Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1134 (RAJ)

Ankita Mathur v. State of Rajasthan

2025-04-21

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, SUNIL BENIWAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act: 1. For the reasons stated in the application and taking into consideration the short period of delay of 8 days in filing the present appeal, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. 2. The application for condonation of delay is allowed accordingly. D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 1262/2024: 1. Heard. 2. The order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition and the order granting sanction is challenged mainly on the ground that the opinion formed while granting sanction is mechanical and there is no due application of mind. 3. We find that the sanctioning authority, after taking into consideration the nature of allegations, has examined the material placed on record before it on the relevant aspects relating to demand, acceptance and recovery. More than that, the transcript of conversation has also been taken into consideration. 4. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the officer of ACB, who presented the records before the sanctioning authority claiming himself to be the Investigating Officer, is factually incorrect, which fact has been clearly admitted by the prosecution during trial. 5. We find that the order passed by the competent authority while granting sanction has not only placed on record and noticed the nature of allegations of fact alleged against the appellant, but also taken into consideration the material on the basis of which allegations are sought to be substantiated during trial. 6. It is well known that demand, acceptance and recovery are three important ingredients to make out a case. Irrespective of whether the material with regard to demand, acceptance and recovery is liable to be believed or not, we are of the view that the sanctioning authority has applied its mind, may be briefly, to come to the conclusion that present is a fit case for grant of sanction for prosecution. We also find from the material on record that the case of prosecution rests on certain transcripts of voice recording between the intermediary and the officer. The order impugned refers to that also. We would not comment upon the whether the material is worth acceptance at this stage because at the stage of considering material to decide whether or not sanction is to be granted, a prima facie view on the availability of the incriminating material collected during trap is to be seen. The order impugned refers to that also. We would not comment upon the whether the material is worth acceptance at this stage because at the stage of considering material to decide whether or not sanction is to be granted, a prima facie view on the availability of the incriminating material collected during trap is to be seen. Whether or not the same is to be relied upon is a matter of trial. That cannot be a ground to assail the correctness and validity of order of sanction. 7. The scope of judicial review in the matter of grant of sanction has been explained by Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions. We may usefully refer to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat [ (1997) 7 SCC 622 ] , wherein it was held thus: “25. This principle was reiterated in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 11 : (1994) 6 SCC 651 , in which it was, inter alia, laid down that the Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made particularly as the Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will be substituting its own decision which itself may be fallible. The Court pointed out that they duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. committed an error of law; 3. committed, a breach of the rules of natural justice; 4. reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached; or 5. abused its powers. 26. xxx 27. xxx 28. In Sterling Computers Ltd. vs. M/s M&N Publications Ltd. and others, AIR 1966 SC 51 : (1993) 1 SCR 81 : (1993) 1 SCC 445 , it was pointed out that while exercising the power of judicial review, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the decision-making process? 26. xxx 27. xxx 28. In Sterling Computers Ltd. vs. M/s M&N Publications Ltd. and others, AIR 1966 SC 51 : (1993) 1 SCR 81 : (1993) 1 SCC 445 , it was pointed out that while exercising the power of judicial review, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the decision-making process? In this case, the following passage from Professor Wade's Administrative Law was relied upon : "The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which legislature is presumed to have intended." 29. It may be pointed out that this principle was also applied by Professor Wade to quasi-judicial bodies and their decisions. Relying upon the decision in The Queen v. Justice of London, (1895) 1 QB 214, Professor, Wade laid down the principle that where a public authority was given power to determined a matter, mandamus would not lie to compel it to reach some particular decision. 30. A Division Bench of this Court comprising of Kuldip Singh and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ. in U.P Financial Corporation vs. M/s. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 1993 SC 1435 : (1993) 2 SCR 149 : (1993) 2 SCC 229, observed as under : "11. The obligation to act fairly on the apart of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the Rule of Law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the Quasi- Judicial Authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi- Judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the Quasi- Judicial Authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi- Judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi- judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well-known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to preferred" (Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, 1997 AC 1014 at 1064). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene." 8. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the order granting sanction. 9. Before parting with the case, we may hasten to add and clarify that the observations which have been made are for the limited purpose of examining the correctness and validity of the order of sanction. It is for the prosecution to prove the case during trial. The observations shall not be treated as a finding on the evidentiary value or reliability of the evidence allegedly collected by the prosecution to prove the case of demand, acceptance and recovery. 10. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.