ORDER : PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs; "(i) Writ of certiorari or any order of like nature to set aside the order dated 30.10.2025 to an extent of not considering the application I.A.No.1/2025 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 in O.S.No.7569/2025 on the file of the XXXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-36) for grant of ex-parte injunction vide Annexure-A. (b) Issue any other writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and property reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper under the circumstances of this case." 3. This Court does not find any need or necessity to issue notice to the respondents for the reason that the respondents have not been served the notice/summons and the petitioner is before this Court questioning the order of the trial Court having not passed any order on the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC by the petitioner. 4. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that he has filed a suit against the defendants who are the publishers of certain news items in the respective newspapers against the petitioner/plaintiff. Along with the plaint, he has filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 seeking an ad-interim ex-parte mandatory injunction order directing the defendants, their men, servants, agents, administrators, assignees, etc., to delete, remove, block, de-index and de-refer the defamatory articles mentioned in the schedule against the plaintiff and such other reliefs. The schedule of the articles published in the respective publications by the respective newspapers is a part of the schedule. Instead of considering this application, the trial Court has merely issued notice to the defendants. Hence, aggrieved by the non-passing of an ad-interim ex parte order, the plaintiff is before this Court. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made several allegations against the defendants for having wrongfully made these statements and this application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC requires to be considered as an urgent interim relief prior to issuance of notice to the defendants ad-interim ex parte by taking into consideration the proviso under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that it is the domain and jurisdiction of the trial Court to deal with this application and pass a reasoned order on the basis of the materials placed and the submissions so put forth, if any, by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. 6. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another V/s Praveen Kumar Singh reported in (2006) 3 SCC 312 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly culled out the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the question of maintainability is no longer res integra, as the Hon'ble Apex Court has already decided this matter time and again in several judgments. It would be relevant to extract paragraph No.13 of the said judgment: "13. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. The interim direction to maintain status quo was an ex parte order. From the order of the Additional District Court it is not possible to come to the conclusion that on a proper advertence to the relevant materials, prima facie clear findings had been rendered by that court on these aspects. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim of possession." 7. Secondly, whether the petition is to be entertained. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim of possession." 7. Secondly, whether the petition is to be entertained. It is seen that the trial Court has gone on to pass an ad- interim order of ex parte temporary injunction. Usually in the normal circumstances while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rule 3 read with Section 151 of CPC, it is the rule that the trial Court issues notice to the defendant before passing an interim order as contemplated under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. There is an exception carved out and the procedure to be followed under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC which reads as under: 3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party-The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: [Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant- (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with- (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent.] 8. The proviso is very clear. The proviso is very clear. It says when the court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, i.e, the defendant, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion and the object of granting the injunction would be defeated due to the delay and thereafter require the plaintiff to comply with the next obligation provided in Order XXXIX Rule 3 read with Section 151 of CPC with regard to delivery of plaint documents and compliance of the order. Therefore, it is very clearly laid down that it is the normal rule of issuance of notice. But however, it does not preclude the trial Court from granting an ad-interim order of temporary injunction without issuance of notice in view of the facts and circumstances that the delay would cause injustice and defeat the purpose of the very filing of the application and the suit. Therefore, it is apparently clear from the provision itself that the trial Court has been conferred with the prerogative and obligation to record the reasons for its opinion and the duty is cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of clause 'a' and clause ‘b' of the proviso. Therefore, when there is an obligation cast by legislation, which is mentioned as “shall,” it is the duty of the trial Court to specifically mention and enumerate the details and the reasons for being satisfied with regard to the grant of an ad-interim temporary injunction and the issuance of the same ad-interim ex-parte injunction without notice and that the delay in issuance of notice would cause injustice to the plaintiff, which has not been done in the present case. It is relevant to extract the observation at paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha -vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161: "32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite-party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that “where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay…”. 33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said “the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party”. The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court “shall record the reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJ Ch 373] and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [ AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : 37 Cri LJ 897] . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare [ (1975) 1 SCC 559 : AIR 1975 SC 915 ] . 35. As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: “Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion…. An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day….” 9. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: “Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion…. An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day….” 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund V/s Kartick Das reported in (1994) 4 SCC 225 at paragraph No.36 held as under: 36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are— (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve; (c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction; (e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application. (f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time. (g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court. 10. In the case of Time City infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow V/s State of U.P. and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1674, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph 5 as under: 5. Looking to the scheme of Order 39, CPC it is clear that ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte. The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. Both the provisions are mandatory. The applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) above said. 11. In the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi V/s Harish Ambalal Choksi and others reported in ( 2024) 11 SCC 351, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraphs 32 and 33 as under: "Principles governing grant of temporary injunction 32. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad [Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568 ] , it was held by this Court that it would not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction. 33. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 ] .)" 12. In the case of Vedant Fashions Pvt. Ltd., V/s Smt. Rajul Devi reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 7191, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has held at paragraph No.9 as under: "A bare reading of the said rule makes it clear that normally, the court, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The exception is, where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, in such an event, the proviso which has been inserted with effect from 01/02/1977 comes into operation, where the court is empowered to grant an ad interim injunction dispensing with notice provided reasons are recorded for its opinion to the effect that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay if notice is to be served on the respondent. The impugned order is extracted supra in order to ascertain as to whether the trial court had complied with the requirements of the proviso while dispensing with the notice to the defendant while grant an exparte order of temporary injunction. From a reading of the impugned order, it is clear that, nowhere reasons have been recorded as to why the trial Court was of the opinion that the injunction had to be granted by dispensing notice to the respondents or that non-grant of an injunction would be defeated by delay if notice is to be ordered on respondents. The impugned order is bald, laconic and bereft of any reason. The learned Trial Judge has not even made a brief reference to the facts of the case to arrive at a conclusion that there is a prima facie case for consideration and about balance of convenience being in favour of the plaintiff and whether she would suffer any reparable loss in case of refusal of exparte injunction. Mechanically, the impugned order has been passed. In that view of the matter, the impugned order has to be quashed on the short ground of there being non-compliance of Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the CPC. It is noted form the impugned order that the next date of hearing is 31.07.2014." 13. In the light of the principles enunciated in the judgments stated supra, the trial Court has to consider the application filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC and decide the same by a reasoned order in accordance with law. 14. In view of the fact that the trial Court has not passed such an order, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the trial Court to dispose of the application within a week's time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 15. Accordingly, I pass the following: ORDER (i) This petition is disposed of. (ii) The matter is remitted back to the trial Court to consider the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC in O.S.No.7569/2025 on the file of XXXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, CCH-36 and pass a reasoned order within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iii )It is needless to mention that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter. Ordered accordingly. (iii )It is needless to mention that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter. Ordered accordingly. In view of the disposal of the main matter, I.A.No.1/2025 stands disposed of.