ORDER : R.NATARAJ, J. The petitioner (Lokayuktha) has challenged an order bearing No.KRIDL/Administrative/CR-Chitradurga (Molakalmuru) /2020-21(EV) dated 18.01.2021 passed by the respondent No.2, by which it censured the officials and closed the proceedings. 2. (i) A complaint was lodged by one Sri.H.T.Nagareddy with the petitioner on 14.11.2017, stating that a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- was sanctioned under the State SCP scheme for the purpose of formation/construction of 5 kilometers tar road from Gaurasamudra SC Colony to Chikkanahalli SC Colony. The said work was entrusted to Karnataka Rural Infrastructure Development Limited (henceforth referred to as 'KRIDL' for short). Accordingly, the Challakere Division of KRIDL took up the work. The petitioner alleges that Sri H.T.Nagareddy in his complaint, claimed that at the behest of the MLA, the work was not carried out as per the stipulated norms and thereby public funds were misappropriated. (ii) Based on the said complaint, the petitioner conducted a preliminary enquiry, after respondent Nos.3 and 4 submitted their comments, which was not accepted by it. The Upalokayakta submitted a report to respondent No.1 under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayaktha Act, 1984 (henceforth referred to as ‘the Act, 1984’ for short) on 14.05.2020, recommending the constitution of a High Powered committee to (i) check the functioning of KRIDL in relation to execution of several works in the State and the quality and fix liability if any on the engineers or officers (ii) To prescribe norms for utilization of funds by the officers of KRIDL and liability / accountability of MD, KRIDL and other Senior officers (iii) To revoke the exemption granted under 4-G of the Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements Act, 1999. It also recommended disciplinary action against respondent Nos.4 and 5 and entrust the enquiry to it under Rule 14A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (henceforth referred to as 'the Rules, 1957'). (iii) The respondent No.1 constituted a High-Powered Committee as recommended by the petitioner and the High- Powered Committee gave its opinion that due to heavy rain in the area, roads asphalted by KRIDL were damaged and the same was not attributable to the respondent Nos.3 and 4. Thus, it recommended to drop the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4. Consequently, the respondent No.1 passed the impugned order dropping the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and censured them. Thus, it recommended to drop the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4. Consequently, the respondent No.1 passed the impugned order dropping the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and censured them. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner is before this Court. 3. (i) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the work was executed between January 2017 to June 2017. However, there was widespread rain in Molakalmuru Taluk between September and October 2017. He therefore contended that between June 2017 to September 2017, the road could not have been damaged. He contends that there is no dispute that the road was damaged and that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 had got the same repaired, during the defect liability period. He therefore contends that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were responsible for laying an inferior quality road, which was washed off within a few months from the date of its laying. (ii) He thus contends that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were responsible for laying an inferior quality road and hence, the respondent No.1 must have taken a conscious decision before exonerating them. He contends that once a recommendation is made under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984, it vests a right in the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the respondent No.1. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments: a) Sri J.P. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (W.P.No.5361/2016) where it was held that, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Lokayukta/Upa- Lokayukta’s recommendation under Section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act, and that the State Government was justified in acting on that recommendation without reassessing the entire investigation, since it cannot sit in appeal over the Lokayukta unless the order is set aside or exceptional circumstances exist; the Court further held that a departmental enquiry is legally permissible despite the closure of the connected criminal case, as different standards of proof apply, and the petitioner’s delayed challenge to the Lokayukta’s procedure was unsustainable. The Court also refrained from detailed factual comments to avoid prejudicing the enquiry, and held that the Government may depart from Lokayukta recommendations only in rare, exceptional cases. The Court also refrained from detailed factual comments to avoid prejudicing the enquiry, and held that the Government may depart from Lokayukta recommendations only in rare, exceptional cases. b) State of Karnataka v. Shivanand B. Mugadum - ILR 2016 KAR 5131 herein it was held that that under Rule 14-A(2)(a)(iii) of the Karnataka Civil Services (CCA) Rules, when misconduct has been investigated by the Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta and the Government decides to initiate a major penalty proceeding under Rule 11, the inquiry must mandatorily be entrusted to the Lokayukta/Upa- Lokayukta, and the Government cannot constitute any “high-power committee” or other authority to conduct such an inquiry; hence, the charge memos and proceedings initiated by the Government were without authority in law. The Court also held that the Tribunal was correct in quashing the charge memos for this jurisdictional defect but had erred in making observations on the merits of the charges, which were accordingly expunged. The Court observed that once the Tribunal found the charge memos to be unsustainable for lack of authority, it ought not to have entered into the merits because such remarks could prejudice any fresh inquiry that the Lokayukta may undertake, and clarified that if a fresh inquiry is entrusted to the Lokayukta, all rights and contentions of both sides would remain open. c) Gulam Kadir v. Special Tribunal - (2002) 1 SCC 33 where this court held that the expression “person aggrieved” in Article 226 is elastic and must be construed in a pragmatic, liberal manner so as to permit any person with a genuine or sufficient interest—not merely a directly affected individual—to invoke the Court’s writ jurisdiction, and that strict locus standi rules should not obstruct judicial review when public law rights or legality concerns are involved; consequently, the High Court erred in denying maintainability on the ground that the petitioner was not personally affected. d) State of Orissa v. Union of India (1995 Supp (2) SCC 154) where it was held that an authority may invoke Article 226 when the impugned action adversely affects its statutory or proprietary rights, and courts adopt a liberal approach to locus standi, particularly where public interest is involved. Since the Lokayukta is a statutory institution created to uphold integrity in public administration, it is competent to challenge orders that undermine its statutory functions. Since the Lokayukta is a statutory institution created to uphold integrity in public administration, it is competent to challenge orders that undermine its statutory functions. e) C. Rangaswamaiah and others v. Karnataka Lokayukta - AIR 1998 SC 2496 where the Court emphasized that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are intended to function as true ombudsmen with independence and enforceable authority, not as “paper tigers.” Their reports must carry real weight and be capable of full implementation to preserve public confidence in the administration. f) State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj - (2020) 3 SCC 423 , where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that recommendations in disciplinary matters must be followed, and judicial interference under Article 226 is limited to cases involving violation of natural justice, breach of statutory procedure, extraneous considerations, or conclusions so arbitrary that no reasonable authority could reach them. The disciplinary authority remains the sole judge of facts if the inquiry is properly conducted. g) State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya - AIR 2011 SC 1931 where the Supreme Court held that courts cannot reassess evidence or act as appellate authorities in disciplinary proceedings, and adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a ground for interference if the enquiry is fair and based on some evidence. Judicial review is permitted only where natural justice, statutory procedure, or fairness is violated, or where findings are arbitrary, capricious, mala fide, or based on extraneous factors. The Court reiterated that departmental and criminal proceedings operate on different standards of proof, and an acquittal on benefit of doubt does not invalidate an earlier departmental finding. The proximity of departmental proceedings to the incident further strengthens their validity. A concluded disciplinary enquiry cannot be reopened merely because of a later criminal acquittal. h) Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran (SLP(civil) No.23631/2008) , where the Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot respondent- appreciate evidence or act as an appellate authority in disciplinary matters, and may interfere only where the enquiry violates law or lacks any legal evidence. The Court listed strict limits on judicial review, permitting interference only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate or the decision is otherwise legally unsustainable. The Court listed strict limits on judicial review, permitting interference only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate or the decision is otherwise legally unsustainable. i) Shashi Bhusan Prasad v. Inspetor General, Central Industrial Security Force and others - (2019) 7 SCC 797 where Supreme Court reaffirmed that departmental misconduct is assessed on a preponderance of probabilities, and a criminal acquittal does not erase the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary authority or the Upa-Lokayukta’s recommendations. Given this and the statutory force of disciplinary proceedings under the KCS (CCA) Rules— which cannot be overridden by executive decisions under the Transaction of Business Rules—the Government’s action reflected in the Official Memorandum dated 18/01/2021 is legally unsustainable. Considering the Lokayukta’s statutory purpose and the public-interest dimension emphasized in Gulam Kadir, this institution is competent to challenge the impugned order before the High Court, which deserves to be set aside. 4. He also contends that the High-Powered Committee without conducting any examination, blindly arrived at a conclusion that due to extensive rain, the road was damaged. He contends this report of the High-Powered Committee could not have been taken into account to debunk the recommendation made by the Upalokayukta. 5. (i) The writ petition is opposed by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, who have filed a detailed statement of objections inter alia contending that the respondent No.2, not fully satisfied with the report submitted by the petitioner, referred the issue to the High-Powered Committee constituted by the respondent No.1, headed by a retired chief engineer. The High- Powered Committee submitted a report on 09.10.2020 and gave a categorical finding that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 were not responsible for the damage caused to the road. (ii) They contend that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the respondent No.2 as it is the disciplinary authority which is entitled to either take out proceedings or drop proceedings subject to its due satisfaction. They therefore contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the respondent No.2. They also contend that once a report under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984, is submitted by the petitioner, there is no mandate in Section 12(4) of the Act, 1984, that an enquiry has to be conducted and that it has to be entrusted to the petitioner. They also contend that once a report under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984, is submitted by the petitioner, there is no mandate in Section 12(4) of the Act, 1984, that an enquiry has to be conducted and that it has to be entrusted to the petitioner. In support of this claim, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasbhai Moti Bhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others - ( 1976) 1 SCC 671. (iii) Likewise, they have relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Hon'ble Lokayukta and another vs. V.Sri.K.G. Ananthanarayana - WP No.29101/2018 , Compassion Unlimited Plus Action(CUPA) and Others vs. Karnataka Lokayukta and Others - WP No.20432/2003 and connected writ petitions and The Registrar, Karnataka Lokayukta and another vs. Dr Dakshayini and Others - WP No.58804/2016. (iv) They further contend that under Rule 14A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, (henceforth referred to as 'the Rules, 1957' for short), the State Government may either conduct an enquiry or entrust the enquiry to the Lokayuktha. They contend that this is applicable only to employees of the State Government and not to employees of the respondent No.2 - corporation, as the respondent No.2 has its own conduct and discipline rules called the KRIDL, 1996 regulations. In support of this contention, they have relied upon the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Shri.R.T.Hudedavar vs. State of Karnataka - WP No.12300/2020. (v) They also contend that it is not incumbent upon the respondent No.2 to conduct an enquiry based on the report submitted by the petitioner under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984 and the respondent No.2 may go into the report submitted by the petitioner and thereafter take a conscious decision whether the enquiry should be conducted or not. In support of this contention, they relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka vs.H.N.Niranjan - WP No.43079/2015. 6. In support of this contention, they relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka vs.H.N.Niranjan - WP No.43079/2015. 6. (i) The learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4, while reiterating the above contentions submitted that the petitioner had itself entrusted the investigation of the allegations made in the complaint to its executive engineer of the Technical Audit Cell (henceforth referred to as ‘TAC’ for short) and that the executive engineer after an elaborate inspection of the spot as well as the measurement books and after conducting tests to ascertain the compressive strength of the road laid, came to the conclusion that the thickness of the road laid was far higher than the thickness stipulated in the tender document. He also reported that the compressive strength of the road laid satisfied the stipulated norms. He also reported that the work was executed within the stipulated amount of Rs.2,00,00,000/-. He also reported that in about 325 meters of the road was damaged and the same was repaired. (ii) The learned counsel therefore contended that even as per the report of the executive engineer of the TAC, there is no defect in the road laid and hence, the order passed by the respondent No.2, dropping the enquiry against the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is just and proper. Besides this, he invited the attention of the Court to the report of the High-Power Committee constituted by the respondent No.2, who also reported that the damage to the road was due to the widespread rain in the area. He thus contends that on facts, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 are not complicit in any misconduct and hence, the respondent No.2 was justified in dropping the proceedings. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent No.2 also reiterated the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3 and 4 and submitted that the respondent No.2 after carefully perusing the report submitted by the High- Powered Committee and also taking into account the findings of the executive engineer of the TAC of the petitioner, rightly came to the conclusion that there was no misconduct on the part of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 warranting a departmental enquiry as recommended by the petitioner. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4. 9. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4. 9. A perusal of the report submitted by the petitioner under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984, shows that it recommended the constitution of a high powered committee to report on the following: "(a) The functioning of the KRIDL in relation to the manner of execution of several works in the State of Karnataka and the quality of the work executed and fixing up the liability, if any, on the concerned Engineers or Officers of KRIDL. (b) To prescribe norms for utilization of the funds by the officers of KRIDL which is granted towards execution of the works and the liability and accountability on the part of the Managing Director, KRIDL and other Senior officers of KRIDL in addition to the officers/Engineers who are active in the execution of the works allotted to it. (c) To revoke the exemption granted under Section 4(g) of Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements Act 1999, having regard to the unsatisfactory functioning, keeping in mind the findings of the report to be submitted by the High Power Committee and to take such other suitable and appropriate decisions in bringing more transparency, objectivity and accountability in the functioning of the KRIDL and the work to be executed by it. It also recommended the following: (a) A recommendation is made to the Competent Authority to initiate Disciplinary Proceedings against Respondents No.4 & 5 and to entrust the same to this authority as per Rule 14-A of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. 10. Before the report under section 12(3) of the Act, 1984 was submitted an inspection was conducted by the executive engineer of the Technical Audit Cell of the petitioner which showed the following: 11. The respondent No.2 after receipt of the report under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1984, had constituted a High- Powered Committee headed by a retired Chief Engineer of the respondent No.2. The High-Powered Committee in terms of its report was of the following opinion: "1) The Estimate was prepared on the based on the established norms. 2) All necessary data required for preparation of estimate has been collected. 3) All the tests have been conducted on the materials used for construction before using them for construction. The High-Powered Committee in terms of its report was of the following opinion: "1) The Estimate was prepared on the based on the established norms. 2) All necessary data required for preparation of estimate has been collected. 3) All the tests have been conducted on the materials used for construction before using them for construction. 4) Measurements recorded in the MB tallies with the measurements actually measured during earlier visits of the investigating teams. 5) No additional cost seems to have been incurred for re-doing of the damaged portions. 6) No major faults were noticed in the preparation of the Estimate which affects the quality of the estimate. 7) The quality of work done is as per prescribed norms." 12. It is based upon the above that the respondent No.2 passed the impugned order dropping the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4, after censuring them. The petitioner though has an institutional locus to challenge the decision taken by the respondent No.2 in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in The Hon'ble Lokayuktha and Another vs. Sri Prakash T.V. and Another - WP No.29212/2017 and Manjunath R Ballari v. The Hon'ble Lokayuktha - SLP(C)No.13209-13210/2021 , in the instant case, there is nothing on record to establish that the road laid under the supervision of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 was defective. On the contrary, the damage caused to the road was due to the extensive rain in the area. It is also found from the report of the executive engineer, Technical Audit Cell of the petitioner that the road was executed from chainage 4.030 to 0.250 and it is only a part of the road that was damaged. The finding of the High-Powered Committee that this damage was due to the extensive rain in the area cannot be disbelieved. Therefore, the respondent No.2 after being satisfied about the report submitted by the High-Powered Committee as well as the report of the executive engineer of the Technical Audit Cell of the petitioner, was justified in dropping the proceedings against the respondent Nos.3 and 4. Hence, no interference is warranted in this writ petition. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 14. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, all pending applications stand dismissed.