JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners in the instant petition have implored for the following reliefs:- (i) “A writ of the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ commanding the respondents to take all necessary steps for payment of compensation, either by way of compulsory acquisition mode or by private negotiation for the remaining portion of land falling in then Khasra No. 330,331 and 309 in estate Bemina that has been taken over by respondents in connection with Flood Spill Channel but for which no compensation has been paid as yet. (ii) In alternative an appropriate writ directing the respondents to return the possession of land back to petitioners after removing the earth-filling there from and pay adequate compensation at the rate of RS. 10,000/ per kanal per year on account of damage caused to property as also on account of use and occupation of petitioners’ land by the respondents during the intervening period”. 2. The facts under the shade and cover of which the aforesaid reliefs have been prayed and as are stated in the petition are that the petitioners 1 & 2 claimed to have jointly owned and possessed 14 Kanal and 17 marlas of land covered under Survey No. 330 and 331 in estate Bemina, District Budgam, out of which 4 Kanals and 13 Marlas were in Survey No. 330 and remaining 10 Kanals and 4 marlas were in Survey No. 331, having been devolved upon the petitioners by inheritance. ? It is being next state that the petitioner 3 with his co-sharers as well owned and possessed 14 Kanals and 5 marlas of land in Survey No. 309, which consisted of 19 Kanals and 09 marlas, in estate Bemina, Budgam. ? It is being further stated that somewhere in 1988-89, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir initiated a process of construction of leftover portion of Jhelum Flood Spill Channel in estate Bemina and onwards which flood channel have had been conceived and constructed many decades back to avoid floods in the Srinagar city, and the construction of the portion from Bemina District Budgam towards north side up to Zainakote, Srinagar, of the proposed Flood Spill Channel had been left midway to be completed in future and in furtherance thereof the said process for completion of leftover portion was initiated somewhere in 1988-89. ? ? It is next stated by the petitioners that out of the aforesaid land, owned and possessed by them some land had already been acquired for the construction of the Flood Channel in question and that out of Survey No. 309, land measuring 10 Kanals and 14 Marlas was supposed to come underthe construction of Flood Channel and was formally sought to be acquired, whereas, similarly, land measuring 1 Kanal and 18 marlas, and 7 Kanals and 02 marlas was sought to be formally acquired from Survey No. 330 and 331, respectively. ? It is being further stated that somewhere in the year 1989, the petitioners were paid compensation qua the land acquired by the respondents, measuring 10 Kanals and 14 marlas out of Survey No. 309, 01 Kanal and 18 marlas from Survey No. 330 and 07 Kanals and 02 marlas from Survey No. 331, however, the remaining land then owned by the petitioners being 03 Kanals and 11 marlas in Survey No. 309, 02 Kanals and 15 marlas in Survey No. 330 and 03 Kanals and 02 marlas in Survey No. 331, was not acquired by the respondents and the petitioners , as such continued to remained in possession thereof as owners. ? It is being further stated that though the land was acquired by the respondents and the compensation to the land owners including the petitioners was paid in the year 1988-89 and that no further construction at ground level of the Flood Channel upto Zainakot was undertaken, a process thereof however, came to be initiated by the respondents in the year 2007-08 and the land acquired in the year 1988-89 of the petitioners by the respondents was actually taken over by the respondents in this regard. ? It is being next stated by the petitioners that while constructing the Flood Channel in question, the respondents did not restrict the construction of the Channel over the already acquired land, but also took over the remaining portion of the land owned and possessed by the petitioners in order to have the smooth alignment of the Flood Channel. ? ? It is being next stated by the petitioners that while constructing the Flood Channel in question, the respondents did not restrict the construction of the Channel over the already acquired land, but also took over the remaining portion of the land owned and possessed by the petitioners in order to have the smooth alignment of the Flood Channel. ? It is being further stated by the petitioners that the said remaining land of the petitioners was however taken over without following any formal acquisition proceedings and that the petitioners part with the said land only upon the assurance of the respondents that since formal acquisition proceedings are likely to take some time yet compensation qua the land would be paid to them, as a consequence whereof the petitioners did not object to either taking over of the land in question or the process of the construction of the Flood Channel. ? It is being next stated by the petitioners that though the respondents initiated a process for payment of compensation for the land in question in favour of the petitioners and in this regard a report was drawn by respondent 3, detailing out therein the total land over which the Flood Spill Channel had been constructed as also the area of the land for which the compensation had been paid to the land owners as well as remaining land for which compensation had not been paid. ? It is being further stated by the petitioners that while the construction of the Flood Spill Channel was in progress, settlement proceedings were undertaken by the Revenue Department to update its record and in order to bring it at par to the ground realities and before compensation, qua the land in question would be paid by the respondents to the petitioners, said settlement proceedings got concluded. ? It is next being stated by the petitioners that the Flood Channel stands constructed during the course of the settlement proceedings and a separate survey number came to be carved out in the said settlement proceedings, qua the land in question, being survey No. 659 qua the land measuring 142 Kanals and 10 marlas, however, on account of the settlement proceedings the said land was shown in possession of the Flood Control Department instead of the original, actual owners including the petitioners herein. ? ? It is next stated by the petitioners that on account of the settlement proceedings the new survey numbers to the entire land, not only included the land earlier acquired by the respondents for construction of the Flood Channel, but also included the land in question which was taken over by the respondents from the petitioners in the year 2007-08 upon which the petitioners and the other land owners had the absolute title as owners thereof. ? It is being further stated by the petitioners that since the leftover land in question of the petitioners was taken over by the respondents without any compensation, the petitioners approached the respondents for payment of compensation thereof, however, the respondents did not pay the same to the petitioners while taking note of the fact that the land in question stands recorded in the name of State during settlement proceedings and not in the name of the petitioners. ? It is being stated by the petitioners that faced with the said situation they approached the respondents 6 for clarification in this regard, whereupon respondent 6 solicited a report providing therein that while the petitioners have been given compensation to some portion of their land, the remaining portion of the land of the petitioners has been recorded in the name of State during settlement proceedings, even though no compensation had been paid to them for the said remaining land. ? It is being stated that being satisfied that the compensation had been paid for the land acquired from the petitioners, the respondent 6 took up the matter with respondent 4 for payment of compensation to the petitioners for the land in question which had been taken over by the respondents in the year 2007-08 without formally acquiring the same during the process of settlement. ? ? It is further stated by the petitioners that since the revenue authorities were not sure about the area of the land for which the compensation have been paid to the petitioners and the other land owners, as such, an information in this regard came to be sought from the respondent 4, in response whereof the respondents 3 & 4 furnished the details of compensation paid to the land owners including the petitioners, confirming that the compensation stands paid in respect of land measuring 01 Kanal 18 marlas in Survey No. 330, 07 Kanals 02 in Survey No. 331 and 10 Kanals 14 marlas in Survey No. 309 in favour of the petitioners. ? It is being further stated that though it had been conclusively established that the petitioners had been paid compensation for the land which had been acquired by the respondents formally and not for the land in question taken over by the respondents in the year 2007-08, the petitioners expected the payment of compensation for the land in question to them which however, was not paid, leaving no option open to the petitioners except to seek the indulgence of this Court through the medium of instant petition on the premise that the non-payment of compensation to them for their proprietary land by the respondents in essence amounts to refusal of payment of compensation to them against their immoveable property taken over by the respondents without formally acquiring the same and, thus, constituting violation of their right to property. 3. Objections have been filed by the respondents 1 to 3 and 6 to the petition. 4. In the objections filed by the respondents 1-3, it is being admitted by the respondents that the petitioners were paid compensation for the land which came to be acquired formally, however, the compensation sought by the petitioners for the land in question is not payable to them, in that, the petitioners are not recorded as the owners of the said land as the land in question is recorded as “Gair Mumkin Flood Channel”. 5. In the objections filed by respondent 6, a similar stand has been taken as has been taken by the respondents 1-3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. 5. In the objections filed by respondent 6, a similar stand has been taken as has been taken by the respondents 1-3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Insofar as, the specific plea of the petitioners raised in the petition, qua the land measuring 03 Kanals and 11 marlas in Survey No. 309, 02 Kanals and 15 marlas in Survey No. 330 and 03 Kanals and 02 marlas in Survey No. 331, is concerned, the same was not acquired by the respondents in the year 1988-89 and the petitioners, as such, continued to remain in possession thereof as owners and continued to be recorded as owners thereof in the relevant revenue records which however after the settlement proceedings came to be shown as “Maqbooza Mehkamui Flood Control as Gair Mumkin Flood Channel”. 7. Record reveals that the respondents have not specifically and in explicit terms denied that the petitioners are and were not the recorded owners of the land in question and, as such, are not entitled to the compensation thereof. What is being disputed and denied by the respondents in the aforesaid reply(s) filed to the petition is that the land in question is recorded in the revenue records as “Maqbooza Mehkamui Flood Control as Gair Mumkin Flood Channel”, which however goes in conflict with the specific reports of the respondents 3,4 & 6, that the land in question, in fact, has been and is owned by the petitioners notwithstanding its having been recorded as “Gair Mumkin Flood Channel” under the occupation of the Irrigation and Flood Control, Department. Thus in presence of this position obtaining in the matter qua the land in question on any premise including on account of applicability of SRO 154 of March 1986 and SRO 109 of 1987, pressed into service by the respondents, the effect of which SRO’s have been taken cognizance of and considered by the two Coordinate Benches of this Court in case titled as “Raja Bano v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir ” being WP( C) No. 177/2023, decided on 12.08.2024, and “Ghulam Ahmad Bhat & Others v. State of J&K & Others ”, being OWP No. 1441/2012, decided on 22.12.2023, wherein it has been inter alia held that merely recording the land as “Gair Mumkin Nala” would not ipso facto transfer the title of the land from the petitioners therein to the respondents therein while relying upon the settled position of law that the right of property is a constitutional right, enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution and a person can be divested of ownership of the property only in accordance with the provisions of law entitling the land owners to the payment of compensation while relying upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in case titled Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, reported as (2020)2 SCC 569 , which being relevant germane herein is also referred and relied in the instant case as well hereunder:- “12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the 9 Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human rights in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. a The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. 12.3. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. a The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. 12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the Constitutional right under Article 300- A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Lid. v. Darius Shapur Chenal wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6) "6.... Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefore must be paid." (emphasis supplied) 12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21) "21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed." (emphasis supplied) 12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30) "30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists." (emphasis supplied) 12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48) "48. ... Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists." (emphasis supplied) 12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48) "48. ... In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law, Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no a deprivation." (emphasis supplied) 12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had "orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellate of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance it placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDCS wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode, The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumari held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension…..” 8. Viewed thus, for what has been observed, considered and analyzed hereinabove, the instant petition succeeds. 9. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension…..” 8. Viewed thus, for what has been observed, considered and analyzed hereinabove, the instant petition succeeds. 9. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the Respondent-Irrigation and Flood Control Department is commanded to send an indent to the competent authority for initiating the process of acquisition of the land in question of the petitioners, detailed out in the preceding paragraphs within a period of six weeks from the date a copy of this judgment is served upon them, whereupon the competent authority upon receipt of such indent shall proceed with the acquisition of the land in question in accordance with present applicable law and pass appropriate award in accordance with law. 10. It is made clear that the respondents, if they chose so, may take recourse to the private negotiation in the matter instead of taking recourse to the formal acquisition proceedings under the relevant law. 11. The respondents shall conclude the aforesaid process, preferably within a period of three months from the date of passing of this judgment. 12. Disposed of along with connected CM(s). 13. Record produced by the learned counsel for the respondents is returned back in the open Court.