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2025 DIGILAW 1130 (GAU)

Laldingliani v. Lalbiakvela (L) s/b Laldingliana

2025-06-27

MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Aldrin Lallawmzuala, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Dinari T. Azyu, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 as well as Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent. 2. This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 17 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 read with Section 100 and Order XLII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the appellant, Smt. Laldingliani against the judgment and decree passed on 03.04.2018 by the learned District Judge, Aizawl in RFA No. 19/2014 whereby the judgment and decree passed in Declaratory Suit No. 17/2009 by the Court of learned Civil Judge No. 1, Aizawl was set aside and reversed by decreeing the suit in favour of the respondent No. 1. 3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant second appeal, in brief, are that the predecessor in interest of the respondent No. 1, namely, Lalbiakvela had filed a declaratory suit before the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge No. 1, Aizawl mainly against the present appellant Laldingliani (the defendant No. 4) and other revenue officials seeking a declaration that LSC No. 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 in favour of the appellant (defendant No. 4 of that suit) is illegal, void, and invalid. The plaintiff (present respondent No. 1) also sought for a declaration that he is the owner of the suit land and building under LSC No. 932 of 1979 re-numbered as LSC No 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 located at Kulikawn, Aizawl. 4. The contention of the plaintiff (the respondent No. 1) before the Trial Court was that he is owner of the land and building under LSC No. 932 of 1979 re-numbered as LSC No. 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 located at Kulikawn, Aizawl. It is also contended that the defendant No. 4 is the daughter of the elder brother of the plaintiff who without his knowledge and consent got transferred the said LSC in her own name in collusion with the revenue authorities. 5. On the other hand, the defendant No. 4 (the present appellant) had pleaded in her written statement that the plaintiff had transferred the said LSCs in her name with full knowledge and consent by subscribing his signatures in the application for transfer of ownership before the witnesses and family gatherings at the residential quarters of Mr. 5. On the other hand, the defendant No. 4 (the present appellant) had pleaded in her written statement that the plaintiff had transferred the said LSCs in her name with full knowledge and consent by subscribing his signatures in the application for transfer of ownership before the witnesses and family gatherings at the residential quarters of Mr. Lalhmachhuana ITS, Khatla, Aizawl. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the Trial Court on 01.11.2010:- “1. Whether the suit is maintainable or not? 2. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation, doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence or not? 3. Whether transfer of land and building under LSC No. 932 of 1979 to the defendant no. 4 is illegal, void and invalid or not. And if so, whether such transfer/mutation is liable to cancel or not? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed or not. If so, to what extent?” 7. The plaintiff (the respondent No. 1) had adduced the evidence of two witnesses, namely, the plaintiff Mr. Lalbiakvela himself as PW-1 and Mr. Laldingliana as PW-2. 8. The defendant No. 4 (the appellant) also adduced four witnesses, namely, the defendant No. 4 herself as DW-1, Smt. Lalnunsangi as DW-2, Smt. Nuzawni as DW-3 and Mr. R. Lalsangluaia as DW-4. 9. Ultimately, by judgment dated 14th of May, 2012, the said plaintiff was decreed and the LSC No. 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 issued in favour of the defendant No. 4 was declared as illegal, void, and invalid. It was also decreed that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and building under LSC No. 932 of 1979 re-numbered as LSC No 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 located at Kulikawn, Aizawl. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14.05.2012 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl in Declaratory Suit No. 17/2009, the defendant No. 4 (the appellant) Smt. Laldingliani preferred an appeal registered as RFA No. 11/2012. 11. Thereafter, by judgment and order dated 12.02.2013, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case for a fresh adjudication to the Trial Court after receipt of the case record back on remand. The Trial Court by judgment and order dated 11.10.2013, after deciding the issue Nos. 2 and 3 against the plaintiff, dismissed the suit. 12. 11. Thereafter, by judgment and order dated 12.02.2013, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case for a fresh adjudication to the Trial Court after receipt of the case record back on remand. The Trial Court by judgment and order dated 11.10.2013, after deciding the issue Nos. 2 and 3 against the plaintiff, dismissed the suit. 12. Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 11.10.2013 passed by the Trial Court in Declaratory Suit No. 17/2009, the plaintiff (the present respondent No. 1) preferred an appeal before the Court of the learned District Judge, Aizawl which was registered as RFA No. 19/2015. Thereafter, by judgment and order dated 03.04.2018, the First Appellate Court i.e., the Court of learned District Judge, Aizawl allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed in Declaratory Suit No. 17/2009 and allowed the prayer of the plaintiff by cancelling the LSC No 104502/01/26 of 2004 dated 10.12.2004 issued in the name of the defendant No. 4 Ms Laldingliani. The land and building covered by LSC No. 932 of 1979 were declared to be part of estate of the deceased Lalbiakvela. 13. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 03.04.2018 passed in RFA No. 19/2014 passed by the learned District Judge, Aizawl, the present appellant, namely, Laldingliani has preferred the instant Regular Second Appeal. 14. After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides and after going through the materials on record, this Court, on 23.11.2022, framed following substantial question of law in this instant regular second appeal:- “1. Whether the Judgment & Order dated 3.4.2018 passed by the First Appellate Court in allowing the Regular First Appeal filed by the instant plaintiff/respondent No.1 is perverse and not based on evidence on record? 2. Whether the learned First Appellate Court had correctly apply Section 16 (3) of the Contract Act, 1872 to the facts of the case especially when it has not been pleaded by the plaintiff/respondent No.1? 15. Mr. Aldrin Lallawmzuala, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned First Appellate Court had erred in not taking into the consideration the evidence on record while coming to the findings that the defendant No. 4 (the present appellant) failed to discharge the onus to prove that the LSC No. 932 of 1979 was transferred to her by the plaintiff (the respondent No. 1 herein) Lalbiakvela. He also submitted that the plaintiff Lalbiakvela even executed a will in respect of landed property covered under LSC No. 932 of 1979, in favour of the present appellant. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the only issue to be decided by the First Appellate Court was that whether there was lawful transfer inter vivos as claimed by the defendant No. 4 so as to validate the mutation of her name in respect of LSC No. 932 of 1979. He submits that though the defendant No. 4 by adducing the evidence of defence witness, namely, DW-1 to DW-4, has proved that the ownership of land and building covered by LSC No. 932 of 1979 was transferred in the name of defendant No. 4 by the plaintiff with full consent and knowledge. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that though the testimony of defence witnesses remain uncontroverted, however, the First Appellate Court, in the impugned judgment did not consider the evidence of defence witnesses and came to an adverse finding merely on the ground that no gift deed was exhibited by the defendant No. 4. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the instant case the transaction in question does not require execution of a formal gift deed as it was a voluntary transfer of ownership with the consent of the original owner and which was duly acted upon by mutation in the official record and acceptance of same by the present appellant. Hence, he submits that the decision of First Appellate Court is a wrong decision. 18. He also submits that the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 cannot be regarded as a contract as there was no consideration between them, hence, the First Appellate Court erred in holding that the contract between plaintiff and the defendant No. 4 is covered under the provision of Section 16(4) of the Contract Act. He submits that the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court is, therefore, perverse. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the DW- 4 has categorically deposed that no separate agreement was prepared as the form prescribed by the Revenue Department for mutation of land revenue record consisted of all the required details. He submits that the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court is, therefore, perverse. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the DW- 4 has categorically deposed that no separate agreement was prepared as the form prescribed by the Revenue Department for mutation of land revenue record consisted of all the required details. However, the First Appellate Court has ignored this fact and decreed the first appeal in favour of the plaintiff by rendering a perverse judgment. He has, therefore, submitted that as the First Appellate Court did not take into consideration the uncontroverted testimony of defendant’s witnesses, the judgment rendered by it is not sustainable as same is perverse. He, therefore, prays for deciding the substantial questions formulated in this Regular Second Appeal in favour of the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 20. On the other hand, Ms. Dinari T. Azyu, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that the First Appellate Court has correctly decided the issues between the parties in the impugned judgment. She submits that the First Appellate Court has considered all the relevant materials on record before rendering the impugned judgment and same cannot be regarded as perverse. She submits that the plaintiff has categorically deposed in his evidence that the mutation of the name of the defendant No. 4 in respect of LSC No. 932 of 1979 was done without his knowledge and consent. The said contention was disputed by defendant No. 4, however, he failed to produce any gift deed or any other documents of conveyance to substantiate her claim that the ownership of the land and building in question was transferred by the plaintiff to her. She submits that in this case, the testimony of defendant No. 4 shows that her name was mutated on the basis of will executed by the plaintiff, which shows that during the lifetime of the testator, the transfer intended by the will of the plaintiff was given effect to, which is illegal. She submits that the will dated 27.06.1995 was ultimately revoked by the plaintiff on 03.08.2007; therefore, same cannot be the basis of the transfer of ownership of the disputed land and property. 21. She submits that the will dated 27.06.1995 was ultimately revoked by the plaintiff on 03.08.2007; therefore, same cannot be the basis of the transfer of ownership of the disputed land and property. 21. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that there cannot be a mutation of the name of defendant No. 4 in respect of LSC No. 932 of 1979 on the basis of transfer of ownership without there being any gift, sale or any other legally recognized mode of conveyance of ownership in her favour by the plaintiff. She submits that an immovable property can be legally transferred only by way of registered deed of conveyance, which has not happened in the instant case. In support of her submission, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has cited a ruling of the Apex Court in the case of “ Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited –Vs- The State of Haryana and Ors. , reported in “ (2012) 1 SCC 656 ” 22. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has, therefore, submitted that there is no perversity in the impugned judgment and the substantial question of law formulated in this Regular Second Appeal may be decided against the appellant. 23. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the materials available on record including the records of the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court. 24. It is to be noted that the original plaintiff Lalbiakvela died on 16.05.2011 and his legal representative was allowed to be substituted in his place by order dated 19.08.2011. It is also not in dispute that the “will” executed on 27.06.1995 by the original plaintiff was ultimately revoked by him on 03.08.2007. Therefore, there is no dispute at the bar that said will cannot be the basis of the mutation of the name of the defendant No. 4 in respect of land and building covered under LSC No. 932 of 1979. 25. The main substantial question formulated in this appeal is as to whether the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court in allowing the appeal filed by the plaintiff (present respondent No. 1) was perverse or not? 26. A decision may be regarded as perverse if no reasonable person would have arrived at the same on the basis of evidence which is available on record. 26. A decision may be regarded as perverse if no reasonable person would have arrived at the same on the basis of evidence which is available on record. A decision would necessarily be perverse if it is based on no evidence at all. It is also perverse when it is based on some irrelevant materials. It is also perverse when while arriving at the said decision, vital evidence has been ignored. 27. The Apex Court has observed in the case of “ Associates Builders -vs- DDA ” reported in “ (2015) 3 SCC 49 ” as follows:- “ 32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , it was held : (SCC p. 317, para 7) “7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , it was held : (SCC p. 14, para 10) “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 28. In the instant case, if we peruse the impugned judgment, it appears that the Trial Court has considered the evidence of defendant’s witnesses in Paragraph Nos. 16, 17 and 18 of the impugned judgment and it did not relied on their testimony because the defendant No. 4 failed to produce the documents which she had claimed that was the basis of transfer of ownership in her favour. 16, 17 and 18 of the impugned judgment and it did not relied on their testimony because the defendant No. 4 failed to produce the documents which she had claimed that was the basis of transfer of ownership in her favour. On the other hand, the plaintiff Lalbiakvela (since deceased) has categorically stated that he has not transferred the ownership of the landed property under LSC No. 932 of 1979 to the defendant No. 4. The transfer of ownership of immovable property can be made only in the modes recognized by law, however, in the instant case, though at one point of time the defendant No. 4 had claimed that the plaintiff had gifted her the property, however, no deed of gift or for that matter any kind of document by which the ownership was transferred could be produced by the defendant No. 4, therefore, the First Appellate Court had correctly decided the issue No. 2 against the defendant No. 4. 29. As while arriving at the said decision, the First Appellate Court has considered the relevant materials on record including the evidence of defendant’s witnesses, the finding arrived at cannot be regarded so outrageously defying logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. As the defendant No. 4 has failed to produce the documents on the basis of which she was claiming herself to be the owner of the disputed land, the finding arrived at by the First Appellate Court holding the plaintiff (respondent No. 1) to be the owner of the disputed land and property and also holding the transfer of ownership of land and building under LSC No. 932 of 1979 from plaintiff to defendant No. 4 as illegal, void and invalid cannot be regarded as perverse. The first substantial question of law formulated in this appeal is, accordingly, answered against the appellant. 30. As regards the second substantial question of law, which is formulated in this appeal, is concerned, this Court is of considered opinion that though the First Appellate Court does not appear to be right in coming to the finding that the provisions of Section 16 (3) of the Contract Act, 1872 is applicable to this case as there was no pleading to that effect by any of the parties. However, the said question would not have materially affected the outcome of the first appeal as the issue No. 2 formulated by the First Appellate Court would have otherwise also be decided against the defendant No. 4 for her failure to produce any document of conveyance of ownership of the land and building covered by LSC No. 932 of 1979. Therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that the second substantial question of law formulated by this Court on 23.11.2022 in this Regular Second Appeal is not involved in this case and its outcome does not have any bearing on the outcome of the case. 31. For the reasons discussed in foregoing paragraphs, this Regular Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed.