JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (‘CMA’) arises out of an order dated 07.07.2025 passed in I.A.No.1921 of 2024 in SOP.No.10 of 2024 by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Kukatpally (‘The Trial Court’). 2. The appellant had filed SOP.No.10 of 2024 to declare the purported resignation of the appellant from the respondent No.1- M/s. St. Vincent Educational Society (‘the Society’) as being fabricated and not binding on the appellant, and also to declare the Resolutions dated 23.05.2024 and 30.05.2024 passed by the respondent Nos.2-7 in the 1 st and 2 nd Special General Body Meetings of the Society dated 23.05.2024 and 30.05.2024 respectively as being illegal, null and void. 3. The appellant filed an IA in the SOP under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking a direction on the respondent Nos.1 – 11 to maintain the status quo ante as prevailing prior to the purported resignation letter of the appellant dated 30.04.2024 which was accepted in the Resolution dated 23.05.2024 passed in the 1 st Special General Body Meeting of the Society thereby permitting the appellant to continue functioning as the General Secretary and member of the respondent No.1 Society. 4. By the impugned order, the appellant’s IA was dismissed by the Trial Court, inter alia, on the ground that there were several disputed questions of fact which have to be decided in the main case viz. whether the resignation of the appellant is valid or fabricated and whether the appointment of the respondent No.3 has been done as per the Rules and Regulations of the Society. The Trial Court also opined that without deciding the disputed questions of fact, a status quo ante could not be granted. It was further noted that the appellant failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour or show balance of convenience in his favour or show that he would suffer irreparable loss for warranting the grant of an injunction in the matter. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that there is grave urgency for passing interim orders in the present CMA, since the respondent Nos.2 to 7 continue to siphon off money from the respondent No.1 Society. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that there is grave urgency for passing interim orders in the present CMA, since the respondent Nos.2 to 7 continue to siphon off money from the respondent No.1 Society. Senior Counsel contends that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the strong prima facie case established by the appellant, the balance of convenience being in favour of the appellant, and the irreparable injury which would be caused to the appellant due to the actions of the respondents if the interim order as prayed for is not granted. 6. Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant disputes the resignation letter dated 30.04.2024 allegedly given by the appellant, as well as the Notices of the Meetings of the respondent No.1 Society which were relied upon by the respondents to show that the appellant’s representatives/family members were duly intimated of the meeting. Counsel also submits that the Trial Court did not consider the binding force of the Circular Memo bearing Circular No.12/D&IG/Peshi dated 01.10.2010 issued by the Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, A.P., Hyderabad (‘Inspector General’). 7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 7 submits that the alleged resignation letter dated 30.04.2024 was given by the appellant when he was present in India and that the appellant or his family members (the respondent Nos.8 to 10) did not object to or protest against the acceptance of the appellant’s resignation letter. Senior Counsel further disputes the binding force of the Circular dated 01.10.2010, relied upon by the appellant and urges that the Resolution dated 23.05.2024 inducting the new members of the Managing Committee was approved by two-thirds majority as evident from the signatures appended to the Resolution in this respect which stands testimony to the adherence to the Rules and Regulations of the respondent No.1 Society. 8. The brief facts which are relevant to the present Appeal are as follows. (i) The appellant was inducted as a member and appointed as the General Secretary of the respondent No.1 Society on 25.11.2010. The appellant served the respondent No.1 Society as the General Secretary for 14 years before resigning from the said post by way of the disputed resignation letter dated 30.04.2024. (i) The appellant was inducted as a member and appointed as the General Secretary of the respondent No.1 Society on 25.11.2010. The appellant served the respondent No.1 Society as the General Secretary for 14 years before resigning from the said post by way of the disputed resignation letter dated 30.04.2024. (ii) A Notice dated 30.04.2024 had been circulated intimating that the 1st Special General Body Meeting of the respondent No.1 Society was scheduled to be held on 23.05.2024 for accepting the resignation of the appellant from the post of General Secretary of the respondent No.1 Society and for appointing a new General Secretary in his stead. (iii) The 1 st Special General Body Meeting was held on 23.05.2024 where the appellant was recorded as having resigned on 30.04.2024 and the respondent Nos.8 – 10 (the appellant’s brother, wife and daughter respectively) were recorded as being ‘Absent/Not Available’ (the respondent No.8) and ‘Out of Country/Not Available’ (the respondent Nos.9 and 10). (iv) The 2 nd Special General Body Meeting was held on 30.05.2024 wherein the 1 st General Body Meeting Resolution was approved. (v) The respondent No.1 Society sent a letter dated 30.05.2024 to the Registrar of Societies, Hyderabad District (North) Red Hills, Hyderabad to incorporate the changes in the Managing Committee of the Society including the resignation of the General Secretary, appointment of a new General Secretary and Vice President. (vi) The appellant filed W.P.No.21455 of 2024 challenging the action of the Registrar of Societies with regard to incorporating the changes in the Managing Committee of the respondent No.1 Society. The said Writ Petition was subsequently withdrawn for the purpose of filing a comprehensive Society Original Petition before the jurisdictional Court. (vii) The appellant filed S.O.P.No.10 of 2024 on 05.11.2024 before the Trial Court. In the said S.O.P., the appellant filed I.A.No.1921 of 2024 seeking a direction to the respondent Nos.1 – 11 to maintain status quo ante as prevailing prior to the purported resignation letter dated 30.04.2024 which was dismissed by the Trial Court vide impugned order dated 07.07.2025. 9. As stated above, the appellant filed the I.A. in the SOP for a direction on the respondent Nos.1 – 11 to maintain status quo ante as prevailing prior to the disputed resignation letter of the appellant dated 30.04.2024. 10. We have perused the impugned order dismissing the appellant’s IA passed by the Trial Court. 9. As stated above, the appellant filed the I.A. in the SOP for a direction on the respondent Nos.1 – 11 to maintain status quo ante as prevailing prior to the disputed resignation letter of the appellant dated 30.04.2024. 10. We have perused the impugned order dismissing the appellant’s IA passed by the Trial Court. The primary reason given is that the act of forgery/fabrication of the resignation letter is a matter which has to be tried in the SOP. The impugned order however does not contain any discussion with regard to adherence to the ‘Circular Memo’ dated 01.10.2010 i.e., as to whether the respondent No.11 complied with the instructions issued to the District Registrars on the procedure to be followed before accepting the papers filed by a new Managing Committee. To clarify, the ‘Inspector General’ issued a Circular Memo dated 01.10.2010 containing certain instructions which are to be followed while effecting changes in the Managing Committees of various Societies. The Circular in fact reveals that these instructions to the District Registrars have been necessitated pursuant to the complaints received by the Inspector General that the Managing Committees of some Societies are being changed without following due procedure as mentioned in the bye-laws of those Societies. Instruction No.5 is relevant to the present matter and is set out below: ‘5. The District Registrar has to issue a notice to the members who resigned and take affidavit in his office from them to confirm the fact that they indeed resigned.’ 11. It is thus evident that before giving effect to the resignation of a member of the Society, the District Registrar has to issue a Notice to the concerned member who resigned and take an Affidavit from such member to ascertain/confirm whether that member has actually resigned. Therefore, without even going into the fact of whether the appellant’s resignation letter was fabricated or not, it is undisputed that the procedure outlined in Instruction No.5 was not followed with regard to the appellant’s resignation. The impugned order also does not contain any finding on this aspect. 12. The argument made on behalf of the respondent No.1 Society with regard to the Circular dated 01.10.2010 being contrary to Section 69 of The REGISTRATION ACT , 1908 (‘the 1908 Act’) is not acceptable for the following reasons. The impugned order also does not contain any finding on this aspect. 12. The argument made on behalf of the respondent No.1 Society with regard to the Circular dated 01.10.2010 being contrary to Section 69 of The REGISTRATION ACT , 1908 (‘the 1908 Act’) is not acceptable for the following reasons. Section 69 of the 1908 Act deals with the power of the Inspector General to superintend the Registration Offices and make Rules thereunder. The relevant part of Section 69 of the 1908 Act is set out below. ‘69. Power of Inspector-General to superintend registration offices and make rules – (1) The Inspector-General shall exercise a general superintendence over all the registration offices in the territories of the State Government, and shall have power, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Act: … … … (2) The rules so made shall be submitted to the State Government for approval, and after they have been approved they shall be published in the Official Gazette, and on publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.’ 13. It is clear from the above that section 69 of the 1908 Act can be divided into two parts. The first part contemplates superintendence over all the Registration Offices while the second part empowers the Inspector General to make the Rules for such superintendence. The first part i.e., section 69(1) does not require any publication in the Official Gazette. The requirement of publication is only present under section 69(2) of the 1908 Act which deals with the Rule making power of the Inspector General. This very issue was comprehensively dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Gaddam Laxmaiah Vs. Commisisoner and Inspector General, Registration and Stamps, Hyderabad , [2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 815] where the Division Bench negated the contention that Circulars/Instructions issued by the Inspector General in exercise of powers of general superintendence under section 69(1) need to be published in the Official Gazette. Therefore, we do not find any force in the argument that the Circular Memo dated 01.10.2010 ceases to have the force of law or is contrary to section 69 of the 1908 Act. It is undisputed that the said Circular is still in force. 14. Therefore, we do not find any force in the argument that the Circular Memo dated 01.10.2010 ceases to have the force of law or is contrary to section 69 of the 1908 Act. It is undisputed that the said Circular is still in force. 14. The very fact that the Trial Court did not consider the admitted violation of Instruction No.5 in the Circular dated 01.10.2010 goes to the root of the matter since the appellant’s purported resignation letter forms the trigger of the dispute. 15. We may also add that Instruction No.5 of the Circular dated 01.10.2010 charts the course to be followed in relation to resignation and to pre-empt any mischief by interested parties in using fabricated letters of resignation against the resigned person. Hence, non-compliance with Instruction No.5 of the Circular defeats the very mischief against the appellant, which the Circular sought to prevent. 16. Even otherwise, there are other factors which cast a long shadow of doubt. The contention of the respondents that the changes in the Management were approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting is one such suspicious fact. Firstly, the Minutes of Meeting dated 23.05.2024 recorded the appellant as having resigned on 30.04.2024 i.e., even before the letter of resignation was accepted by the respondent No.1 Society. Further, the attendance sheet of the 2nd Special General Body Meeting held on 30.05.2024 does away with the appellant’s name altogether and marks the appellant’s brother, wife and daughter (the Joint Secretary and Executive Members, respectively) as being ‘absent/out of country’. Hence, the assent of six members out of nine as on 30.05.2024 appears to be contrived. The passing of the Resolution at the meeting held on 30.05.2024 by two-thirds majority would not have taken place had the appellant along with his three representatives been taken into consideration or counted in the total list of ten Managing Body Members. To clarify, the appellant and his representatives would have constituted four out of ten of the members. 17. It should also be reiterated that the Notice for accepting the appellant’s resignation was circulated on 23.05.2024 for scheduling the 2 nd Special General Body Meeting on 30.05.2024 whereby the resignation of the appellant was to be approved. Hence, as on 23.05.2024, the petitioner could not have been discounted as already having resigned. 18. 17. It should also be reiterated that the Notice for accepting the appellant’s resignation was circulated on 23.05.2024 for scheduling the 2 nd Special General Body Meeting on 30.05.2024 whereby the resignation of the appellant was to be approved. Hence, as on 23.05.2024, the petitioner could not have been discounted as already having resigned. 18. The Trial Court failed to take the above issues into consideration and proceeded only while considering the allegation of forgery. We are of the firm view that the non-compliance with the Circular dated 01.10.2010 and the attending facts including the manner in which the Managing Committee of the respondent No.1 Society passed the Resolution on 30.05.2024 would amount to a strong prima facie case in favour of the appellant which the Trial Court failed to appreciate altogether. The balance of convenience and the irreparable injury caused to the appellant in the dismissal of the IA follows from the aforesaid. 19. The fact that the appellant remained excluded from the management of the respondent No.1 Society from April/June, 2024 will not affect the balance of convenience since the appellant filed W.P.No.21455 of 2024 before this Court challenging the incorporation of the changes in the Managing Committee by the Registrar of Societies. The litigation between the parties cannot prejudice a valid right in the face of illegality. 20. We are hence of the considered view that the impugned order should be set aside. However, since the appellant has not been acting as the General Secretary of the respondent No.1 Society, from April/June, 2024, and the newly appointed General Secretary has been in place since 30.05.2024, we deem it fit to permit the appellant as well as the newly appointed General Secretary of the Society to function together with equal say in all matters of day-to-day administration with a system of checks and balances. The day-to-day administration would include all the accounts and financial transactions of the respondent No.1 Society being made available to the appellant including for the duration when the appellant ceased to be the General Secretary of the respondent No.1 Society. This arrangement shall continue till the Trial Court disposes of the SOP. The Trial Court shall dispose of the SOP as expeditiously as possible within a reasonable period of time and without any unnecessary delay. 21. CMA.No.314 of 2025, along with all connected applications, is disposed of.