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2025 DIGILAW 1133 (RAJ)

Shree Madan Engineering Works v. Madan Engineering Works

2025-04-21

AVNEESH JHINGAN, BHUWAN GOYAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. This appeal is filed against order dated 29.09.2022 passed by Commercial Court, Ajmer granting interim injunction in favour of respondent-plaintiff. 2. The brief facts are that appellant is a proprietorship concern of Vivek Jangir s/o Raj Kumar, the grandson of Madanlal Jangir. The respondent is a proprietorship concern of Sajjan Kumar Jangir s/o Madanlal Jangir. M/s Madan Engineering works since 1971 is engaged in manufacturing of agricultural equipments and the trademark with logo of ‘MEW’ was registered on 12.08.2016 bearing registration No.2632425. After death of Madan Lal Jangir (hereinafter referred to as deceased), his widow Smt. Mangi Devi Jangir became the proprietor. Vide registered gift deed dated 04.09.2020, Smt. Mangi Devi and Rajkumar (father of the appellant) gifted to respondent the business of M/s. Madan Engineering Works along with assets. The suit was filed by the respondent seeking permanent injunction pleading infringement and unfair trade practice of using trademark of the respondent. An application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC was allowed by the impugned order restraining the appellant from use of trademark of M/s Madan Engineering Work by using the name M/s Shree Madan Engineering Works. Hence, the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that dispute between two brothers is a family dispute and the Commercial Court has no jurisdiction. The contention is that petition for cancellation of the trademark of the respondent is pending before this Court. Reliance is placed upon Sections 14 and 18 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 1999”) to submit that transfer of trademark was in violation of provisions. The submission is that trademark was registered for ‘MEW’ and not for Madan Engineering Works and this fact was not considered while passing the impugned order. 4. As per contra the gift deed specifically mentions that the respondent can get the trademark transferred in his name and in fact it was transferred. 5. The business of the M/s. Madan Engineering Works was succeeded by Smt. Mangi Devi Jangir widow of the deceased and the trademark was got registered in the year 2016. Smt. Mangi Devi and father of the appellant by registered gift deed dated 04.09.2020 gifted the business along with the assets including trademark to the respondent. The trademark was thereafter transferred in the name of respondent. 6. Smt. Mangi Devi and father of the appellant by registered gift deed dated 04.09.2020 gifted the business along with the assets including trademark to the respondent. The trademark was thereafter transferred in the name of respondent. 6. Albeit, as on date there are litigations between the parties qua the registration of trademark and challenging the gift deed but there is no stay in favour of appellant. In other words, as on date trademark is registered in the name of the respondent and by the gift deed the ownership of the business vests with respondent. 7. Before proceeding further as an abundant caution, it is clarified that the observations made hereinafter are only for purpose of deciding the appeal against the order granting interim injunction and shall not be construed as opinion of this Court on the merits of the case. 8. The contention that it is a case of family dispute and Commercial Court has no jurisdiction lacks merit. The suit for permanent injunction is filed pleading that the trademark registered in the name of the respondent is being misused by the appellant. Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 specifically includes dispute regarding Intellectual Properties Rights of registered and unregistered trademarks, copyrights, patents, designs etc. within the ambit of commercial dispute and there is no distinction made of such dispute arising between the brothers. 9. The second contention that the petition for cancellation of the trademark is pending before this Court does not enhance cause of grievance of the appellant. There is no interim protection in favour of the appellant. 10. The reliance on sections 14 and 28 of 1999 Act needs no dilation at this stage. Suffice to say that the issue with regard to the validity of registration of trademark is not subject matter of the suit. The sections have been relied upon to make a submission that the trademark was not transferred in accordance with law, but this issue is subject-matter of a pending petition challenging the registration of trademark in favour of the respondent. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon Section 17 of 1999 Act submits that the exclusive registration of the trademark in favour of the respondent was qua ‘MEW’ and no separate application was filed for registration of trademark of Madan Engineering Works, Ladnun. The argument has a fallacy. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon Section 17 of 1999 Act submits that the exclusive registration of the trademark in favour of the respondent was qua ‘MEW’ and no separate application was filed for registration of trademark of Madan Engineering Works, Ladnun. The argument has a fallacy. On perusal of the scanned trademark of the appellant it is forthcoming that the appellant has used ‘MEW’ and not Madan Engineering Works in the logo. 12. Taking the case of the appellant at the highest, even if there is no registration in favour of the respondent for Madan Engineering Works, it is not in dispute that trademark ‘MEW’ is registered in name of the respondent and is being used by the appellant by adding ^^Jh** 13. Before concluding, in all fairness we deal with the objections raised by the learned counsel for the appellant qua the concluding para of the impugned order whereby the appellant has been restrained to use the trademark of the respondent M/s Madan Engineering Works by writing ^^Jh** Suffice to say the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit pleading that by using logo of ^^Jh** MEW” the appellant is misusing the trademark and in this background the directions in the impugned order were passed. 14. There is no legal or factual error much less perversity in the impugned order calling for interference and the appeal is disposed of. 15. Needless to say the parties shall be at liberty to make a prayer before the Court concerned for expeditious disposal of the suit. Considering the nature of the dispute the Court concern shall not grant unwarranted adjournments to either of the party.