ORDER : (MITALI THAKURIA, J.) Heard Mr. D. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. K. Deori & Mr. K. Dabi, learned counsel for the applicant/returned candidate. Also heard Mr. N. Pada, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/Election Petitioner. 2. The present interlocutory application has been filed seeking dismissal of the Election Petition No. 4/2024 under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for non-disclosure of cause of action and material facts, and also under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for striking out portions of the pleadings that are alleged to be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious. 3. The applicant is the returned candidate and arrayed as respondent No. 1 in Election Petition No. 4/2024, which has been filed by the election petitioner challenging the election result of the 36-Nari Koyu (ST) Assembly Constituency of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Respondent No. 2 is the Returning Officer and has been arrayed as a pro forma respondent. 4. It is the case of the applicant that the election petition lacks the requisite material facts and particulars regarding the alleged corrupt practices, such as booth capturing and undue influence. The allegations are vague and general in nature and do not disclose any cause of action as required under Section 83(1) (a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (in short, RP Act, 1951’). 5. It is submitted by Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant/returned candidate, that in paragraph No. 12(I) of the election petition, the respondent/election petitioner has alleged that one of his proposers, Shri Ninya Angu, was attacked by supporters of the returned candidate on 27.03.2024 at 1.30 PM to prevent filing of the nomination. However, the election petitioner had already filed his nomination at 12.42 PM on 27.03.2024, as per the documents annexed by the petitioner himself, rendering the alleged incident at 1.30 PM factually baseless, improbable and frivolous. 6. Further Mr. Mazumder submitted that though in paragraph No. 12(II), it is alleged that the supporters of the returned candidate gave threatening to the election petitioner, but the said allegation lack specific details such as date and time, names, and places of the alleged incidents, and thus, the said allegation is also vague and devoid of material particulars. 7. Mr. Further Mr. Mazumder submitted that though in paragraph No. 12(II), it is alleged that the supporters of the returned candidate gave threatening to the election petitioner, but the said allegation lack specific details such as date and time, names, and places of the alleged incidents, and thus, the said allegation is also vague and devoid of material particulars. 7. Mr. Mazumder also submitted that in paragraph No. 12(III), the petitioner alleged that his proposer- Shri Ninya Angu and a supporter- Shri Katon Moyong were restrained from entering the Office of the Returning Officer’s on the day of scrutiny by the supporters of the Returned Candidate, namely Shri Illi Koyu, Shri Minge Kadu, Shri Dakge Riba and Shri Chie Kadu & Ors., but those individuals were not authorized by the election petitioner to enter the Returning Officer’s Office at the time of scrutiny under Section 36 of the RP Act, 1951, and hence, the claim of interference with the election process is unsustainable and devoid of material facts. 8. Further, in paragraph No. 12(IV), the petitioner refers to an alleged attack on their convoy on 30.03.2024. But from a bare perusal of the FIR dated 31.03.2024, lodged in this regard, it is seen that the alleged incident is not related to any election offence, rather it pertains to a distinct criminal offence and thus, there is no cause of action to proceed on the ground of corrupt practice. Further he submitted that in paragraph No. 12(V) of the election petition, it is alleged that the applicant/returned candidate in connivance with the Returning Officer has deliberately failed to install of CCTV cameras at Loglu Polling Station, Tabiripo Polling Station, Sipu Polling Station and Potte Polling Station, which led to commission of violence and coupled with undue influence on the supporters/voters of the Election Petitioner, thereby ultimately leading to interfere with the free exercise of electors right to vote. But, non-installation of CCTV cameras against the returned candidate is vague averments made in the election petitions do not justify the requirements of pleading “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and hence, the same is liable to be strike out and rejected at the threshold. 9. But, non-installation of CCTV cameras against the returned candidate is vague averments made in the election petitions do not justify the requirements of pleading “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and hence, the same is liable to be strike out and rejected at the threshold. 9. In paragraph No. 13(I) of the election petition, it is alleged that on the date of poll, i.e. on 19.04.2024, at 21 Potte Polling Station, one of the supporters of the election petitioner, Shri Ananto Goswami and his family members, were intimidated by the supporters of Returned Candidate, Shri Nina Kadu and he has impersonate the actual voters Shri Ananto Goswami and 2 (two) others and absentee voter of Smti yapa Kadu was voted by Smti Yaken Nguji. Similarly, in paragraph No. 13(II), it is alleged that the supporters of Returned Candidate had casted the votes of absentee Shri Mangal Singh Yadav and his family members and also for those absentees who had already casted their votes through postal ballots and same was brought to the notice of the concerned authority. Again in paragraph No. 13(III), it is alleged that vote of deceased person, namely, Late Tajum Kadu of Potte village, who expired on 23.09.2022, was casted by Shri Nina Kadu. In that context, it is submitted by Mr. Mazumder that the election petitioner failed to identify the absentee voters who had casted votes through postal ballot. He further contended that had there had been any incident of booth capturing at 21 Pottee Polling Station, then 100% of votes of all the voters of the said Polling Station would have been casted in favour of the returned candidate. But, as per the records and the result sheets, it is seen that out of 332 voters, only 290 had exercised their adult franchise, of whom 29 casted their votes in favour of the election petitioner and 70 voters remained absent. Thus, the existence of 70 uncasted votes contradicts the allegation of booth capturing . Therefore, the election petitioner could not satisfy the requirements of pleading of “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and same is liable to be strike out. 10. Mr. Mazumder further submitted that although the election petitioner has referred to video footage in paragraph Nos. Therefore, the election petitioner could not satisfy the requirements of pleading of “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and same is liable to be strike out. 10. Mr. Mazumder further submitted that although the election petitioner has referred to video footage in paragraph Nos. 12(III) and 12(IV) in support of the allegations of corrupt practices, such footage has not been furnished along with the election petition, which has highly prejudice the Returned Candidate to defend his case. He further submitted that it is the duty of election petitioner to plead all the material facts and particulars and annex all the relied documents and material exhibits at the time of filling of election petition within limitation period. Further it is submitted that the election petitioner has lost the election by huge margin of 1694 valid votes and even if all votes from the four disputed polling stations were hypothetically credited to the petitioner, the result of the election would not be materially affected. Thus, the election petition has failed to make out prima facie case that any corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate, or his agents, workers and supporters. On these grounds, the election petition is devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed with heavy costs. Accordingly, it is prayed by the applicant/returned candidate for striking out paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) and 13(I) to 13(IV) from the pleadings of the election petition and also prayed for dismissal of the election petition on the point of non-maintainability. 11. Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel, further submitted that as per Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act, it is a mandatory requirement that the consent of the returned candidate is to be establish if any corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate through his agent or any other person. But, here in the instant case, there is no any averment made in the pleadings of the election petitioner that any consent was obtained from the returned candidate while committing the alleged offence of undue influence and booth capturing by his agents, workers and the supporters. 12. Further he submitted that as per Section 100(1)(d)(ii) of the RP Act, it is to be established that any corrupt practice was committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent. 12. Further he submitted that as per Section 100(1)(d)(ii) of the RP Act, it is to be established that any corrupt practice was committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent. In addition, he refers to Section 135A of the said Act, which defines the offence of booth capturing and lays down five specific explanations, namely, clauses (a) to (e), for determining what constitutes such an offence. For ready reference, the explanations appended to Section 135A are extracted hereinbelow:- “Explanation.- For the purposes of 4this sub-section and section 20B, “booth capturing” includes, among other things, all or any of the following activities, namely: — (a) seizure of a polling station or a place fixed for the poll by any person or persons making polling authorities surrender the ballot papers or voting machines and doing of any other act which affects the orderly conduct of elections; (b) taking possession of a polling station or a place fixed for the poll by any person or persons and allowing only his or their own supporters to exercise their right to vote and 5prevent others from free exercise of their right to vote; (c) 6coercing or intimidating or threatening directly or indirectly any elector and preventing him from going to the polling station or a place fixed for the poll to cast his vote; (d) seizure of a place for counting of votes by any person or persons, making the counting authorities surrender the ballot papers or voting machines and the doing of anything which affects the orderly counting of votes; (e) doing by any person in the service of Government, of all or any of the aforesaid activities or aiding or conniving at, any such activity in the furtherance of the prospects of the election of a candidate. 7(2) An offence punishable under sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.” 13. Mr. Mazumder further submitted that here in the instant case, the election petitioner has neither provided any explanation nor made any specific allegation as to how the offence of booth capturing was committed by the returned candidate through his agents, workers, or supporters. He accordingly submitted that the petitioner had failed to establish that there is “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act and hence, the election petition is liable to be dismissed and the paragraph Nos. He accordingly submitted that the petitioner had failed to establish that there is “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act and hence, the election petition is liable to be dismissed and the paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) and 13(I) to 13(IV) are liable to be struck out from the pleadings of the election petition. 14. Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel, further submitted that there is an allegation of impersonation of only 4-5 numbers of the voter. However, even if it is assumed to be true, the same is insufficient to materially affect the outcome of the election, especially when the returned candidate was declared elected with a margin of more than 1600 valid votes. It is, therefore, submitted that the allegations do not meet the threshold contemplated under Section 100(1)(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and on that ground as well, the election petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. To substantiate his plea, Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel, relied on the following decisions: (i) L. R. Shivaramagowda Vs. T. M. Chandrashekar , reported in (1999) 1 SCC 666 (ii) Udhav Singh Vs. Madhav Rao Scindia , reported in (1977) 1 SCC 511 (iii) Samant N. Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez , reported in (1969) 3 SCC 238 (iv) Azhar Hussain Vs. Rajiv Gandhi , reported in 1986 Supp. SCC 315 : AIR 1986 SC 12 (v) Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar Vs. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar reported in (2009) 9 SCC 310 (vi) Mangani Lal Mandal Vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari , reported in (2012) 3 SCC 314 (vii) Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali , reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 (viii) Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju Vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy , reported in (2018) 14 SCC 1 (ix) Basanagouda Vs. Dr. Amarkhed & Ors. , reported in (1992) 2 SCC 612 (x) Markio Tado Vs. Takam Sorang & Ors. , reported in (2012) 3 SCC 236 16. In the case of L. R. Shivaramagowda (supra), as relied by the applicant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had expressed the view that the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleading could be allowed to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition. 17. In the case of L. R. Shivaramagowda (supra), as relied by the applicant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had expressed the view that the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleading could be allowed to introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition. 17. Further, in the case of Udhav Singh (supra), as relied by the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex Court had expressed the view that the petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the Court has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation. But failure to plead the material facts even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act. 18. Further, in the case of Samant N. Balkrishna (supra), in paragraph Nos. 24 & 25 of the judgment, as relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed about the provision of Section 100 of the RP Act, and the said paragraphs are quoted hereinbelow: “24. The heads of substantive rights in Section 100(1) are laid down in two separate parts: the first dealing with situations in which the election must be declared void on proof of certain facts, and the second in which the election can only be declared void if the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, can be held to be materially affected on proof of some other facts. Without attempting critically to sort out the two classes we may now see what the conditions are. In the first part they are that the candidate lacked the necessary qualification or had incurred disqualification, that a corrupt practice was committed by the returned candidate, his election agent or any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent or that any nomination paper was improperly rejected. These are grounds on proof of which by evidence, the election can be set aside without any further evidence. These are grounds on proof of which by evidence, the election can be set aside without any further evidence. The second part is conditioned that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, was materially affected by the improper acceptance of a nomination or by a corrupt practice committed in his interest by an agent other than an election agent or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes or by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Representation of the People Act or rules or orders made under it. This condition has to be established by some evidence direct or circumstantial. It is, therefore, clear that the substantive rights to make an election petition are defined in these sections and the exercise of the right to petition is limited to the grounds specifically mentioned. 25. Pausing here, we may view a little more closely the provisions bearing upon corrupt practices in Sec. 100. There are many kinds of corrupt practices. They are defined later in Section 123 of the Act and we shall come to them later. But the corrupt practices are viewed separately according as to who commits them. The first class consists of corrupt practices committed by the candidate or his election agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent. These, if established, avoid the election without any further condition being fulfilled. Then there is the corrupt practice committed by an agent other than an election agent. Here an additional fact has to be proved that the result of the election was materially affected. We may attempt to put the same matter in easily understandable language. The petitioner may prove a corrupt practice by the candidate himself or his election agent or someone with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, in which case he need not establish what the result of the election would have been without the corrupt practice. The expression "any other person" in this part will include an agent other than an election agent. This is clear from a special provision later in the Section about an agent other than an election agent. The expression "any other person" in this part will include an agent other than an election agent. This is clear from a special provision later in the Section about an agent other than an election agent. The law then is this: If the petitioner does not prove a corrupt practice by the candidate or his election agent or another person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent but relies on a corrupt practice committed by an agent other than an election agent, he must additionally prove how the corrupt practice affected the result of the poll. Unless he proves the consent to the commission of the corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or his election agent he must face this additional burden. The definition of agent in this context is to be taken from Section 123 (Explanation) where it is provided that an agent "includes an election agent, a polling agent and any person who is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the election with the consent of the candidate." In this explanation the mention of "an election agent" would appear to be unnecessary because an election agent is the alter ego of the candidate in the scheme of the Act and his acts are the acts of the candidate, consent or no consent on the part of the candidate.” 19. Further, in the case of Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar (supra), in paragraph No. 57 of the judgment, as relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex court had discussed about the material facts wherein it has been held that “material facts” must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him within the period of limitation. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact will entail dismissal of the election petition. The election petition must contain a concise statement of “material facts” on which the petitioner relies. 20. Again in the case of Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (supra), as relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex Court has expressed the same view in regards to material facts and material particulars. 21. The election petition must contain a concise statement of “material facts” on which the petitioner relies. 20. Again in the case of Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (supra), as relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex Court has expressed the same view in regards to material facts and material particulars. 21. Further, in the case of Basanagouda (supra), as relied by the applicant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No. 8 of the judgment, had held that “…during the post independent era ten parliamentary elections have entrenched democratic polity in this country which cannot be permitted to be eroded by showing laxity in the matter of booth-capturing which has now been made an offence under s.135A of the Act. The allegation of booth capturing and rigging, if proved, is a corrupt practice under s.100(1)(b) and materially affects the result of the election under cl.(1)(d) and also is a disqualification. Therefore, the allegation must be specifically pleaded giving material particulars. The nature and various acts of capturing booths were enumerated in the explanation to s.135A. As stated they are only illustrative but not exhaustive.” 22. Further in the case of Markio Tado (supra), as relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraph Nos. 25, 27 & 28 of the judgment, has held as under: “25. As far as impersonation or double voting is concerned, such actions would amount to improper reception of votes which is a separate ground for declaring an election to be void under Section 100 (1) (d) (iii) of the said Act. This ground was not pleaded in the petition, nor was any issue framed thereon for the trial. As can be seen from the explanation to Section 135 A, the main element of booth capturing is use of force or intimidation. As against that impersonation or double voting involves cheating or deception. Thus, these two grounds deal with two different aspects of corrupt practices. That being the position, the question is as to whether the respondent No.1 could have been permitted to lead any evidence in this behalf without raising the ground in this election petition. As against that impersonation or double voting involves cheating or deception. Thus, these two grounds deal with two different aspects of corrupt practices. That being the position, the question is as to whether the respondent No.1 could have been permitted to lead any evidence in this behalf without raising the ground in this election petition. This is particularly on the background that the earlier application I.A. No.6/2010 calling for the register of voters' counterfoils (Form 17-A) from the 38 polling stations of Itanagar had not been entertained at that stage under the order dated 31.03.2010 which was prior to recording of evidence. 27. It is thus obvious that having failed to place any material with respect to either booth capturing or impersonation, the first respondent was trying to make fishing and roving inquiry to improve his case by calling for the record of the voters register from Itanagar Constituency, in support of his grievance of double voting. In the absence of any evidence with respect to the persons who at the instance of the appellant allegedly captured the booths or made double voting or impersonation in Tali Constituency, no such inference could have been drawn against the appellant.The learned Single Judge, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing the second application made by the first respondent. 28. Besides, the ground of improper reception requires a candidate to show as to how the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate was materially affected, in view of the requirement of Section 100 (1) (d) of the Act of 1951. First respondent has stated that there were some 1304 double entries of voters. The allegation of respondent No.1 on evidence was only with respect to Roing and Ruhi polling station. The votes received by the appellant in both these polling stations put together come to 1873. The appellant has won with a margin of 2713 votes. That being so the second application could not have been entertained even on that ground in the absence of prima facie case that the result of the election had been materially affected.” 23. Relying on the above referred judgments, Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, submitted that the petitioner could not establish or bring any material facts in the pleadings particularly for the allegation of booth capturing, undue influence as alleged in paragraph Nos. Relying on the above referred judgments, Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, submitted that the petitioner could not establish or bring any material facts in the pleadings particularly for the allegation of booth capturing, undue influence as alleged in paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 of the pleadings in election petition. For these defects, the election petition is not maintainable in its present form and thus, the paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 of the election petition is liable to be struck out and the entire petition is liable to be dismissed on the point of non-maintainability. 24. Per contra, Mr. N. Pada, learned counsel for the respondent/election petitioner, submitted both orally and through his written objection that as per Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act, 1951, an election can be declared void if the returned candidate and his agents or any other person with the consent of the returned candidate has committed any corrupt practice as defined under Section 123 of the RP Act, which includes the undue influence and booth capturing as corrupt practice. He further submitted that as per Section 83 of the RP Act, it provides that an election petition should contain a concise statement of material facts and if such election petition is based on commission of corrupt practice by the returned candidate, then the election petition should set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice. Mr. Pada further submitted that from the bare perusal of the petition, it is evident that all material facts have been stated in paragraph No. 12 of the petition and that specific instances of undue influence have been elaborately set forth in paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) of the election petition. Similarly, in paragraph Nos. 13 (I) to 13(IV) of the election petition, the material facts and particulars of corrupt practice of booth capturing committed by the returned candidate, his agents, workers and supporters at the time of polling is well discussed and detail particulars is also stated in the said paragraph. 25. Mr. Pada further submitted that the election petitioner has pleaded both the material facts and material particulars with sufficient clarity of corrupt practice of undue influence and booth capturing which is also supported by the document Nos. 25. Mr. Pada further submitted that the election petitioner has pleaded both the material facts and material particulars with sufficient clarity of corrupt practice of undue influence and booth capturing which is also supported by the document Nos. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21, annexed along with the election petition, which are intended to be exhibited and proved during the course of trial in order to establish the alleged corrupt practices. He further submitted that it is a settled position of law that while “material facts” has to be pleaded, additional material particulars can be provided during the course of trial of the election petition. He further submitted that the election petitioner had stated the material facts with full particulars supported by documents regarding commission of corrupt practice of undue influence committed by the returned candidate, his agents and workers etc. and therefore, the production of the videos pertaining to the above mentioned sequences of events during the state of trial does not amount to introduction of new facts and documents. 26. Mr. Pada further submitted that in paragraph No. 12(I) of the election petition, the name of the person who allegedly attacked the petitioner’s party workers and prevented them from campaigning in that area has been specifically mentioned. He also pointed out that in paragraph No. 12(III), the names and identities of the individuals who allegedly manhandled the supporters of the petitioner during the scrutiny of the nomination papers have been clearly stated. Accordingly, he submitted that all the material facts are being concisely pleaded and all the witness are ready to depose in favour of the election petitioner during the course of the trial. Therefore, he submitted that the instant interlocutory application filed by the applicant/returned candidate is premature in nature and intend only to delay the proceedings with mala fide intention. The election petitioner will prove his case by producing the evidence and all the material particulars at the time of trial and while adducing the evidence. He further submitted that in paragraph No. 13 of the election petition, serious allegation of undue influence are brought against the returned candidate and the command and control of the returned candidate will also be proved through the witness at the time of trial. 27. In support of his submissions, Mr. He further submitted that in paragraph No. 13 of the election petition, serious allegation of undue influence are brought against the returned candidate and the command and control of the returned candidate will also be proved through the witness at the time of trial. 27. In support of his submissions, Mr. Pada, learned counsel for the respondent/election petitioner, also relied on the following decisions:- (i) Raj Narain Vs. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi & Anr. , reported in (1972) 3 SCC 850 (ii) Harkirat Singh Vs. Amrinder Singh , reported in (2005) 13 SCC 511 28. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides and also perused the case record and the annexures filed along with the petition as well as the written objection filed by the respondent/election petitioner. 29. The present interlocutory application has been filed by the applicant/returned candidate raising the issue that the election petition lacks the requisite material facts and particulars regarding the alleged corrupt practices, such as booth capturing and undue influence and as per the applicant/returned candidate, all the allegations made in the election petition are vague and general in nature and do not disclose any cause of action as required under Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act, 1951. The main contention of the applicant pertains to the allegation set out in paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) of the election petition, wherein the election petitioner has alleged: (i) an attack on one of his proposers by the supporters of the returned candidate on 27.03.2024; (ii) threats to the election petitioner by supporters of the returned candidate; (iii) restraining of the petitioner’s supporters from entering the office of the Returning Officer on the day of scrutiny of nominations; (iv) an attack on the convoy of the election petitioner on 30.03.2024; and (v) a deliberate failure on the part of the returned candidate, allegedly in collusion with the Returning Officer, to install CCTV cameras at certain polling stations, which allegedly facilitated violence and undue influence upon the voters supporting the petitioner. However, the applicant contended that these allegations are not supported by specific particulars and are vague in nature, and the grounds which are brought in paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) do not justify the requirements of pleading of “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1) (a) of RP Act, 1951. 30. However, the applicant contended that these allegations are not supported by specific particulars and are vague in nature, and the grounds which are brought in paragraph Nos. 12(I) to 12(V) do not justify the requirements of pleading of “material facts” within the meaning of Section 83(1) (a) of RP Act, 1951. 30. It is also the contention of the present applicant/returned candidate that the allegations brought in paragraph Nos. 13(I) to 13(IV) are also vague allegation which also do not justify the requirements of pleading of “material facts” as envisaged under Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act, 1951. In paragraph No. 13(I), it is alleged that on the date of poll, i.e. on 19.04.2024, at 21 Potte Polling Station, one of the supporters of the election petitioner, Shri Ananto Goswami and his family members, were intimidated by the supporters of returned candidate and one Shri Nina Kadu had impersonate the actual voter and 2 (two) other family members and casted vote in favour of the returned candidate. However, it is contended that the said allegations are also vague and false allegation. Similarly, the allegation brought in paragraph No. 13(II) that the supporters of returned candidate had casted the votes of absentee Shri Mangal Singh Yadav and his family and they also casted votes for the absentees through postal ballots are also false and vague allegations. Likewise, in paragraph No. 13(III), it is alleged that a vote was casted for a deceased person, namely, Late Tajum Kadu of Potte Village, allegedly by one Shri Nina Kadu, who is one of the supporters of the returned candidate, is also false allegation brought by the election petitioner. 31. Mr. Mazumder, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant/ returned candidate, mainly stressed on the point that as per records and the result sheets, out of 332 voters, only 290 had exercised their adult franchise and out of 290 electors, 29 electors had casted their votes in favour of the election petitioner and 70 remained absent. Further it is contended by Mr. Mazumder that the impersonation of only 4/5 numbers of voter cannot materially affect the result of the returned candidate. Further it is contended by Mr. Mazumder that the impersonation of only 4/5 numbers of voter cannot materially affect the result of the returned candidate. In the same time, the returned candidate had won the election by margin of more than 1600 and it is not a case wherein the returned candidate won the election at the margin of 4/5 numbers of votes, which could materially affect the result of the election and thus, there is no material facts to the election result of the election petitioner and accordingly the election petitioner had failed to make out a case for corrupt practice of undue influence of voters to prima facie make out a case that any corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate, his agents, workers and supporters. 32. But, from the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent/election petitioner and also on perusal of pleadings in the petition, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 12 & 13, including all the sub-paragraphs thereof, it is observed that the election petitioner had brought sufficient averments in the election petition to prima facie bring the “material facts” which is required within the meaning of Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act. The petitioner has, in a concise manner, brought the allegations of corrupt practices such as booth capturing and undue influence. Specific instances have been described as to how votes were casted in favour of the returned candidate through impersonation and how the supporters, workers and agents of the election petitioner was prevented from entering the office of the Returning Officer. In the same time, allegations have also been made as to how the election petitioner and his supporters were prevented from campaigning in certain areas. 33. In view of above, it is the opinion of this Court that the issues raised are very premature and not fit for summary adjudication at this stage. The evidence of the witnesses are yet to be recorded wherein both the election petitioner as well as the returned candidate will get their adequate opportunity to substantiate their respective pleas during the course of trial. Therefore, prima facie this Court finds that the election petitioner has brought some “material facts” in his election petition. 34. The evidence of the witnesses are yet to be recorded wherein both the election petitioner as well as the returned candidate will get their adequate opportunity to substantiate their respective pleas during the course of trial. Therefore, prima facie this Court finds that the election petitioner has brought some “material facts” in his election petition. 34. Another issue raised by the applicant/returned candidate pertains to non- supply of the video footage relating to the incident of the alleged corrupt practices, which according to the applicant has prejudiced him to effectively to defend his case. However, as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent/election petitioner, those video footages of the alleged incident will be produced during the course of trial when the copy of the same will be provided to the present applicant/returned candidate to enable him to prepare his proper defence. At present, the matter is still at the initial stage of trial and the issues have not yet framed. Both the parties will get their full opportunities to produce and exhibit their documents as well as to adduce oral and documents evidence in support of their respective cases. Therefore, at this stage, the contention of the applicant regarding prejudice due to non-supply of video footage is premature and does not merit interference. 35. Coming to the submission made by the learned counsel for the applicant in regards to compliance of Section 100(b) of the RP Act wherein the consent of the returned candidate is required to establish if any corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate through his agent or any other person. It has further been contended that in the instant case, there is no any averment made in the pleadings of the election petitioner that any consent was obtained from the returned candidate while committing the alleged offence of undue influence and booth capturing by his agents, workers and the supporters and it is also to be established that any corrupt practice committed in the interest of returned candidate by any agent other than his election agent as per Section 100(d)(ii) of the RP Act. There may not be any specific mention in regards to taking consent of the returned candidate by his agents, workers or supporters in the commission of the alleged corrupt practices. There may not be any specific mention in regards to taking consent of the returned candidate by his agents, workers or supporters in the commission of the alleged corrupt practices. However, the mere absence of such an averment at this stage cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that no such consent was ever given. Whether such consent was in fact given is a matter of evidence, which can only be ascertained during the course of trial. As per the requirement under Section 100(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the corrupt practice must be shown to have been committed by the returned candidate or by any other person with his consent. But such a finding cannot be rendered at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, in the absence of any recorded evidence. Therefore, it would be premature for this Court to determine, at this stage, whether or not the element of consent existed in the alleged acts of booth capturing and undue influence. 36. The learned counsel for the applicant/returned candidate also cited various judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the distinction between “material facts” and “material particulars” have been elaborately discussed and it is the view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court has the discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after expiry of prescribed limitation period. But failure to plead the “material facts” even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act. Such failure is considered fatal to the maintainability of an election petition, and it has been further held that material facts cannot be permitted to be introduced subsequently through amendment beyond the prescribed time limit. But, here in the instant case, from the entire discussions made above and also from the overall pleadings in the election petition and the submissions advanced, this Court is of the view that the election petitioner has prima facie pleaded the “material facts” in his election petition necessary to sustain the cause of action, particularly in paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 including all the sub- paragraphs therein. Therefore, it cannot be held that the present election petition is liable to be dismissed at this stage for the want of “material facts” in the pleadings. 37. 12 & 13 including all the sub- paragraphs therein. Therefore, it cannot be held that the present election petition is liable to be dismissed at this stage for the want of “material facts” in the pleadings. 37. In view of the entire discussions made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no sufficient ground to hold that the election petition is liable to be dismissed for non-disclosure of “material facts” as alleged by the applicant/returned candidate, particularly in paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 along with their sub-paragraphs. Therefore, the prayer for rejection of the election petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, as well as for striking out the pleadings under Order VI Rule 16 CPC, is found to be devoid of merit at this stage. 38. Accordingly, the interlocutory application stands disposed of in terms of the observations made above.