JUDGMENT : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J. I.A. No. 10039 of 2024 1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 271 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 08.02.2024 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 5292 of 2014. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that the applicants received the copy of the impugned judgment and the file was then moved on 14.05.2024 for taking a decision regarding filing of the Letters Patent Appeal. 3. It is then stated that a decision was taken on 15.05.2024 to take the opinion of the Department of Law and also the office of the Advocate General and the file of the case was moved accordingly. It is stated that the Advocate General’s office gave opinion on 05.06.2024 for filing the Letters Patent Appeal, steps were then taken on 11.06.2024 for preparing the grounds for filing the Letters Patent Appeal, and then the same was sent to the Secretary of the Department on 07.08.2024 for approval. 4. It is stated that approval was granted by the Secretary of the Department to file the Appeal on 14.08.2024, it was then sent to the Law Officer for preparing the grounds of Appeal on 30.08.2024 and the Appeal then came to be filed on 11.09.2024. 5. It is contended that there are goods merits in the appeal and so the delay in filing the appeal is to be condoned, because the delay is also on account of procedures and was unintentional. 6. The counsel for the applicants placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh , Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025, in support of his claim that the delay is liable to be condoned. 7. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that though the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the writ petition has been pronounced on 08.02.2024, the Letters Patent Appeal came to be filed on 11.09.2024, with the delay of 271 days. 8. It is not as if the applicants are not aware that the time for filing the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is only 30 days. 9. 8. It is not as if the applicants are not aware that the time for filing the Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge is only 30 days. 9. Since the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the applicants, they were certainly aware of the same on the date of its pronouncement itself. 10. Yet, from 08.02.2024 till 14.05.2024, the applicants did nothing in the matter. Only thereafter the file was moved from table to table and from office to office, and ultimately, the appeal was filed with a delay of 271 days, as mentioned above. 11. Even the certified copy of the impugned judgment was applied for on 20.08.2024, i.e. after six months from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, as can be seen from certified copy of the impugned judgment filed along with the accompanying Appeal. 12. The applicants seem to be of the view that they can file the appeal at any point of time, and it does not really matter how long they take in getting instructions and filing Letters Patent Appeal. This attitude is to be strongly deprecated. 13. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another , [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] , the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 15. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 15. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai v. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 3 SCC 159 ] , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 2 SCC 327 ] , Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others , [ (2021) 11 SCC 557 ] , Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another , [ (2022) 9 SCC 263 ] , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & others , [ (2022) 9 SCC 266 ] 16. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that theywant to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 17. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary , Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024. 18. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra) referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. Reliance has been placed in Inder Singh (supra) on certain judgments of the Supreme Court, particularly in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra , [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 ] and also the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India , [ (2023) 10 SCC 531 ] , to hold that a liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. 19. Inder Singh (supra) was a case where the learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of 1537 days and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the same. 20. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (supra) and in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It also stated that if there is a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical consideration. 21. In Sheo Raj Singh (supra), referred to in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh (supra), the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing a Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; that the law is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate power should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly wrong and not when it is merely not right. 22. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since in the instant application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the period of delay. It is not considering an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to condone it. 23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that applicants have been negligent in taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal and they have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the same. 24. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed.Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed. 25. All pending applications shall stand closed.