ORDER : Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J. These two Criminal Petitions are heard and disposed of by way of this common order, as the facts and circumstances in these two cases are identical, but, of course, some of the Petitioners are different, albeit they arise out of two different cases. 2. Criminal Petition No.1616 of 2025 and Criminal Petition No.1755 of 2025 have been filed challenging the chargesheet filed in C.C.No.1152 of 2020 on the file of the learned II Additional judicial First-Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 341, 188 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the I.P.C., in Crime No.06/2020 of Robertsonpet Polic Station; and C.C.No.1304 of 2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 188 (Para-II) of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, the Act., in Crime No.100/2020 of Pedana Police Station. 3. The allegation against the Petitioners in C.C.No.1152/2020 is that the Petitioners formed into an unlawful assembly at a particular center of the city of Machilipatnam sitting in the main road and giving slogans for the arrest of Ex-Chief Minister Sri Nara Chandrabau Naidu by the Vijayawada police and giving slogans against the police. As they caused inconvenience, free flow of vehicular traffic and public, the Sub-Inspector of Police Robertsonpet Police Station/L.W.1 lodged a report which was registered as FIR in Crime No.06/2020 under Sections 341 and 188 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.’ After completion of the investigation L.W.6 filed chargesheet. 4. The facts and circumstances in C.C.No.1304/2020 are that there was a lockdown announced by the Government of India and the District Magistrate, Krishna at Machilipatnam had issued orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Cr.P.C., for control of Covid-19 due to widespread of Carona Virus in the general public. On 09.04.2020, the Petitioners travelled together in a car violating the orders passed by the District Magistrate, Krishna at Machilipatnam in proceedings vide Rc.No.C1/55/M/2020 dated 22.03.2020 under Section 144 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The Head Constable/L.W.1 of Pedana Police Station lodged a report with L.W.7/Sub-Inspector of Police, Pedana Police Station, which was registered as a case in Crime No.100/2020 under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and under Section 3 of ‘the Act.’ After investigation he filed chargesheet, which was number as C.C.No.1304/2020. 5. 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 7. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.1152/2020 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam; and C.C.No.1304/2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’/Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’?" 8. In the two chargesheets the alleged offences are Sections 341, 188 read with Section 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 3 of ‘the Act.’ Ms. M.Nikitha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in T.Jeevan Singh v. State of Telangana, Crl.P.No.2069/2023 dated 01.03.2023 wherein at paragraph No.6 while referring another judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Kodela Siva Prasad v. Koritala Venkata Ramanaiah, 2006 (3) ALT (Crl.)49 (A.P) it was held that obstruction in the free flow of traffic would not amount to wrongful restraint under Section 341 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 9. The facts and circumstances in C.C.No.1152/2020, the Petitioners themselves formed into an unlawful assembly in a particular center of city of Machilipatnam sitting in the main road and giving slogans for their cause. They also allegedly had caused obstruction in the free flow of traffic. Section 339 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ defines what is wrongful restraint. Section 340 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ defines what is wrongful confinement. Section 341 is the punishment provided for wrongful restraint. “339.Wrongfulrestraint.— Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right toproceed,is said wrongfully torestrainthatperson. 340. Wrongfulconfinement Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceedings beyond certain circumscribing limits,is said"wrongfully toconfine" thatperson. 341. Punishment forwrongful restraint.— Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or withfinewhichmayextendtofive hundredrupees, or withboth.” 10. 340. Wrongfulconfinement Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceedings beyond certain circumscribing limits,is said"wrongfully toconfine" thatperson. 341. Punishment forwrongful restraint.— Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or withfinewhichmayextendtofive hundredrupees, or withboth.” 10. Section 339 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ defines wrongful restraint as the voluntary obstruction of any person so as to prevent them from proceeding in a direction in which they have a legal right to proceed. The provision contemplates a specific and targeted impediment to an individual’s lawful movement. As per the allegations in C.C.No.1152/2020, the Petitioners were part of a public demonstration, forming an assembly and raising slogans on a public road, which allegedly disrupted the general flow of traffic. 11. However, such obstruction, being indiscriminate and affecting the public at large, does not satisfy the essential ingredients of Section 339 of ‘the I.P.C.’ There is no assertion that the complainant was individually and intentionally restrained from proceeding in a particular direction. The inconvenience caused appears to be incidental to the protest and not the result of a deliberate act aimed at curtailing the complainant’s personal liberty. Consequently, the offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is not attracted, as the requisite element of specific intent to restrain a particular person is absent. 12. The Petitioners were allegedly obstructing the free flow of traffic, which is not an offence contemplated under Section 341 of ‘the I.P.C.’ Therefore, Section 349 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, as per Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, ‘the I.P.C.,’ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned. 13. In the two instant cases, there is no ‘complaint’ by the public servant, and there was only chargesheet filed under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The ‘complaint’ as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was not filed. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police report, the learned Magistrate was not authorised to take cognizance of the alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,’ there is an embargo for taking cognizance. 14. Ms. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police report, the learned Magistrate was not authorised to take cognizance of the alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,’ there is an embargo for taking cognizance. 14. Ms. M.Nikitha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under: “28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPCor abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence describedin thosesections. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence describedin thosesections. (VideGovindMehta v.Stateof Bihar [ (1971) 3 SCC 329 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 608 : AIR 1971 SC 1708 ] , Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [ (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935 ] , Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [ (1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] , State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [ (1998) 2 SCC 391 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 642] , K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [ (2005) 7 SCC 352 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1673] and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah[(2005) 4SCC 370 : 2005SCC (Cri) 1101] .) 29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 : AIR 1953 SC 293 : 1953 Cri LJ 1232] and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [ AIR 1966 SC 1775 : 1966 Cri LJ 1491] , this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it orby putting awronglabel onit.” 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar , (1971) 3 SCC 329 at paragraph No.12 it is held as under: “12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of timeat which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [ AIR 1967 SC 528 : (1967) 1 SCR 520 : 1967 Cri LJ 528] . The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with theprovisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offencesenumeratedtherein.” 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh , (1996) 3 SCC 533 at paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [ (1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935 ] the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1- 1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable.” 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh , (1998) 2 SCC 391 at paragraph No.2 held as under: “2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [ (1983) 4 SCC 240 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 822 : AIR 1983 SC 1053 ] on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC.” 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2005) 7 SCC 352 at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under: “3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents,which waslaunched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short “IPC”) on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwahv.Meenakshi Marwah[(2005) 4SCC 370 : 2005SCC (Cri) 1101] has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisionsof Section195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC wereapplicable. 4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. 4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not relate to falsity or otherwise of thecomplaint beforethe Deputy Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court wasnotjustified inquashing prosecutionof therespondents.” 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B., (1953) 1 SCC 637 at paragraph No.12 held as under: “12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on theother hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code.” 20. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners also relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh , (1994) 4 SCC 95 wherein at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under: “15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression ‘public servant concerned’. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by thepublic servantconcerned. 16. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by thepublic servantconcerned. 16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [ AIR 1968 SC 1422 : 1969 Cri LJ 4 : 70 Pun LR 1131] we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression ‘public servant concerned’. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and theappealis allowed.” 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy , (1981) 2 SCC 185 at paragraph No.8 it is held as under: “8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure shouldbe upheld.” 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh , 1968 SCC OnLine SC 253 at paragraph No.5 it is held as under: “5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by theMagistrate beforewhom theoriginal proceedingswere taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 readsas follows: “559. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 readsas follows: “559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successorin office. (2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of suchMagistrate.” This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara Kanon Manjhi v. Gopi Manjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re Subramaniam Chettiar [ AIR 1957 Mad 442 ] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed byShri Joginder Singh “Karangarhia”, Magistrate.” 23. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed byShri Joginder Singh “Karangarhia”, Magistrate.” 23. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni , (2020) 20 SCC 1 wherein at para No.48, it is held as under: “48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible tosplit themup, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthyv.State, 1953 SCC OnLineMad 236 :AIR1955 Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , SCCpp. 190-91, paras7-8) “7. … In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLineMad 236 :AIR1955 Mad 237], SCC OnLine Mad) ‘The main point on which Mr Jayarama Ayyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 readsasfollows: “ 193. Punishment for false evidence .—Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” “Fabrication of false evidence” is defined in Section 192. The relevant portionof it is: “Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that suchcircumstance maycause anypersonwhoin suchproceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said “to fabricatefalseevidence”.” The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceedingin anycourt. Mr Jayarama Ayyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecutingthe accusedfor anoffence for whicha complaint of court is notnecessary.’ 8. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecutingthe accusedfor anoffence for whicha complaint of court is notnecessary.’ 8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Codeof Criminal Procedureshould beupheld.”” 24. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P., 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726 at para No.86 it is held as under: “86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to thesettled law laid downby theApex Court and otherHigh Courts(referredsupra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime againstthepetitioner is vitiatedby irregularity.” 25. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan supra, the learned Judicial First-Class Magistrates were not authorised to take cognizance in view of the embargo under Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ 26. Therefore, the proceedings in C.C.No.1152/2020 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam and in C.C.No.1304/2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam, are liable to be interfered and quashed. 27. In the result, the Criminal Petitions are allowed. Accordingly, the proceedings in C.C.No.1152/2020 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam and C.C.No.1304/2020 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam, are quashed.