JUDGMENT : NARENDRA SINGH DHADDHA, J. 1. The present civil second appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants (for short ‘the defendants’) against the judgment and decree dated 15.03.2019 passed by Additional District Judge No. 10, Jaipur Metropolitan City, (for short ‘the appellate Court’) in civil regular appeal No. 81/2017, whereby the appellate court while dismissing the appeal filed by the defendants, affirmed the judgment and decree dated 08.03.2017 passed by Additional Civil Judge No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan City (for short ‘the trial Court’) in civil suit No. 224/2013, whereby the trial court while partly decreeing the suit filed by the respondent- plaintiff (for short ‘the plaintiff’), held the plaintiff entitled to get first selection scale from 18.12.1995 and second selection scale from 18.12.2004. The plaintiff was also held entitled to get salary on notional basis from the date of his termination i.e. 22.01.1993 to 11.04.2011 and thereafter he was held entitled to get actual salary. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he was appointed with the defendants-Corporation as a Conductor on daily wages basis vide order No.1244 dated 25.05.1985. Thereafter, vide order No.4122 dated 26.12.1985, he was appointed on one year’s probation period and granted the regular pay scale along-with other allowances. Later on, his services were terminated. Subsequently, vide Order No.5144 dated 18.12.1986, the plaintiff was appointed afresh on one year probation period and was again granted regular pay scale and other allowances. Thereafter, vide order No.727 dated 12.03.1987, his services were terminated. 3. Against the said termination order dated 12.03.1987, the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.2, Jaipur City which was decreed in his favour on 16.02.1990 and he was directed to be continued in service without any interference with all consequential benefits from the date of termination. In compliance of the said order, the plaintiff was re-instated in service in Udaipur Depot vide order No.252 dated 31.03.1990. Thereafter, vide order No.1166 dated 22.01.1993, the plaintiff’s services were again terminated. For approval of said termination order, an application was filed by the Corporation under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal, which was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 03.02.2009. Thereafter, vide order No.1166 dated 22.01.1993, the plaintiff’s services were again terminated. For approval of said termination order, an application was filed by the Corporation under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal, which was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 03.02.2009. The defendants-Corporation challenged the said order by filing S. B. Civil Writ Petition No.13972/2009 in which a compromise was arrived at between the parties on 18.02.2011. As per the compromise, the plaintiff- workman shall relinquish the back wages and other monetary benefits and accordingly the Corporation would take the plainitff back in service within a month from the date of compromise and the plaintiff’s services shall be continued and the salary and allowances would be given to him from the date of his reinstatement. On the basis of said compromise, the plaintiff was taken back in service vide order No. 177 dated 11.04.2011. After joining the duty by the plaintiff, the minimum pay scale was given to him and his pay fixation was not done. So, the plaintiff filed a suit before the trial court stating that as per the State Government vide Finance Department’s order dated 25.01.1992, he is entitled to get benefit of first and second selection scales on completion of 9 and 18 years of his service from 18.12.1995 and18.12.2004 respectively. 4. Defendants in their written statement mentioned that initially, the plaintiff was appointed as a daily wage Conductor vide order No.1244 dated 25.05.1985. Lateron, vide order No.4122 dated 26.12.1985 he was appointed on one year’s probation period. Subsequently, his services were terminated but vide Order No.5144 dated 18.12.1986, he was appointed on one year’s probation period. Again his services were terminated vide order No.727 dated 12.03.1987. Plaintiff was served different charge sheet on account of his misconduct. Vide order No.252 dated 31.03.1990, he was taken back in service subject to decision taken by the Head Office. Later on, due to his misconduct, his services were terminated vide order No.1166 dated 22.01.1993. For approval of the termination order, the defendants-Corporation filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal which was rejected by the Tribunal. The defendants-Corporation challenged the said order by filing the writ petition before this court in which compromise was arrived at between the parties. For approval of the termination order, the defendants-Corporation filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal which was rejected by the Tribunal. The defendants-Corporation challenged the said order by filing the writ petition before this court in which compromise was arrived at between the parties. According to the said compromise, the plaintiff was re-instated in service vide order No.177 dated 11.04.2011. So, he is not entitled to get selection scales on account of not completing 9 and 18 years of service. 5. On the basis of pleading of the parties, the trial court framed following issues:- (I) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get first and second selection scale and A.C.P. after counting his length of service from18.12.1986 and accordingly entitled to get his pay fixation done? (II) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get declared the pay fixation order No.5399 dated 27.09.2011 as illegal? (III) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get done the notional pay fixation from the date of termination i.e. 22.01.1993 till the date of reinstatement i.e. 11.04.2011 and then entitled to get done the actual pay fixation and after pay fixation also entitled to get the difference amount of pay along-with interest thereon? (IV) Whether the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the civil suit? (V) Relief? 6. To prove his case, the plaintiff-Kanhiyalal Gameti got examined himself as PW-1 and exhibited certain documents. To prove their case, the defendants got examined Dalchand as DW-1 and exhibited certain documents. 7. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 08.03.2017 while partly decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff, held him entitled to get first selection scale from 18.12.1995 and second selection scale from 18.12.2004. The plaintiff was also held entitled to get salary on notional basis from the date of his termination i.e. 22.01.1993 to 11.04.2011 and thereafter he was held entitled to get actual salary. 8. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree dated08.03.2017, the defendants filed an appeal before the appellate Court. The appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 15.03.2019 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 08.03.2017 passed by the trial Court. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants submits that the trial Court as well as appellate Court have committed error in deciding the issue No. 4 against the defendants. The appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 15.03.2019 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 08.03.2017 passed by the trial Court. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants submits that the trial Court as well as appellate Court have committed error in deciding the issue No. 4 against the defendants. Learned counsel for the defendants further submits that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit because the case is related to industrial dispute and only the Industrial Tribunal has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. 10. Learned counsel for the defendants further submits that the trial Court as well as appellate court have committed an error in granting first selection scale to the plaintiff from 18.12.1995 and second selection scale from 18.12.2004. As per the compromise, the plaintiff was not entitled to get any pay and allowances for the termination period i.e. from 22.01.1993 to 11.04.2011. So, the judgments and decree passed by the appellate Court as well as the trial court are required to be set aside and this appeal be admitted on the substantial questions of law, as framed in the memo of appeal. 11. Despite service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. 12. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the defendants and perused the impugned judgments and decree passed by the trial Court as well as appellate Court. 13. It is an admitted position that termination order issued by the defendant-Corporation against the plaintiff was set aside by the Industrial Tribunal. The defendants challenged the said order by way of filing writ petition before this Court in which compromise was arrived between the parties. According to the said compromise, the plaintiff was re-instated in services but back wages and other monetary benefits of the termination period were rejected to him. The trial Court while decreeing the suit, only directed that the plaintiff is entitled to get first selection scale from 18.12.1995 and second selection scale from 18.12.2004. The trial Court in its judgment also observed that the plaintiff is entitled to get salary on notional basis from the date of his termination i.e. 22.01.1993 till 11.04.2011 and thereafter, he was held entitled to get actual salary. The trial Court in its judgment also observed that the plaintiff is entitled to get salary on notional basis from the date of his termination i.e. 22.01.1993 till 11.04.2011 and thereafter, he was held entitled to get actual salary. So, in my considered opinion, no ground is made out to admit the second appeal on the substantial questions of law, as framed in the memo of appeal. So, the second appeal being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed, which stands dismissed accordingly in limine. 14. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.