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2025 DIGILAW 1133 (TS)

B. Madhusudan v. Union of India

2025-09-26

NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, P.SAM KOSHY

body2025
ORDER : P.Sam Koshy, J. Heard Mr. B. Madhusudan, petitioner / party-in-person, and Mr. K. Balakrishna, learned counsel for respondent No.11. 2. The present writ petition has been filed seeking for the following reliefs: “The petitioner is most respectfully humbly submits that for the factual backdrop and factual matrix submitted in the writ petition and writ petition miscellaneous petitions, legal position, valid legal grounds, in view of Judgment of Hon’ble Chief Justice of Hon’ble Supreme Court, for reasons submitted above and to respect our holy book in letter and spirit in the interest of justice and fair play, it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court, may graciously be pleased”: 1. To allow Writ Petition with Rs 10,00,000 (ten lakhs) exemplary costs on respondents (recoverable from erring officers) for deliberately, willfully, inspired by malice for vested interests dragged the petitioner into this litigation by creating false documents without inherent lack of jurisdiction by playing fraud on the Constitution of India, fraud on court, fraud on the petitioner which was totally avoidable. 2. To quash & set aside Director General (Commercial)-1 order dated 30.08.2016, Deputy Comptroller & Auditor General (Commercial) Order dated 20.11.2017, Comptroller & Auditor General of India Order dated 04.01.2019, Charge Sheet dated 09.04.2015, Hon’ble Tribunal orders dated 03.06.2019, 09.09.2019 etc. 3. To direct R-1 to treat the period of absence of the petitioner with effect from 03.01.2012 onwards till the date of normal retirement as duty for all purposes including seniority, promotion, increment, pension etc as fraud has no existence in the eyes of law as the transfer Order dated 14.12.2011 was suo motu cancelled and merged with the orders dated 30.08.2016, 20.11.2017 04.01.2019 and completely wiped out from existence and the petitioner was unconstitutionally prevented from discharging his duties and to pay his arrears of pay and allowances with effect from 03.01.2012 onwards to till the date of his normal retirement along with interest 36 percent p.a from the date pay and allowances was due till the date of actual payment in accordance with the Rules prescribed by law. It is not out of place to submit here that the then Respondent No-1 (Shri Vinod Rai) had paid cost Rs.5000 and interest @ 10 percent p.a with effect from 23.12.2008 onwards to till the date of actual payment as directed by Hon’ble Tribunal in O.A.No.140 of 2012 vide order dated 18.09.2012. 4. It is not out of place to submit here that the then Respondent No-1 (Shri Vinod Rai) had paid cost Rs.5000 and interest @ 10 percent p.a with effect from 23.12.2008 onwards to till the date of actual payment as directed by Hon’ble Tribunal in O.A.No.140 of 2012 vide order dated 18.09.2012. 4. To direct R-1 to pay vindictive damages of Rs.10 crores (recoverable from erring officers) as fraud, lack of integrity of the respondents have no existence in the eyes of law and orders deliberately, willfully passed in fragrant violation of Article 311, 14, 21, 141 etc., of the Constitution of India were null and void and non est in the eyes of law. 5. To direct R-8 i.e. Shri Rajiv Mehrishi Comptroller & Auditor General of India New Delhi to pay Rs. one crore personally from his pay and allowances if this Hon’ble Court convinced that he deliberately, willfully by playing fraud not paid pay and allowances of the petitioner for eight years in violation of Article 311, 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. 6. To direct R-9 i.e., Shri M.S.Subramanyam, Director General to a minimum amount of Rs.10 lakhs to the petitioner for deliberately, willfully colluding with the other respondents, depicting total lack of integrity etc., if the Hon’ble Chief Justice is convinced that he deliberately, willfully for vested interest not supplied vital fundamental documents in violation of mandatory constitutional provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and for submitting misleading and misrepresenting replies befooling judges in our country. 7. To direct R-10 i.e., Ms Rebecca Mathai to pay Rs.one crore personally to the petitioner from her pay and allowances for unconstitutional sealing of his residential accommodation on 05.06.2017 without inherent lack of jurisdiction if this Hon’ble Court convinced that she deliberately, willfully by laying fraud sealed petitioners residential accommodation in violation of inter alia Article, 21 and 14, 311 of the Constitution of India. 8. To direct R-11 i.e. Hon’ble Mr. Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, Chairman to pay Rs. one crore to the petitioner for deliberately, willfully violating Article 311, 14, 21 etc., of the Constitution of India in collusion with the respondents, depicting total lack of integrity etc., if the Hon’ble Chief Justice is convinced that he deliberately, willfully disrespected our Holy Book, Magna Carta or Great Charter of India. Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, Chairman to pay Rs. one crore to the petitioner for deliberately, willfully violating Article 311, 14, 21 etc., of the Constitution of India in collusion with the respondents, depicting total lack of integrity etc., if the Hon’ble Chief Justice is convinced that he deliberately, willfully disrespected our Holy Book, Magna Carta or Great Charter of India. The petitioner was a victim of fraud on the Constitution of India and approached the Hon’ble Tribunal for justice. All are equal before law and bound by supreme law of land; 9. To pass such other orders or any other relief or direction which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit, just and proper in the facts, merits and circumstances of the case to safeguard the interests of crores of innocent Taxpayers & to meet the ends of justice and upholding the supremacy of Rule of Law etc. Respondent independent integrity Constitutional Organization is a welfare State and a model employer within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India headed by R-1 i.e., Shri Rajiv Mehrishi Comptroller & Auditor General of India.R-1 is the arm of Constitution of India and plays pivotal role in the safe guarding the interest of tax payers and is responsible for the conduct of the audit of total expenditure of the Union and the State Governments more than Rupees 30 lakh crores per annum & is responsible for the conduct of the audit of financial transactions of 1760 public sector undertakings, 683 Central Autonomous Bodies, besides hundreds of State Autonomous Bodies. I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble Court that it may graciously be pleased to issue order or direction more particularly in the nature of Writ of Certiorari, calling for records pertaining to the orders dated 03.06.2019 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad in O.A.No.1154 of 2018 and M.A No 312 of 2018, M.A No.313 of 2018 in O.A No 1154 of 2018 and quash the same as violative of Articles 311, 14, 21, 141, 32 etc., of the Constitution of India, illegal, biased, arbitrary and violative of principles of Law and pass such other order as the Hon'ble Court may deems fit and proper in the interest of justice”.” 3. Though the nature of pleadings and the relief sought for travels through the chequered history of the petitioner’s career under the respondents, but primarily the petitioner through the present writ petition is assailing the order dated 03.06.2019, in O.A.No.1154 of 2018, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’) where under challenge before the Tribunal in the said O.A. was an order dated 30.08.2016, passed by the Director General (Commercial)-I-cum-Disciplinary Authority, Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi. 4. Vide the said impugned order, the petitioner after a disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965) was inflicted with a punishment of ‘compulsory retirement’ w.e.f., 30.08.2016. In addition to the order of punishment of compulsory retirement, the disciplinary authority also held that during the intervening period between 14.04.2012 and 29.08.2016 also be treated as dies non. 5. The order of punishment was pursuant to a departmental enquiry initiated wherein the petitioner was served with a charge sheet dated 09.04.2015 which stood served upon the petitioner on 16.04.2015. The said charge sheet contained two articles of charges which reads thus: (i) Non-compliance of the official order of PDCA, MAB dated 13.04.2012 relieving him to join the office of PAG (Audit)-III, Mumbai, Maharashtra; and (ii) Using abusive, intemperate, discourteous, intimidating and derogatory language against superiors and senior officers of the department. 6. From the records available in the writ petition, what is clearly reflected is that in spite of the charge sheet having been serve upon the petitioner and sufficient opportunity being given, the petitioner did not submit his explanation to the charge sheet within the stipulated period of time and also within the extended period of time, the petitioner failed to submit his explanation to the charge sheet. However, at a belated stage, the petitioner did submit his explanation, but when he was called upon to participate in the departmental enquiry, he failed to participate in the proceedings leading to the Enquiry Officer proceeding ex parte against him. In spite of the petitioner being fully aware of the developments so far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned, he chose not to participate in the same and kept sending representations after representations unconnected with the disciplinary proceedings and the charges leveled against him. In spite of the petitioner being fully aware of the developments so far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned, he chose not to participate in the same and kept sending representations after representations unconnected with the disciplinary proceedings and the charges leveled against him. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer further advised and gave the petitioner an advice asking him to cooperate and participate in the enquiry proceedings and finally he was also granted an opportunity to submit his written defence if at all he intends to produce or submit before the Enquiry Officer. Since he did participate in the enquiry, the enquiry was concluded ex parte. The Enquiry Officer before submitting his enquiry report directed the petitioner to appear for personal hearing along with his defence assistant, if any, for at least three times, which too the petitioner failed to avail. The petitioner later on was also informed about the date on which the listed due documents enumerated in the charge memo would be presented and examined before the Enquiry Officer. Even on that date, the petitioner absented himself and on which date the Enquiry Officer was left with no other option but to proceed ex parte. Subsequently also, the petitioner was informed of the regular dates of hearing of the enquiry proceedings on various occasions and in all the dates of hearing, the petitioner chose not to attend the same and without there being any valid or cogent reason or grounds for not attending the enquiry proceedings, all of which forced the Enquiry Officer to conclude the enquiry proceedings ex parte. Thereafter, the petitioner was again sent with a notice so as to ensure compliance of principles of natural justice asking the delinquent petitioner if he so wants to record his defence statement or to lead any evidence in his support. The petitioner though belatedly did submit his written statement of defence on the first charge i.e., Article No.1 and finally the Presenting Officer submitted his written brief on 03.12.2015 and the petitioner in turn submitted his defence brief dated 18.12.2015. Finally, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report holding that the charges leveled against the petitioner stood proved. In spite of best efforts being made, the petitioner did not respond to the enquiry report. Finally, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report holding that the charges leveled against the petitioner stood proved. In spite of best efforts being made, the petitioner did not respond to the enquiry report. Subsequently, the disciplinary authority made a couple of attempts in ensuring supply of enquiry report to the petitioner but the attempt made by the respondent-department failed as there was total non-cooperation on the part of the petitioner. Subsequently, a notice was pasted at his house to appear before the authorities under the respondents so that the petitioner can come and receive the enquiry report, which too the petitioner did not honor and comply and finally vide order dated 30.08.2016, the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment. The said order dated 30.08.2016 was subjected to challenge before the Tribunal vide O.A.No.021/1154/2018. The Tribunal also after hearing the rival parties dismissed the O.A. vide order dated 03.06.2019, which has led to filing of the instant writ petition. 7. As can be seen from the pleadings and the multiple reliefs sought for, the petitioner, in fact, was primarily challenging the punishment order of compulsory retirement. Though the petitioner initially in the course of his submissions did try to argue of various other issues otherwise than punishment of compulsory retirement, finally, he agreed to argue his case confining himself to the punishment order of compulsory retirement. 8. The petitioner had primarily challenged the order firstly on the ground that the order of compulsory retirement has not been passed by a competent person. Thus, the order of punishment being other than that of the appointing authority and that too an Officer who is lower in rank than the appointing authority in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the same was bad in law and unconstitutional. According to the petitioner, he belonged to Group ‘A’ Officer cadre and the Officer who has passed the order of punishment of compulsory retirement was not otherwise authorized to impose punishment for a Group ‘A’ Officer. 9. The second contention of the petitioner was that the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated was because of mala fides and bias only on account of the order of transfer which was earlier issued by the department dated 14.12.2011 having not been complied with. 9. The second contention of the petitioner was that the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated was because of mala fides and bias only on account of the order of transfer which was earlier issued by the department dated 14.12.2011 having not been complied with. According to him, since the order of transfer itself was with mala fides and bias, the same was unconstitutional and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings itself was liable to be vitiated. 10. Thirdly, it was contended that he was not given a fair opportunity of hearing during the disciplinary proceedings, inasmuch as he had filed certain representations requesting to furnish certain documents and which the department had not furnished and, therefore, the impugned order of compulsory retirement needs to be interdicted on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 11. Lastly, it was contended by the petitioner that since the department has not filed any written statement or counter before the Tribunal, responding to O.A.No.1154 of 2018, the respondents cannot be permitted to argue their case nor can their counter, if any filed in the instant writ petition, be taken into cognizance. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.11 disputed and denied all the averments raised and contended by the petitioner. According to him, the petitioner, in fact, was not a Group ‘A’ officer as was being contended. He further submitted that even otherwise on the date when the order of punishment was passed, undisputedly, the petitioner was a Group ‘B’ Officer and, therefore, the Officer who had passed the order of punishment was fully competent and authorized to pass the order of punishment. The learned counsel further contended that the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on the ground of insubordination and also for his conduct unbecoming of a Government employee. The so-called misconduct was proved before the Enquiry Officer by the Presenting Officer. The petitioner chose not to contest the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer and which led to the Enquiry Officer proceeding ex parte against the petitioner and submitting the enquiry report holding the charges to be proved. 13. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for respondent that mere perusal of the order of punishment dated 30.08.2016 would by itself show the numerous opportunities of hearing being provided to the petitioner at every stage of the enquiry, right from the issuance of articles of charges itself. 13. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for respondent that mere perusal of the order of punishment dated 30.08.2016 would by itself show the numerous opportunities of hearing being provided to the petitioner at every stage of the enquiry, right from the issuance of articles of charges itself. But there was a consistent deliberate non- cooperation on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination can the same be held to be violative of principles of natural justice. According to him, if the petitioner was willfully abstaining himself from appearing before the Enquiry Officer and also willfully not availing the opportunity being provided at every stage of the proceedings would amount to due compliance of all the principles of natural justice. Therefore, prayed for upholding of the order of the Administrative Tribunal. 14. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, what is primarily to be adjudicated upon by this Bench in the course of deciding the instant writ petition is, “as to whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the O.A. that the petitioner had filed assailing the order of compulsory retirement?” 15. From the facts narrated in the preceding paragraphs, we are of the considered opinion that, in fact the three major grounds on which the petitioner has assailed the order of compulsory retirement are that which needs to be answered. Those are:- (i) Whether the authority which has passed the order of compulsory retirement dated 30.08.2016 was the competent authority or the disciplinary authority so far as the petitioner is concerned. If not, the consequences. (ii) Whether the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and issuance of the order of compulsory retirement was with mala fide and ulterior motive or not, so as to vitiate the same. (iii) Whether in the course of conducting departmental enquiry, the authorities have abided to the principles of natural justice or not. (iv) Whether the Tribunal committed an error in dismissing the O.A. in spite of the department having not filed their Counter before the Tribunal and in the absence of anything in rebuttal to the averments made in the petition before the Tribunal, the O.A. could not had been dismissed by the Tribunal. 16. Coming to the first ground raised by the petitioner, we need to put certain facts on record to better appreciate the issue. 16. Coming to the first ground raised by the petitioner, we need to put certain facts on record to better appreciate the issue. The petitioner in the instant case was appointed vide order dated 25.03.1983 to the post of Section Officer (Commercial). The said order was issued on behalf of the Additional Deputy Comptroller Auditor General (Commercial) which was signed by some other officer for the Additional Deputy Comptroller Auditor General from the Central Pay Commission recommendation. The Additional Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General are responsible for discharging the functions of Accountant General, Chief Auditors in their functional areas and assist the Comptroller and Auditor General in vetting the audit reports and servicing the parliamentary committees. As per the recommendation of the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General have been equated to the post of Secretary to Government and those of the Additional Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General are equated to the post of Additional Secretary to Government. 17. Vide order dated 11.11.2002, the petitioner got further promoted along with other similarly placed persons from the post of Audit Officer (Commercial) to the cadre of Senior Audit Officer (Commercial). The said order was though from the office of Comptroller and Auditor General of India, but was issued by the Principal Director (Commercial) and the order of promotion was signed by an Administrative Officer/CA- I. The petitioner continued to work on the said post at the same place till 14.12.2011. 18. On 14.12.2011, there was a re-shuffling of the officers in the department and an order of transfer was issued for many of the officers and one of the officers was the petitioner himself who was transferred from Hyderabad to Maharashtra. He was working under Pr.DCA/MAB-HYD and stood transferred to the office of AG(CA) Maharashtra. 19. Not happy with the order dated 14.12.2011 transferring the petitioner from Hyderabad to Maharashtra; he preferred to challenge the same before the Tribunal vide O.A.No.1294 of 2011 and contested his case before the Tribunal himself. The Tribunal, finally vide order dated 29.02.2012, dismissed the said O.A. holding that the transfer for a Government employee is an incident to service and that the petitioner has not been able to show any mala fides or the order of transfer to be violative of any of the service rules. The Tribunal, finally vide order dated 29.02.2012, dismissed the said O.A. holding that the transfer for a Government employee is an incident to service and that the petitioner has not been able to show any mala fides or the order of transfer to be violative of any of the service rules. The petitioner challenged the order of the Tribunal before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh (as it then was under the unified State of Andhra Pradesh) vide W.P.No.7256 of 2012. Initially, an order of stay was granted by the High Court on 26.03.2012. Subsequently, after hearing both the sides finally, the High Court vide order dated 13.04.2012 dismissed the writ petition holding it to be devoid of merit and, moreover, the incumbent who was transferred in place of petitioner at Hyderabad had already assumed charge and started discharging his duties and that he was also not a party to any to these proceedings. 20. Meanwhile, the petitioner had resorted to a contempt proceeding against the respondents alleging non-compliance of the interim order passed by the High Court on 26.03.2012 in W.P.No.7256 of 2012. However, in view of the subsequent developments, the contempt case stood dismissed vide order dated 24.07.2015. After dismissal of the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner immediately stood relieved from service from Hyderabad on 13.04.2012 itself. Though he stood relieved from the office from 13.04.2012, the petitioner did not report at the transferred place i.e. at Maharashtra. He was issued with a memo dated 19.02.2014 asking to report for duty immediately, failing which he will be subjected to disciplinary action. Earlier also similar memos were issued, but the petitioner did not pay any heed and, finally, an office memorandum dated 02.06.2015 was issued asking the petitioner to immediately report for duty in the office of the Accountant General, Audit-III, Maharashtra, Mumbai, within 15 days, which too was not honored by the petitioner. Finally, the petitioner was issued with a charge-memo on 09.04.2015 wherein two charges were leveled against him. The said charges have already been reproduced in the initial part of this order. Finally, the petitioner was issued with a charge-memo on 09.04.2015 wherein two charges were leveled against him. The said charges have already been reproduced in the initial part of this order. A detailed enquiry was conducted and the petitioner deliberately appears did not cooperate in the departmental enquiry, as in spite of repeat opportunity of hearing being provided right from the stage of issuance of charge-memo, the petitioner chose not to respond to the charge-memo and secondly, chose not to put up his defence before the Enquiry Officer or participate in the enquiry proceedings. 21. Under the said circumstances, an ex parte proceedings was initiated by the Enquiry Officer and the enquiry report holding the charges to have been proved was issued, which stood challenged by the petitioner before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also dismissed the petitioner’s appeal which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 22. Initially, the ground of competence raised by the petitioner to the order of punishment was on the ground that the petitioner’s substantive base station was Ranchi and, therefore, the disciplinary authority could not had been Director General (Commercial) – I, rather it ought to had been Director General (Commercial) – II. Further, it is only at the High Court stage when the writ petition was filed, the petitioner has taken the ground of disciplinary authority being lower than the appointing authority. Therefore, according to him, the order of compulsory retirement is bad in law in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 23. The CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 specifically lays down details regarding the penalties and the disciplinary authority in respect of a Government employee. Rule 13 deals with authority to institute proceedings, and Rule 14 deals with the procedure for imposing punishment. The Ministry of Finance had issued a notification dated 20.04.2012 prescribing the authorities competent to impose penalties in terms of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. For ready reference, the classification of the post and the penalties which can be imposed by each of the post holders is reproduced hereunder, viz., Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) New Delhi, the 20 th April, 2012 S.O. 1527. For ready reference, the classification of the post and the penalties which can be imposed by each of the post holders is reproduced hereunder, viz., Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) New Delhi, the 20 th April, 2012 S.O. 1527. - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (2) of Rule (9), clause (b) of Sub-Rule (2) of rule 12(1) of Rule 24 read with Rule 34 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the President after constitution with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, hereby makes the following further amendments in the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) vide S.O. No.2915, dated the 13th September, 1988, namely :- In the said notification, for the Schedule, the following schedule shall be substituted :- COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL’S MANUAL OF STANDING ORDERS (ADMINISTRATIVE), VOL. II Section ‘E’ Powers under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 - Part I-General Central Services - Group ‘B’ Authority competent to impose penalties and penalties which it may impose (with reference to item numbers in rules 11 of) CCS (CCA) Rules 24. In the present case on hand, as the petitioner was a Senior Audit Officer (Commercial) and as per the contention of the respective counsel who contends that as per the Government Gazette Notification, dated 20.04.2012, which was issued by the President clearly outlining that the appointing Authority for Senior Audit Officers are Officers of the rank of Principal Accountant General or Accountant General or those of equivalent rank (Additional Secretary or Joint Secretary). In the present case, the charge sheet as also the order of punishment dated 30.08.2016 have been passed by the Director General (Commercial) who otherwise is an Officer of the rank of Additional Secretary. Considering Rule 12 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and taking into consideration the Government Gazette Notification, dated 20.04.2012, there is no force in the contention of petitioner insofar as the order of punishment being issued by an incompetent Officer. 25. Considering Rule 12 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and taking into consideration the Government Gazette Notification, dated 20.04.2012, there is no force in the contention of petitioner insofar as the order of punishment being issued by an incompetent Officer. 25. Though the petitioner claims himself to be a Group A officer from 2009 onwards, but on perusal of records, it would reveal that the post which the petitioner occupied was brought in the category of Group A only vide order dated 14.06.2019 by way of office memorandum issued by the Ministry of Finance, wherein it was said that since the accounts officers and senior audit officers are being classified under Group ‘A’ w.e.f. 09.04.2009 by the date when this office memorandum that was issued on 14.06.2019, the petitioner had already been subjected to penalty vide order dated 30.08.2016 itself. Thus, for all practical purposes, till the date on which the penalty was issued i.e. on 30.08.2016, he was otherwise in the department considered as a Group ‘B’ officer. 26. If we read the aforesaid contents of, firstly the notification dated 20.04.2012, which provides for the details of the officers who could initiate disciplinary proceedings and who could the appellate authority be, it would be amply clear that the disciplinary proceedings in the instant case as has been reflected in the preceding paragraphs was issued and initiated strictly in accordance with the said notification and the disciplinary authority also, including the authority who had issued the charge sheet were all in terms of the Rules that were governing the field right from the date the charge sheet was issued, till the order of compulsory retirement was passed. 27. In view of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the said objection raised by the petitioner in respect of the order of punishment being passed by somebody lower than the authority who had issued the appointment order is not sustainable for the reason that the Rules itself meanwhile have got amended and came into force way back in the year 2012 itself and once when the Rules stand amended and came into force, it is the amended Rules which would automatically become applicable. Thus, the said issue stands decided against the petitioner. 28. Thus, the said issue stands decided against the petitioner. 28. Coming to the second ground that is raised by the petitioner i.e. “the disciplinary action and the proceedings being with mala fides and was result of a biased attitude of the department against the petitioner”, what needs to be considered is, admittedly the petitioner stood transferred from Hyderabad to Maharashtra which he did not comply with. He had challenged the said order of transfer before all the legal forums available to him and at all levels he ultimately failed. Though, initially there seems to be an interim protection granted by the High Court, but later on the said interim protection stood vacated and the writ petition stood disposed of and which was affirmed in all the appellate stages. 29. Another aspect which is revealed is, before the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, the Department had issued numerous notices to the petitioner asking him and directing him to report for duty at the earliest, which too, the petitioner did not comply with. In the process, the department was left with no other option but to initiate disciplinary proceedings in the teeth of admitted factual matrix of the petitioner having not joined the transferred place and subsequently, he also having failed before the Tribunal as also before the High Court. Still, thereafter, he did not comply with the order for a considerable period of time. The action thus initiated on the disciplinary front cannot be found fault with. In view of the same, the said ground also stands decided against the petitioner. 30. As regards the third ground of not being given a fair opportunity of hearing during the disciplinary proceedings and the petitioner being denied material documents in the course of the departmental enquiry, it is necessary to see the disciplinary proceedings, particularly the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer. Right from the stage of issuance of charge sheet, the department has been repeatedly approaching the petitioner by sending notices and numerous reminders, firstly to give response to the charge memo and secondly, to enter appearance before the Enquiry Officer and defend his case with a liberty of taking help from a defence assistant and subsequently even during the enquiry proceedings the petitioner did now show any serious efforts in contesting the departmental enquiry on its merits in spite of being served with the notice of the departmental proceedings. In spite of best of efforts being made by the Enquiry Officer in providing sufficient time to avail the opportunity of defence and also to ensure that he contests the departmental proceedings to disprove the allegations so far as the charges are concerned, went in vain as the petitioner at no point of time did conduct himself seriously before the Enquiry Officer trying to disprove the charges leveled against him and also to prove his innocence. In view of the same, the said ground raised by the petitioner also stands decided against the petitioner as he has not been able to produce any strong material to substantiate the contention that he has raised. 31. Coming to the last ground that the petitioner has raised as to “the Tribunal committing an error in dismissing the O.A. in spite of the department had not filed their Counter before the Tribunal in the absence of anything in rebuttal to the averments made in the petition before the Tribunal and the O.A. ought not to have been dismissed by the Tribunal”, there is no strong ground to interdict the disciplinary action for the reason that since the O.A. was filed by the petitioner himself, it was for the petitioner to have from the materials available in the O.A. to establish that the action on the part of the department was illegal or contrary to the Rules. 32. A plain reading of the contents of O.A. and the pleadings made by the petitioner therein was in itself sufficient for the Tribunal to go into the merits of the case and decide the issues raised by the petitioner, and if the Tribunal has decided the matter based upon the materials available in the O.A., it cannot be held that the Tribunal has misconducted itself or has committed an error of law in deciding the O.A. against the petitioner that too in spite of there being no counter from the department. It need not always be a case where the counter having not been filed would mean that the case of the applicant / petitioner has to be blindly accepted in toto without appreciating the merits of the case. 33. It need not always be a case where the counter having not been filed would mean that the case of the applicant / petitioner has to be blindly accepted in toto without appreciating the merits of the case. 33. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not made out a strong case calling for an interference to the impugned order of compulsory retirement, neither has he been able to make out a case to hold that the order of the Tribunal dated 03.06.2019, in O.A.No.1154 of 2018, to be bad in law. The writ petition, therefore, in the given factual matrix of the case stands dismissed. No costs. 34. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.