JUDGMENT : (SYAM KUMAR V.M.,  J.) Since the parties to these Writ Petitions and the subject matter involved are the same, they are considered and disposed of together. 2. Petitioner is an apex Co-operative Society as defined under Section 2(a) of the Co-operative Societies Act. The 3 rd respondent while working as Manager of the Bank at its office at Thrissur was charged of serious financial improprieties and other lapses. Since the reply submitted by him was not found satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was conducted. On the basis of the report submitted therein, the 3 rd respondent was dismissed from service by the order dated 17.09.2008. He preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors, which was dismissed by an order dated 19.01.2009. The 3 rd respondent then filed ARC No.84 of 2011 (Old No.55 of 2009) before the Co-operative Arbitration Court (Northern), Kozhikode (Ext.P1) inter alia seeking to set aside the domestic enquiry report and to reinstate him in service with full back wages. The Bank filed Ext.P2 written statement in the ARC. The Arbitration Court vide Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 set aside the suspension as well as dismissal of the 3 rd respondent and directed him to be reinstated in service if not already superannuated. However, the prayer for back wages was rejected. The 3 rd respondent challenged Ext.P3 order to the extent it declined him back wages before the Kerala Co- operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') by filing Appeal No.37 of 2014. The Tribunal vide Ext.P4 judgment dated 28.10.2014 allowed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Arbitration Court setting aside the domestic enquiry report and order of suspension and dismissal. As regards the question of entitlement of the 3 rd respondent to back wages, the Tribunal remanded back the said question to the Arbitration Court for fresh consideration. In the meanwhile, the Bank had preferred a Revision Petition numbered as R.P.No.59 of 2014 before the Tribunal challenging Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 of the Arbitration Court. The said R.P. was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order on 13.11.2014 terming the same as time barred. The petitioner Bank has preferred both the above Writ Petitions seeking to set aside the above mentioned two orders of the Co-operative Tribunal. The said R.P. was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order on 13.11.2014 terming the same as time barred. The petitioner Bank has preferred both the above Writ Petitions seeking to set aside the above mentioned two orders of the Co-operative Tribunal. While W.P.(C) No.3655 of 2015 is filed by the Bank seeking to quash Ext.P4 judgment dated 28.10.2014 of the Tribunal remanding the question of entitlement to back wages for fresh consideration to the Arbitration Court, the other Writ Petition viz., W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015 is filed by the Bank seeking to quash Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014 of the Tribunal dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the Bank. 3. Heard Sri.Gilbert George Correya, Advocate for the petitioner Bank and Sri.Shaji Thomas, Advocate, for the 3 rd respondent. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Bank contended that the Tribunal erred in rendering Ext.P4 judgment dated 28.10.2014 in the appeal filed by the 3 rd respondent on the erroneous assumption that the petitioner Bank had not challenged Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 rendered by the Arbitration Court by filing an appeal or revision. He contended that the petitioner Bank had indeed challenged Ext.P3 order of the Arbitration Court by filing a revision, namely Revision Petition No.59 of 2014, before the very same Tribunal. It is contended by the learned counsel that on 28.10.2014, when Ext.P4 judgment was rendered by the Tribunal in the appeal preferred by the 3 rd respondent, the above said Revision Petition had already been heard by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was aware of the fact that both the appeal and revision were pending before it. Hence both the matters ought to have been heard together. The learned counsel proceed to substantiate this contention by pointing to the order in Revision Petition No.59 of 2014, which has been produced as Ext.P4 in W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015 which states that the revision petition was heard on 04.08.2014 though the order dismissing in the same was rendered only on 13.11.2014. Thus according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is after hearing the Revision Petition on 04.08.2014 that the Tribunal disposed of the appeal of the 3 rd respondent on 28.10.2014 holding that no revision had been filed by the petitioner Bank. Thus according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is after hearing the Revision Petition on 04.08.2014 that the Tribunal disposed of the appeal of the 3 rd respondent on 28.10.2014 holding that no revision had been filed by the petitioner Bank. This according to the learned counsel is an error apparent on the face of the record and hence Ext.P4 judgment allowing the appeal of the 3 rd respondent is fit to be set aside on the said ground alone. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Bank further contended that Ext.P4 judgment of the Tribunal allowing the appeal preferred by the 3 rd respondent is erroneous also for the reason that the Tribunal had remanded the matter back to the Arbitration Court after expressing in the judgment its opinion that the 3 rd respondent was entitled to back wages. Hence, according to the learned counsel, the decision that the Arbitration Court would take in the light of such an express opinion is a ‘foregone conclusion’. As regards Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014 impugned in W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015, dismissing the revision petition filed by the Bank, the learned counsel vehemently submitted that such dismissal is unsustainable in law. The learned counsel for the petitioner Bank contended that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the revision petition, holding that the same was time barred. Reliance is placed on the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in North Eastern Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and another v. Ashok Paper Mill (Assam) Ltd. and another [(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1649] where the question whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963 applies to the proceedings under the Jogighopha (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 was considered. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that, when a court is seized of a situation where no limitation stands provided either by specific applicability of the Limitation Act or the special statute governing the dispute, the court must undertake a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case to examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice to a party. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the dictum laid down by this Court in B.Preethakumari v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General) Thiruvananthapuram and others [(2022) SCC OnLine KER 4727], wherein it had been held after referring to the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [ (1976) 2 SCC 58 ] that the Co-operative Arbitration Court should exercise its discretion in a judicial and judicious manner and if it is found that there are rare and exceptional circumstances which warrant not to grant the relief of reinstatement then such discretion should also be exercised, so as to consider the grant of compensation in view of reinstatement. It had also been held by this Court therein that in the ordinary perspective in such cases, especially involving dismissal, causes stigma for misconduct and if it is in violation of the statutory mandate, reinstatement would be the appropriate relief. However, such discretion to grant reinstatement should be used only for compelling and good reasons. No such reason has been stated in the case at hand by the Arbitration Court for ordering reinstatement of the 3 rd respondent. The Tribunal never got an opportunity to look into the same as the revision was dismissed at the threshold wrongly holding that it is barred by limitation. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner on placing reliance on the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and another v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association and another [ (2012)10 SCC 353 ], and contended that revisional or supervisory power as vested in a Tribunal is to be distinguished from the Appellate jurisdiction. Such supervisory or revisional jurisdiction is a power vested in the Superior Court or Tribunal enabling it to satisfy itself as regards the correctness of the orders of the Inferior Tribunal. The said powers ought to have been exercised by the Tribunal in accordance with law. Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014 dismissing the Revision Petition clearly reveals that the Tribunal had erred in exercising such revisional powers. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd respondent submitted that both the orders issued by the Tribunal which have been impugned in these Writ Petitions do not call for any interference. The same have been rendered in accordance with law. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd respondent submitted that both the orders issued by the Tribunal which have been impugned in these Writ Petitions do not call for any interference. The same have been rendered in accordance with law. As regards the scope for interference with Ext.P4 orders rendered by the Tribunal in both these Writ Petitions, the learned counsel for the 3 rd respondent placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das [2023 KHC 6774] wherein the scope and ambit of for exercise of issuance of Certiorari was charted and laid down inter alia holding that the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal and it does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down by this Court in President, Anickad Regional Farmers Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another v. Benny Thomas and another [ 2022 (6) KHC 298 ] wherein this Court had affirmatively placed reliance on the dictum laid down in David T.K. v. Kuruppumpady Service Co Operative Bank and others [ 2015 (2) KHC 301 ], wherein it had been held as follows: "4. The proposition that can be deduced from the law laid and settled by the apex court is that the scope and extent of interference with the factual findings of the tribunal are exceptionally limited. the jurisdiction of the high court in a red petition filed under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the findings of a tribunal is supervisory and not appellate. Unless the High Court finds that there are manifest errors or that the findings are patently unreasonable or tainted with perversity, the writ jurisdiction would not be invoked to unsettle such factual findings. Were the tribunal exercises a discretion giving valid reason, no interference is called for. Even if another view is possible, interference under the writ jurisdiction is not justified, unless the decision impugned is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, as wholly unavailable on record or in direct conflict with settled principle of law. Were the tribunal exercises a discretion giving valid reason, no interference is called for. Even if another view is possible, interference under the writ jurisdiction is not justified, unless the decision impugned is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, as wholly unavailable on record or in direct conflict with settled principle of law. If the High Court comes to a conclusion that the tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents or the materials on record to such an extent to which a reasonably prudent person could not have come to the conclusions reached by the tribunal, or that the tribunal has ignored the relevant materials or had taken into consideration any inadmissible material, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the findings of the tribunal." 6. Reliance is also placed in the same respect on the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goyel [ (2022) 4 SCC 181 ], wherein it was laid down that the High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, re-weigh the evidence or facts upon which determination under challenge is based. The Supreme Court had in the said decision also placed reliance on its earlier decision in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. [ (2001) 8 SCC 97 ], wherein it had been held that the scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was considered. It was held that the exercise of power under the said Article involves a duty on the high court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardships or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts or Tribunals. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardships or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts or Tribunals. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ], wherein it had been reiterated that reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. As regards the challenge put forth by the petitioner Bank against the order of the Tribunal affirming the reinstatement of the 3 rd respondent and directing of payment of back wages to the 3 rd respondent thus setting aside the remand on the question of back wages as found by the Arbitration Court, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd respondent placing reliance on the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others [2013 KHC 4982] and in Ravindran K.S. v. Branch Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2015 KHC 4356] that the order of the Tribunal fully meets the mandates of law and settled by the said precedents is thus valid and legal. No interference is called for with the finding in Ext.P4 order of the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the 3 rd respondent and it was valid and legal on the part of the Tribunal to hold that the 3 rd respondent is entitled to full back wages. No interference is called for with the finding in Ext.P4 order of the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the 3 rd respondent and it was valid and legal on the part of the Tribunal to hold that the 3 rd respondent is entitled to full back wages. The learned counsel contended that the principle of merger applies and placed reliance on the dictum laid dowon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000 KHC 636], wherein it had been held that where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. 7. The contentions put forth and precedents relied by both parties have also been considered. Petitioner has in both the Writ Petitions sought for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 orders issued by the Tribunal. The two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when it comes to the issue of writ of certiorari has been lucidly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (supra). It reads as follows: “50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” It is trite thus that supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. This Court cannot substitute its own decision on facts and conclusions for that of the inferior court or Tribunal. It is well settled that exercise of issuance of certiorari and interfering with the orders of the courts or the Tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. 8. Having thus reminded myself of the contours of the jurisdiction while considering the orders rendered by Tribunals in disciplinary proceedings, I proceed to consider the contentions made regarding Ext.P4 orders rendered by the Tribunal sought to be quashed in both the Writ Petitions. 9. 8. Having thus reminded myself of the contours of the jurisdiction while considering the orders rendered by Tribunals in disciplinary proceedings, I proceed to consider the contentions made regarding Ext.P4 orders rendered by the Tribunal sought to be quashed in both the Writ Petitions. 9. As regards judgment dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of 2014 produced as Ext.P4 and impugned in W.P.(C) No.3655 of 2015 is concerned, I note that the Tribunal had vide the said order set aside that portion of the award of the the Arbitration Court which concluded that the 3 rd respondent is not entitled to get back wages and had relegated the question to be decided by the petitioner Bank. The Tribunal vide the impugned order after setting aside that portion of the award of the Arbitration Court directed the Arbitration Court to dispose of the question regarding payment of back wages to the 3 rd respondent expeditiously, at any rate, within two weeks from the date of receipt of the lower court records and copy of judgment of the Tribunal. Contrary to the contention that was put forth by the counsel for the petitioner Bank, I note that this finding was arrived at by the Tribunal not solely based on the reason that the petitioner Bank had not filed an appeal or revision against the award of the Arbitration Court. The Tribunal, I note, had in detail considered the question of entitlement of back wages both on facts and law. The Tribunal found that the Arbitration Court had not stated any reason for finding that the 3 rd respondent is not entitled to get back wages. After finding that the petitioner Bank had not proved the allegations against the 3 rd respondent, the Arbitration Court without any reasons found that the 3 rd respondent had not performed his duties befitting the manner as a Branch Manager of the petitioner Bank. It is on the said basis that the Arbitration Court had concluded that the 3rd respondent is not entitled to back wages. This according to the Tribunal is erroneous and devoid of just reason. The Tribunal held that the Arbitration Court had not answered the question of 3rd respondent’s entitlement to back wages in accordance with law. The conclusion arrived at by the Arbitration Court was termed by the Tribunal as ‘an observation made without any justifiable reason’. This according to the Tribunal is erroneous and devoid of just reason. The Tribunal held that the Arbitration Court had not answered the question of 3rd respondent’s entitlement to back wages in accordance with law. The conclusion arrived at by the Arbitration Court was termed by the Tribunal as ‘an observation made without any justifiable reason’. Thus the Tribunal concluded that the direction of the Arbitration Court to the petitioner Bank to decide the issue of back wages was incorrect and unsustainable. It was also concluded that the Arbitration Court ought not have given such a direction to the petitioner Bank after finding the entire disciplinary proceedings initiated against the 3 rd respondent by the Bank to be vitiated and after setting aside the enquiry report, order of suspension and dismissal from service. Thus, the said finding of the Arbitration Court was found to be legally and factually incorrect and unsustainable by the Tribunal for valid reason. The above discussion and finding arrived at by the Tribunal unequivocally reveals that the Tribunal had arrived at the same after a due appreciation of all relevant aspects and not simply because the petitioner Bank had not filed an appeal or revision that the said decision was arrived at. It was a conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal on merits. I note that the said finding of the Tribunal adheres to the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), which reads as follows: “The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintances to avoid starvation. Not only the concerned employee but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintances to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra-virus, the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice,, , entitles the employee to claim full back wages,. . If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits,, , then it is for him, oblique her, to specifically plead and prove. that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. denial of back wages to an employee who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” No other anomaly has been pointed out with respect to the judgment dated 28.10.2014 of the Tribunal. The same cannot hence be lightly interfered with as is trite by the precedents discussed above. The decision of the Tribunal thus deserves to be retained undisturbed. Consequently, I do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of 2014 issued by the Tribunal. 10. Now I proceed to consider the contentions put forth concerning the legal sustainability of the order in R.P.No.59 of 2014 produced as Ext.P4 and impugned in W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015. Admittedly there had been delay on the part of the petitioner Bank in filing the Revision Petition. It was sought to be explained out by the petitioner Bank as follows: The 3 rd respondent had already crossed the age of superannuation on 06.06.2014. Hence the counsel who had been representing the petitioner Bank before the Arbitration Court opined that the order of the reinstatement would not adversely affect the interests of the Bank. It was sought to be explained out by the petitioner Bank as follows: The 3 rd respondent had already crossed the age of superannuation on 06.06.2014. Hence the counsel who had been representing the petitioner Bank before the Arbitration Court opined that the order of the reinstatement would not adversely affect the interests of the Bank. The receipt of the said opinion along with the records of the case took some time and it was received by the Bank belatedly. Thereafter, the records of the case along with the opinion of the counsel were forwarded to the standing counsel and after some delay, the Bank had thus preferred the Revision Petition No.59 of 2014 against the order dated 06.02.2014 passed by the Arbitration Court. It is relevant to reproduce the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal regarding delay. It reads as follows: “No time is prescribed for filing revision. So the reasonable time to file revision is to be taken as 90 days ( Tajudeen Shameer v. Secretary, Coastal Urban Co Operative Bank Ltd. , 2004 (1) KLT 909 ). It was held in the decision of Sarojini Amma v. Trivandrum District Co. Ltd. , 2005, 3 KLT 655, that revisional jurisdiction ought not to be permitted to be invoked after a fairly long period until good reasons are shown to excuse such delay, and it ought to have been filed at least within 5 months. This revision petition was filed after the expiry of 5 months period. No good reasons shown to excuse the delay. Therefore the delay cannot be condoned. The Revision Petition filed is time barred. Point answered accordingly.” Thus the Tibunal had after considering the reasons stated by the petitioner back for condoning the delay concluded that the revision had been filed beyond a reasonable period of time and that no good reasons had been shown to excuse the delay. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the reliance placed by the Tribunal on the dictum in Tajudeen Shameer (supra) and Sarojini Amma (supra) are devoid of merits. In the former, this Court had held that a revision petition under Section 84 of the Act has to be filed within a reasonable period, (say 90 days) and that if the revision petition was filed beyond the reasonable period, the petitioner was required to explain the reasons for the delay. In the former, this Court had held that a revision petition under Section 84 of the Act has to be filed within a reasonable period, (say 90 days) and that if the revision petition was filed beyond the reasonable period, the petitioner was required to explain the reasons for the delay. In the latter, this Court had held that revisional jurisdiction ought not to be permitted to be invoked after expiry of a fairly long period until good reasons are shown to excuse such delay. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said precedents are not applicable to the facts of the cases at hand. He contends that the finding therein that the revision must be exercised at least within a period of five months is not conclusive. Nowhere had it been prescribed that the revision petition filed beyond the period of 150 days was mandatorily to be dismissed without looking into the reasons advanced for the delay. Thus it is argued that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner alleging delay. This contention is sought to be buttressed by placing reliance on the dictum in North Eastern Chemical Industries, (P) Ltd. (supra), wherein it has been held that when no limitation stands prescribed, it would be inappropriate for a court to supplant the legislature's wisdom by its own and provide a limitation, more so in accordance with what it believed to be the appropriate period. A court should in such a situation consider in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand the conduct of the parties, the nature of the proceedings, the length of the delay, the possibility of prejudice being caused and the scheme of the statute in question. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also underscored that when a party to a dispute raises a plea of delay despite no specific period being prescribed in the statute such party also bears the burden of demonstrating how the delay in itself would cause the party additional prejudice or loss as opposed to the subject matter of dispute being raised at an earlier point in time. It was also held therein that in the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed to file an appeal the same would be governed by the principle of reasonable time for which by virtue of its very nature no strait-jacket formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as per the facts and circumstances of each case. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after taking note of the sequence of events, held that the appellants cannot be said to have transgressed the boundaries of reasonable time in filing the appeal before the concerned court. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has in North Eastern Chemical Industries, (P) Ltd. (supra) held that in the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed to file an appeal the same would be governed by the principle of reasonable time which has to be determined based on a case to case basis. This Court had in Tajudeen Shameer (supra) and Sarojini Amma (supra) laid down broad guidelines as to what could be deemed as reasonable regarding condonation of delay in the filing of a revision petition under Section 84 of the Act. When this Court thus specifies the time period taking note of the absence of statutory prescription in the said respect, the same has to be scrupulously complied with and followed after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. Nothing has been produced so as to reveal that the petitioner bank had any valid or legally tenable cause for seeking condonation of the delay that had occasioned in filing the revision petition, which admittedly was beyond the period of five months. The purported reason stated for condonation of delay had been duly considered by the Tribunal and found not valid enough to meet the mandates of law governing condonation. Apparently no substantial cause has been made out for condonation of the delay occasioned and the revision petition was dismissed by the Tribunal as time barred. I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal in this respect. It follows that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal to dismiss the Revision Petitioner filed by petitioner bank was valid and proper and there is no reason to interfere with the order dated 13.11.2014 in Revision Petition No. 59/2014 rendered by the Tribunal. 13. I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal in this respect. It follows that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal to dismiss the Revision Petitioner filed by petitioner bank was valid and proper and there is no reason to interfere with the order dated 13.11.2014 in Revision Petition No. 59/2014 rendered by the Tribunal. 13. It is also relevant to take note of the fact that even while the matters were pending before the Arbitration Court and the Tribunal, the 3 rd respondent had passed the age of superannuation. This had rendered his reinstatement in the petitioner bank impossible. The Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal had taken due note of this aspect while considering the question of payment of back wages. The direction to effect payment of back wages which ought to have followed as a natural corollary to the order of reinstatement, did not happen. The effect of quashing the impugned orders by issuing a writ of certiorari will reopen the entire proceedings to revisit its correctness. In addition to the fact that the prayer for issuance of certiorari is not legally sustainable, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I note that substantial justice and equity demands that the matter be brought to a quietus now rather than a re-ignition of the challenge regarding the correctness of an enquiry report submitted in the year 2008. The 3 rd respondent had been deprived of his back wages which ought to have vested in him in 2014 along with the order of reinstatement issued by the Arbitration Court. Bearing in mind the travails that an reinstated employee and his family may have had to endure, as elaborated in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the prayer to quash Ext.P4 order in appeal filed by the 3 rd respondent cannot be allowed on the ground of equity and substantial justice also. The similar prayer seeking to quash Ext.P4 order which dismissed the revision petition also has to fail on the same ground. Eleven years of deprivation of back wages suffered by the 3 rd respondent and his family is enough. Thus on the grounds of equity and substantial justice too, I find that the prayer sought for issuance of certiorari in these Writ Petitions is not fit to be granted. Eleven years of deprivation of back wages suffered by the 3 rd respondent and his family is enough. Thus on the grounds of equity and substantial justice too, I find that the prayer sought for issuance of certiorari in these Writ Petitions is not fit to be granted. In view of the above discussion, I find no reason to interfere with the order dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of 2014 and order dated 13.11.2014 in Revision Petition No.59 of 2014 rendered by the Kerala Co-Operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, and impugned in these Writ Petitions. Both Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.