Order : (FARJAND ALI, J.) 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13.02.2020 passed by the learned Trial Court, whereby the respondent, Smt. Nirmala Devi, was acquitted of the charges levelled against her. Leave was granted to the appellant to prefer an appeal. There was a delay of 228 days in filing the appeal, which was also condoned. 2. The respondent has been duly served and is represented by learned counsel, Shri R.S. Chundawat. The respondent no.1 was not present on the previous date of hearing. Furthermore, the respondent no.1 and his counsel were also absent on 17.03.2025, 16.12.2024, 06.05.2024, 08.04.2024, and 05.02.2024. In pursuance of the process issued, the respondent, who is an elderly lady, appeared in person along with her counsel. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that a criminal complaint was filed at the instance of the appellant, alleging, inter alia, that the accused-respondent had borrowed a sum of money and, in discharge of said liability, issued a cheque drawn on ICICI Bank, Bhilwara, dated 07.03.2008, amounting to Rs. 4,00,000/-. On 30.08.2008, the said cheque was returned unpaid, having been dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in the account. 4. It is further contended that a legal notice dated 24.09.2008 was issued to the accused to apprise her of the dishonour of the cheque; however, the said notice was returned unserved with the remark of the postal authority indicating that the addressee was not found at the stated address, as she had reportedly relocated. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was instituted by the appellant, which was duly contested by the respondent. Upon hearing both sides and after extensive discussion of the factual matrix and legal propositions, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent of all charges. Hence, the present appeal. 5. The pivotal legal issue in this matter pertains to the proper service of the statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , upon the accused to establish her awareness of the cheque's dishonour. The appellant alleged collusion between the accused and the postman; however, no cogent evidence has been led to substantiate this claim. The admission made by PW-1, the complainant, that he was aware of the accused’s residence at Village Karohi, assumes significance, particularly in light of the fact that the notice was sent to House No. 9-D-17, New Bapu Nagar, Bhilwara. The appellant alleged collusion between the accused and the postman; however, no cogent evidence has been led to substantiate this claim. The admission made by PW-1, the complainant, that he was aware of the accused’s residence at Village Karohi, assumes significance, particularly in light of the fact that the notice was sent to House No. 9-D-17, New Bapu Nagar, Bhilwara. The respondent's ordinary residence at Village Karohi stands duly established. There is sufficient material on record to support the conclusion that the notice was deliberately not dispatched to the correct address of the accused. Furthermore, Ex. P/5, the returned envelope, bears an endorsement indicating the non-availability of the accused at the mentioned address, thereby strengthening the defence's contention that she did not reside at the location to which the notice was sent. The record convincingly reflects that no earnest effort was made by the complainant to serve the respondent with the requisite information regarding the dishonour of the cheque. 6. As per the mandate of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is incumbent upon the complainant, after receiving intimation from the bank regarding the dishonour of the cheque, to duly inform the accused by way of a legal notice before instituting a criminal complaint. 7. In order to appreciate the legal framework governing the offence in question, it would be apposite to reproduce hereinbelow the relevant provision, i.e., Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , which reads as under: “138. 7. In order to appreciate the legal framework governing the offence in question, it would be apposite to reproduce hereinbelow the relevant provision, i.e., Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , which reads as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.— Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless — (a)the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c)the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.] “ 8. In order to sustain a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , the existence of a valid cause of action is indispensable. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.] “ 8. In order to sustain a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , the existence of a valid cause of action is indispensable. The statutory framework envisages that the cause of action for initiating criminal proceedings arises only upon the dishonour of the cheque and the subsequent issuance of a legal notice to the drawer, calling upon them to make payment of the dishonoured amount within the prescribed statutory period. It is only upon the failure of the drawer to comply with such notice— either by explicitly denying the liability or by impliedly refusing to pay through deemed non-compliance—that the offence is said to be complete, thereby giving rise to the cause of action for instituting a complaint. 9. The legislative intent behind embedding the notice requirement under Section 138 is to ensure that the drawer is duly informed about the dishonour of the cheque and is given an opportunity to remedy the situation before facing criminal prosecution. The provision unequivocally mandates that no complaint can be entertained unless it is preceded by a valid notice that has been duly served upon the accused. Merely dispatching a notice does not suffice. It must be demonstrated that the notice was either actually received by the accused or deemed to have been received under the law. This distinction between mere dispatch and effective service is pivotal in determining the legality of the complaint and the viability of the prosecution. 10. Furthermore, the jurisprudence on this subject has recognized two distinct categories of denial that can constitute a cause of action under Section 138: (1) Express Denial , where the accused, upon receiving the notice, categorically refuses to pay the cheque amount, and (2) Deemed Denial , which operates in scenarios where the notice is shown to have been served upon the accused, but no payment is made within the statutory period. Either of these conditions must be fulfilled in order for the complainant to invoke criminal jurisdiction under the NI Act. 11. It is imperative to underscore that the concept of “notice” within the contours of Section 138 is not synonymous with mere transmission of the communication. The sine qua non is that the notice should reach the accused. Either of these conditions must be fulfilled in order for the complainant to invoke criminal jurisdiction under the NI Act. 11. It is imperative to underscore that the concept of “notice” within the contours of Section 138 is not synonymous with mere transmission of the communication. The sine qua non is that the notice should reach the accused. In cases where the accused is shown to have willfully evaded service—such as by avoiding receipt or absconding—courts are required to conduct a contextual inquiry into whether such evasion amounts to constructive service. In such cases, the burden lies on the complainant to demonstrate that reasonable steps were taken to ensure delivery and that the accused's conduct amounted to a deliberate evasion. 12. The legal presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 becomes relevant in this regard. This provision stipulates that where a document is properly addressed, prepaid, and sent by registered post to the last known address of the addressee, the service is deemed to have been effected unless the contrary is proved. However, this presumption is not absolute; it operates only when the complainant satisfactorily establishes that the address to which the notice was dispatched was, in fact, the bona fide and habitual residence of the accused at the material time. Absent such proof, the presumption of deemed service cannot be invoked to the complainant’s advantage. 13. In summation, the statutory obligation under Section 138 is not fulfilled by the mere act of sending a notice; what the law mandates is that the notice must reach the accused, either in fact or by operation of a legal presumption grounded in reasonableness and supported by credible evidence. In cases where the notice is returned undelivered and the complainant fails to establish that it was sent to the correct and current address of the accused, the foundational requirement of service remains unfulfilled, thereby vitiating the cause of action and, consequently, the maintainability of the complaint itself. 14. It is a settled proposition of law that the sine qua non for launching a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , is the accrual of a valid and complete cause of action. 14. It is a settled proposition of law that the sine qua non for launching a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , is the accrual of a valid and complete cause of action. Such cause of action arises only upon the fulfilment of a series of statutory preconditions, the most critical among them being the failure of the drawer to honour the demand raised through a statutory notice served upon them after the cheque has been dishonoured. The legal notice must inform the accused of the fact of dishonour and call upon them to discharge their liability within the stipulated time frame of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said notice. It is only upon the lapse of this prescribed period, without the accused having made payment of the cheque amount, that the penal consequences under Section 138 stand attracted, thereby giving rise to a valid cause of action in favour of the complainant. 15. Indeed, the jurisprudential foundation of Section 138 is predicated upon this structured sequence of events: the issuance of a cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and not merely any issuance or possession of a cheque. It is imperative to appreciate that not every cheque issued or retained or held in possession attracts the penal consequences under this provision. The cheque must have been issued specifically in lieu of a subsisting legal liability or for repayment of loan. Cheques that are issued for any other purpose and if it is dishonoured for any other cause then it would not fall within the purview of Section 138. The legislative intent clearly mandates that the cheque must have been issued against a lawful debt or liability that is actual and enforceable at the time of its issuance. 16. Furthermore, the cheque must be presented for encashment within its validity period, which, under prevailing banking norms, is three months from the date of its issuance. A presentation made beyond this period would render the instrument stale and unenforceable, thereby nullifying the complainant's claim under Section 138. Upon presentation, the cheque must be dishonoured for reasons recognized under the Act, such as "insufficiency of funds" or "exceeds arrangement," including cases where the drawer has issued a “stop payment” instruction. A presentation made beyond this period would render the instrument stale and unenforceable, thereby nullifying the complainant's claim under Section 138. Upon presentation, the cheque must be dishonoured for reasons recognized under the Act, such as "insufficiency of funds" or "exceeds arrangement," including cases where the drawer has issued a “stop payment” instruction. Following such dishonour, the complainant is statutorily obliged to issue a legal notice to the drawer within thirty days from the receipt of the bank's return memo. As already discussed, the accused must then be afforded fifteen days from the receipt of such notice to make payment of the dishonoured amount. 17. It is only upon the failure of the accused to make such payment within the stipulated period after receipt of the statutory notice that the cause of action for prosecution under Section 138 is deemed to arise. Absent any of the aforementioned conditions—whether the legal debt, timely presentation, dishonour, notice within prescribed time, or failure to pay post-receipt of notice—the complaint under Section 138 would suffer from a fundamental legal infirmity and would be liable to be dismissed. Thus, the procedural rigour embedded in the provision is not merely directory but is mandatory, forming the very bedrock upon which the right to prosecute stands accrued. 18. In the absence of this sequence being duly completed, the cause of action remains inchoate and legally untenable. The statute does not contemplate any penal liability to arise in abstract or merely upon the dishonour of the cheque per se; it mandates a procedural compliance framework, the violation of which alone crystallizes the offence and empowers the complainant to invoke criminal law machinery. 19.Accordingly, where the accused receives the statutory notice and yet defaults in making payment within the stipulated fifteen-day window, such omission is construed in law as a constructive and deliberate denial to pay, thereby constituting the cause of action contemplated under Section 138. Conversely, if the drawer makes payment within the prescribed time, the cause of action does not mature, and no prosecution can be instituted. In legal terms, the complaint would be premature and liable to be dismissed for want of a complete cause of action. Conversely, if the drawer makes payment within the prescribed time, the cause of action does not mature, and no prosecution can be instituted. In legal terms, the complaint would be premature and liable to be dismissed for want of a complete cause of action. 20.Thus, the failure to discharge the liability within the statutory period after receipt of notice is not a mere procedural lapse— it is a substantive element of the offence, without which the complainant lacks the legal foundation to prosecute the matter. This temporal aspect of non-payment post-notice is what transmutes a civil liability into a penal offence. Therefore, absent a valid cause of action, the invocation of the criminal jurisdiction under Section 138 is rendered legally unsustainable. 21. The learned Trial Court has also undertaken a meticulous appreciation of evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the cheque in question was not issued by the accused to the appellant in discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability. Although a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act arises in favour of the holder of the cheque, the accused successfully rebutted the same by adducing cogent and credible evidence. It was not established that there existed a legally enforceable debt or liability for which the cheque was issued and subsequently dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. In essence, the appellant has failed to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt. 22. The learned Trial Judge has not committed any error, either of law or of fact, in dismissing the complaint and acquitting the accused. Moreover, unless it is demonstrated that the evidence has been grossly misappreciated or material evidence has been ignored, the appellate court ought not to interfere with the findings of acquittal. 23. Accordingly, finding no merit in the present Criminal Appeal, the same stands dismissed.