JUDGMENT : M. K. THAKKER, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr.Krutarth Pandya waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondent. 2. This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India , challenging the award dated 01.10.2021 passed by the learned Labour Court, Gandhidham, in Reference No. 158 of 2017, whereby the reference filed by the present petitioner was rejected and the contention regarding forceful resignation was unaccepted. 3. It is the case of the present petitioner that he was appointed as a Senior Engineer (Quality Control) on a probation basis on 25.12.2006, and was subsequently made permanent on 25.09.2017. The petitioner was deputed at the Special Economic Zone in Kandla and was responsible for checking the quality of material supplied to the respondent company. The petitioner had been serving continuously since 2006. However, on 25.04.2017, the Head of the Department, Mr. P.B. Patil, allegedly called the petitioner and threatened him with the initiation of criminal and civil proceedings for cheating and fraud, specifically for allegedly claiming undue travel allowance by submitting fake hotel bills. Due to the coercion and threats issued by Mr. Patil, the petitioner was allegedly compelled to tender his resignation on 26.04.2017. Although the acceptance of the said resignation was never communicated to the petitioner, and his legal dues were paid only after the issuance of a demand notice, the learned Labour Court dismissed the reference. This dismissal is the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Prateek Bhatia for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Krutarth Pandya for the respondent. 5. Learned advocate Mr.Bhatia submits that the petitioner was forced to sign the resignation letter dated 25.04.2017. The resignation was typed, and under the threat of civil and criminal proceedings, the petitioner was compelled to sign it. Learned advocate Mr.Bhatia further submits that, as per the terms of the appointment, the petitioner was required to serve a three-month notice period. Alternatively, if the company wished to relieve the employee before the expiry of the notice period, such decision was required to be communicated in writing. It is submitted that although the resignation was allegedly tendered on 25.04.2017, the petitioner withdrew the same through a demand notice dated 20.05.2017. Despite this, the petitioner was relieved from service on 26.05.2017. Alternatively, if the company wished to relieve the employee before the expiry of the notice period, such decision was required to be communicated in writing. It is submitted that although the resignation was allegedly tendered on 25.04.2017, the petitioner withdrew the same through a demand notice dated 20.05.2017. Despite this, the petitioner was relieved from service on 26.05.2017. Since the resignation had already been withdrawn prior to the date of relieving, it is submitted that the resignation ought to have been treated as non-existent, and the act of relieving the petitioner constitutes illegal termination. Learned advocate Mr.Bhatia further submits that the petitioner’s legal dues were admittedly paid only after the issuance of the demand notice. Moreover, the endorsement made on the resignation letter by the employer merely states that the petitioner “may be relieved as requested and in accordance with the guidelines of the company.” It is further submitted that as per the guidelines stated in the appointment order, either a written communication is mandatory or a three- month notice is required to be issued. In the absence of compliance with these conditions, it is contended that the learned Labour Court erred in not accepting the petitioner’s case regarding the alleged forceful resignation and its timely withdrawal. Learned advocate Mr.Bhatia also submits that the email dated 06.02.2017, annexed with the relieving letter and the service certificate, was never received by the petitioner on the date he was alleged to have retired. It is further submitted that the payment of legal dues was made on 29.05.2017, which is subsequent to the issuance of the demand notice. Therefore, the resignation should have been considered as having been obtained under coercion, and the withdrawal of such resignation ought to have been permitted by the respondent management. The failure to consider these aspects constitutes an error on the part of the learned Labour Court. In support of the submissions, learned advocate Mr.Bhatia has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Srikantha S.M. Versus Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. reported in (2005) 8 SCC 314 and New India Assurance Company Limited Versus Raghuvir Singh Narang and Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 335 , and has submitted that if a resignation is withdrawn before its acceptance and the employee is thereafter not permitted to resume duty, it amounts to termination without following the due process under the Industrial Disputes Act . In light of the above, it is submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award is liable to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Pandya submits that the petitioner created false travel bills and obtained monetary benefits amounting to Rs. 23,000/- and above. It is submitted that when the petitioner was called upon to provide an explanation, he failed to offer a satisfactory response and subsequently tendered his resignation on 25.04.2017, making it effective from 26.04.2017. Learned advocate Mr.Pandya further submits that, as per the petitioner’s own evidence, he admitted that he did not report to work on 26.04.2017, and the resignation letter was endorsed by the company with an acceptance dated 25.04.2017. It is further submitted that the relieving letter, along with the service certificate, was issued on 25.04.2017, and all legal dues were paid to the petitioner on 26.05.2017. It is contended that the demand notice, alleging that the resignation was obtained under coercion, was issued as an afterthought, and the request for withdrawal of resignation was made only thereafter. Learned advocate Mr.Pandya submits that once the resignation was made effective on the same day, i.e., 25.04.2017, the question of its withdrawal after nearly a month does not arise. In support of the above contentions, learned advocate Mr.Pandya has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Shriram Manohar Bande Versus Uktranti Mandal And others reported in AIR 2024 SC 2325 , North Zone Cultural Centre Versus Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar reported in (2003) 5 SCC 455 , Raj Kumar Versus Union of India reported in AIR 1969 SC 180 , as well as the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sejalben Hemantkumar Patel (supra). It is submitted that when the applicable rules do not require formal communication for acceptance of resignation, and the same is accepted by way of endorsement, the contract of employment stands terminated. Accordingly, no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner. In view of the above, learned advocate Mr.Pandya submits that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in dismissing the reference and therefore, the petition deserves to be rejected. 7. Having considered the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, it emerges that the petitioner was appointed as a Senior Manager in the Quality Control Department of the respondent company on 25.12.2006. 7. Having considered the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties, it emerges that the petitioner was appointed as a Senior Manager in the Quality Control Department of the respondent company on 25.12.2006. Upon completion of the probation period, he was confirmed in service effective from 26.09.2007. The petitioner issued a demand notice dated 20.05.2017, wherein he sought to withdraw the resignation allegedly obtained under coercion by one Mr. P.B. Patil and requested reinstatement to his previous position. As the petitioner was not reinstated pursuant to the said demand notice, he initiated the impugned reference, and the industrial dispute was referred to the learned Labour Court, Gandhidham- Kachchh, on 29.08.2017. In the said proceedings, the Labour Court framed two issues: (i) whether the petitioner qualifies as a "workman" under Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act , 1947; and (ii) whether the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with consequential benefits. After considering the nature of the petitioner’s duties, the learned Labour Court held that he falls within the definition of "workman" under Section 2 (s) of the ID Act. The Court then proceeded to examine the petitioner’s entitlement to relief and the contention of forceful resignation. During cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that he did not work on 26.04.2017 and that the resignation letter produced at Exhibit 19/2 bears his signature. The petitioner alleged that the resignation letter had been prepared by Mr.Patil and that he was compelled to sign it. However, no documentary or oral evidence was adduced by the petitioner to substantiate the claim of forceful resignation. Notably, Mr.Patil, who was alleged to have coerced the resignation, was not examined as a witness. In this context, the Labour Court held that the resignation appeared to have been given voluntarily. Furthermore, the petitioner had accepted the legal dues upon resignation. Although it is true that payment of dues was made on 29.05.2017, after the issuance of the demand notice, the petitioner neither deposited the received amount before the Labour Court nor returned it to the respondent establishment. It was also contended that the relieving letter and service certificate, both dated 25.04.2017, were received only after 06.02.2017, based on an email allegedly sent by the respondent. However, this contention was not supported through the cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses. It was also contended that the relieving letter and service certificate, both dated 25.04.2017, were received only after 06.02.2017, based on an email allegedly sent by the respondent. However, this contention was not supported through the cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses. Therefore, the Labour Court was justified in rejecting the reference by holding that the resignation was voluntary and that the petitioner had accepted the legal dues following his resignation. With regard to the payment of dues, this Court has referred to the Employee Clearance Form, which forms part of the record, as well as the payment vouchers, which indicate that after deducting an amount of Rs. 23,300/-, all remaining payments were made to the petitioner on 26.05.2017. 8. This Court is of the view that merely pleading non-receipt of the amount and forceful resignation is insufficient, as such claims must be substantiated with evidence during the course of the proceedings. In support of this position, this Court has referred to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen , reported in (1971) 2 SCC 617 , wherein the Apex Court has held as under: “9. We now propose to examine each of the claims of the appellants in the light of our observations as to the formula applicable in determining its validity or otherwise. At the outset it may be noted that on behalf of the appellant only a solitary witness, M.K. Ghosh a Chartered Accountant of the Company who on his own admission had joined the Company six months prior to his giving evidence was produced. Obviously this witness could not speak about the relevant matters from his personal knowledge. Apart from this infirmity the Tribunal has characterised his evidence as contradictory, evasive and not reliable. Innumerable statements, letters, balance-sheet, profit and loss account and other documents called for or otherwise were filed on behalf of the appellants. It cannot be denied that the mere filing of any of the aforementioned documents does not amount to proof of them and unless these are either admitted by the respondents or proved they do not become evidence in the case.” 9. It cannot be denied that the mere filing of any of the aforementioned documents does not amount to proof of them and unless these are either admitted by the respondents or proved they do not become evidence in the case.” 9. As regards the arguments pertaining to non-communication of the acceptance of the resignation, this Court has referred to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Shriram Manohar Bande (supra) North Zone Cultural Centre (supra), Raj Kumar (supra), and the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sejalben Hemantkumar Patel (supra). On referring to the said decisions, it emerges that a resignation becomes effective upon its acceptance. Even if such acceptance is not communicated, and even where the rules or guidelines governing resignation do not mandate communication of acceptance, it cannot be held that the contract between the present petitioner and the respondent has not ceased. Regarding the decision relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, it is noted that it pertained to different facts, where the effective dates of resignation were mentioned to be at a later time. However, in the present case, the resignation was tendered on 25.04.2017, with the effective date from 26.04.2017. In this context, the cited decisions are not helpful to the petitioner in obtaining any relief. 10. Considering the overall circumstances, this Court is of the view that no error has been committed by the learned Court in dismissing the reference. The petition, being devoid of merits, therefore deserves to be dismissed. 11. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed. 12. Rule is discharged.