ORDER : J.C. DOSHI, J. 1. This petition is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 549 days occurred in filing Civil Application for setting aside the abatement and permitting the petitioner to take recourse of provision of Order 22 Rule 4-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The brief facts are as under : 2.1 The petitioner Farzan Kali Pardiwala has filed Special Civil Suit No. 147 of 2015 before the Principal Senior Civil Court, at Vapi, District Valsad against the defendant Sarosh Minu Pardiwala and Mayaben Sarosh Pardiwala for the relief of declaration and cancellation of registered sale deed No. 4108 dated 19.4.2010 and to obtain the possession of the part of land of Survey No. 1080, City survey No. 3675. The suit was filed by Kali Minu Paridwala as the power of attorney holder of Farzan Kali Pardiwala. 2.2 According to the suit averment, the suit property was sold to the defendant by the registered sale deed No. 4108 on 19.4.2010 at the sale consideration of Rs. 7,50,000/-. The defendant paid the sale consideration by way of cheque which got dishonored and therefore, the plaintiff claimed that title of the suit property does not pass upon the defendant as sale consideration was not paid. Upon this averments, relief to cancel sale deed and to get back the possession was sought by filing the suit. 2.3 The defendant came out with a defense, filing written statement that the defendant was the real owner of the suit property. They purchased the property from Chimanbai Purshottambhai on 1.9.1980, by registered sale deed thereafter they made the pucca construction whereupon the defendant No.1 was carrying garage business. It is further contended that in the year 2006, the defendant No.1 seriously fell ill and was advised to take complete rest. Taking advantage of the said situation of the defendant a bogus forged attorney was created on 23.4.2006 and on the basis of the said power of attorney Mr. Kali Minu Pardiwala executed the sale deed in favour of his wife as a guardian of Farzan Kali Pardiwala for amount of Rs. 99,999. In the year 2009, the defendant came to know about the execution of fictitious sale deed based upon the forged power of attorney, hence, a criminal complaint was lodged under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 504, 506(2). 99,999. In the year 2009, the defendant came to know about the execution of fictitious sale deed based upon the forged power of attorney, hence, a criminal complaint was lodged under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 504, 506(2). Subsequent thereto a meeting held in presence of prominent persons whereby power of attorney holder Kali Minu Pardiwala had accepted his ingenuine error and agreed to transfer the suit property in the name of defendant No.1. It was further contended that a reverse sale deed thus was executed in favour of defendant No.1 without having any consideration but since the plaintiff was the sole son of defendant and his brother, the defendant agreed to give Rs. 7,50,000/- to plaintiff by way of cash as magnanimity as also love and affection but not as a sale consideration but any how plaintiff got the particulars of the cheque engrossed in sale deed as a sale consideration. 2.4 These were the averments upon which suit was fought before the learned Trial Court and having been permitted to lead the evidence and appreciated the same learned Trial Court reached to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to make out the case and ultimately the suit was dismissed. 3. The unsuccessful challenge was made by way of filing First Appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2016. 3.1 In the background of facts whereby two unsuccessful attempts were made before the Court below, in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC came to be filed by the plaintiff. 4. When the Second Appeal was filed, the respondent No. 2 Mayaben Sarosh Pardiwala had already been expired and therefore, she was joined as a dead person and appeal was abated against her. Respondent No.1 Sarosh Minu Pardiwala expired during the pendency of the Second Appeal. The order dated 20.8.2024 noted that learned advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar appearing for the petitioner seeks time to take necessary steps to bring the legal heirs on record as respondents have expired. Thereafter, he did not remain present and did not take any necessary steps and thus by order dated 10.9.2024 this Court abated the Second Appeal. 5. The order dated 20.8.2024 noted that learned advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar appearing for the petitioner seeks time to take necessary steps to bring the legal heirs on record as respondents have expired. Thereafter, he did not remain present and did not take any necessary steps and thus by order dated 10.9.2024 this Court abated the Second Appeal. 5. In the background of aforesaid facts, the petitioner came out with two petition firstly, the petition for seeking condonation of delay and secondly to set aside the abatement and to permit the petitioner to take recourse of the Order 22 Rule 4-A of the CPC. 6. Heard learned advocate Mr. Nirav C. Thakkar appearing for the petitioner. 6.1 Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar mainly submits that respondents No.1 and 2 husband and wife expired issue less. The petitioner is the son of the brother of late Sarosh Minu Pardiwala. Therefore, he is the sole heir of the respondents, however, he cannot be appellant and respondent at the same time. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, when the matter is related to the estate of the deceased, and decision in Second Appeal directly affecting the estate of the deceased Sarosh Pardiwala. Learned advocate Mr. Nirav Thakkar submit that the Court should proceed in Second Appeal appointing Administrative General under Order 22 Rule 4 A of the CPC. He would further submit that the petitioner has explained the delay sufficiently. The Court taking a pragmatic approach should not jettison this petition lest it could amount to throw out the petitioner without substantially heard. Taking up liberal approach is the main ground of argument to condone delay claimed to be un-intentional. 8. On this submission learned advocate Mr. Thakkar, submitted to allow this petition and to condone the delay. 9. Case pleaded, condonation of delay of 549 days, it is noticeable that neither the argument nor the averments made in the petition bring any sufficient explanation for condonation of delay of 549 days. Paras No. 4,5 and 6 of the petition claimed to be reason explaining delay are reproduced as under :- “4. The applicants submit the delay caused in preferring the application for setting aside abatement is beyond the control of the applicants. That there is a genuine legal issue as to who shall represent the estate of the deceased sole opponent since the only family that the deceased had was that of the applicant himself. The applicants submit the delay caused in preferring the application for setting aside abatement is beyond the control of the applicants. That there is a genuine legal issue as to who shall represent the estate of the deceased sole opponent since the only family that the deceased had was that of the applicant himself. That hence various options were being explored on the legal side, which took up considerable amount of time. That the delay is bonafide and genuine and there is no mala fides on part of the appellant in preferring the application with any delay much less a delay of 549 days. 5. The applicant submits that the applicant has reasonable chances of succeeding in the main Second Appeal as he has a meritorious case. The applicant submits that a meritorious case ought not to be thrown out only on the ground of delay since the same would result in miscarriage of justice. The applicant submits that it is settled law that technicalities ought not to come in way of dispensing substantial justice. The applicant submits that procedure is a hand maid of justice and law and the delay occurred in preferring the application for setting aside abatement is required to be condoned. 6. The applicant submits that prima facie case is in favour of the applicant and the balance of convenience is also in favour of the applicant. The applicant submits that the applicant will suffer irreparable loss if the delay in preferring Civil application for setting aside abatement is not condoned in the interest of justice. On the other, since there is no opponent to represent the estate of the deceased sole opponent, there is no likelihood of any loss being occasioned to the other side if the delay is condoned.” 10 None of the aforesaid averment are containing any bare word which can be said to be a explanation for condonation of delay. Sufficient explanation could be examined provided that the explanation is averred by the petitioner. In the present case none of the averments are found to be properly explained and met with the essential criteria. In absence of assigning any sufficient cause for gross delay of 549 days, the delay cannot be condoned. 10.1 In Shivamma (Dead) through Lrs Vs. Sufficient explanation could be examined provided that the explanation is averred by the petitioner. In the present case none of the averments are found to be properly explained and met with the essential criteria. In absence of assigning any sufficient cause for gross delay of 549 days, the delay cannot be condoned. 10.1 In Shivamma (Dead) through Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board , 2025 LiveLaw SC 849 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in interpretation of section 5, held that phrase “within such period” including both the original period of limitation prescribed as well as period of delay leading to actual filing of the application or appeal, as the case may be, has to be explained. “we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a necessary implication indicate that the phrase “within such period” signifies that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period within which, the appeal or the application, as the case may be, should have been filed, if not for the delay, but also the period taken in addition to the prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application, as the case may be.” 11. For the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days. 12. The Apex Court in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Gokulchand and Anr SLP (civil) Diary No. 61179 of 2024, while issuing notice took a strong view and held that the State of Madhya Pradesh has arranged to file SLP in the Apex Court over a time period of delay of300/400 days. In para 3 of the order dated 31.1.2025, it was stated that delay of 656 days are gross in preferring Second Appeal before the High Court. The State was not able to assign any sufficient cause for the gross delay however, the Hon’ble Apex Court kept the issue as something else was in the mind of the Apex Court. Relevant para 3 and 4 are read as under : “3. The State was not able to assign any sufficient cause for the gross delay however, the Hon’ble Apex Court kept the issue as something else was in the mind of the Apex Court. Relevant para 3 and 4 are read as under : “3. In the present case, the State preferred a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 2 1908 before the High Court with delay of 656 days. The State was not able to assign any sufficient cause for this gross delay and, accordingly, the High Court rejected the plea to condone the delay. It is this order which has now been made a subject matter of challenge before this Court by filing the present Special Leave Petition and that too with delay of 177 days. 4. We could have dismissed this petition solely on the ground of delay but we do not intend to do this as we have something else in our mind.” 13. In H. Guruswamy & Ors Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs. in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025 in para 12 glance features of the matter and in para 13 Apex Court held that the concepts of such ‘liberal approach’, ‘substantial justice’ should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 reads as under: “12. We take notice of the following glaring features of the matter: (i) The original suit is of the year 1977. The said suit came to be re-numbered as Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980. It has been 48 years that the suit is pending for recording of evidence. (ii) The Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980 came to be dismissed for default in the year 1983. The same was restored in 1984. (iii) The defendant No. 4 in Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980, namely, Nagaraja passed away on 4.12.1999. (iv) The respondents herein were granted opportunities on 6.03.2000, 18.7.2000 and 22.8.2000 respectively to bring the legal heirs of the defendant No. 4 on record. Having failed to do so the suit ultimately came to be dismissed as having stood abated. (v) The rights of the deceased respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the suit filed for specific performance i.e. the Original Suit No. 33 of 1971. Having failed to do so the suit ultimately came to be dismissed as having stood abated. (v) The rights of the deceased respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the suit filed for specific performance i.e. the Original Suit No. 33 of 1971. (vi) The respondents having obtained the certified copies on 26.8.2005 preferred the Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006 on 06.03.2006. (vii) Indisputably, there is a delay of 6 years (about 2200 days) in filing the application for recall itself. 13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties. 15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the 12. We take notice of the following glaring features of the matter: (i) The original suit is of the year 1977. The said suit came to be re-numbered as Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980. It has been 48 years that the suit is pending for recording of evidence. (ii) The Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980 came to be dismissed for default in the year 1983. The same was restored in 1984. (iii) The defendant No. 4 in Original Suit No. 1833 of 1980, namely, Nagaraja passed away on 4.12.1999. (iv) The respondents herein were granted opportunities on 6.03.2000, 18.7.2000 and 22.8.2000 respectively to bring the legal heirs of the defendant No. 4 on record. Having failed to do so the suit ultimately came to be dismissed as having stood abated. (v) The rights of the deceased respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the suit filed for specific performance i.e. the Original Suit No. 33 of 1971. (vi) The respondents having obtained the certified copies on 26.8.2005 preferred the Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006 on 06.03.2006. (v) The rights of the deceased respondent No. 1 had already been decided in the suit filed for specific performance i.e. the Original Suit No. 33 of 1971. (vi) The respondents having obtained the certified copies on 26.8.2005 preferred the Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006 on 06.03.2006. (vii) Indisputably, there is a delay of 6 years (about 2200 days) in filing the application for recall itself. 13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 14. We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties. 15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is not inclined to allow this petition for condonation of delay, yet this Court noticed that the contention raised in this main petition is to set aside the abatement and to take recourse of Order 22 Rule 4-A of CPC. It could hardly have any grievance as the suit filed by the appellant is already dismissed and dismissal is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. The ground canvassed for the cancellation of the sale deed was that the sale consideration stated in the sale deed is not passed and therefore the sale deed qua the disputed land is fallacious. The object of Rule 4-A of Order 22 is to prevent hardship or suffering to a contesting party with demise of his opponent and therefore Rule 4A is for appointment of General or the officer of the Court to represent the estate of the deceased. However, the aforesaid issue touching the estate of the deceased remain unclear. Mr. Thakkar learned advocate could not throw light on this issue. Further, apt to note that in the present case the petitioner came with the case that the sole respondent died issue less but whether he has legal representative as defined in the law is not brought to the notice. Moreover aspects remain that appellant lost his stance before two Court below who are essentially tasked to examine facts, yet Second Appeal is not admitted. Moreover aspects remain that appellant lost his stance before two Court below who are essentially tasked to examine facts, yet Second Appeal is not admitted. Moreover this Court fails to understand how dispute raised in the Second Appeal touches the estate of deceased Sarosh Pardiwala. Learned advocate Mr. Thakkar could not bring any arguable point in this regard. 15. All aforesaid reasons are if are counted, the case of the appellant is wholly misconceived. Thus, petition has no merit and accordingly stands dismissed.