ORDER : S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR, J. 1. In this petition, the petitioners seeks the following reliefs: i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ or direction or order to the Respondent No.2 and 3 to allow the benefit of the reward under MEIS to the Petitioner in respect of all the shipping bills mentioned in the application dated 25.04.2022 vide ANNEXURE-A which was submitted to the Respondent No.2 and direct the other respondents to implement the same in a time bound manner in the interest of Justice and equity. ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction of appropriate nature to call for the records of the case and after scrutinizing the same, to strike down and quash the impugned email dated 22-01-2022 sent by Respondent No.3 vide Annexure-B in the interest of Justice and equity. iii) Grant such other consequently reliefs as this Hon'ble court may think fit in the interest of Justice and equity. 2. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that despite detailed representation at Annexure ‘A’ dated 25.04.2022 submitted by the petitioner to respondents No.2 and 3 including the documents mentioned in the representation comprising of Shipping Bills, NOC etc. the respondents No.1 to 3 have not taken any steps for the purpose of granting the benefit of MEIS in favour of the petitioner, who is before this Court by way of the present petition, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shah Nanji Nagsi Exports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in (2025) 33 Centax 360 (S.C) , and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Customs and Others Vs. M/s.Suretex Prophylactics (India) Pvt. Ltd., in W.A.No.556/2022 dated 01.07.2024 and submits the present petition deserves to be disposed of by issuing necessary directions to the respondents. 3. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondents No.1 to 3 submits that if reasonable time is granted, respondents No.1 to 3 would consider the representation at Annexure ‘A’ submitted by the petitioner and take appropriate decision/pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 4. 3. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondents No.1 to 3 submits that if reasonable time is granted, respondents No.1 to 3 would consider the representation at Annexure ‘A’ submitted by the petitioner and take appropriate decision/pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 4. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be necessary to extract Annexure ‘A’, which reads as under: KONKAN SPECIALITY POLYPRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED Grams: KONSPEC Corporate Office: Plot No.37, KIADB Industrial Area, Baikampady, Mangalore - 575011 Phone : +91-824- 2408129/2409274 Fax : +91-824-2408657 E-mail :info@konspec.com Website :www.konspec.com Ref:……………………………… Date: 25.04.2022 To, The Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, Kendriya Sadan, Koramangala, Bangalore - 560 034. Dear Sir, Subject: Application for MEIS Script With reference to the subject cited above, we would like to inform you that, we are successfully received NOC from Customs House Chennai to avail MEIS Scripts for shipping bills attached herewith. We kindly request to issue MEIS Scripts at the earliest. We are attaching following documents for your kind perusal. 1. List of Shipping Bills. 2. NOC Letter from Chennai Customs 3. Copy of Valid RCMC 4. Copy of Shipping Bills. 5. E-Bank Realization Certific ate 6. Copy of Bill of Lading Kindly acknowledge the same and issue the MEIS Scripts at the earliest. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For KONKAN SPECIALITY POLYPRODUCTS PVT LTD., Mr. VINOD BHAT MANGAER-SUPPLY CHAIN" 5. In the case of Shah Nanji's case (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal calls in question the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, rendered on 02.08.2021 in Writ Petition No. 4095of 2019, by which the writ petition instituted by the appellant was dismissed. The High Court took the view that the error which had crept in while filing of shipping bills was attributable to the customs broker, and that the appellant, ifso advised, could pursue his remedies against the broker but no relief could begranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 3. The facts are largely undisputed. The appellant is a private company engaged in the export of corn starch. During the period between 22.07.2017 to05.10.2017, the appellant effected 54 (fifty-four) shipping bills under Serial No. 467 of Appendix 3B to the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2015–20 and was eligible for incentive under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme(hereinafter referred to as “MEIS”) contained in Chapter 3 of the Policy. 4. During the period between 22.07.2017 to05.10.2017, the appellant effected 54 (fifty-four) shipping bills under Serial No. 467 of Appendix 3B to the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2015–20 and was eligible for incentive under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme(hereinafter referred to as “MEIS”) contained in Chapter 3 of the Policy. 4. For each of these consignments, shipping bills were filed electronically on the ICEGATE platform through the appellant’s customs broker. It so happened that in the column requiring a declaration of intent to claim reward, the default entry “No” which was to be altered as “Yes” was not done by Customs broker. This inadvertent omission, though clerical in nature, prevented the shipping bills from being transmitted to the repository of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT). The consequence was that the appellant’s claim for MEIS reward could not be processed electronically. 5. On discovering the error, the appellant addressed a representation dated13.03.2018 to the Regional Authority of DGFT. At the same time, an application was made before the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Mundra, invoking Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962. By an order dated 08.06.2018,the Deputy Commissioner allowed the amendment of all shipping bills, so that the declaration “No” was substituted by “Yes”. The fact of this correction is not in dispute. 6. Despite the correction, when the appellant pursued the matter with DGFT, it was informed that the system permitted no manual intervention and that unless the shipping bills were originally transmitted with the entry “Yes”, they could not be processed. The appellant as a consequence, was compelled to approach the Policy Relaxation Committee (hereinafter referred to as “PRC”)on 05.12.2018. The PRC, however, by a cryptic email dated 15.03.2019,rejected the claim, stating merely that no merit or hardship was made out. No reasons were assigned, nor was the appellant afforded an opportunity of being heard. 7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 4095 of 2019before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. During its pendency, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered its judgment in Portescap India Private Limited v. Union of India & Others on 02.03.2021, dealing with an identical issue. A pursis was filed by the appellant bringing the judgment to the notice of the Court. Nonetheless, by its judgment dated02.08.2021, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. 8. We have heard Learned Counsel, Mr. A pursis was filed by the appellant bringing the judgment to the notice of the Court. Nonetheless, by its judgment dated02.08.2021, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. 8. We have heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Gagan Sanghi, appearing for the Appellant and Shri S. Dwarakanath, Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Respondents. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the exports were genuine, covered under the notified products in Appendix 3B,and that the intention to claim MEIS was evident from the invoices. It was urged that once the Customs authority had corrected the shipping bills under Section 149, the bills stood regularised in law and were required to be acted upon. Further it was contended that the rejection by the PRC was arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice as no reasons were assigned nor hearing granted. Further it was submitted that the High Court, erred in relegating the appellant to pursue remedies against the broker, when the entitlement arose under the statutory scheme. Reliance was placed upon Portescap India Private Limited (supra), which had attained finality. 9. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents submitted that the FTP and Handbook of Procedures required a declaration of intent to be made on the shipping bill at the time of export. Unless “Yes” was so marked, the DGFT system could not accept the claim or process the claim, and no manual over-writing was permissible. It was urged that MEIS is a policy incentive, and strict compliance with procedure is mandatory. The PRC, being the competent authority, considered the matter and rejected it. The High Court was, therefore, correct in declining to grant relief. 10. The principal question for consideration is whether an inadvertent error in the shipping bills, which was permitted to be corrected under Section 149 of the Customs Act, can defeat an exporter’s claim under the MEIS? 11. This issue has received judicial consideration in a line of decisions of the Bombay High Court. In Portescap India Private Limited (supra), the Bombay High Court dealt with a similar situation where an exporter had inadvertently marked “N” (for No) instead of “Y” (for Yes) while filing shipping bills. The High Court held that such a mistake was purely procedural and, once corrected, could not extinguish substantive entitlement. In Portescap India Private Limited (supra), the Bombay High Court dealt with a similar situation where an exporter had inadvertently marked “N” (for No) instead of “Y” (for Yes) while filing shipping bills. The High Court held that such a mistake was purely procedural and, once corrected, could not extinguish substantive entitlement. The Court directed the authorities to process the claim, emphasising that the purpose of Chapter 3 of the FTP is to incentivise exports and that this object would be frustrated if inadvertent mistakes were treated as insurmountable. The ratio of Portescap (supra )is squarely applicable to the present case. 12. The principle was reiterated in Technocraft Industries (India) Limited v. Union of India and Others where the Bombay High Court again considered denial of MEIS benefits despite the shipping bills having been corrected under Section 149. The High Court noted the hardship faced by exporters and directed the Customs and DGFT authorities to take appropriate steps to prevent recurrence of such disputes, observing that systemic rigidity cannot be allowed to defeat substantive rights. The facts of the present case furnish an illustration of the very mischief which Technocraft (supra)sought to remedy. 13. In Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Union of India and Others , the Bombay High Court dealt with a similar rejection of MEIS claims despite amendment under Section 149. The High Court deprecated the rejection, holding that technical or systemic constraints cannot override statutory entitlements. The High Court went to the extent of imposing costs upon the DGFT. While we do not consider it necessary to adopt that course, we find ourselves in respectful agreement with the principle enunciated that beneficial schemes must be construed liberally and that procedural lapses, once rectified, cannot be allowed to defeat substantive rights. 14. These decisions, read together, demonstrate a consistent judicial approach that distinguishes between procedural formalities and substantive entitlements. The scheme under Chapter 3 of the FTP is a beneficial one, intended to reward exporters. Once exports are genuine and fall within the notified category, inadvertent mistakes of procedure cannot be treated as fatal, especially where they are corrected under statutory authority. The rejection by the PRC, bereft of reasons and passed without hearing, falls foul of the principles of natural justice. Once exports are genuine and fall within the notified category, inadvertent mistakes of procedure cannot be treated as fatal, especially where they are corrected under statutory authority. The rejection by the PRC, bereft of reasons and passed without hearing, falls foul of the principles of natural justice. The High Court’s view that the appellant may proceed against the customs broker fails to address the statutory entitlement which accrues to the exporter under the scheme. Administrative technology must aid, not obstruct, the implementation of the law. 15. In light of the above discussion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 02.08.2021 is set aside. The rejection by the Policy Relaxation Committee is quashed. The respondents are directed to process the appellant’s claim for MEIS benefit on the basis of the amended shipping bills and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of this judgment. 16. While we refrain from imposing costs, we cannot but observe that the recurrence of such disputes, despite authoritative pronouncements in Portescap, Technocraft Industries and Larsen and Toubro Limited underscores the need for systemic correction. The Union of India, acting through the Directorate General of Foreign Trade and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, must take appropriate measures, whether by issuing comprehensive instructions or by suitable technological adjustments, to ensure that genuine exporters are not driven to needless litigation on account of inadvertent procedural lapses which have been rectified in accordance with law. 17. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. 6. The Division Bench in the case of Principal Commissioner of Customs and Others Vs. M/s.Suretex Prophylactics (India) Pvt. Ltd., in W.A.No.556/2022 dated 01.07.2024 has held as under: "This intra-court Appeal seeks to call in question the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21.03.2022 whereby the Respondent's W.P.No.2617/2022 having been favoured, relief has been granted to them. 6. The Division Bench in the case of Principal Commissioner of Customs and Others Vs. M/s.Suretex Prophylactics (India) Pvt. Ltd., in W.A.No.556/2022 dated 01.07.2024 has held as under: "This intra-court Appeal seeks to call in question the order of the learned Single Judge dated 21.03.2022 whereby the Respondent's W.P.No.2617/2022 having been favoured, relief has been granted to them. The operative portion of the order reads as under: "The writ petition is allowed quashing the decision dated 26.10.2021 by the Policy Relaxation Committee under the Director General of Foreign Trade (the first respondent) and observing that insofar as the orders dated 22.10.2020 and 28.10.2020 (Annexures - B and C) by the Deputy Commissioner [Exports], Airport and Air Cargo, Commissionerate and the Joint Commissioner of Customs, ICD, Whitefield must yield and cannot be a reason to refuse the MESI benefits to the petitioner. It is declared that the petitioner would be entitled for the MESI benefits but subject to the condition that the petitioner shall furnish, within a period of eight [8] weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, proof of withdrawal of the pending appeals. It would be needless to observe that the respondents must complete necessary formalities to facilitate the extension of MESI rewards to the petitioner consequent to this order." 2. Learned Panel Counsel appearing for the Appellant- Revenue vehemently argues that the learned Single Judge ignored the Board Circular No.36/2010 dated 23.09.2020 which governed conversion of Shipping Bills from one scheme to another and also the prescription of limitation period. Learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the private Respondent opposes the Appeal making submission in justification of the impugned Judgement and the reasons on which it has been structured. He adds that the learned Single Judge has framed the impugned Judgement keeping in view decisions of two High Courts which have attained finality and that subsequently two more High Courts also have taken the same view on the question involved. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the appeal papers in the light of decisions cited we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (i) The 1 st respondent who was the writ petitioner had desired to avail MEIS benefit under Chapter III of the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) by operating the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). However, he had pressed a wrong button. However, he had pressed a wrong button. The learned Single Judge at para 15 of the impugned Judgement has rightly observed as under: "Further, it undisputed that the petitioner, but for the error in making a choice of entering 'N' over 'Y', would be entitled for the benefit of the MESI Scheme. It would be difficult to believe that the petitioner, even if entitled for MESI benefit, would have chosen to give up the benefit unless it was for inadvertent error. These must also be relevant factors in assessing whether there is a bonafide and inadvertent error in making the choice. The PRC of the DGRT has not considered these circumstances in rejecting the petitioner's request for MESI rewards." 3. Shri V. Raghuraman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the assessee submits that almost identical questions have been treated and answered in favour of the assessee by the four High Courts in the Country. The views of these four High Courts would merit acceptance in view of the observations of the Apex Court in KUSUM INGOTS & ALLOYS LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 2004 SC 2321 . Even otherwise, the logic employed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned Judgment does not merit interference.Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned Judgment, we decline indulgence in the matter broadly agreeing with the reasoning occurring at para 15 of the impugned Judgment which has the following text: "Further, it undisputed that the petitioner, but for the error in making a choice of entering 'N' over 'Y', would be entitled for the benefit of the MESI Scheme. It would be difficult to believe that the petitioner, even if entitled for MESI benefit, would have chosen to give up the benefit unless it was for inadvertent error. These must also be relevant factors in assessing whether there is a bonafide and inadvertent error in making the choice. The PRC of the DGRT has not considered these circumstances in rejecting the petitioner's request for MESI rewards." 5. The contention of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raghuraman appearing for the private Respondent that the learned Single Judge has followed the decision of another Coordinate Judge in W.P.No.8862/2021 (T-RES) between M/S. BIOCON LTD. Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN TRADE and Orissa High Court Judgment in W.P.(c) 29635/2020 between INDIAN METALS & FERRO ALLOYS LTD. Vs. The contention of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Raghuraman appearing for the private Respondent that the learned Single Judge has followed the decision of another Coordinate Judge in W.P.No.8862/2021 (T-RES) between M/S. BIOCON LTD. Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN TRADE and Orissa High Court Judgment in W.P.(c) 29635/2020 between INDIAN METALS & FERRO ALLOYS LTD. Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN TRADE is apparent from paragraph 5 of the impugned judgement. The Kerala High Court in ST. GOBAIN INDIA PVT. LTD., vs. UOI, 2018 (361) E.L.T. which too is referred in the impugned Judgement supports the case of the private Respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS Vs. N.C.John & Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2022 (380) E.L.T. 241 (SC), has affirmed the similar view by dismissing the SLP. When multiple High Courts concordantly hold a particular view on an instrument of central law universally applicable to the country at large, the same is highly persuasive, if not binding in the light of KUSUM INGOTS supra. An argument to the contrary would be a breeding ground for discrimination of individuals in the sense that individuals of one State would get benefit and those of other would not. To put it in other words, it would be a case of State based discrimination that falls foul of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Much is not necessary to deliberate. 6. The vehement contention of learned Panel Counsel appearing for the Appellants that the very scheme in question being digitally handled, there is no scope for human intervention and therefore, the inadvertent error attributable to the private Respondent, regardless of his intent cannot be rectified, appears to be too farfetched an argument. In all human institutions whether humanly handled or machine handled, the errors are bound to occur and they need to be rectified, in the absence of law to the contrary. Otherwise, innocuous errors would perpetuate to the disadvantage of citizens, which a Welfare State like ours cannot justify. Further, we have not been notified any rule that prescribes some limitation period that does not admit condonation of delay. All this is an added ground for our not interfering in the matter. In view of the above, this Appeal being devoid of merits is liable to be and accordingly dismissed, costs having been made easy. Further, we have not been notified any rule that prescribes some limitation period that does not admit condonation of delay. All this is an added ground for our not interfering in the matter. In view of the above, this Appeal being devoid of merits is liable to be and accordingly dismissed, costs having been made easy. The order of the learned Single Judge shall be given effect to within an outer limit of eight weeks from today, and delay in implementation would be viewed very seriously." 7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the undisputed fact that the representation at Annexure ‘A’ has not been considered by the respondents No.1 to 3 even till today, I deem it just and appropriate to dispose of the petition directing the concerned respondents No.1 to 3 to address the grievances of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, after considering the document submitted along with the representation at Annexure ‘A’ as enumerated in the representation and bearing in mind the judgement of the Apex Court in Shah Nanji's case (supra) and the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Customs and Others (supra), within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 8. Subject to the aforesaid directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.