ORDER : JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J. This Criminal Revision Case has been filed by the petitioners seeking to set aside the impugned Order dated 02.07.2025 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.315 of 2024 in Sessions Case No.4 of 2024 by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Jagitial (for short, “the learned trial Court”), whereby the application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) was allowed, thereby adding the petitioners as accused Nos.4 and 5 in Sessions Case No.4 of 2024. 2. Heard Sri G. Ravi Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the record. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned trial Court failed to satisfy itself with regard to the essential ingredients of any of the alleged offences. It is contended that the learned trial Court did not properly appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case and erroneously passed the impugned Order. It is further submitted that since there was no involvement of the petitioners in the alleged crime, the Police had deleted their names from the array of accused during the course of investigation. After such deletion, the de-facto complainant did not file any protest petition objecting to the said deletion. The power conferred upon the Court under Section 319 of Cr.P.C is a discretionary and extraordinary power, which must be exercised sparingly and with great caution. Hence, while seeking to set aside the impugned Order, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and others , [ 2025 INSC 416 ] wherein at Paragraph No.13 it was held that: “ 13 . The law on the point of summoning additional accused in exercise of power conferred by Section 319 Cr.P.C is well settled. One may profitably refer to and rely on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 , where law has been authoritatively declared. We consider it proper to quote the conclusions reached by this Court qua the questions arising for decision, hereunder: “ 117 . We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) and (iii) — What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised ?
We consider it proper to quote the conclusions reached by this Court qua the questions arising for decision, hereunder: “ 117 . We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) and (iii) — What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised ? AND — Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319 (1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal case [ (2014) 3 SCC 306 ], the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 CrPC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence” under Section 319 CrPC becomes available for summoning an additional accused. 117.2. Section 319 CrPC, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 CrPC, and under Section 398 CrPC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 CrPC. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. 117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial. Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319 (1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4.
Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319 (1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319 (4) CrPC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination. Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319 (1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5. Though under Section 319 (4)(b) CrPC the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would be the same as for framing a charge10[10 In paragraph 106, the Court held “Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. ]. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused.
]. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different. Question (v)—Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged? Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge- sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 CrPC has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.” 4. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State contended that the trial Court had passed impugned order after hearing both sides and considering the material available on record, and therefore, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court needs no interference of this Court as there is no illegality or irregularity in the said order and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Revision Case. 5. Having regard to the submissions made on either side and upon perusal of the record, it is apparent on the face of the record that the main Sessions Case pertains to the year 2024. The learned trial Court had duly framed the charges, which were denied by the accused. Subsequently, the learned trial Court commenced the trial and recorded the evidence of PW1 and PW2. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecution filed an application under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., seeking to array the petitioners as accused Nos.4 and 5. 6. In the context of the present case, it is relevant to extract Section 319 of Cr.P.C., which reads as under: “319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.
6. In the context of the present case, it is relevant to extract Section 319 of Cr.P.C., which reads as under: “319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), Then - (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.” 7. A bare reading of the above provision makes it evident that Section 319 of Cr.P.C. confers an independent and discretionary power upon the Court to proceed against any person who is not already an accused in the case. The said power can be exercised by the Court itself during the course of any inquiry or trial, if it appears from the evidence that such person has committed an offence for which he could be tried together with the existing accused. This provision does not contemplate or authorize either the prosecution or any of the accused to seek the addition of another person as an accused by filing an application before the Court. 8.
This provision does not contemplate or authorize either the prosecution or any of the accused to seek the addition of another person as an accused by filing an application before the Court. 8. Manifestly, it is for the Court, on its own satisfaction derived from the evidence, to proceed against the petitioners for the offence which they appear to have committed, and not for the prosecution to move an application in this regard, particularly in a case where the names of the petitioners were deleted by the Police after due investigation, and admittedly, no protest petition was filed by the de-facto complainant. However, a careful scrutiny of the entire impugned order does not disclose under which offence or under which penal provision, the petitioners are liable to be tried. Having regard to the settled principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, though only a prima facie case is required to be made out from the evidence adduced before the Court not necessarily tested on the touchstone of cross-examination, the material must nevertheless disclose much stronger evidence than a mere probability of complicity. The test to be applied is one which is higher than that applied at the stage of framing of charge, but short of such satisfaction that the evidence, if left unrebutted, would necessarily lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the Court ought to refrain from exercising power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has committed a grave procedural irregularity in allowing the petition filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the same is set aside. 9. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed. Consequently, the impugned Order dated 02.07.2025 in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.315 of 2024 in Sessions Case No.4 of 2024 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Jagitial, is hereby set aside. All proceedings arising therefrom shall stand quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.