to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra) wherein it has been clarified the position that post filing of the charge-sheet and cognizance, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not lie but the application filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C does give jurisdiction to the High Court Division Bench to proceed with the hearing after appropriate amendments by way of challenging the order of cognizance and raising appropriate grounds in support of that challenge is made in the application. In view of the above mentioned two orders passed by the Co-ordinate Benches from Principal Seat, we considered it appropriate to hear the Bar at some length on the question “Whether petitions contening composite prayers i.e., to quash the F.I.R, charge- sheet and the order taking cognizance pertains to be heard by a Division Bench or by a Single Bench under the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960?” 4. Upon perusing the relevant prayer clauses which we have reproduced herein above clarifies that applicants seeks to challenge the entire substratum of the prosecution right from the registration of F.I.R to the judicial act of taking cognizance by the competent Court. 5. While addressing the aforesaid issue, the learned senior counsel Mr. Dhorde submitted that the statutory scheme under the Appellate Side Rules admits of no ambiguity, applications for quashing F.I.R/C.R or charge-sheet lies before the Division Bench irrespective to whether they are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C simpliciter or read with Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He further argued that the order taking cognizance is a consequential order and when composite reliefs are sought, the application/petition continues to remain within the province of Division Benches of this Court. He distinguished the case of Neeta Singh & Ors vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors in Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No. 13578/2024 Dated 15.10.2024 which has been considered and interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court holding that a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the F.I.R becomes infructuous upon taking cognizance. However, by pointing out that where Section 482 of Cr.P.C or corresponding Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short “B.N.S.S”) is invoked, the High Court retains jurisdiction even post cognizance to quash not only the F.I.R and charge-sheet but also the order taking cognizance. He further relied upon the Division Bench decision of Nagpur Bench in case of Abdul Faruk Abdul Rahim vs. State of Maharashtra and another passed in Criminal Application No. 394/2011 dated 21.10.2011. He took us through Paragraph No. 1, 24 and 27 to 32 of the said judgment and submitted that the roster and rules consistently reserves quashing of F.I.R and/or charge-sheet within the domain of Division Benches of this Court and, therefore, any contrary view would be per incurium. He took us through Paragraph No. 1, 24 and 27 to 32 of the said judgment and submitted that the roster and rules consistently reserves quashing of F.I.R and/or charge-sheet within the domain of Division Benches of this Court and, therefore, any contrary view would be per incurium. He further argued that quashing of the order of taking cognizance by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court does not epso facto quash the F.I.R and charge-sheet, nor does it give the jurisdiction to the Hon’ble Single Judge to quash the F.I.R and charge-sheet. According to him, since the Single Judge has no jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R and charge-sheet, the guidelines in case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 including malafides cannot be considered at the stage of quashing of the order taking cognizance. While concluding, he submitted that in view of Bombay Appellate Side Rules and the nature of proceedings, the petitions seeking quashing of F.I.R, charge-sheet and the consequential order taking cognizance of the case would lie for consideration before the Hon’ble Division Bench and not before the Bench of Single Judge of this Court. 6. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sapkal while towing the same line as of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Dhorde, placed reliance on the decision of G. Sagar Suri and another vs. State of U.P and others (2000) 2 SCC 636 , Joseph Salvaraj A vs. State of Gujarat and others (2011) 7 SCC 59 , Anand Kumar Mohatta and another vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and another (2019) 11 SCC 706 and Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621, to emphasize that continuation of criminal proceedings on vague or essentially civil dispute amounts to abuse and that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers/writ jurisdiction must interdict such misuse. He further argued that if after cognizance is taken by the competent Court during the pendency of the petitions or application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, such composite matters if relegated to a Single Judge it would fragment relevant and cause multiplicity and will defeat the very purpose of the Appellate Side Rules which consolidates such challenges before the Division Bench of this Court. He further submitted that taking into consideration the Appellate Side Rules and given the volume of pending matters, he pressed for an authoritative pronouncement by a Larger bench. 7. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Katneshwarkar submitted that nomenclature cannot control the jurisdiction of the Courts and the Court is required to look into the pith and substance of the reliefs. A prayer to quash an F.I.R or charge-sheet is in substance a challenge to the State’s investigative action and prosecutorial foundation which is akin to writ of certiorari/prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He drew our attention to the text of Chapter I Rule 2(4)(ii) and Chapter XVII Rule 18(4) to urge that even under these provisions, the matters pertaining to challenge of F.I.R or charge-sheet are specifically assigned to Division Bench and such matters are expressly excluded from Single Judge jurisdiction irrespective of whether they are filed under Section 482 simplicitor or read with Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that permitting the parties to avoid Division Bench scrutiny by restricting the challenge to the cognizance order would encourage forum shopping and undermine roster discipline. He also prayed that in view of the two orders passed by the Co-ordinate Benches at Principal Seat requires reference to a larger Bench and hence, question be referred to the larger Bench of this Court. 8. We have also heard learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Deshmukh who towed the similar line of submissions as of the earlier counsels highlighting the systematic ramifications and urging a reference to a larger Bench. 9. Ms. Rashmi Kulkarni, learned Advocate, analyzed the concept “Cognizance” relying on S. K. Sinha Vs. Videocon International Ltd. and ors AIR 2008 SC 1213 , thereby submitting that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that the High Court was in error in equating issuance of process with taking of cognizance by Criminal Court, taking of cognizance merely means becoming aware of or to take notice judicially …..these initiation of proceedings dealt with in Chapter XIV is different from commencement of proceedings. The initiation of proceedings must preced commencement of proceedings. The initiation of proceedings must preced commencement of proceedings. She also placed her reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat vs Afroz Mohammad Hasanfatta AIR 2019 SC 2499 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in so far as taking cognizance based on police report, the Magistrate has advantage of the charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and other evidence collected by the police during investigation. Investigating Officer collects the necessary evidence during the investigation conducted in compliance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C and in accordance with the rules of investigation. The evidence and material so collected are snifed at the level of the Investigating Officer and, thereafter, charge-sheet is filed. In appropriate case, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is also obtained before filing the charge-sheet. The Court thus, has the advantage of the police report along with the materials placed before it by the police. Under Section 190 of Cr.P.C, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon a police report and a Magistrate where satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceedings and thus, directs issuance of process. In case of taking cognizance of offence based upon the police report, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing the process. In cases instituted on a police report, the Magistrate is only required to pass an order issuing summons to the accused. She also argued that in the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that the High Court under the provisions of Section 397 of Cr.P.C cannot examine the merits and demerits of the case to substitute its own view when the matter is at nascent stage. Thus, her submission is that cognizance, means, merely taking judicial notice of an offence to proceed further and it does not valid, absorb or merge the F.I.R or charge-sheet nor cognizance order. Consequently, setting aside the cognizance order does not automatically quash and set aside the F.I.R or charge-sheet. She therefore, argued that where composite prayers exists, as in this case, the matter must remain before the Division Bench which alone can grant complete relief in such cases. 10. The learned Advocate, Mr. Ostwal took us to both the orders passed by the Co-ordinate Benches and also through the relevant provisions of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules. She therefore, argued that where composite prayers exists, as in this case, the matter must remain before the Division Bench which alone can grant complete relief in such cases. 10. The learned Advocate, Mr. Ostwal took us to both the orders passed by the Co-ordinate Benches and also through the relevant provisions of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules. He also argued that quashing of F.I.R and charge-sheet lies exclusively within the domain of Division Bench and Single Judge has no power to issue Writ of Certiorari/prohibition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance upon Robert Mosses vs. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Writ Petition No. 213/2011 by the Division Bench of this Court, decided on 18.07.2011. He also placed his reliance on the judgment of Abdul Faruk Abdul Rahim (supra) which has already relied upon and mentioned herein above. He placed before us a circular dated 03.09.2015 (Ref. No. P/150412/188) issued by Registry and amendments thereafter in Appellate Side Rules and submitted that the circular and subsequent amendment under no ambiguity refers quashing of F.I.R/charge-sheet with the Division Bench. He further argued that the term “Cognizance” which is not defined in Cr.P.C only means “taking judicial notice of offence” and does not equate to quashing of F.I.R/Charge-sheet. In support of this argument, he relied upon the judgment of Bhushan Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 5 SCC 414 . He also relied upon the judgment of S. K. Sinha (supra) which has been already relied by learned Advocate, Ms. Kulkarni. Thus, according to him, quashing of order of cognizance by learned Single Judge would still leave F.I.R/charge-sheet alive, which only the Division Bench of this Court can quash. He also submitted that the issue requires to be referred to the larger Bench in light of two orders passed by the Division Benches at Principal Seat. 11. Learned APP for the State contended that the challenge to F.I.R and charge-sheet will lie before the Division Bench under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, however, challenge to the order of cognizance by the competent Court will have to be placed before Single Judge but whenever composite prayer is brought by way of an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C or a petition under Article 227 then the same should be placed before the Division Bench of this Court. We specifically confronted with the learned APP who is appearing for the State as to why his counter part at the Principal Seat raised an objection contrary to his submission, the learned APP was unable to respond and left the matter to be decided by the Court. 12. Having heard all the learned counsels, we now proceed to analyze the aforesaid position in the light of statutory scheme and the rules. A) Statutory Scheme and Rules :- Chapter XVII Rule 1, 4 and 17 of the Appellate Side Rules reads as under : 1.(i) Applications for issue of writs, directions, etc. under Article 226 of the Constitution - Every application for the issue of a direction, order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution shall, if, the matter in dispute is or has arisen substantially outside Greater Bombay, be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench to be appointed by the Chief Justice. The application shall set out therein the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought. It shall be solemnly affirmed or supported by an affidavit. In every such application, the applicant shall state whether he has made any other application to the Supreme Court or the High Court in respect of the same matter and how that application has been disposed of. (ii) Applicant to inform Court, if, during pendency of an application, the Supreme Court has been approached - If the applicant makes an application to the Supreme Court in respect of the same matter during the pendency of the application in the High Court, he shall forthwith bring this fact to the notice of the High Court by filing an affidavit in the case and shall furnish a copy of such affidavit to the other side. (iii) Hearing may be adjourned pending decision by Supreme Court. - The Court may adjourn the hearing of the application made to it pending the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter. 4. Division Bench to dispose of the application; rule nisi may be granted by a Single Judge. - Applications under Rule 1 shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench; but a single Judge may grant rule nisi, provided that he shall not pass any final order on the application. 17.(i) Applications under Articles 227 and 228. 4. Division Bench to dispose of the application; rule nisi may be granted by a Single Judge. - Applications under Rule 1 shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench; but a single Judge may grant rule nisi, provided that he shall not pass any final order on the application. 17.(i) Applications under Articles 227 and 228. - An application invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution or under Article 228 of the Constitution, shall be filed on the Appellate Side of the High Court and be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench to be appointed by the Chief Justice. The application shall set out therein the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought. It shall be solemnly affirmed or supported by an affidavit. In every such application, the applicant shall state whether he has made any other application to the Supreme Court or the High Court in respect of the same matter and how that application is disposed of. (ii) Applicant to inform Court, if, during pendency of an application, the Supreme Court is approached. - If the applicant makes an application to the Supreme Court in respect of the same matter during the pendency of the application in the High Court, he shall forthwith bring this fact to the notice of the High Court by filing an affidavit in the case and shall furnish a copy of such affidavit to the other side. (iii) Hearing may be adjourned pending decision by the Supreme Court. - The Court may adjourn the hearing of the application made to it pending the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter. (iv) Rules 2 to 16 to apply mutatis mutandis. - Provisions of Rules 2 to 16 above shall apply mutatis mutandis to all such applications. Thus the aforesaid provisions stipulates that petitions under Article 226 and 227 are ordinarily to be heard by a Division Bench. Rule XVII of the Appellate Side Rules carves out exception permitting Single Judge, disposal of writ petitions challenging order of specified Judicial/Quasi Judicial Authorities under the listed enactments. Thus the aforesaid provisions stipulates that petitions under Article 226 and 227 are ordinarily to be heard by a Division Bench. Rule XVII of the Appellate Side Rules carves out exception permitting Single Judge, disposal of writ petitions challenging order of specified Judicial/Quasi Judicial Authorities under the listed enactments. Importantly, Chapter I Rule 2(h)(ii) which reads as under :- ii) applications for quashing an F.I.R., C.R., Charge Sheet or order directing investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. irrespective of whether such applications have been filed under section 482 simpliciter or read with Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution. When above Chapter I Rule 2(h)(ii) is read along with Chapter XVII Rule 18(4), it expressly excludes from the Single Judge jurisdiction “applications for quashing an F.I.R, C.R, Charge-sheet or an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, irrespective of whether such applications have been filed under Section 482 simplicitor or read with Article 226 and/or Article 227.” 13. The purpose of the aforesaid provisions/rules is evident, that these provisions specifically deal with the challenges that seek to eradicate the very foundation of a criminal proceedings (F.I.R/charge- sheet) are to be dealt with by Division Benches so as to secure uniformity and minimize conflicting outcomes. 14. Even if we consider the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court giving guidelines to us while exercising Article 226, 227 and Section 482 of Cr.P.C powers, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radheshyam vs. Chhabinath (2015) 5 SCC 423 have held that judicial orders are not ordinary amenable of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and have clarified that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 as well as inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C is the appropriate forum in such cases. Even in case of M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd & anr vs. Special Judicial Magistrate AIR 1998 SC 128 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court have reiterated that the High Courts may exercises its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of Cr.P.C to quash criminal proceedings where abuse of process is evident. In case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal (supra), illustrative categories were laid down for quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse. In case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal (supra), illustrative categories were laid down for quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse. Continuing these line of guidance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again held in the case of Neeta Singh (supra) that once a competent Court has taken cognizance, a petition under Article 226 simplicitor to quash an F.I.R may not survive. However, latest dictum in Pradnya Kulkarni (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that where the petition invokes the twin jurisdiction one under Article 226 of Constitution of India along with Section 482 of Cr.P.C which now, corresponds to Section 582 of B.N.S.S, the High Court retains its jurisdiction post cognizance to quash not only the F.I.R/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognizance provided the pleadings are appropriately incorporated in the petition and most importantly if the roster so permits. Secondly, the Court recognized that a Division Bench could examine such composite reliefs and mold reliefs as warranted on facts. 15. Before we proceed to analyze the controversy in the present matter, we deem it necessary to place on record that the order dated 9 th September 2025, passed by the Division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, appears not to have been brought to the notice of the Division Bench, which subsequently passed the order dated 11 th September 2025 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3901 of 2021, ( Zain Shroff v. State of Maharashtra and another ). On a careful perusal of both orders, we find that they do not reflect any similarity in reasoning or context. On the contrary, the order dated 9th September 2025 adopts a correct view of law by placing reliance on Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules 1960. In that case, the petitioner had voluntarily decided to withdraw the petition after the competent court had taken cognizance of the offence, seeking liberty to challenge the order of cognizance separately. Recognizing this, the Division Bench presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice permitted withdrawal of the petition and granted liberty as prayed to challenge the order of cognizance before the single judge in accordance with Rule 18. 16. Recognizing this, the Division Bench presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice permitted withdrawal of the petition and granted liberty as prayed to challenge the order of cognizance before the single judge in accordance with Rule 18. 16. In contrast, the order dated 11 th September 2025 dealt with a situation where the petitioner sought to amend the pending petition by incorporating a challenge to the order of cognizance along with necessary pleadings, without relinquishing the original prayers for quashing the FIR and charge sheet. Considering such composite prayers, similar to those raised in the present case, the Learned Division Bench held that once the competent court has taken cognizance of the offence, a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be continued for quashing the FIR or charge sheet. It further held that the petitioner should approach the learned single judge to challenge the judicial order taking cognizance. Therefore, in our considered view, the order dated 11 th September 2025 alone squarely deals with the issue of maintainability of petitions containing composite reliefs post cognizance. Subsequent to the reservation of this matter for orders, another division bench of this court, also headed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and comprising one of us (Smt. Vibha V. Kankanwadi, J.) delivered an order dated 30 th September 2025 in Criminal Application No. 1414 of 2025. In that case, the division bench held that since summons has been issued by the competent court, the applicant would have liberty to approach the learned single judge having subject jurisdiction by filing a fresh writ petition to challenge the judicial order taking cognizance. This order too rests upon Chapter XVII, Rule 18(4) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules 1960. It thus emerges that the orders passed by the coordinate benches referred to above operate in distinct factual circumstances. The order dated 9 th September 2025 pertains to a petitioner who voluntarily abandoned the challenge to the FIR and charge sheet and sought liberty to contest only the order of cognizance before the single judge in terms of Rule 18. It thus emerges that the orders passed by the coordinate benches referred to above operate in distinct factual circumstances. The order dated 9 th September 2025 pertains to a petitioner who voluntarily abandoned the challenge to the FIR and charge sheet and sought liberty to contest only the order of cognizance before the single judge in terms of Rule 18. The order dated 11 th September 2025, however, proceeds on the footing that when a challenge to the order of cognizance is coupled with a continued challenge to the FIR and charge sheet, such composite reliefs are not maintainable before the division bench and must be placed before the learned single judge. 17. In this apparent divergence in approach between the view taken by the division bench in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3901 of 2021 by order dated 11 th September 2025 and the earlier order dated 9 th September 2025, that persuades us to hold that an authoritative pronouncement by a larger bench is necessary to settle the issue conclusively. It is also our view that the composite prayers raising challenge to the FIR and charge sheet along with the order of cognizance of the competent court will lie before the division bench under Rule 18 (4) of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules 1960 and cannot be considered by the single judge of this court. 18. Thus, the controversy before us is not whether a single judge has jurisdiction to examine the legality of an order issuing process in a private complaint or to exercise powers under Article 226/ 227 of Constitution of India/ Section 482 of Cr.P.C in appropriate categories of matters. The narrow but recurring question is “When a petition contains composite prayers to quash F.I.R, charge-sheet and the order taking cognizance does the subsequent challenge to the order of cognizance will divest the Division Bench of its jurisdiction and shift the proceedings to a Single Judge?” 19. We are not in agreement with the view taken by the Division bench at Principal Seat in its order dated 11.09.2025 in Criminal Writ Petition no. 3901/2021. As a matter of text, Chapter I Rule 2(h)(ii) and Chapter XVII Rule 18(4) are mandatory. They need to be decided on the nature of the relief alone. We are not in agreement with the view taken by the Division bench at Principal Seat in its order dated 11.09.2025 in Criminal Writ Petition no. 3901/2021. As a matter of text, Chapter I Rule 2(h)(ii) and Chapter XVII Rule 18(4) are mandatory. They need to be decided on the nature of the relief alone. Where the reliefs sought are quashing F.I.R/charge-sheet then the matters are assigned to Division Bench irrespective of whether they are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C simplicitor or with the aid of Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of principle, we are of the opinion that reliefs are to be adjudicated in a manner that avoids multiplicity and fragmentation. Thus, when such petitions challenging F.I.R/charge-sheet are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C or under Article 227 of the Constitution and during their pendency if the consequential order of taking cognizance is passed by the competent Court then such composite prayers will have to be considered and decided by the Division Bench of this Court. If a Single Judge were to quash only cognizance order, the parties would still require recourse to a Division Bench for the purpose of quashing F.I.R/charge- sheet. In our view, the rules could not have intended such procedural disharmony. 20. The concept of taking cognizance is well settled in criminal jurisprudence. When a Magistrate or Sessions Court takes cognizance under section 190 of Cr.P.C., it signifies the judicial application of mind to the police report or complaint for the limited purpose of proceeding further in accordance with law. It marks the transition from the investigative stage to the judicial stage. The act of taking cognizance does not create an offence, it merely initiates judicial scrutiny of the material placed before the court and sets the process of trial in motion. 21. When a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, sets aside or quashes an order of cognizance, it only nullifies the judicial act of the Magistrate in taking cognizance. Such an order does not, by itself, obliterate the first information report or the charge sheet, unless the court expressly extends such relief. The FIR and the charge sheet are products of investigative process, while the order of cognizance is a judicial consequence thereof. Such an order does not, by itself, obliterate the first information report or the charge sheet, unless the court expressly extends such relief. The FIR and the charge sheet are products of investigative process, while the order of cognizance is a judicial consequence thereof. Hence, quashing the cognizance order merely halts further judicial proceedings based on that order. It does not erase the foundational investigation or its outcome. In appropriate cases, the prosecution may even take corrective steps, such as refiling the charge sheet or seeking cognizance afresh if the defect is curable in law. 22. The legal distinction between quashing an FIR or charge sheet and the quashing the order of cognizance is therefore significant. Quashing the FIR or charge sheet strikes at the very root of the prosecution and brings the entire criminal proceedings to an end. In contrast, quashing the order of cognizance only sets aside the judicial act of taking cognizance. It does not automatically terminate the underlying investigation or extinguish the offense alleged. Consequently, while the former permanently ends the proceedings, the latter merely suspends its judicial continuation, leaving scope for revival upon proper compliance with law. 23. The distinction has been consistently recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts. 24. In the State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanl Lal and others , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the parameters for quashing criminal proceedings. 25. In R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (AIR) 1951 SC 207, the Court explained the import of the expression ‘taking cognizance’. It is held that :- 8] In Gopal v. Emperor, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Pat. 245: (45 Cr. L. J. 177 S. B.) it was observed that the word 'cognizance' is used in the Code to indicate the point when the Mag. or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a different thing from the initiation of proceedings. It is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Mag. The Ct. noticed that the word 'cognizance' is a word of somewhat indefinite import & it is perhaps not always used in exactly the same sense. 26. Further, in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 609 , it was reiterated that the act of taking cognizance involves judicial application of mind. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held :- 49. 26. Further, in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 609 , it was reiterated that the act of taking cognizance involves judicial application of mind. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held :- 49. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. Section 190 of the Code empowered taking cognizance of an offence and not to deal with offenders. Therefore, cognizance can be taken even if offender is not known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered. Their names may transpire during investigation or afterwards 50. Person who has not joined as accused in the charge-sheet can be summoned at the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. There is no question of applicability of Section 319 of the Code at this stage (see SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi). It is also trite that even if a person is not named as an accused by the police in the final report submitted, the court would be justified in taking cognizance of the offence and to summon the accused if it feels that the evidence and material collected during investigation justifies prosecution of the accused (see Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja). Thus, the Magistrate is empowered to issue process against some other person, who has not been charge-sheeted, but there has to be sufficient material in the police report showing his involvement. In that case, the Magistrate is empowered to ignore the conclusion arrived at by the d investigating officer and apply his mind independently on the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case. At the same time, it is not permissible at this stage to consider any material other than that collected by the investigating officer. 51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. 51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused. 52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction. 53. However, the words "sufficient ground for proceeding" appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect. 54. However, there has to be a proper satisfaction in this behalf which should be duly recorded by the Special Judge on the basis of material on record. No such exercise is done. In this scenario, having regard to the aforesaid aspects coupled with the legal position explained above, it is difficult to sustain the impugned order dated 19-3-2013 in its present form insofar as it relates to implicating the appellants and summoning them as accused persons. No such exercise is done. In this scenario, having regard to the aforesaid aspects coupled with the legal position explained above, it is difficult to sustain the impugned order dated 19-3-2013 in its present form insofar as it relates to implicating the appellants and summoning them as accused persons. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2961 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 3161 of 2013 filed by Mr Sunil Bharti Mittal and Ravi Ruia respectively are, accordingly, allowed and order summoning these appellants is set aside. The appeals arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 3326-27 of 2013 filed by Telecom Watchdog are dismissed. 55. While parting, we make it clear that since on an erroneous presumption in law, the Special Magistrate has issued the summons to the appellants, it will always be open to the Special Magistrate to undertake the exercise of going through the material on record and on that basis, if he is satisfied that there is enough incriminating material on record to proceed against the appellants as well, he may pass appropriate orders in this behalf. We also make it clear that even if at this stage, no such prima facie material is found, but during the trial, sufficient incriminating material against these appellants surfaces in the form of evidence, the Special Judge shall be at liberty to exercise his powers under Section 319 of the Code to rope in the appellants by passing appropriate orders in accordance with law at that stage. 27. Likewise, in Manharbhai Muljibhai Kakadia v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel (2012) 10 SCC 517 , it was clarified that setting aside an order of cognizance affects only the judicial order, not the FIR or charge sheet, unless such order is specifically passed by the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held :- 24. The procedural scheme in respect of the complaints made to Magistrates is provided in Chapter XV of the Code. On a complaint being made to a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, he is required to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses, if any, and then on considering the complaint and the statements on oath, if he is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, the complaint shall be dismissed after recording brief reasons. The Magistrate may also on receipt of a complaint of which he is authorised to take cognizance proceed with further inquiry into the allegations made in the complaint either himself or direct an investigation into the allegations in the complaint to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In that event, the Magistrate in fact postpones the issue of process. On conclusion of the inquiry by himself or on receipt of report from the police officer or from such other person who has been directed to investigate into the allegations, if, in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, the complaint is dismissed under Section 203 or where the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then a process is issued. In a summons case, summons for the attendance of the accused is issued and in a warrant case the Magistrate may either issue a warrant or a summons for causing the accused to be brought or to appear before him. 25. Pertinently, Chapter XV uses the expression, "taking cognizance of an offence" at various places. Although the expression is not defined in the Code, but it has acquired definite meaning for the purposes of the Code. 30. In State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid the expression, "taking cognizance of an offence" has been explained in para 43 of the Report which reads as follows: (SCC p. 696) "43. Similarly, when Section 20-A(2) of TADA makes sanction necessary for taking cognizance-it is only to prevent abuse of power by authorities concerned. It requires to be noted that this provision of Section 20-A came to be inserted by Act 43 of 1993. Then, the question is as to the meaning of taking cognizance. Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons." 31. The above cases where the expression, "taking cognizance of an offence" for the purposes of the Code (old as well as new) has been explained have been noted by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Pastor P. Raju. The Court in para 13 of the Report referred to the distinction between "taking cognizance of an offence" and "issuance of process" and observed as under: (SCC p. 734) "13. …..Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out." 34. The word "cognizance" occurring in various sections in the Code is a word of wide import. It embraces within itself all powers and authority in exercise of jurisdiction and taking of authoritative notice of the allegations made in the complaint or a police report or any information received that an offence has been committed. In the context of Sections 200, 202 and 203, the expression "taking cognizance" has been used in the sense of taking notice of the complaint or the first information report or the information that an offence has been committed on application of judicial mind. It does not necessarily mean issuance of process. 28. The similar view has been expressed by the two judgments of our High Court, Abdul Faruk Abdul Rahim (supra) and Robert Mosses (supra). 29. It does not necessarily mean issuance of process. 28. The similar view has been expressed by the two judgments of our High Court, Abdul Faruk Abdul Rahim (supra) and Robert Mosses (supra). 29. In view of the settled position, we find merit in the submissions of all learned counsel that setting aside the order of cognizance alone does not ipso facto nullify the FIR or charge sheet. The act of taking cognizance is a threshold exercise of judicial mind, it does not validate the investigation nor merge the FIR or charge sheet into itself. Therefore, a petitioner seeking to comprehensively challenge both the investigative and judicial stages must frame a composite challenge that encompasses all reliefs. Having regard to the provisions of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, such composite reliefs are appropriately maintainable before the division bench of this court, which can adjudicate all connected issues in a unified manner and render a complete and authoritative determination of the matter. 30. We also want to place it on record that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeta Singh (supra) address only about the maintainability of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India simpliciter post cognizance. It does not dilute the Appellate Side Rules, allocation of business within the High Court nor does it speaks about composite petitions invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C now, Section 528 of B.N.S.S where the Division Benches jurisdiction is textually reserved. 31. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the following question of law arise for reference to a larger Bench :- (1) Whether under the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 more particularly Chapter I Rule 2(h)(ii) and Chapter XVII Rule 18(4) requires the petitions/applications seeking quashing of a F.I.R, C.R or charge-sheet to be heard by Division Bench of this Court irrespective of the invocation of Section 482 of Cr.P.C (now, corresponding Section 528 of B.N.S.S) and/or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, and whether a Single Judge has jurisdiction to finally dispose of such applications? (2) In a composite petition where besides quashing the F.I.R/charge-sheet, even the order taking cognizance/issuing process is also challenged with proper pleadings divest the Division Bench of its jurisdiction and requires the matter to be placed before a Single Judge; or does the Division Bench retains its jurisdiction to decide all reliefs so as to avoid multiplicity and also to maintain uniformity with the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules? (3) Whether quashing an order taking cognizance under Section 190 of Cr.P.C (corresponding Section 210 of B.N.S.S) or an order issuing process under Section 204 of Cr.P.C (corresponding Section 227 of B.N.S.S) necessarily results in quashing of the F.I.R and charge-sheet; and if no, whether a Single Judge can grant complete relief in such composite cases in consonance with the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules? 32. For the reasons recorded above, we pass following order :- ORDER (a) The Registry shall place the papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for Constitution of larger Bench to consider and decide the questions formulated in Paragraph No. 31. (b) All contention on merits of quashing are expressly kept open. 33. We note a sincere appreciation for the learned Counsels who appeared and gave their assistance in the matter.