JUDGMENT : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, CJ. I.A. No. 10361 of 2024 1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 224 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 09.01.2024 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6080 of 2017. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that the respondents had given a representation on 29.05.2024 including photocopy of the writ petition and certified copy of the judgment dt. 09.01.2024 and then the file was placed before the concerned Section on 05.06.2024. It is stated that later, the file was placed before the competent authority through proper channel on 15.06.2024 and then forwarded the Legal Department for seeking opinion of the Advocate General for filing Letters Patent Appeal against the impugned order. 3. It is stated that grounds of appeal were prepared and file was put up before the Advocate General on 21.06.2024 and he assigned the file to the Senior Standing Counsel-III on 03.07.2024 and the D.E.O. of the concerned district was authorized to file it on 18.07.2024. 4. It is stated that the Senior Standing Counsel-III resigned from the post and so the file was allotted to the Senior Standing counsel-II on 06.08.2024. 5. Thereafter, the memo of appeal was drafted and sent to the Department for approval, and after approval was granted, it was filed. It is stated that the delay was due to procedural technicalities and not deliberate and that the applicants are government functionaries having several layers of decision-making which consumed lot of time. It is also stated that there are good merits in the appeal and so the delay should be condoned. 6. Admittedly, the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge was pronounced on 09.01.2024 in the presence of the counsel for applicants. Yet, till the representation was given on 29.05.2024 by the respondent, i.e., 3½ months later, nothing was done to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Also, the application for issuance of certified copy was made by the applicants on 23.07.2024, more than six months from the date of pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Single Judge as can be seen from the certified copy filed along with the accompanying memo of appeal. 7. Also, the application for issuance of certified copy was made by the applicants on 23.07.2024, more than six months from the date of pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Single Judge as can be seen from the certified copy filed along with the accompanying memo of appeal. 7. The applicants were fully aware that the limitation for filing of Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is only 30 days, but the file kept moving from table to table and from office to office, and after a delay of 224 days, it came to be filed. 8. The counsel for the State Government placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh , Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025 in support of his claim that the delay is liable to be condoned. 9. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] , the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd., [ (2022) 3 SCC 159 ] , Pr. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd., [ (2022) 3 SCC 159 ] , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 2 SCC 327 ] , Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others, [ (2021) 11 SCC 557 ] , Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another, [ (2022) 9 SCC 263 ] , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others, [ (2022) 9 SCC 266 ] . 11. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 12. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 12. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024. 13. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1) referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. 14. Reliance has been placed on certain judgments of the Supreme Court, particularly in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra , [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 ] and also the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India , [ (2023) 10 SCC 531 ] , to hold that liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. 15. Inder Singh (supra 1) was also a case where the learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of 1537 days and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the same. 16. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra 8) and in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra 9), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It also stated that if there is a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical consideration. 17. In Sheo Raj Singh (supra 11), referred to in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra 1), the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; that the law is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate power should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly wrong and not when it is merely not right. 18. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since, in the instant application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the period of delay. It is not considering an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to condone it. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we are satisfied that the applicants have not taken steps for filing the appeal expeditiously and acted in a negligent manner. We are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown by them for condoning the delay of 224 days in filing the appeal. 20. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. 21. All pending applications shall stand closed.