JUDGMENT : (MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA, J.) 1. Heard Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the petitioner, i.e., the State of Mizoram. Also heard Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This Criminal Revision Petition under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the Sate of Mizoram, impugning the Order dated 12.11.2015 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court (P.C. Act) Aizawl in connection with SR(PCA) No. 1/2015 arising out of Criminal Trial No. 2442/2012 in connection with ACB P.S. Case No. 10/2012 whereby the respondents were discharged of offence under Section 120B/468/477A of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant Revision Petition, in brief, are that the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Vigilance Department vide letter No.13015/98/2010-VIG dated 26.05.2010 furnished a copy of L. No.B.13017/69/2006- RD(WD)Pt-1 dated 11.05.2010 with each enclosure of related papers received from the Under Secretary of the Government of Mizoram, RD Department requesting to conduct enquiry in the implementation of Hariyali Project-V within Siaha District. Accordingly, ACB Enquiry No. 14/2010 dated 01.06.2010 was registered and endorsed to Inspector F. Engkunga, ACB. 4. Acting on the enquiry report, the SP, ACB Mizoram registered ACB P.S. Case No. 10/2012 dated 05.10.2012 under Sections 1208/468/477A of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 13 (1) (d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against the respondents, namely (1) R. Zotawna, Director, Horticulture Department, Government of Mizoram, the then DHO, Siaha, (2) SR Lalrinliana, Horticulture Development Officer (Rtd), the then DHO, Siaha, (3) T.Vanupa, Horticulture Extension Officer, DHO, Siaha, (4) C.Ramrela, Horticulture Extension Officer, DHO, Siaha, and (5) C.Lianluaia, Asst. Divisional Horticulture Officer, Kolasib Division, the then Horticulture Extension Officer, DHO Office. Inspector Dennis VL. Lura, ACB was entrusted to conduct investigation of the case. 5. During the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statements of several witnesses and claimed to have unearthed alleged mismanagement of the money under the Hariyali Project-V within Siaha District. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer found that Rs. 15,81,222/- had been misappropriated by the respondents for their own pecuniary benefits and submitted the charge sheet accordingly. 6. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer found that Rs. 15,81,222/- had been misappropriated by the respondents for their own pecuniary benefits and submitted the charge sheet accordingly. 6. Though, the charge-sheet was laid against all the above-named respondents (accused persons), however, by the impugned order dated 12.11.2015, all of them were discharged by the learned Judge, Special Court (P.C. Act) Aizawl finding no prima facie case against them. 7. Ms. Linda L. Fambawl, the learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that the Trial Court had erred in discharging the accused persons (respondents) in spite of the fact that sufficient incriminating materials were there against them on record and a prima facie case was made out against them under Section 120B/468/417/477A of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 8. She submits that the materials submitted along with the charge- sheet in this case clearly indicates that the amount of Rs. 15,81,222/- has been misappropriated by the respondents (accused persons) for their pecuniary benefits. 9. She also submits that there are materials in the record which indicates that the respondents had forged the signatures of the beneficiaries in the APRs and indulged in criminal conspiracy for misappropriating funds under Hariyali Project-V (2005-2007) amounting to Rs. 15,81,222/-. 10. She submits that the learned Trial Court erred in giving undue importance to the technicalities and considering the procedure laid down in the ACB manual for ordering preliminary enquiry to be mandatory and accordingly, giving benefit of the non-compliance of such requirement to the respondents without ascertaining as to whether any prejudice has been caused to the respondents due to the non-compliance of the procedural requirement of seeking approval of Chief Vigilance Officer before ordering the preliminary enquiry. 11. She also submitted that the another aspect which the Trial Court considered is also technical in nature while giving benefit to the respondents in as much as non-availability of original FIR itself cannot be regarded as fatal for the prosecution case as the photocopy of the said FIR was available with the charge-sheet and such technical matters may be pleaded only at the stage of trial and not at the stage of consideration of charges. 12. In support of her submissions, she has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “State represented by Inspector of Police Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. 12. In support of her submissions, she has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “State represented by Inspector of Police Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. M. Subrahmanyam” reported in (2019) 6 SCC 357 , wherein it was observed as follows: “7. In Bihar SEB v. Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Ltd. [Bihar SEB v. Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Ltd., 1984 Supp SCC 597 ] , the Court opined: (SCC p. 598, para 6) “6. Undoubtedly, there is some negligence but when a substantive matter is dismissed on the ground of failure to comply with procedural directions, there is always some element of negligence involved in it because a vigilant litigant would not miss complying with procedural direction. … The question is whether the degree of negligence is so high as to bang the door of court to a suitor seeking justice. In other words, should an investigation of facts for rendering justice be peremptorily thwarted by some procedural lacuna?” 8. The failure to bring the authorisation on record, as observed, was more a matter of procedure, which is but a handmaid of justice. Substantive justice must always prevail over procedural or technical justice. To hold that failure to explain delay in a procedural matter would operate as res judicata will be a travesty of justice considering that the present is a matter relating to corruption in public life by holder of a public post. The rights of an accused are undoubtedly important, but so is the rule of law and societal interest in ensuring that an alleged offender be subjected to the laws of the land in the larger public interest. To put the rights of an accused at a higher pedestal and to make the rule of law and societal interest in prevention of crime, subservient to the same cannot be considered as dispensation of justice. A balance therefore has to be struck. A procedural lapse cannot be placed on a par with what is or may be substantive violation of the law.” 13. She submits that a mini trial is not contemplated at the stage of considering an application for discharge and Court has to proceed with an assumption that the material brought on record by the prosecution side are true. 14. A procedural lapse cannot be placed on a par with what is or may be substantive violation of the law.” 13. She submits that a mini trial is not contemplated at the stage of considering an application for discharge and Court has to proceed with an assumption that the material brought on record by the prosecution side are true. 14. The learned Public Prosecutor has also submitted that in their statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the respondents have admitted the fact of diversion of funds for purchasing plastic chairs, folding bed, dining tables, drawing tables, water filter, mosquito nets, mattresses and bed cover for disbursing to Watershed Committee of five Village Council, however, without obtaining any permission to do so. 15. She also submits that there are materials on record to show that the fund allocated for Hariyali Project-V was diverted in other purpose without there being any authorization for the same. 16. In support of her submission she has cited ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “State of Tamilnadu Represented by the Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti corruption Vs. N. Suresh Rajan” reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709 , wherein it was observed as follows: “31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it “considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction”. 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [ (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256] . The same reads as follows : (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43) “43. … Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of „prima facie? case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.” 17. The learned Public Prosecutor for the State respondent has submitted that the charge-sheet clearly indicates that the respondents were found liable for forging the signatures of the beneficiaries in APRs and found involved in criminal conspiracy by which the amount of Rs. The learned Public Prosecutor for the State respondent has submitted that the charge-sheet clearly indicates that the respondents were found liable for forging the signatures of the beneficiaries in APRs and found involved in criminal conspiracy by which the amount of Rs. 15,81,222/- out of total sanctioned amount under Hariyali Project-V was found to be misappropriated by the accused persons, however, in spite of that the Trial Court observed that no Prima Facie case has been made out against the respondents, therefore, the impugned order is required to be interfered with and charges are required to be framed against under appropriate provisions of law against the respondents. 18. On the other hand, Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Trial Court has rightly discharged the respondents (accused persons) by passing the impugned order and the same needs no interference by this Court. He submits that the charge-sheet was laid in this case without following the mandatory provision under Chapter-V of ACB Manual which provides that “the Director/SP shall obtain approval of the Chief Vigilance Officer before ordering preliminary enquiry and shall also obtain approval to register an preliminary enquiry to lay trap against an IAS Officer, Heads of Department and Joint Secretary of above level Officers”. 19. He submits that no such approval was obtained in the instant case and nothing was produced along with charge-sheet to indicate that any such approval as mandated under the ACB Manual was produced before the Court. He submits that even the Original FIR was not sent along with the charge-sheet and only a copy of the FIR is available in the case record. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in the charge-sheet no specific allegations has been made against the accused persons as to what role was played by each of them individually in commission of the alleged offence. He submits that merely stating that the petitioners have embezzled an amount of Rs. 15,81,222/- for their own pecuniary benefits is not sufficient unless there is an indication in the chare-sheet as to what is the material evidence available on the file to substantiate such an accusation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Sharif Ahmad Vs. 15,81,222/- for their own pecuniary benefits is not sufficient unless there is an indication in the chare-sheet as to what is the material evidence available on the file to substantiate such an accusation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Sharif Ahmad Vs. State Of U.P. and Another ” reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 726. 21. He submits that the statement of the accused persons recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in which they have implicated themselves cannot be taken into consideration for ascertaining as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. Though, the statement of witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be utilized for such purpose. In support of his submission, he cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ P. Krishna Mohan Reddy Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh ” reported in 2025 SCC online 1157 , in which the Apex Court has observed as follows: “45. However, the aforesaid observations cannot be singled out and construed devoid of its context. While it is permissible for the courts to examine the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima- facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature or gravity of the allegations, the same applies only insofar as such police statements are of witnesses and not accused persons.” 22. He has submitted that in the charge-sheet only bold accusations have been made against the respondents without there being any materials to substantiate such accusations. 23. He submits that merely because of the fact that the respondents were holding the post which were responsible for project implementation of Hariyali Project-V within the Siaha District, they cannot be charged along with the offence of misappropriation of Rs. 15,81,222/- as well as for manipulating of the APRs merely on the basis of suspicion. 23. He submits that merely because of the fact that the respondents were holding the post which were responsible for project implementation of Hariyali Project-V within the Siaha District, they cannot be charged along with the offence of misappropriation of Rs. 15,81,222/- as well as for manipulating of the APRs merely on the basis of suspicion. He submits that if there is a grave suspicion based on material on which such suspicion has been made the charges may be framed however, if the material on record give rise to a situation under which two views are possible, one view leading to some suspicion but not grave suspicion then the Trial Court would be allowed in discharging the accused persons which he submits as happened in this case. In support of his submission, he has cited the case of “Shilpi Sha rma Vs. State of Another” reported in (2022) SCC Online Del 2493, wherein it was observed as follows: “9. It is a settled law that a judge, while considering the question of framing of charges, is certainly empowered to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. Where the material placed before the court discloses great suspicion against the accused, which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge and proceeding with the trial. However, if two views are equally possible and the judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gave rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, the judge will be fully Justified to discharge the accused. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., the judge cannot act merely as the post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court and should not make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial [Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra)].” 24. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that as nothing has been shown as to how the accused persons have committed the alleged offence and the charge-sheet was filed without proper investigation only on the basis of vague suspicion, the Trial Court was correct in discharging them by passing the impugned order, therefore, the same does not warrants any interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prays for dismissing the instant Criminal Revision Petition. 25. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record including the Trial Court record, which was requisitioned in connection with this case. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both sides in support of their submissions. 26. At the outset, it is important to note that while dealing with the instant case, this Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction. There is no dispute to the legal proposition that revisional powers belong to supervisory jurisdiction of a superior Court. While exercising its revisional powers, the Court has to confine to the legality and propriety of the findings and also whether the Trial Court has kept itself within the bounds of its jurisdiction, including the question as to whether the Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, this Court is not supposed to arrive at a different possible conclusion after re-appreciation of evidence even if the Trial Court is found to have acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction. 27. In the instant case, the impugned order has been passed by the Court of learned Special Court (P.C. Act), Aizawl. As per the Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate. As such, the provisions contained in the Section 239 and Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be applicable in respect of procedure for the discharge of an accused as well as for framing of charges against him, respectively. 28. The accused persons, thus, may be discharged only if the learned Special Judge considered the charge against them to be groundless. 28. The accused persons, thus, may be discharged only if the learned Special Judge considered the charge against them to be groundless. Similarly, only if the learned Special Judge is of the opinion that there were grounds for presuming that the accused persons have committed offence which he is competent to try and it can be adequately punished by him, he ought to have framed charges against accused persons in writing. 29. If we go through the impugned order, it appears that the Trial Court has discharged the respondents mainly on three grounds. Firstly, it came to the conclusion that the mandatory requirement of obtaining approval of the Chief Vigilance Officer by the Director/SP before ordering the preliminary enquiry was not done according to the provisions of Chapter-V of the ACB Manual. In this regard though, there certainly appears to be a procedural lapse committed by the Investigating Authority in this case, however, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of the “State represented by Inspector of Police Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. M. Subrahmanyam” (Supra) as quoted in paragraph No. 12 herein before, this Court is of the considered opinion that though the question of the said procedural lapse may always be raised during the trial, however, at the state of consideration of charges itself the case of the prosecution cannot be thwarted at the threshold without there being anything on record to show as to how it has caused prejudice to the respondents (accused persons). 30. The second ground on which the Trial Court took into consideration, while discharging the respondents by passing the impugned order, is that the charge-sheet was not accompanied by the original FIR. In this regard, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a question which may always be raised at the appropriate stage of trial, however, for such procedural negligence, the prosecution case may not be thwarted at the initial stage of consideration of charges, if otherwise there are grounds for presuming that the respondents have committed the offence alleged against them in the charge-sheet. 31. 31. The third as well as the main ground which was taken into consideration by the Trial Court for discharging the respondents is that no specific allegation against each of the individual accused person has been made in this case and no indication is there in the charge-sheet as to by what material evidence the prosecution is intending to prove the general accusation made against the accused persons. In this regard, the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of “Sharif Ahmad Vs. State Of U.P. and Another” (Supra) is relevant and the same is quoted herein below: “31. Therefore, the investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the file. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. The role played by the accused in the crime should be separately and clearly mentioned in the chargesheet, for each of the accused persons.” 32. The Trial Court has observed, in the impugned order, that no specific allegations were leveled against any of the respondents individually and only general accusations was made against them in the charge-sheet which is also vague in nature without any specific details. The Trial Court has observed that the general accusations of misappropriation levelled against the respondents as well as accusations of forgery made against them only raises a suspicion against them, however, in absence of any specific materials on record substantiating such a suspicion, the same cannot be regarded as grave suspicion. The Trial Court thereafter, considering the observation of the Apex Court in the case of “ Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra ” has discharged the respondents. 33. Let us examine, as to whether in the charge-sheet any specific accusation has been made against any of the respondent with any indication as to what supporting materials are there to substantiate the said accusations. 34. If we peruse the charge-sheet dated 16.12.2015 which was filed against the respondents, it appears that the same is a very long one. It also appears that total 93 witnesses have been enlisted in the charge-sheet. 34. If we peruse the charge-sheet dated 16.12.2015 which was filed against the respondents, it appears that the same is a very long one. It also appears that total 93 witnesses have been enlisted in the charge-sheet. It also appears from the charge-sheet that during the investigation, it was found that against IWDP Hariyali Project-V (2005-2007) within the Siaha District covered five villages. The district Horticulture Office, Siaha was entrusted with the implementation of the said project in the District and the amount of Rs. 72,00,000/- was allocated as the first installment for promotion of the said project from the Nodal Department DRDA, Siaha. 35. It also appears that during the investigation, it was found that the project implementation authority of the aforesaid project was empowered to utilize the funds under three main heads, namely, Work Component Community Organization and Training and Administration Overhead, however, during investigation it was found that the funds were utilized for purchasing other items for which there was no administrative approval. 36. It was found that some of the APRs were actually not signed by the beneficiaries and the money shown to have been received by such beneficiaries as actually not paid. 37. The Investigating Officer has also stated in the charge-sheet out of the sanctioned amount of Rs. 72,00,000/- and the amount of Rs. 15,81,222/- was found to be not utilized for the purpose of implementation of the Hariyali Project-V for which it was sanctioned, therefore, it has been alleged that the same has been misappropriated by the respondents for their own personal benefits. 38. It appears that the Trial Court had, in the impugned order, observed that unless there is specific allegation against each of the accused persons on their own level of post held by them at the relevant time there is no way proving the allegation against them. It was also observed that the allegation made against them is vague and general in nature without any details. The Trial Court also observed that there is no allegation as to who, out of the five accused persons who had misappropriated the Government money. 39. It also observed that there may be possibility that some accused may not be guilty whereas some of them may be guilt and held that the accusations against them is of general nature. 40. The Trial Court also observed that there is no allegation as to who, out of the five accused persons who had misappropriated the Government money. 39. It also observed that there may be possibility that some accused may not be guilty whereas some of them may be guilt and held that the accusations against them is of general nature. 40. We have discussed in paragraph No. 31 hereinbefore that the Apex Court in the case of “Sharif Ahmad Vs. State Of U.P. and Anoth er” (Supra) has observed that the Investigating Officer is duty bound to mention clearly and separately in the charge-sheet as to what role each of the accused persons have played in the alleged crime and what material is available on record against each of them. On the other hand, in the instant case as correctly held by the Trial Court that the general accusation have been made against the accused persons (respondents) without specifying the role played by them individually in the alleged crime. 41. However, as we have discussed herein above that while considering the question of discharging of the accused persons, the Trial Court shall have to follow the mandate of provisions contained in Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and they may be discharged only if the charges against them are considered to be groundless. 42. In the instant case there are materials to indicate that the signatures of beneficiaries in the APRs were forged and there has been falsification of accounts hence, the person responsible for collecting the signatures of the beneficiaries in the APRs as well as those responsible for maintaining the accounts as well as supervising disbursement of funds may be involved. The case in hand shows that an amount of Rs. 15,81,222/- has been found to be not utilized for the purpose related to the implementation of Hariyali Project-V. However, it has been shown to be so utilized by the accused persons. It is also important to note that in the impugned order itself there is an observation by the Trial Court that some of the accused persons may be involved in the alleged offence and some may not be, which itself calls for an examination of the case against each of the accused persons individually by the Trial Court at the time of consideration of the charges, which was not done by the Trial Court. 43. Instead the Trial Court without considering the case of the accused persons individually have discharged all of them on the ground that general accusations have been made against them in the charge- sheet without any specific accusations. This case cannot be regarded as a case where the charges made against the accused persons can be termed as groundless. 44. In so far as the facts and circumstances of this case shows that it clearly involves the question of mis-utilization of public money. Under such circumstances, the Trial Court ought to have considered the case of all the accused persons individually vis-à-vis the charge-sheet and all the documents sent along with it to consider as to whether the charges may be framed against any of the accused persons or whether they are liable to be discharged. 45. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order dated 12.11.2015 passed in SR(PCA) No. 1/2015 arising out of Criminal Trial No. 2442/2012 in connection with ACB P.S. Case No. 10/2012 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded back to the Trial Court with the following directions: a. The Trial Court shall, after giving an opportunity to the prosecution side as well as accused persons, consider the materials available on record including the police report as well as the documents sent along with it, afresh. It shall thereafter take a decision as to whether charges are required to be framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against any of the accused or all of them, or they are required to be discharged under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 46. This Criminal Revision Petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of. 47. Send back the Trial Court records along with a copy of this judgment to the Trial Court. 48. As the respondents are represented by their engaged counsel before this Court, the respondents (accused persons) are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 30.07.2025 to participate in the further proceedings before the Trial Court.